Bamidbar (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Erev Shabbat, Parashat Bamidbar, 5766

Questions

1. Different ways of relating to two contradictory verses.
2. The relation between the problem of two verses and the problem of “these and those are the words of the living God.”
3. First-order and second-order paradox.
4. What is self-reference, and what is an equilibrium point?
5. How many interpretations are there of the rule “these and those are the words of the living God”?
6. On two meanings of harmonization, one layered above the other.

The Principles

Two verses that contradict one another. The common denominator.

“The Lord spoke to Moses after the death of Aaron’s two sons, when they drew near before the Lord and died.”

—Leviticus 16:1

“Aaron’s sons Nadav and Avihu each took his fire pan, put fire in it, laid incense on it, and brought before the Lord alien fire, which He had not commanded them. Fire came forth from before the Lord and consumed them, and they died before the Lord. Moses said to Aaron: This is what the Lord meant when He said, ‘Through those who are near to Me I will be sanctified, and before all the people I will be glorified.’ And Aaron was silent.”

—Leviticus 10:1–3

“Nadav and Avihu died before the Lord when they brought alien fire before the Lord in the wilderness of Sinai, and they had no sons; Eleazar and Ithamar served as priests during the lifetime of Aaron their father.”

—Numbers 3:4

“Nadav and Avihu died when they brought alien fire before the Lord.”

—Numbers 26:61

“When they drew near before the Lord and died. Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says: They died because of the drawing near, and not because of the offering. Rabbi Akiva says: One verse says, when they drew near before the Lord and died, and another verse says, they brought before the Lord alien fire. The phrase when they brought alien fire before the Lord decides the matter: they died because of the offering, and not because of the drawing near. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: the offering was sufficient on its own, and the drawing near was sufficient on its own.”¹

—Sifra, Aharei Mot, parashah 1

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

In last year’s article we dealt with the reasons for the death of Aaron’s sons. Two different biblical sources describe the reason in different ways, and as we saw, different tannaim choose each of the possibilities: some attribute it to the drawing near, that is, entering beyond their proper boundary—”when they drew near before the Lord and died”—and some attribute it to an invalid offering—”they brought before the Lord alien fire.”

As noted, each of the two views has a source in Scripture, and therefore we in fact have here the problem of “two verses that contradict one another.” As we also saw in the article on Parashat Bo, 5765, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva apply this principle in different ways. Rabbi Akiva decides in favor of one side on the basis of a third verse, leaving one of the verses unexplained. Rabbi Yishmael, by contrast, tends to reconcile the two verses harmoniously, so that they do not contradict one another.

We noted that Rabbi Akiva, too, will accept an appropriate compromise where such a reading is textually called for and reasonable. Only where no reasonable compromise is available does the question arise whether one should nevertheless force a mediating reading between the two possibilities, or instead decide in favor of one of them and leave the other without interpretation.

We saw that in our midrash (rabbinic exposition) as well, Rabbi Akiva follows his usual approach. As for the tannaim who disagree with him—Rabbi Yosei the Galilean and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah—it is worth examining whether they follow Rabbi Yishmael’s path. Beyond that, this determination required us to ask what was implausible in the proposals of the dissenters, thereby forcing Rabbi Akiva to turn to the more strained method.

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean holds that both things indeed occurred, but only one of them was the cause of death. This is a kind of compromise between the two positions. Rabbi Akiva rejects Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s opinion because of various interpretive problems.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, by contrast, holds that either of the two reasons would by itself have been sufficient to make Aaron’s sons liable to death. At first glance, this is an ideal interpretation: it allows us to preserve each verse in its full form and interpret it literally, and to adopt both verses together without leaving one of them unexplained. We also noted that by doing so, Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah apparently undermines the very method of “two verses that contradict one another,” since in most cases one can find a solution of this sort.

We pointed out that Rabbi Akiva probably rejects Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah’s opinion for a more general methodological reason. He opposes an interpretation that sees two independently sufficient causes for the same event.

