Vayera (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

---

Questions

1. Two structures of gezerah shavah (verbal analogy): LIFO and FIFO.
2. Is the distinction between them a sharp one?
3. Which of them is a genuine gezerah shavah, and which is defective?
4. What is the interpretive significance of this distinction?
5. An empirical examination of our hypothesis from last year concerning the difference and its implications.

The hermeneutical principle

Gezerah shavah (verbal analogy).

A. Summary from last year

Resh Lakish said: What is the meaning of the verse, “He will shut up the heavens”? At a time when the heavens are restrained from bringing down dew and rain, it is like a woman in labor who does not give birth.

And this is what Resh Lakish said in the name of Bar Kappara: “Restraint” is stated with regard to rain, and “restraint” is stated with regard to a woman. “Restraint” is stated with regard to a woman, as it is said: “For the Lord had completely closed up every womb.” And “restraint” is stated with regard to rain, as it is written: “He will shut up the heavens.”

“Birth” is stated with regard to a woman, and “birth” is stated with regard to rain. “Birth” is stated with regard to a woman, as it is written: “She conceived and bore a son.” And “birth” is stated with regard to rain, as it is written: “And it shall cause to bring forth and to sprout.”

“Remembering” is stated with regard to a woman, and “remembering” is stated with regard to rain. “Remembering” is stated with regard to a woman, as it is written: “And the Lord remembered Sarah.” And “remembering” is stated with regard to rain, as it is written: “You have remembered the earth and watered it; You greatly enrich it; the channel of God is full of water.” What is the meaning of “the channel of God is full of water”? A Sage taught: There is a kind of reservoir in the firmament from which the rains emerge.
— Babylonian Talmud, Ta’anit 8a-b

This midrash presents three instances of gezerah shavah between childbirth and rainfall. In the article from 2005-2006, we analyzed the differences among the three midrashim cited here. We noted that the differences are especially significant precisely because these are three adjacent gezerah shavah expositions that appear consecutively in the very same source. In such a case, variations in formulation are more likely to be meaningful.

In general, our main claim was that the first exposition is a formal gezerah shavah, whereas the last two are only pseudo-gezerah shavah. We offered two main indications for this distinction, and both preserve a consistent distinction between the first exposition and the last two:

1. In the first exposition, both biblical sources are verses from the Torah. In the other two, one of the sources comes from the Prophets or Writings. We cited from the methodological rule-books the principle that one does not derive gezerah shavah from verses in the Prophets or Writings, even if they are free for interpretation; see, for example, Yevin Shemu’ah, rule 102.¹ This is an indication that the last two gezerah shavah expositions are not genuine gezerah shavah. It is possible that these last two expositions are merely a gillui milta (a clarification of an already known point), and as the rule-books note, one may indeed derive such clarifications from verses in the Prophets and Writings.
2. We defined two kinds of formal gezerah shavah structure, distinguished by the order in which the target passage and the source passage appear in the biblical verses and in the conclusion of the exposition. In rabbinic language, gezerah shavah usually appears in the following form: “X is stated with regard to subject A, and X is stated with regard to subject B” — that is, the sources. From here come the conclusions: “Just as B is Y, so too A is Y.” Thus subject B is the source passage, and subject A is the target passage. The concluding sentence always teaches the target from the source, and therefore its order is fixed. But the opening sentence that cites the sources appears in two different forms: if the verse concerning the target passage appears first, the structure is called LIFO (Last In, First Out), and if the verse concerning the source passage appears first, the structure is called FIFO (First In, First Out).

The last two expositions have a FIFO structure. The first exposition has a LIFO structure. Our claim was that a genuine gezerah shavah is constructed in LIFO form, whereas a pseudo-gezerah shavah, or a gillui milta, is constructed in FIFO form.

