Lech Lecha (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help
Mida Tova
Sabbath eve, Parashat Lekh Lekha, 5766

Questions:

1. What distinguishes gezerah shavah (verbal analogy) from kal va-homer (a fortiori inference)?
2. Did Abraham our Patriarch use gezerah shavah and kal va-homer, and why?
3. What are the midrashic anachronisms meant to teach us?
4. What is the disagreement among the authors of the various midrashim on this matter?
5. What is the relation between peshat (plain-sense interpretation) and derash (midrashic interpretation)?
6. What distinguishes textual hermeneutical principles from logical ones?
7. Can one produce a peshat interpretation by means of derash tools such as gezerah shavah and kal va-homer?
8. Why are binyan av and kal va-homer, which are based on ordinary human reasoning, still counted as principles of derash?

The principles:

Kal va-homer. Gezerah shavah. Binyan av.

A. Summary from Last Year

Rabbi Hanina ben Pazi said: Abraham did not know from where he was to circumcise himself. The Holy One, blessed be He, hinted to him and told him from where he should circumcise himself: “And I will make you exceedingly numerous” — from the place by which you are fruitful and multiply. Bar Kappara says: Abraham expounded by kal va-homer: if trees, from what place are they subject to orlah (the prohibition on fruit from a tree during its first three years)? From the place where they bear fruit. So too I, from the place by which I produce fruit, I need to circumcise myself.

— Midrash Tanhuma, Buber edition, Parashat Lekh Lekha, section 27

“And I will establish My covenant,” and so on. Rabbi Huna said in the name of Bar Kappara: Abraham sat and reasoned by gezerah shavah. “Orlah” is said here, and “orlah” is said regarding a tree. Just as the “orlah” said regarding a tree is the place where it bears fruit, so too the “orlah” said regarding a human being is the place where he bears fruit. Rabbi Hanina said to him: Had gezerot shavot already been given to Abraham? Astonishing! Rather, from “And I will establish My covenant between Me and you, and I will multiply you exceedingly” — from “I will multiply you exceedingly” [he learned] “I will establish My covenant between Me and you.”

— Genesis Rabbah, Theodor-Albeck edition, parashah 46

And Rabbi Huna Bar Kappara said: Abraham our Patriarch sat and expounded: “Orlah” is said regarding a tree, and “orlah” is said regarding a human being. Just as the “orlah” said regarding a tree is the place where it bears fruit, so too the “orlah” said regarding a human being is the place where he bears fruit. Rabbi Hanin ben Pazi said: Did Abraham our Patriarch already know kal va-homer inferences and gezerot shavot? Rather, He hinted to him: “And I will establish My covenant between Me and you,” and so on — the place by which one is fruitful and multiplies.

— Leviticus Rabbah, Vilna edition, parashah 25

In last year’s essay we examined Abraham’s reasoning as it appears in the above midrashim. The first midrash treats this reasoning as kal va-homer. The second, at its outset, treats it as gezerah shavah, and in the end rejects that possibility, since Abraham did not expound gezerah shavah. In place of gezerah shavah it offers another interpretive consideration, one that Abraham apparently could indeed have used. The third midrash is essentially a summary of the first two, but in the course of doing so it assumes that even kal va-homer inferences were not employed by Abraham our Patriarch, and not only gezerah shavah, as stated in the second midrash. The first midrash presents the opinions in the reverse order, and its wording suggests that there is really no problem with Abraham’s employing kal va-homer. If there is any problem at all, it exists only with respect to gezerah shavah.

We then considered the nature of these two principles, and saw that they represent two poles within the system of hermeneutical principles. Kal va-homer represents the logical principles of derash. These principles are not deductive, as I explained in previous weekly essays, but they arise from reasoning that we use in all areas of life and not only in interpreting Scripture. The substrate on which the midrashic tool operates is biblical halakha (Jewish law), not the language of Scripture. The inference is made by applying ordinary logical tools to the halakhic data found in the Bible. Gezerah shavah, by contrast, represents the textual principles. These principles do not employ everyday reasoning, and almost all of them are unique rules pertaining only to biblical interpretation. The data that underlie interpretations by these principles are textual and not merely halakhic. The interpreters derive conclusions from the language of Scripture and its words, not only from the laws that appear in it.