In the second part of the article we dealt with the question of parallel explanatory planes. We briefly proposed several models for the relation between different explanatory planes, and we will not repeat them here. We saw that the interpretive methods adopted by the tannaim in this midrash parallel our treatment of the levels of peshat (plain-sense interpretation) and derash (homiletical interpretation). Rabbi Breuer’s method of “two aspects” parallels the interpretation adopted by Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah in our midrash: when there are two contradictory passages, we maintain that each presents a true aspect in its own right. The overall picture is the combination of the two aspects. It is important to note that this remains true even when those aspects contradict one another.

Rabbi Hayyim of Brisk’s method of “two legal categories,” which similarly reconciles contradictory talmudic sources, also rests on parallel logic. He too solves the contradiction by melding the two sides into one overall picture that is created by composing them—sometimes as a fusion, but usually as an aggregate.² We brought an example of this from a person’s liability for damages caused by his property.

B. The Principle of “Two Verses That Contradict One Another” and the Rule “These and Those Are the Words of the Living God”

Introduction

In last year’s article we assumed that Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah’s view is that either of the two causes, by itself, would have been enough to make them liable to death. We explained that if in fact a combination of both causes had been necessary, then the Torah’s two descriptions—both the drawing near and the offering—would turn out to be imprecise.

In a note we mentioned that Malbim cites Yalkut as reading Rabbi Akiva’s view as “they did not die from the drawing near alone,” meaning that he requires a combination of the two causes. From this it clearly follows that Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah holds that each cause is sufficient on its own. A similar conception also emerges from Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s words. His view seemed to be that only one of the causes brought about the death of Aaron’s sons, even though both of them—the drawing near and the offering—did in fact occur.

The picture that emerges is that when two sources contradict one another, several kinds of response are possible:

1. Adopt one and reject the other.
2. Create a substantive compromise between the explanations, taking part from each and producing a third explanation out of the two parts. According to this approach, each of the two explanations is partial, but neither is wholly correct.
3. A technical compromise, like Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s approach above: one cause is the real one and the other is secondary. Or: the second cause did indeed occur, but it did not affect the result; it is not the explanation.
4. The two causes accumulate and together produce the result. Here two possibilities arise:
5. Together they create a third state, different from either of them, and that third state produces the result (= a fused composition).³
6. Both are needed, each as it is, in order to reach the result (= an aggregate composition).
7. Both explanations are true, each in its own right. In other words, either one by itself would have been enough to explain the result. This is not a composition at all.

Rabbi Akiva adopts option 1, at least where no plausible option of another type is available. Rabbi Yishmael tends always to adopt option 2. Rabbi Yosei the Galilean adopts option 3. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah adopts options 4 or 5.

In this year’s article we will consider the similarities and differences between these options, as they arise with respect to the principle of “two verses that contradict one another,” and parallel options that arise in understanding the rule “these and those are the words of the living God” with regard to disputes among Torah sages.

“These and Those Are the Words of the Living God”: The Basic Problem⁴

This rule is a basic axiom in the world of halakha (Jewish law). We customarily apply it to almost every dispute among the sages of halakha. Yet its sources in the Talmuds, at least the explicit ones, are rather limited. It appears in only two places in the Babylonian Talmud, though its spirit seems to hover over many others.

The basic problem is that the rule “these and those are the words of the living God” seems to contain an internal logical contradiction. How can two conflicting statements both be “the words of the living God”? Are both of them true simultaneously?

Ritva, in his novellae to Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 13b, raises the difficulty and writes as follows:

“These and those are the words of the living God. The French rabbis of blessed memory asked: How is it possible that both should be the words of the living God, when one forbids and the other permits? They answered that when Moses ascended on high to receive the Torah, he was shown, with respect to every matter, forty-nine arguments for prohibition and forty-nine arguments for permission. He asked the Holy One, blessed be He, about this, and He said that the matter would be entrusted to the sages of Israel in every generation, and the decision would follow them. This is a sound explanation on the level of derash, and on the way of truth there is a reason and a secret in the matter.”