We also proposed an explanation for this distinction. An exposition built in LIFO form opens with the intonation of a difficulty: X is stated in the target passage, and I am looking for its interpretation. We begin with some difficulty in the target passage and find its resolution. The learning moves from the explicit to the obscure. By contrast, an exposition with a FIFO structure sounds more serene. We begin with the source passage, where there is no difficulty, and learn from it to the target passage. This is a calm comparison between two contexts.

Our claim was not that this is necessarily a universal rule. However, at least in a case where two adjacent expositions appear with a structural difference, there is room to argue that the basis of the difference lies in the question whether this is a genuine gezerah shavah or not. We shall examine this question later in the article.

We then addressed the question whether gezerah shavah is a textual-formal hermeneutic, or whether the textual similarity serves as an indication of an essential similarity, making the comparison akin to a binyan av (an inference from an archetypal case). We raised the possibility that a gezerah shavah that opens with the obscure target passage and wonders about it (LIFO) is searching for a solution to a riddle. The gezerah shavah is the solution we have found to a question that troubles us. It therefore stands to reason that such a gezerah shavah is, at least at its starting point, formal. By contrast, in a gezerah shavah that compares two contexts (FIFO), one may view the textual parallel as a basis for a rational comparison between the two contexts. To explain why a textual confirmation is needed for a similarity that reason itself already suggests, we noted that the notion of a scriptural decree, in general, does not necessarily point to drawing wholly novel conclusions from the text, conclusions that would never have occurred to us. We saw there an example in which a scriptural decree assists and supports a line of reasoning that already existed beforehand.

We cited the dispute between Rashi and Rashbam — a dispute revisited in several additional articles in 2005-2006; see, for example, the article on Parashat Vayelekh — regarding the symmetrization of gezerah shavah. According to Rashi, the rule that “a gezerah shavah cannot be applied partially” — see Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 22b — means that all the parameters of the source passage must be transferred to the target passage. According to Rashbam, by contrast, this rule means that the comparison between target and source works in both directions. According to Rashbam, gezerah shavah looks more like a comparison grounded in a real similarity between the contexts, whereas according to Rashi it appears to be a formal device meant to solve a local problem. A real similarity between A and B entails a corresponding similarity between B and A. By contrast, a formal solution by gezerah shavah to a difficulty in a specific context does not necessarily indicate an essential similarity, and therefore does not require symmetry.

B. Does the LIFO-FIFO structural distinction really provide a criterion for distinguishing types of gezerah shavah?

Introduction

As we mentioned, in the article from 2005-2006 we proposed a structural indication for distinguishing between two types of gezerah shavah exposition. An exposition with a LIFO structure is a genuine gezerah shavah, whereas an exposition with a FIFO structure is a pseudo-gezerah shavah, or a gillui milta. We suggested that this distinction need not be universal, and that it may be applicable only in contexts where several gezerah shavah expositions appear together, but in different structures. In such cases, the change in structure calls for interpretation, and at least there it is reasonable to assume that it has substantive significance.

In this chapter we shall try to test that claim on several gezerah shavah expositions.

Different forms of gezerah shavah

In rabbinic literature we find several forms used to express a gezerah shavah exposition. Not all of them have the double structure of comparison between two sources followed by an inference, which can be divided into the two types mentioned above.² Sometimes the structure is abbreviated, as in “taking-taking” from the field of Ephron, and it is possible that such an abbreviated structure also indicates that the gezerah shavah is a gillui milta rather than a genuine gezerah shavah; see, for example, Tosafot, s.v. “gamar,” Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 131a. Even in sources with such abbreviated forms there is usually a specification of the sources, and therefore there is room to examine the order in which they appear there as well, but clearly in such cases the distinction is less sharp.

Occurrences of the double type

In order to try to examine our proposal more systematically, we had to inspect some rabbinic text without any prior selection. We chose the Babylonian Talmud and scanned it by means of the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project. We searched for occurrences of gezerah shavah containing double structures — that is, presentation of sources followed by inferences — of the type: “X is stated with regard to A and X is stated with regard to B; just as A is Y, so too B is Y.”