We mentioned some of the basic differences in the Sages’ treatment of these two principles. For example, a person may derive kal va-homer on his own, whereas gezerah shavah one may not derive on one’s own.¹ We saw that these two principles, as two poles, represent the full range of methods of derash. We also saw that the expression “kal va-homer inferences and gezerot shavot” in the language of the Sages refers to the entire set of hermeneutical principles, not specifically to those two alone. Their intent is: all the principles, from gezerah shavah to kal va-homer.²

We noted that these interpretations are anachronisms, since it is implausible that they reconstruct Abraham’s actual reasoning, if only because the biblical text had not yet been given to the world, and it is hard to see how Abraham could compare words in Scripture. Beyond that, the hermeneutical principles themselves had not yet been given. In last year’s essay on Parashat Nitzavim we discussed the process by which the hermeneutical principles were conceptualized and crystallized even after the giving of the Torah, and certainly their present form did not yet exist before Sinai. It should be noted that this problem exists mainly with respect to gezerah shavah, which depends on the biblical text itself, since it draws its conclusions from comparing words that appear in two parallel contexts. With kal va-homer there is a problem as well, but a milder one. There we rely on biblical halakha and perform a kal va-homer on that basis. The problem still exists, because those laws too had not yet been given to us, but here it is possible that the Holy One, blessed be He, who revealed Himself to Abraham, gave him those laws even before Sinai. We find such an idea in midrashim regarding quite a few laws. Some would say that these laws were revealed to him by his “two kidneys,” which “became for him like two rabbis,” in the language of the Sages in the midrash — that is, Abraham discovered them through his own reasoning.

We then discussed the process by which the hermeneutical principles took shape and became formalized, and the meaning of the claim that their source is Sinai. We concluded with two examples of analytical expansions, and compared them to the development and function of the hermeneutical principles.

In the present essay we will address two topics: a sharper formulation of the above distinction between the two kinds of principles, textual and logical, and the significance of this whole discussion for the relation between peshat and derash.

B. Between Kal Va-homer and Gezerah Shavah: Textual and Logical Principles

Introduction

What are these anachronisms meant to teach us? If they do not reconstruct historical reality, then there must be a reason the Sages nevertheless placed this anachronistic burden on Abraham our Patriarch. In last year’s essay we suggested that the disagreement was intended to express a certain element in the laws of orlah and in the conception of the term “orlah.” Here we will suggest a different explanation, one that concerns the meaning of the hermeneutical principles.

Another Look at the Dispute Among the Midrashim

As we saw above, there is a substantive disagreement among the authors of these midrashim, according to Rabbi Hanin or Hanina, over whether Abraham our Patriarch could use the hermeneutical principles of derash at all. In one version, the problem seems to exist only with respect to gezerah shavah. In another, the problem extends to all the principles of derash, with kal va-homer and gezerah shavah serving, as noted, as representatives of the whole system. According to Rabbi Huna Bar Kappara, by contrast, Abraham could use even gezerah shavah, and presumably the other hermeneutical principles as well.

It may be that the purpose of the midrashic anachronism is precisely to teach us this point. The midrash that puts gezerah shavah in Abraham’s mouth may be doing so in order to teach us that even Abraham could have expounded gezerah shavah, even if in fact he did not do so. The lesson concerns the nature of gezerah shavah and the possibility of using it without a received tradition. Rabbi Hanina in that same midrash disagrees on precisely this point, and holds that the character of gezerah shavah does not permit it to be employed before the giving of the Torah — that is, before it itself was given as part of the general system of hermeneutical principles. This is a contrasting conception of the nature of that principle. From the third midrash it emerges that even kal va-homer could not be employed before the giving of the Torah. That midrash implies that even kal va-homer, though it is a logical principle, is not available to one who has not received it through the tradition from Sinai.

Why, in fact, can gezerah shavah not be used before it was given? Why do some maintain that it can be used even before Sinai? What is the relation between gezerah shavah and kal va-homer? Why can kal va-homer be used even according to those who maintain that gezerah shavah cannot? And why do some disagree even with that?