Ritva offers an interpretation that he himself defines as being “on the level of derash.” He claims that there is also an interpretation “on the way of truth,” that is, on the mystical plane. But what about the plain sense? He does not even mention such an approach. It seems that, for him, the logical difficulty remains unanswered.

The natural conclusion would be that this cannot be so, and that one should adopt Rabbi Akiva’s approach here as well—namely, rule in accordance with one of the opinions and reject the other.

The Passage in Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 13b

The first source for the rule “these and those” appears in the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 13b. The sugya deals with the disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, and the Gemara says:

“Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with us, and those said: The halakha is in accordance with us. A heavenly voice went forth and said: These and those are the words of the living God, but the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel. Since these and those are the words of the living God, why were Beit Hillel privileged to have the halakha fixed in accordance with them? Because they were gentle and humble, and they would teach both their own words and the words of Beit Shammai. More than that, they would mention the words of Beit Shammai before their own.”

We see that immediately after the statement “these and those are the words of the living God” comes the statement “but the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel”—almost a contradiction in terms. Both are right, and yet we rule in practice like only one of them. Is this a position similar to Rabbi Akiva’s, which decides in favor of one side, as the closing clause suggests? Or do we nevertheless take both sides together, as the opening clause suggests?

Two Interpretations of the Heavenly Voice’s Reasoning

At first glance, this question depends on how one interprets the reason offered by the heavenly voice for ruling like Beit Hillel: “Because they were gentle and humble, and they taught both their own words and the words of Beit Shammai. More than that, they mentioned the words of Beit Shammai before their own.”

At first glance, this sounds like a reward for good behavior. If it really is a reward, then there is in fact no halakhic truth, and halakhic decision is not a search for truth. The fixing of halakha is a step taken for pragmatic reasons, so that the Torah will not become like two Torahs, and therefore we can decide which side to adopt for halakha as we wish. For this reason, the heavenly voice adopts the words of Beit Hillel, since by doing so we can educate the public toward good character and a proper culture of disagreement.

But some have interpreted the matter differently: because Beit Hillel were mild of spirit and placed the words of Beit Shammai before their own, it follows that they seriously considered Beit Shammai’s opinion, and only afterward decided against it. One who behaves this way is more likely to reach the truth than one who does not seriously weigh the words of his opponent. According to this approach, halakhic decision is indeed a search for truth, and the preference for Beit Hillel was not given as a reward or as an educational measure. It was made because there is a higher probability that the truth lies on their side.⁵

According to the first direction, the focus of the heavenly voice’s statement is the opening clause: “these and those are the words of the living God.” The fact that the halakha follows Beit Hillel is only a pragmatic reservation, nothing more. According to the second direction, the situation is the reverse: the focus is the closing clause, “the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel.” The question then becomes: what is the status of the opening clause according to this approach? In other words, in what sense, on this view, are “these and those the words of the living God”?

Possible Explanatory Directions for the Rule “These and Those”

It seems, at first glance, that several possible directions emerge in the commentators’ interpretations of the saying “these and those are the words of the living God.” The two basic directions were described in the previous section, but they branch into a more complex structure; on this see Avi Sagi’s book mentioned above. These directions differ on the question of the status of the different opinions within halakha. The three main directions are, using Avi Sagi’s terminology:

1. The monistic approach. Some maintain that only one of the halakhic positions is correct.
2. The pluralistic approach. Some hold that all of them “were right together,” and that in fact there is no halakhic truth in any objective sense.
3. The harmonistic approach. Others hold that all the views must be included in one complex structure, and that structure itself is the halakhic truth.

This range of opinions closely resembles the possibilities we raised above concerning contradictory biblical sources, under the heading “two verses that contradict one another.” All the possibilities we raised there are relevant to the problem of disputes as well, and vice versa: the possibilities raised regarding disputes can also be applied to contradictory scriptural verses.