The search showed that in the overwhelming majority of cases — 119 out of 138 — the order is LIFO, which corroborates our basic assumption that a genuine gezerah shavah is generally represented by a LIFO structure.³ On the other hand, among the 19 cases that appear in FIFO form, we also found quite a few examples that seem to be genuine and full gezerah shavah expositions.

Already in the 2005-2006 article we pointed to the existence of such expositions, and we suggested there that only when several gezerah shavah expositions of both types appear together in the same midrash, or perhaps with regard to the same verse, are we justified in seeking an explanation for the distinction between the different structures. In such a case, it is highly likely that the expositor intentionally chose different structures for some reason. In that situation, a FIFO structure is an indication that we are dealing with a defective gezerah shavah, or with a gillui milta. By contrast, a gezerah shavah in LIFO form is probably a genuine gezerah shavah.

For comparison, we scanned the Jerusalem Talmud, and to our surprise we found that all gezerah shavah expositions of this type are built in exactly the same way. All of them refer to “here” and “there” rather than explicitly naming their contexts, and without exception they are all in LIFO form. In the entire Jerusalem Talmud there is not a single gezerah shavah exposition in FIFO form. On the one hand, this pattern strongly reinforces the assumption that LIFO is indeed the original and full form of gezerah shavah. On the other hand, there was no point in testing our claim about the relation between the two types in the Jerusalem Talmud.

As noted, in the Babylonian Talmud we found 19 double-form gezerah shavah expositions in which the structure is FIFO. Examination shows that many of them seem like genuine gezerah shavah expositions and not merely comparisons amounting to gillui milta. But, as stated, we are looking for sugyot in which there are parallel expositions with reversed order. In our search of the Babylonian Talmud, we found only three such sugyot:

1. Babylonian Talmud, Arakhin 33b: the gezerah shavah of “wall” and “wall.”
2. Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 51b and 74a: the gezerah shavah of “entirely” and “entirely.”
3. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 75b: the gezerah shavah of “depravity” and “depravity.”

We examined the three sugyot that emerged from the search, and we shall now describe the results one by one.

The sugya in Arakhin 33b

In tractate Arakhin, the Gemara discusses the law of houses in walled cities, which may be redeemed by the seller until one year from the date of sale. The Gemara explains that the city must have been surrounded by a wall by gentiles from the days of Joshua son of Nun, before Israelites settled there, just as in the law of reading the Megillah in walled cities. The source is the following baraita:

For it was taught in a baraita: “If a man sells a dwelling house in a walled city” — this means one that was surrounded by a wall and only afterward inhabited, and not one that was inhabited and only afterward surrounded. I might think this applies even if Israelites built the wall around it. “Wall” is stated here and “wall” is stated there; just as there it was gentiles, so too here it was gentiles. I might think this applies even if gentiles built the wall only afterward. “Wall” is stated there, in Deuteronomy 3:5, and “wall” is stated here; just as there it was gentiles beforehand, so too here it was gentiles beforehand.

The baraita presents two gezerah shavah derivations of “wall” and “wall.” The first, which is in LIFO form, teaches us that gentiles must build the wall around the city, not Israelites. The second, which is in FIFO form,⁴ teaches us that the walling must have taken place before Israelites settled there.

The phenomenon becomes even sharper if we note that the sources are designated by “here” and “there,” not by their actual contexts. In such a case it is even more natural to expect a LIFO order, for what sense is there in beginning a derivation with “there,” when the problem with which we are occupied is “here”?⁵

Our claim, therefore, is that the first gezerah shavah is a genuine gezerah shavah, whereas the second is a gillui milta — that is, a defective gezerah shavah. There are two additional indications in the structure of the exposition that help us see this:

1. The gezerah shavah in FIFO form is the second, not the first. This alone can explain why a FIFO structure is possible here, since the connection between the target passage and the source passage is already known from the previous use of this gezerah shavah. If so, the source passage is already known, and there is no need to open with the target passage specifically in order to introduce the source. The source is already familiar to us from before, and the connection with it has already been established by the first gezerah shavah. In fact, this gezerah shavah could have been presented as follows: “Wall” is stated here and “wall” is stated there. Just as there it was gentiles, so too here it was gentiles. Just as there it was beforehand, so too here it was beforehand.⁶

This reasoning is textual. The second gezerah shavah can be phrased in FIFO form because the two sides are already known and do not require fresh “presentation.” But the question still remains: why was the derivation concerning the order of walling chosen as the second, and not the derivation concerning the fact that the builders had to be gentiles? For that, we turn to the second indication.