It seems that the basis of the distinction lies in the distinction we drew between textual principles and logical principles, categories represented by kal va-homer and gezerah shavah. These two are particularly apt examples of the two kinds of principles: kal va-homer is a clear logical principle, and gezerah shavah is a clear textual principle. Let us try to see more broadly the relation between them.

Gezerah Shavah and Kal Va-homer³

There are several differences between gezerah shavah and kal va-homer, and almost all of them were mentioned in last year’s essay. As already noted, the basic difference is that gezerah shavah is a textual principle, whereas kal va-homer is a logical one. The other differences are also related, in one way or another, to this distinction. We will stand on a few of them here.

The Logical Status of the Compared Sides

First, in gezerah shavah the two sides have the same logical standing, since this is a comparison, although see an exception in Rashi’s view, discussed in our essay on Parashat Vayera last year. By contrast, in kal va-homer there is a hierarchy, although see a qualification in Maimonides’ view, discussed in last year’s essay on Parashat Shemini: the teaching case is lenient and the derived case is stringent, unless one understands it as a comparison, as discussed in my previous weekly essays.

This difference too is rooted in the basic distinction. When we deal with textual principles of derash, they will almost always be comparative tools. These tools are various textual indications that direct us to compare two halakhic contexts. The difference among the principles lies in the question: what is the textual indication that tells us to make the comparison? It is difficult, though in principle not impossible, to imagine a textual indication telling us to be more stringent in one subject than in another. Kal va-homer, by contrast, is a logical consideration, and logic can indeed show us that one subject is more severe than another.

Whether One May Derive It Independently

A second difference is that kal va-homer may be derived independently, whereas gezerah shavah may not be derived independently. This difference too seems connected to the distinction we made. Kal va-homer is a logical principle. Reasoning of this kind is used in all areas of thought and interpretation, and is not unique to biblical interpretation and derash. If so, there is no reason not to use those same tools in interpreting Scripture. Gezerah shavah, by contrast, is a formal tool that must be applied carefully and precisely, since we have no logical checks on its conclusions. We do not use it in other contexts. Is it always correct to compare any two contexts in which identical biblical words appear? Many possible conclusions can be drawn from such comparisons. Which of them should we adopt, and which not? Kal va-homer cannot have formal limitations, since wherever it is logical we apply it. Gezerah shavah, however, being a formal tool, is bound to the instructions we have received. It cannot be applied on the basis of our own logic, although, as we have already noted, the comparison we make following a gezerah shavah — which laws we learn from it and which not — is itself also based in part on ordinary reasoning.

Punishment by Inference

A third difference between kal va-homer and gezerah shavah seems at first glance to contradict the previous ones. In kal va-homer we do not punish, and do not derive prohibitions, by inference,⁴ whereas in gezerah shavah we certainly do.⁵ This means that when there is a biblical law whose violation carries a certain punishment, a law learned from it by kal va-homer will not carry a similar punishment.

Some explain this difference on the basis of the first distinction discussed above. Since in gezerah shavah the two laws have similar standing, one can learn the punishment in the derived context from the punishment in the source context. The comparison between the two contexts includes the sanction imposed on offenders. But in kal va-homer, as we saw, the derived case is more severe than the source case, and thus the fact that we do not punish the violator of a law learned through kal va-homer is explained by the possibility that he deserves a more severe punishment, and we do not wish to let him obtain atonement through a lighter one.

According to the prevalent view, however, the rule that “we do not punish by inference” is rooted in concern over error in the inferential process of derash. On this view, the difference indicates a greater difficulty with kal va-homer than with gezerah shavah, apparently contrary to what we have seen so far. Until now we have found that kal va-homer is a logical principle, whereas gezerah shavah is a formal principle that requires tradition.