Methodological Note: A Second-Order Paradox in the Rule “These and Those”

Before turning to the different positions themselves, it is important to note a preliminary methodological point. We have already observed that the statement “these and those are the words of the living God” seems to contain a paradox: two contradictory contents are both regarded as correct at the same time. Here, however, we want to point to a second-order paradox, methodological in nature, which many do not notice, including Avi Sagi himself: there is a dispute among sages about how we should relate to disputes among sages.

We mentioned that several interpretive directions emerge among the commentators regarding this very rule. If so, what should we do with the different views concerning this dispute itself? Should we say of them too, “these and those are the words of the living God”? In which of the mutually contradictory senses should this phrase serve us with respect to its own interpretation?

This problem seems, at first glance, insoluble. Whoever claims that the phrase should be interpreted to mean that everyone is right thereby says that everyone is right even with respect to the interpretation of this phrase itself, and therefore even the interpretations according to which not everyone is right are, from his perspective, also right. And the converse is true as well.

One can find here a technical solution, along the lines of Russell and Whitehead’s theory of types; see their introduction to Principia Mathematica. That theory was created to solve paradoxes arising from self-reference. According to this proposal, a statement cannot refer to statements on the same hierarchical level as itself. In our context, this means that the phrase “these and those are the words of the living God” does not apply to interpretations of itself.

This is a technical solution that is apparently satisfying at the logical level, but substantively it is unjustified. Why should this dispute be excluded from the rule? If indeed all the sides advanced by Torah sages in all their disputes are correct, then why exactly here, in this sugya, did some of them manage to be mistaken? We may note that even in philosophy this technical solution is usually unsatisfying, and we have discussed that elsewhere.⁶

Equilibrium Points and the Harmonistic Solution

It seems that the only reasonable solution to this paradox is that the rule “these and those are the words of the living God” can have only one possible interpretation. In other words, if we interpret this formula as meaning that everyone is right, then all interpretations of the formula must also somehow converge with one another and create a picture according to which all the views are right in the same way. And similarly for each of the explanatory directions proposed by the commentators. This itself leads toward a harmonistic interpretation of the rule “these and those.”

To analyze the paradox fully and systematically in logical terms, we would now have to go through the five possibilities raised above with respect to the principle of “two verses that contradict one another,” since, as stated, they are applicable to the question of disputes as well, and examine, through the prism of each one separately, its relation to all the others. In other words, we would have to take each of the possibilities and apply it to the disputes over the interpretation of the rule “these and those,” and see whether a consistent picture emerges. After reviewing all the possibilities and analyzing them on their own terms, we would have to adopt the one that succeeds in preserving consistency in application—that is, the position that can be applied both to all halakhic disputes and to this dispute itself. In mathematical language, one may say that this is the equilibrium point of the problem.

Unfortunately, however, it seems that this problem has several equilibrium states, that is, several solutions that remain consistent. For example, one who holds that in every halakhic dispute there is only one truth and the rest are mistaken will say the same regarding those who disagree with him in interpreting the rule “these and those” itself. There too only he is right and everyone else is mistaken. The question, of course, is who can guarantee that he is indeed the one who is right. Why not one of the other opinions? Conversely, according to the view that everyone is equally right, even the person who maintains that the rule “these and those” means that only one person is right is also right.

If so, we cannot untangle this knot by abstract mathematical methods alone. The way to solve the problem is apparently also to examine the plausibility of the various positions, and not only their consistency. For example, the solution proposed above, according to which there is only one correct opinion, may be consistent, but it is certainly not reasonable.⁷

In our opinion, the two positions according to which there is no halakhic truth and everyone is right, and according to which there is only one halakhic truth and all the rest are errors, are not consistent; see briefly above. If so, the equilibrium point that satisfies both the mathematical demands of consistency and the demands of plausibility is the harmonistic solution, according to which all the opinions converge in order to create a fuller picture. To be sure, this convergence can take several forms and several shapes.⁸

The Passage in Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 6b

The second source that treats dispute in terms of “these and those are the words of the living God” is the sugya in Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 6b. The unique feature of this source is that there we are also given a reason and an explanation for the terse statement, which brings us back to the question of “two verses that contradict one another.” This is the language of the Gemara:

“As it is written: And his concubine was unfaithful to him (Judges 19). Rabbi Evyatar said: He found a fly in her. Rabbi Yonatan said: He found a hair in her. Rabbi Evyatar met Elijah and said to him: What is the Holy One, blessed be He, doing? He said to him: He is occupied with the episode of the concubine at Gibeah. And what is He saying? He said to him: My son Evyatar says thus, and My son Yonatan says thus. He said to him: Heaven forbid! Can there be uncertainty before Heaven? He said to him: These and those are the words of the living God: he found a fly and did not become angry; he found a hair and did become angry.”