2. The teaching that the builders must be gentiles is a novelty produced by the gezerah shavah itself. But the teaching that the walling must precede habitation is already present in the wording of the verse itself — “a dwelling house in a walled city” means one that was walled and only afterward inhabited. Here we see a reason why the derivation concerning the order of walling is not a genuine gezerah shavah, since the rule is already known. From this it becomes understandable why the structure of the second gezerah shavah is FIFO. In fact, if anything, we should have used this gezerah shavah to learn from “here” to “there,” since in “here” the rule is already known from the verse itself. The reversed order of formulation is therefore even more understandable.

If we look at Maimonides, Laws of Sabbatical and Jubilee, chapter 12, we see that he cites only the rule that the city had to have been walled already at the time of entry into the land. He does not mention the rule that gentiles built the wall later.⁷

For comparison, let us cite a parallel source for this exposition, found in Yalkut Shimoni on Behar, section 665:

For it was taught in a baraita: “If a man sells a dwelling house in a walled city” — that it was walled and only afterward inhabited, and not inhabited and only afterward walled. I might think this applies even if Israelites walled it. “Wall” is stated here and “wall” is stated there; just as there, gentiles, so too here, gentiles. I might think this applies even if gentiles walled it only afterward. “Wall” is stated here and “wall” is stated there; just as there, beforehand, so too here, beforehand.

The order of the two gezerah shavah derivations here is similar to the previous exposition. However, here both parts of the exposition appear in LIFO form.

The sugya in Menachot 51b

In this sugya there appear two adjacent gezerah shavah derivations concerning the meal offering of an ordinary priest and the meal offering of the High Priest — that is, the High Priest’s daily griddle-cakes offered every day with the regular offering. The verses in the Torah are these, Leviticus 6:15-16:

And the anointed priest who shall be in his place from among his sons shall prepare it; it is an everlasting statute to the Lord; it shall be entirely burnt.

And every meal offering of a priest shall be entirely burnt; it shall not be eaten.

The first verse deals with the meal offering of the High Priest and states that it is wholly burned upon the altar and not eaten. The second verse deals with the meal offering of an ordinary priest, and it too states that it must go up wholly upon the altar and may not be eaten.

In Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 51b, the following exposition appears:

As it was taught in a baraita: I have derived only for the upper verse — the meal offering of the High Priest — that it is “entirely burnt,” and for the lower verse — the meal offering of an ordinary priest — that it “shall not be eaten.” From where do we know to apply what is stated of this one to the other, and what is stated of the other to this one? The verse therefore says “entirely” and “entirely” for a gezerah shavah. “Entirely” is stated here and “entirely” is stated there. Just as here, it is entirely burnt, so too there, it is entirely burnt. And just as there, it is to impose a negative commandment on eating it, so too here, it is to impose a negative commandment on eating it.

At first glance, the order here appears to be the reverse of what we would expect in light of the previous analysis: the FIFO comes before the LIFO. Let us now see the simple explanation for this.

From the terminology it appears as though the exposition is dealing with the High Priest, the “upper” verse. Therefore the term “here” refers to the High Priest and “there” refers to the ordinary priest. But in the first half of the exposition we learn, in FIFO structure, that the meal offering of the ordinary priest must also be wholly burned. We can now see the problem with the FIFO structure more clearly: after all, the subject of the exposition is the meal offering of the ordinary priest, since the inference teaches us a certain law about it. The meal offering of the ordinary priest is the target passage, and the meal offering of the High Priest is the source passage. If so, why refer to the meal offering of the High Priest as “here,” and to that of the ordinary priest as “there”? The subject under discussion is the meal offering of the ordinary priest, and ostensibly that should have been called “here.”