The solution to this difficulty lies in the fact that gezerah shavah is not employed unless it has been received by tradition. At first glance this seems to imply that there is never really a case in which we punish on the basis of gezerah shavah. If gezerah shavah is always based on tradition, then the law and the interpretation leading to it are already given in advance, and there is no fear of error. But as we have already noted more than once, the medieval authorities point out that in many places we find gezerot shavot expounded by later sages without any clear tradition. See last year’s essay on Parashat Miketz, and Encyclopedia Talmudit, entry “Gezerah Shavah.” The statement that a person may not derive gezerah shavah on his own must therefore be understood in a somewhat more complex way. One may not invent it out of nothing. Rather, there are several given indications — either the law that is the product of the interpretation, or the words being compared, or the halakhic contexts being compared, and the like — and on the basis of those we construct gezerah shavah interpretations. In such situations there really are controls on these interpretations, since they are guided by data already given before the interpretation is made. It is therefore understandable that gezerah shavah interpretations are in fact more reliable than kal va-homer, and can therefore serve as a basis even for punishment.

By contrast, with kal va-homer, which is a logical principle, anyone may derive it on his own, and there are no controls comparable to those available in gezerah shavah interpretations. Therefore the fear of error is greater with kal va-homer than with gezerah shavah — for example, a possible refutation that escaped the interpreter’s notice. For this reason the Torah requires us not to rely on our kal va-homer interpretations and not to punish on their basis.

“Scripture Took the Trouble to Write It”

A final difference to be noted here concerns the rule found in several places in the Talmud: “A matter that can be derived by kal va-homer — Scripture nonetheless took the trouble to write explicitly.” A law that could be learned through kal va-homer is sometimes nevertheless written openly in the Torah. With gezerah shavah, by contrast, this is not so.⁶ The accepted explanation is that gezerah shavah is simpler, and therefore more secure. Hence no additional scriptural corroboration is needed for a law derived from it. This difference points in the same direction as the one presented above. Precisely because of the formality and lack of universal logic in gezerah shavah, the Torah gives us various controls to direct us toward the correct halakhic result. But once such controls exist, one can rely more on interpretations produced by gezerah shavah than on those produced by the logical principle of kal va-homer.

Some explain this by noting that in kal va-homer we do not punish by inference, and therefore if the Torah wishes to prohibit or punish a transgressor of a law learned through kal va-homer, it must write that law explicitly. But one who violates a law derived through gezerah shavah is punished even without an explicit verse, and therefore there is no point in writing it explicitly as well. At first glance this explanation seems merely technical, and unrelated to the substantive distinctions discussed above. On further thought, however, that conclusion is not necessarily correct. The reason we do not punish for a law learned through kal va-homer is precisely the fear of error. Therefore, when the Torah writes the law explicitly and thereby allows punishment, it is in effect giving that law a firmer basis. In gezerah shavah, by contrast, we punish even where there is no explicit verse teaching the law in question. The reason is that with gezerah shavah, given the controls that guide it, we have much greater confidence and the fear of error is far lower. Thus this explanation too implicitly assumes the same substantive distinction presented above.

The Other Hermeneutical Principles

All the other hermeneutical principles of derash are also divided between the textual type and the logical type. In several essays we have tried to determine whether this or that principle is textual or logical, and the matter is not always clear.⁷ Even regarding gezerah shavah itself, we noted that elements of analogical reasoning underlie it.⁸ The textual indication is only one of the components that lead to a gezerah shavah interpretation. Beyond that, there are also indications relating to the character of the two contexts being compared. Conceptual similarity is one of the criteria that determine between which pairs of biblical words we will construct a gezerah shavah.

We should also note that the other characteristics presented above — such as punishment by inference, whether every person may derive the principle independently, or the rule that “Scripture took the trouble to write it” — are not distributed between these two categories in a fully clear and sweeping way, and there are also quite a few disputes on these points. See the references above.

Kal va-homer is the clearest example among the logical principles. Gezerah shavah, by contrast, is the clearest example among the textual principles. That is why these two were chosen to represent the two types of hermeneutical principles, the textual and the logical.

Back to the Dispute Among the Midrashim

We can now better understand the disagreement among the midrashim quoted above. According to the author of the second midrash, Rabbi Hanina holds that Abraham could not expound gezerah shavah, but kal va-homer he certainly could. The reason is that Abraham our Patriarch did not have the controls that would guide him to use gezerah shavah correctly and avoid error. Kal va-homer, however, he could indeed use, because it is based on human reason, which serves us in other contexts as well. One does not need tradition and revelation at Sinai in order to use considerations such as kal va-homer.