The sages disagree about what happened in the episode of the concubine at Gibeah. One says that her husband found a hair, and the other says that he found a fly. With regard to this dispute as well, which concerns aggadah (non-legal rabbinic teaching), the rule “these and those are the words of the living God” appears. But here there is also an explanation: “He found a fly and did not become angry; he found a hair and did become angry.” What is the nature of the harmonization Elijah the prophet produces here between the two opinions? To which of the schemes proposed above does it correspond?

One might understand it as corresponding to direction 2 or 3. In fact Rabbi Yonatan was right, since the anger was caused by the hair and not by the fly. Still, there is a minor compromise between them, for in practice he found a fly as well and not only a hair. This shows that there is not really a significant difference between these directions and direction 1. It is clear that, in substance, Rabbi Evyatar was mistaken, and therefore there is a selection and a decision in favor of one interpretation. Yet Rabbi Evyatar was not entirely mistaken, since he understood some partial aspect of reality.

But the Gemara can also be understood differently. It may be speaking here of the accumulation of influences: the fly was still not enough to anger him, but when he also found a hair, then his wrath flared up. In that case the result was achieved through the combination of both causes together. Here we have already arrived at direction 4. Direction 5 does not seem plausible in the language of the Gemara.

What Emerges from the Interpretation of the Author of Nefesh HaHayyim on This Sugya

Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin, in his book Nefesh HaHayyim, Gate 4, chapter 6, cites this Gemara within the framework of a discussion of the status of aggadot and of mistaken positions in halakha. He defines Torah as God’s will, as does the author of the Tanya in almost exactly the same language, in chapters 3–5 there, and asks himself: what is the status of aggadot? After all, they do not express any normative will in the unequivocal sense of halakha. If so, do they have the status of Torah? He broadens the question to include questions asked by young students, which may be entirely mistaken and certainly do not hit upon God’s will. According to his definition, these too would apparently not count as Torah study.

In his answer he distinguishes between God’s will and God’s word. Mistaken positions are indeed not God’s will, and neither are aggadot. But both are within the category of God’s word, that is, utterances that issued from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be He. Therefore the Holy One tells Moses at Sinai everything that a student will one day ask, according to one version of that well-known midrash, in order to grant these matters the status of Torah. And just as we are taught that He and His will are one, so too He and His speech are one. In both ways we cleave to the Giver of the Torah, whether through His will or through His speech.

Rabbi Hayyim continues and says that, in the heights above, as it were, the Holy One Himself speaks the words of Torah together with every sage or student who studies Torah. He brings proof of this from our sugya: alongside the discussion of the concubine at Gibeah, about which Rabbi Evyatar and Rabbi Yonatan disagreed, the Holy One Himself, as it were, recites their words together with them; see the quotation above.

In light of his words, one can also interpret Elijah the prophet’s language when he says: “these and those are the words of the living God.” As noted, this sugya deals with aggadah and not with halakha. If so, the issue is not God’s will but God’s word. And when two sages disagree, the Gemara relates to both as “the words of God,” meaning God’s word. This yields an interesting solution to the contradiction seemingly embedded in this rule. God’s will is only the true position, and only in halakha. But even the dissenting opinion is God’s word. The pluralism does not concern halakha itself, or God’s will. The Holy One wills only the true thing. But there is pluralism in Torah, which is God’s word.