One must also note regarding the first half of the exposition that it is not at all clear what novelty this derivation adds. The verse explicitly says that the meal offering of an ordinary priest must be wholly burnt; why then do we need a gezerah shavah? The author of Torah Temimah on the verse explains that without the gezerah shavah we might have thought that the ordinary priest’s meal offering must be burned only so that it not be eaten, since the verse does not explicitly say to burn it on the altar. The gezerah shavah teaches that even for an ordinary priest, the burning is an independent commandment. But this explanation still seems somewhat strained. After all, the verse explicitly says that it may not be eaten; why should we think that the command “it shall be entirely” means the very same thing? It therefore seems that the first half of the exposition is superfluous, since the law derived from it is explicitly written in the verse.⁸ We should not be surprised, then, to discover that the structure of this gezerah shavah is indeed FIFO. Yet the fact that it is specifically the first half still requires explanation.

The second half of the exposition deals with the meal offering of the High Priest. The terminology of “here” and “there” remains as it was, since this is the second half of the same exposition. This half teaches us, in LIFO form, that even in the case of the High Priest’s meal offering there is a negative prohibition against eating it, even though the verse does not explicitly say “it shall not be eaten.”

From this analysis it becomes clear that the second exposition is the one that ought to have come first. If we reverse the order of the expositions, we immediately see that the terminology of “here” and “there” is then constructed properly. The “here” is the subject of the first exposition, namely the meal offering of the High Priest, and the “there” is the meal offering of the ordinary priest. This also yields the result that the first of the two expositions is in LIFO form and the second is FIFO, which fits better with the logic we encountered in the sugya in Arakhin.

Unlike the sugya in Arakhin, here even the order of the expositions does not require special explanation. They appear in the order of the verses. The subject is the “upper” verse — the meal offering of the High Priest — and afterwards comes the exposition concerning the “lower” verse — the meal offering of the ordinary priest. Beyond that, we have also seen that here too the second exposition is a pseudo-gezerah shavah, since the law derived from it is explicitly written in the verse. Exactly as we saw above in the sugya in Arakhin.

After writing this, we found that Maimonides writes as follows in Laws of the Procedure of the Offerings, chapter 12, halakha 9:

All meal offerings brought upon the altar require the taking of a handful, and the priest burns the entire handful upon the altar, while the remainder is eaten by the priests, except for the meal offering of a male priest, from which no handful is taken; rather, one burns it entirely, as it is said: “And every meal offering of a priest…” From this you learn that the initiation meal offering, the daily griddle-cakes, and the meal offering of a priest who brings a sinner’s offering or a voluntary meal offering are all burned upon the altar and are not subject to handful-taking.

It is clear from Maimonides’ wording that the obligation to burn the meal offering of an ordinary priest is explicitly written in the verse. And this is indeed what the author of Kesef Mishneh writes there:

“All meal offerings brought upon the altar require the taking of a handful,” etc. At the beginning of the chapter, on folio 72b: these are the meal offerings from which a handful is taken, and whose remainders belong to the priests — the fine flour offering, the pan offering, the deep-pan offering, etc. And what he wrote, “except for the meal offering of a male priest,” etc. — that is stated there, and it is an explicit verse.

Let us emphasize that Maimonides and the Kesef Mishneh are dealing with the obligation to burn the offering, not with the prohibition against eating it, which is not mentioned here at all. Thus we see that this gezerah shavah really is superfluous and not genuine, since the obligation to burn it entirely is explicitly written in the verse. This is exactly our point.