If so, the purpose of the anachronistic midrash is to teach us about the nature of gezerah shavah: it cannot be used without the guidance of tradition. Presumably the same applies to all the other textual principles. All of them are particular interpretive tools for Scripture, and therefore a tradition is needed if we are to use them properly. In fact, the tradition is needed even for us to know that they exist at all. Kal va-homer, by contrast, can be employed by anyone, because each of us uses this mode of thinking in all contexts. No tradition is required to authorize our use of such interpretive tools. Presumably the same applies to the other logical principles of derash as well. One can imagine that Abraham our Patriarch, like any other person, could have used them even without tradition. These tools are familiar to every thinking person, and no tradition is required in order for us to know of them.

Thus the author of the second midrash wishes to teach us the difference between textual and logical tools of derash. In his view Abraham can use only logical tools, whether midrashic or peshat-oriented, but not textual ones. The difficulty arises with the author of the third midrash, who places in Rabbi Hanin’s mouth the claim that Abraham could not use any tools of derash, textual or logical alike. Why should Abraham not be able to use a consideration such as kal va-homer?

In the past we have often addressed the opposite question: why do logical principles such as kal va-homer or binyan av belong to the system of derash rather than to plain-sense interpretation? Is analogy not a tool of peshat? Would we not have used it even without a tradition from Sinai? We use it in every other context, so why should the Torah be any different in this respect?

Can Ordinary Modes of Thought Be Applied to the Torah?

Last week we suggested a completely opposite possibility: that even for interpreting and expounding the Torah we require “authorization from above” in order to apply even the simplest tools of thought. According to this proposal, analogical considerations in interpreting and expounding Scripture are legitimate only because the principle of binyan av was given to us. Likewise, kal va-homer considerations in interpreting and expounding Scripture are legitimate only because this hermeneutical principle was given to us.

This approach turns the whole picture upside down. Derash becomes the foundation, rather than an additional level built upon peshat. This raises the question: what criterion distinguishes derash from peshat? If considerations of peshat receive their validity from principles of derash such as binyan av and kal va-homer, then what makes them peshat? Why are ordinary binyan av or kal va-homer still considered derash rather than plain-sense interpretation? We will address this question in the next chapter, and it will arise from continuing our analysis of the midrashim discussed here.

C. Peshat and Derash

Introduction

According to the author of the third midrash, Abraham our Patriarch could not make kal va-homer and gezerah shavah inferences, and presumably could not use the hermeneutical principles of derash at all. For that reason he was forced to offer an alternative, namely interpretive considerations that should not raise this problem. It follows that such considerations apparently do not belong to derash but to peshat, and therefore Abraham could use them.

According to this view, kal va-homer and binyan av cannot be used without permission from Sinai, whereas in peshat interpretation one certainly can make use of reasoning even without such a tradition. But this distinction is problematic. After all, all these are tools that arise from ordinary human reason. What, then, distinguishes the reasoning of kal va-homer and binyan av from other peshat interpretations? In this chapter we will try to examine the alternative reasoning and learn from it something about the relation between peshat and derash.

It should be noted that according to the author of the second midrash, this reasoning might still count as derash, since Abraham could perform scriptural derash such as kal va-homer — that is, use the logical principles of derash — and only gezerah shavah and the like, the textual principles, were inaccessible to him. If so, on that view there is no necessity to say that Abraham’s reasoning was a peshat interpretation. Yet according to this midrash the opposite question arises: why are kal va-homer and binyan av considered tools of derash rather than part of the tools of plain-sense interpretation? We concluded the previous chapter with this question, and we will deal with it briefly here.

The Reasoning of Rabbi Hanina, or Hanin, ben Pazi

As stated, according to Rabbi Hanina Abraham could not use kal va-homer or gezerah shavah, nor the hermeneutical principles of derash in general. What, then, was the reasoning that led him to his conclusion? That reasoning is presented in the midrashim above:

Rabbi Hanina said to him: Had gezerot shavot already been given to Abraham? Astonishing! Rather: “And I will establish My covenant between Me and you, and I will multiply you exceedingly.” From “I will multiply you exceedingly” [he learned] “And I will establish My covenant between Me and you.”