The Harmonistic Approach

Let us carry this direction one step further. In halakha there are at least two different planes that must be distinguished: the metaphysical facts, which have a normative character, from which halakha is derived,⁹ and the system of norms meant to guide actual conduct. The metaphysical picture is multicolored, and all the opinions grasp some part of it: he found a fly and did not become angry; he found a hair and did become angry. This normative reality is a product of God’s speech. As is well known, “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made”—that is, God’s speech has the property of creating and bringing reality into being. But in the end the normative guidance is one, and that is God’s will, which branches out from those parts of His speech that have halakhic-normative implications.

The rule “these and those” in the passage in Gittin is now interpreted as follows: both sides grasp something of the overall metaphysical structure that underlies halakha, but the truth in its full manifestation is the totality as a whole—the combination of all the opinions together. By contrast, on the normative plane, that is, with respect to practical halakhic guidance, it may certainly be that only one of the opinions is correct.

As background to these remarks, we should note that according to Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin, Torah study is not merely a means of arriving at the true normative guidance, but also a means of cleaving to the Holy One through His speech and His will, and of bringing their appearance into creation.¹⁰

Returning to the Different Interpretations of the Rule “These and Those”

In light of what we have said, the monistic approach to the rule “these and those” relates to the normative layer, that is, God’s will. The harmonistic approach relates to the metaphysical layer, that is, God’s word. The approach of substantive pluralism, in our opinion, does not exist in Jewish thought. In our view there is no position that maintains that there is no halakhic truth at all. Beyond various formulations in works of thought, this emerges clearly from the actual functioning of halakha itself.¹¹

A systematic review of all the shades presented in Sagi’s book shows that all of them can be mapped onto the picture presented here, but such a detailed discussion lies beyond the scope of the present article.

We arrive at the conclusion that the interpretation of the rule “these and those” itself must be harmonistic. If we regard this conclusion as an equilibrium point, we will notice that the term “harmonistic” is interpreted here in two senses, one layered above the other: the relation to disputes is harmonistic, meaning that truth is composed of the union or fusion of all the opinions; and the relation to the rule “these and those” itself is also harmonistic, meaning that it is composed of a fusion of all the different approaches, at least ostensibly, to that rule. If so, we have indeed arrived at an equilibrium point.

The Relation to “Two Verses That Contradict One Another”

Despite the similarity, there are several differences in the analysis between interpretations of the rule “these and those” and approaches to a situation in which there are “two verses that contradict one another.”

With two contradictory verses, one cannot say that one of them is mistaken. At most, there can be a technical instruction to ignore it and to use a third verse as decisive.

With regard to two verses, the a priori claim we raised concerning the rule “these and those” is not correct—namely, that there is only one correct possibility. The rule “these and those” itself deals with disputes, and therefore applying the answers to the question of how we should relate to disputes to the rule itself is a case of self-reference, and therefore leads to circularity. But with respect to two contradictory verses there is no problem of this kind. One may say that the first-order paradox exists in both cases, but the second-order, methodological paradox exists only with respect to the rule “these and those.”

If so, the picture we reached with respect to the rule “these and those” does indeed open with the map we drew from reflection on the case of two contradictory verses, but the conclusion does not necessarily carry back over to that case. True, option 4, which is the main parallel, though not the only one, to the harmonistic approach, can be interpreted as containing some of the other possibilities within it, but in this context there is no necessity to interpret it that way.

Conclusion

In an article of this sort we cannot hope to encompass a topic as broad as the rule “these and those.” We wanted only to sketch briefly a line of analysis that leaves us in accordance with the a priori determination we raised above: that the rule “these and those” can have only one correct interpretation, and that it probably includes the full range of legitimate approaches to it. This itself brings us to the harmonistic approach, and indeed we saw that in the end we arrived there necessarily, and in both senses; that was the equilibrium point of our analysis.

The position we have presented parallels option 4, which we raised in last year’s article with respect to “two contradictory verses.” But in light of what has been said here, it seems to include, to some extent, the other possibilities as parts of itself. The other possibilities remain valid with respect to two contradictory verses, but not with respect to the rule “these and those.”

Footnotes