The sugya in Menachot 74a

Now, in Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 74a, a parallel exposition appears, but there the order is different:

As it was taught in a baraita: I have derived only for the upper verse that it is entirely burnt, and for the lower verse that it shall not be eaten. From where do we know to apply what is stated of this one to the other, and what is stated of the other to this one? The verse therefore says “entirely” and “entirely” for a gezerah shavah. “Entirely” is stated here and “entirely” is stated there. Just as there, it is entirely burnt, so too here, it is entirely burnt. And just as here, it is to impose a negative commandment on eating it, so too there, it is to impose a negative commandment on eating it.

It is easy to see that the difference is not in the order of the expositions, for here too we first learn that it must be entirely burnt and then learn that a negative prohibition applies to eating it. Rather, in each of these two teachings, the structure itself is reversed. Let us repeat the analysis we made of the previous exposition.

First, let us identify the subject of the exposition from the terminology of “here” and “there.” It is clear from the wording that “here” is the meal offering of the ordinary priest, while “there” is the meal offering of the High Priest. In other words, the subject with which the exposition is dealing is the meal offering of the ordinary priest. The order of the expositions is therefore now constructed properly. The first exposition deals with the meal offering of the ordinary priest, and the second with that of the High Priest. We can now see that in this exposition the structure accords with our earlier results: first LIFO and then FIFO.

However, one should note that according to what we said above, here the first exposition is the “superfluous” one, and that in itself poses no problem. The problem is that the superfluous exposition is specifically the one built in LIFO form. It would seem from this that the author of Torah Temimah was correct in his explanation of the baraita, and that this is indeed a full-fledged exposition.

From Tosafot, s.v. “af kan,” in the sugya on 51b, it emerges that specifically the second exposition is superfluous, since if there is an obligation to burn it entirely, then the prohibition against eating it is obvious. If this is indeed the superfluous exposition, then the structure of this baraita in 74a is much easier to understand.

The sugya in Sanhedrin 75b

In tractate Sanhedrin, the Gemara discusses the laws of forbidden sexual relations and tries to identify the list of relatives prohibited in sexual relations. This is a complex sugya, and it will therefore be difficult for us to enter into it here in the detail it deserves. We shall try to examine only those aspects relevant to our discussion.

The Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 9 states:

And these are those who are burned: one who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter, and the daughter of a priest who committed adultery. Included in “a woman and her daughter” are his own daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter, her daughter’s daughter, her son’s daughter, his mother-in-law, the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law.

One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter is liable to burning, as the Torah states in Leviticus 20:14:

If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is depravity; they shall burn him and them with fire, so that there be no depravity among you.

This is the source from which the prohibition regarding one’s mother-in-law is derived, and from which we learn that the punishment for that prohibition is burning. The Mishnah states that from this verse we also derive the other prohibitions — one’s own daughter, granddaughter, and so forth. This derivation is set out in greater detail in the Gemara there, which cites the gezerah shavah exposition based on comparison between the preceding verse and this one:

You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter to uncover her nakedness; they are near kin; it is depravity.

The key word in the gezerah shavah is “depravity”:

From where are these matters derived? The Rabbis taught: “If a man takes a woman and her mother” — I have derived only a woman and her mother. From where do we derive a woman’s daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter? “Depravity” is stated here and “depravity” is stated there. Just as there: her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter, so too here: her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter. From where do we derive that males are treated like females? “Depravity” is stated here and “depravity” is stated there. Just as there, males are like females, so too here, males are like females. From where do we derive that below is like above? “Depravity” is stated here and “depravity” is stated there. Just as there, below is like above, so too here, below is like above. And just as here, above is like below, so too there, above is like below.

The meaning of the laws being derived is discussed there in the Gemara, and we shall not enter here into the disputes and the lengthy discussion of the topic. Our main concern is the final gezerah shavah, which equates “above” with “below.” The simple meaning is that ascent upward through the generations is equated with descent downward through the generations. The sugya there contains discussion of the details, but that lies beyond our present concern.