The words “I will multiply you” hinted to Abraham that the matter concerned the place from which one multiplies, that is, the reproductive organs.

Parenthetically, we should note that the verse that gives Abraham this hint is a verse spoken by the Holy One, blessed be He, directly to Abraham himself. There is therefore certainly room to say that at least in the reasoning presented in this midrash there is no anachronism. The verses spoken directly to him were presumably known to Abraham, and there is no need to attribute an anachronistic character to this midrash. Prima facie, that itself would seem to be sufficient reason for Rabbi Hanina to prefer this interpretation over those based on gezerah shavah and kal va-homer. Yet the plain sense of the midrash’s wording, at least in the third midrash, indicates otherwise, for Rabbi Hanina is not troubled by the fact that the biblical words were unknown to Abraham before the Torah was given, but by the fact that he used gezerah shavah and kal va-homer. The problem is how he could make use of principles of derash, not how he could rely on the biblical text. It therefore seems that the advantage of this interpretation must lie in the fact that it is peshat and not derash.

Classifying Rabbi Hanina’s Reasoning as a Peshat Interpretation

What is the nature of this reasoning? It does not seem that any formal principle of derash is being used here. On the other hand, this is also not a literal interpretation. Literally, the words “I will multiply you” are a promise that God will make Abraham numerous. Yet the Sages place in Abraham’s mouth an interpretation that reads these words as a hint to the location where the covenant is to be carried out.

Not for nothing do the authors of the first and third midrash refer to this reasoning as a “hint.”⁹ It is a consideration that stands between peshat and derash. Can it really serve as a basis for identifying the place where the covenant must be performed? At first glance, it is difficult to rely on so tenuous a consideration.

But perhaps the background to the interpretation is also important in characterizing its nature. Abraham was commanded to perform a covenant. He did not know what it meant to perform a covenant, or where on the human body such an act was to be carried out. As a result, he searched for hints in the language of the command spoken to him. The only hint that appeared relevant was the phrase “I will multiply you,” and so he concluded that the command referred to performing the covenant on the reproductive organs. Abraham’s interpretive decision, then, cannot be evaluated in isolation from its context. Because of the distress and uncertainty in which Abraham found himself, he searched for a hint. The hint he found does not satisfy the definition of peshat, but it does not seem to be derash either. If we assume that some hint must be present in the language of the command, then this interpretation certainly meets the criteria of peshat. Without the uncertainty in which Abraham found himself, such an interpretation would amount to no more than a mere hint.

An Intermediate Conclusion About the Distinction Between Peshat and Derash

Thus the distinction between peshat, derash, and hint depends on the situation and not only on the wording of the text. The fit between interpretation and wording is measured not only by language, but also by the constraints and aims of the interpreter.

In the past we have discussed the explanations proposed by the author of Sefer Keritut for the question why some of the thirty-two hermeneutical principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean do not appear in the baraita of Rabbi Ishmael. See, for example, last year’s essay on Parashat Vayeshev. He offers three possible explanations, each relating to a different part of the thirty-two principles. One of the possibilities is that among the thirty-two there are certain principles of derash that are regarded as though they were explicitly present in the text, and therefore Rabbi Ishmael did not count them. That is, these principles are in fact peshat and not derash, and that is why Rabbi Ishmael did not count them among the principles of derash.

As we saw in last year’s essay on Parashat Vayeshev, the explanation is that these principles interpret the text itself. In a situation where we are perplexed and uncertain about how to understand the text, an interpretation reached by way of derash itself becomes peshat. After all, we have no other interpretation for those words, and therefore from our perspective this is their original and primary meaning. In this way, an interpretation reached through derash becomes a peshat interpretation because of the circumstances and the interpretive difficulty.

There are other situations as well in which an interpretation reached through derash becomes a peshat interpretation. For example, when the literal interpretation is unreasonable from the standpoint of ordinary logic. In such cases the midrashic interpretation, though not exactly the literal reading, is accepted as the primary interpretation of the verse, and accordingly its status is that of peshat.¹⁰ That is indeed what the words of the verse mean.¹¹

In the end, it seems that the basic definition of peshat is not so sharp. An interpretation that we regard as the correct and convincing reading of a verse, both linguistically and rationally, will count as its peshat.

