Tzav (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Eve of the Sabbath of Parashat Tzav, 5766

Questions

1. Three manifestations of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general rule and singled out to teach.”
2. Can there be a matter that was not included in the general rule, and yet nevertheless emerged from it to teach?
3. Is a unique hermeneutical rule required in order to perform an analogy?
4. What is the essential difference between the exposition of “a matter that was singled out from a general rule to teach” and that of “general and particular”?
5. Can one expound “a matter that was singled out from a general rule to teach” when the general rule and the particular are in the same verse? And when the general rule itself arises only from an exposition?

The Principles

• A matter that was included in a general rule and singled out to teach.
• General and particular.
• Binyan av (deriving a rule from one paradigm case).

“The person who eats flesh from the sacrifice of well-being that is the Lord’s, while his impurity is upon him, that person shall be cut off from his people. And a person who touches anything unclean—human impurity, or an unclean beast, or any unclean swarming thing—and then eats flesh from the sacrifice of well-being that is the Lord’s, that person shall be cut off from his people.”

Leviticus 7:20–21

The Master said: If one committed all of them in a single lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, you cannot say that he is entirely exempt, for it is written: “For whoever does any of all these abominations… they shall be cut off.” Rather, say this: if he committed one, he incurs one liability; if he committed all of them in a single lapse of awareness, he incurs only one. Rabbi Yohanan said: For this reason the punishment of excision was singled out in the case of one’s sister—to divide the liabilities. Rav Beivai bar Abaye objected: Say instead that only with regard to one’s sister, which Scripture specified, does he incur one liability for her; but for all the others, since they were committed in a single lapse of awareness, he should incur only one.
And according to Rav Beivai bar Abaye, does he not accept that which was taught: Whenever a matter was included in a general rule and singled out in order to teach, it was not singled out to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire general rule? How so? “The person who eats flesh…”—but were not shelamim included among all consecrated offerings? Why then were they singled out? To compare the others to them: just as shelamim are offerings consecrated for the altar and one is liable on their account, so too one is liable only on account of things consecrated for the altar; things consecrated for Temple maintenance are excluded. Rav Beivai said to him: But there too, did you not say that things consecrated for Temple maintenance are excluded? Here too, just as one’s sister is distinctive in that she is a forbidden sexual relation and has no permissibility during the lifetime of the one who renders her forbidden, so too all relations that have no permissibility during the lifetime of the one who renders them forbidden are included; the wife of another man is excluded, since she does become permitted during her husband’s lifetime. Rabbi Yonah, and some say Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Scripture says, “For whoever does any of all these abominations…” Since Scripture thus compared them, all forbidden sexual relations were compared to one’s sister: just as one is liable for one’s sister separately, so too one is liable for each of all the others separately.
And according to Rabbi Yitzhak, who said: Those liable to excision were included in the general rule, so why was excision singled out in the case of one’s sister? In order to judge her by excision and not by lashes—from where does he derive division of liabilities? He derives it from: “And to a woman in the impurity of her menstrual uncleanness you shall not come near,” to impose separate liability for each and every woman.

Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 2b

A. Summary of Last Year’s Essay

Last year’s essay dealt with the principle of “a matter that was included in a general rule and singled out to teach.” We noted that in our portion there are two verses that are expounded by means of this principle. The first, Leviticus 7:18, is expounded in Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim 13a–13b, regarding piggul intention. The second, Leviticus 7:20, is expounded in Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 2b, and also in the illustrative baraita. The second exposition also appears in that baraita, and it concerns the punishment of karet (excision) for eating consecrated meat while impure; this was our main focus.

At the root of the exposition lies the fact that there is a general command concerning one who eats consecrated meat while impure, a command that includes the burnt offering, the meal offering, the sin offering, the guilt offering, and the shelamim (well-being offering) sacrifice, as in Leviticus 7:37. In addition, there is a verse that teaches us about excision for one who eats meat of shelamim while impure. The conclusion is that the shelamim—the matter that had been included in the general rule and was singled out to teach—were singled out in order to teach that, in the whole general category, meaning all consecrated offerings, the punishment of excision exists only for offerings consecrated for the altar.

In the course of the discussion, we dealt with two different manifestations of “a matter that was included in a general rule and singled out to teach”: inclusion and comparison. We also saw that different tannaitic authorities may have disagreed about one of these manifestations. The various manifestations are summarized in the essay for Parashat Vayakhel-Pekudei of this year, and for Parashat Vayakhel, 5765, so we shall not elaborate on them here.

In the course of the discussion, we raised a priori three different scriptural situations in which the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general rule” can appear, and we illustrated them through the exposition in the illustrative baraita:

1. The ordinary manifestation: There are two parallel commands, one concerning the group as a whole and the second concerning a particular case. In such a situation, the second command is redundant, and sometimes even contradictory. In our example, there is a command about all types of consecrated meat, and therefore the verse about shelamim is, prima facie, redundant.

2. There is a scriptural statement that includes the particular within a more comprehensive group. In this possibility, however, the command appears only with regard to the particular and not with regard to the group as a whole. In such a case there is no duplication, and therefore the particular command is not redundant. Even so, we still have to ask why the Torah singled out precisely this particular case. In our example, there is a verse establishing that shelamim are included among consecrated offerings, but there is no verse that imposes excision for eating consecrated meat in impurity.

Such an approach emerges from the versions of the illustrative baraita found in the Constantinople and Venice printings. According to that version, an additional verse appears from later in the chapter, Leviticus 7:37:

“After all, shelamim were included among all consecrated offerings, as it is written: ‘This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, of the sin offering, of the guilt offering, of the ordination offering, and of the sacrifice of shelamim.’”