We can now see that this structure is similar to the structures we have seen thus far. First, let us identify the point of departure of the exposition. The word “here” refers to the first verse, which deals with the prohibition of a woman and her mother — that is, the prohibition regarding one’s mother-in-law — whereas the word “there” refers to the prohibition of a woman and her daughter. We then learn the remaining forbidden relations in LIFO structure by gezerah shavah, with the source being “there,” namely the prohibition of a woman and her daughter. At the end of the exposition there is a reversed gezerah shavah, a FIFO structure, which teaches that above is like below by moving from “here” to “there.”

Once again, the second gezerah shavah is the one with FIFO structure, and that fits what we saw above. After presenting the source and the target in a LIFO structure, we can then carry out a symmetrical gezerah shavah between them even in FIFO form.

Beyond that, it is reasonable to say that if in the first gezerah shavah we compare above to below, then it stands to reason that we should also compare below to above. If one can learn from a woman to her daughter, then one can equally learn from the daughter to the woman. Thus the second gezerah shavah is not only a continuation of the first gezerah shavah; it is in fact a repetition of it. If so, the second gezerah shavah is superfluous, and it may have been stated only to complete the picture.⁹ In another formulation, one could say that the teaching that above is like below is only a sharpening of the conclusion from the previous teaching that below is like above. The introduction to the final gezerah shavah, which is phrased as though there were here yet another gezerah shavah, is merely a literary form for deriving an additional conclusion from the same gezerah shavah already stated earlier לכן. On this formulation, the entire gezerah shavah, with both its parts, is one LIFO structure with two halakhic results.

The interpretive significance of all this

At first glance, the distinction between these two structures is purely technical. Yet, as we noted in our article on this parashah from 2005-2006, there is interpretive significance to the difference between them. A LIFO structure points to a difficulty in context A, from which we set out to seek a solution and scan the rest of Scripture in order to find a key word in another context, B, that will teach us about this context. It is a riddle for which we are seeking a solution. In the language of the Sages, this is called a mufneh term. A superfluous word that has no meaning on the plain-sense level is one example of such a difficulty, and it provides motivation for searching out a gezerah shavah. By contrast, FIFO is a structure that does not begin from any such difficulty — we suggested that perhaps such a gezerah shavah does not require a mufneh term. It is a simple comparison between two contexts. There is no a priori motivation for making the comparison apart from the textual hint.

It is important to note that in such a case it is difficult to ground the gezerah shavah one is making. When the key word appears only twice in the entire corpus — see Cherniak, p. 9 and onward, where he treats this as the classic case of gezerah shavah, following Adolf Schwarz’s book Gezerah Shavah — then one can say that the comparison is well founded. But in other cases, when there is no motivation, such as a difficulty in the target passage, it is hard to justify the decision to make the comparison at all. If, however, there is some motivation for performing a gezerah shavah, because of which we perform a standard gezerah shavah in LIFO form, it is easy to understand why immediately afterward a gezerah shavah is made in the opposite direction. According to some of the medieval authorities, this is a necessary consequence of the rule that a gezerah shavah cannot be applied partially; see the article on Parashat Vayera, 2005-2006. Even according to the other medieval authorities, even if there is no binding rule requiring symmetry in gezerah shavah, the very fact that we compared context A to context B provides a reasonable basis for a reverse comparison as well, even without the existence of any riddle in context A. The reason for the comparison lies in the original LIFO gezerah shavah.

This is another angle from which it is easy to see why FIFO gezerah shavah expositions always appear second, after a gezerah shavah in LIFO form has already been performed. That is exactly what we saw in the three examples above — in the first example, this is true only after the correction and reversal of order implied by our hypothesis.

Seemingly, this is only a technical question, but it teaches us about the essence of gezerah shavah and about the logical difference between it and a gillui milta.

What is a gillui milta? In the example of “gabei” in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 41b-42a, it is the inclusion of both matters on the basis of reasoning — a hekkesh (an analogy based on juxtaposition), or a binyan av.

Footnotes