By contrast, even an interpretation reached through accepted interpretive tools such as analogy and the like will count as a midrashic interpretation if there is another interpretation that provides a more plausible local reading of the text. The relation between peshat and derash is determined not only by the tools we use, but by the overall plausibility of the interpretation produced by those tools.

Another Look at the Relation Between Peshat and Derash

We have dealt with the relation between peshat and derash in several previous essays.¹² Usually the conclusion was that the planes of derash and peshat exist in parallel. These are two parallel explanatory planes. See last year’s essays on Parashat Vayechi and Bamidbar. This is the approach of Nahmanides in his glosses to the Second Root.

By contrast, in the essay on Parashat Yitro we saw that according to Maimonides, in the Second Root there is only one true interpretation for each verse, and therefore in his view derash is not an interpretation of the verse in the full sense. In the essay on Parashat Pekudei we also saw a halakhic implication of that conception.

This picture has implications for the distinction between peshat and derash. According to Maimonides, the peshat interpretation is the only interpretation of the words of the verse, even if it was reached through tools of derash. If that is indeed the interpretation of the verse, then it is a Torah law, that is, a law found in the words of the Torah. An interpretation that uses tools of derash constitutes an expansion of what is written in the Torah, not the uncovering of what is latent in it. See the above-mentioned essay on Parashat Yitro. Such an interpretation is not an “interpretation” in the full sense of the term, because there is another interpretation that reflects the intention of the words themselves. The midrashic interpretation is the product of using tools that expand the verse.

Yet according to what we saw above, what determines whether an interpretation is peshat or midrashic is not the tools employed but the final result, together with its relation to the circumstances and interpretive difficulties posed by the verse in question. As we saw, one can arrive at a peshat interpretation by means of tools of derash. This happens when the interpretation produced by those tools is the correct interpretation of the words of the verse.

Accordingly, for Maimonides the distinction is sharp: a peshat interpretation is an interpretation of the verse; a midrashic interpretation is not an interpretation of the verse but an expansion of it. True, the expansion is carried out by means of tools of derash, but not every interpretation that uses tools of derash is an expansion.

According to Maimonides, when God wrote the verse He did not intend the midrashic interpretation at all, nor is it the meaning of the words of the verse. The midrashic interpretation is an expansion of the original meaning. On this view, the criterion distinguishing peshat from derash is the intention of the words, or the intention of the author. According to the other medieval authorities, with Nahmanides at their head, both peshat and derash are interpretations of the verse, and both interpret its words and the author’s intention. Yet the simpler interpretation is what counts as peshat. According to Nahmanides, the distinction between peshat and derash depends on which interpretation is simpler, not on what the author originally intended. The author intended both levels of interpretation, and the meaning of the words also branches in both directions. Even so, only one of the two interpretations is peshat, while the other is an interpretation by way of derash.

Summary

The picture that emerges here is complex. The distinction between peshat and derash is not sharp. It is not the tools that determine it, but the interpretation produced by using them. In any case, we can now understand why kal va-homer and binyan av, although based on ordinary human tools of thought, are counted as principles of derash. They are inferential tools that can expand the meaning of verses. But where they lead us to the simpler interpretation, that is, to the original intention of the words, they also function as tools of peshat interpretation.

When the authors of the midrashim discussed above determine that Abraham our Patriarch did not use kal va-homer and gezerah shavah, they mean their use as tools of derash. When Abraham sought a peshat interpretation of the verses, or of the commands he had been given, such tools could indeed have served him as well, but only as aids in the search for peshat and the meaning of the command. Expansions, or parallel interpretations that are less simple, cannot be generated by these tools without authorization and tradition from Sinai.

Footnotes

However, as we saw, one does punish for an offense learned through gezerah shavah, unlike kal va-homer. If so, it is certainly possible that this “freeness” is part of the controls the text gives us in order to carry out gezerah shavah correctly. In that case, derash by means of gezerah shavah is not really derash at all, but rather a sophisticated way of finding the peshat interpretation. That is also why one punishes for offenses learned through gezerah shavah, since such laws are regarded as though they were explicitly present in the text.