According to this text, it seems that the general rule from which shelamim emerged is a verse that includes shelamim within all the sacrifices, without any concrete command regarding eating them in impurity. This understanding stands in contrast to the understanding that emerges from the Babylonian Talmud, where the verse of the general rule is a command verse about the entire group, that is, a verse that also contains the punishment of excision. Here, by contrast, the encompassing verse merely defines the group and the particular as part of it.

3. The general rule does not appear in Scripture at all. The command is stated only with regard to the particular case, but it is clear to the Sages, either by reasoning or by tradition, that this particular merely represents an entire group. Again, nothing here is redundant, but it is still unclear why the Torah commanded specifically in this particular case.

In our example, let us suppose that shelamim are merely an example of sacrificial meat, and that the prohibition against eating them in impurity is not unique to shelamim but was stated with regard to all sacrificial meat. In that situation the question arises: why does the Torah command specifically regarding shelamim meat, instead of formulating the command as a law about anyone who eats sacrificial meat in impurity?

We did not find such an approach among the commentators with respect to our exposition. But the exposition in Zevahim 13a regarding piggul intention can certainly be understood this way. In this week’s essay we shall deal mainly with this issue.

We noted that the first manifestation of the principle of “a matter that was singled out from a general rule” has a more textual character, whereas the second and third concern content more directly. This point will become clearer in this year’s essay.

We asked what the real difference is between this principle, at least in manifestations 2 and 3, and Binyan av from a single verse. After all, in Binyan av we generalize from one example to the broader category that contains it. If so, that is exactly what we are doing here as well, and it is not clear why this is defined as a separate principle.

In the sheet for Parashat Shemot, 5765, see Part II, we saw that the commentators disagreed about Binyan av from a single verse. Some explained it as an analogy, or induction, from one place to similar places—Raavad, Rashi, and their school. Others explained it as a structure of “the common denominator” stated in one context—Halikhot Olam and its school. We noted that this dispute can be expressed through the distinction between the possibilities raised here. The Raavad, who holds that Binyan av from a single verse is ordinary analogy, is forced to explain that “a matter that was included in a general rule” is not a mere analogy but a special principle. By contrast, the commentators of the opposing school can explain it according to possibilities 2 and 3, since Binyan av is not analogy but a structure of the common denominator.

However, this solution is problematic, because the commentators of the second school justify their proposal that Binyan av from a single verse is also a structure of the common denominator by arguing that analogy as such, being ordinary human reasoning, does not at all require formal definition and legitimation within the system of hermeneutical principles. If so, it is clear that they will not make analogy dependent on this principle either. Therefore, according to their approach, the question returns in a somewhat different form: why is a unique hermeneutical principle required for an analogy of this kind?

B. A Matter That Was Not Included in the General Rule, Yet Emerged From It to Teach

Introduction

In this year’s essay we shall deal with unusual manifestations of expositions by means of the principle of “a matter that was singled out from a general rule.” We shall examine whether these are indeed expositions that make use of this principle, and we shall try to clarify their relation to Binyan av. As noted, this question already arose in the course of last year’s essay.

The Exposition in Zevahim 13a

In the Zevahim passage, the Gemara expounds additional verses from our portion by means of the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general rule.” On the plain sense of the text, the subject is eating shelamim meat after the two days during which it is permitted to be eaten, that is, leftover sacrificial meat. But the Sages derive from here the law of piggul (an invalidating intention to eat beyond the permitted time), an intention that disqualifies when it is entertained at the time of sprinkling or slaughter.

The verse that commands this is the one preceding the verses about eating consecrated meat in impurity, Leviticus 7:18:

“If any of the flesh of his sacrifice of shelamim is eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted; the one who offered it shall not have it reckoned to him; it shall be piggul, and the person who eats of it shall bear his guilt.”

The Gemara in Zevahim 13 derives the following exposition from this verse:¹

And does piggul intention not invalidate at the stage of receiving the blood? But was it not taught: One might think that intention is effective only at the sprinkling of the blood. From where do we know to include slaughter and receiving the blood? Scripture says: “If it is eaten from the flesh of the sacrifice of his shelamim…”—the standard textual tradition adds “on the third day”—“it shall not be accepted”; the verse is speaking of acts that lead to eating. Might I include even the pouring out of the leftover blood and the burning of the sacrificial fats? Scripture says: “On the third day it shall not be accepted; the one who offers it, it shall not be reckoned.” Sprinkling was included in the general rule, so why was it singled out? To compare others to it, to tell you: just as sprinkling is a service that effects atonement and is indispensable for atonement, so too every service that effects atonement and is indispensable for atonement. Excluded, therefore, are the pouring out of the leftover blood and the burning of the sacrificial fats, which are not indispensable for atonement.

As is well known, sacrificial rites have four primary services: slaughter, receiving the blood, carrying the blood, and sprinkling the blood. After that there are additional rites that are not indispensable for atonement, because the divine acceptance is effected by the sprinkling of the blood, such as burning the sacrificial fats on the altar and pouring the remaining blood onto the base of the altar. In the Sifra they also add the eating of the meat.

The basic datum of the exposition is that piggul intention—an intention to eat the meat beyond its proper time, in the case of shelamim on the third day—invalidates at the stage of sprinkling. That is, if the priest sprinkles the blood while intending to eat the meat beyond its time, the sprinkling is invalid and it invalidates the sacrifice. The Gemara seeks to derive that piggul also invalidates if the intention is entertained during slaughter or during receiving the blood. It learns this from the inclusive wording “if it is eaten,” namely that all the rites that lead to and make possible the eating are subject to piggul. The question then arises whether piggul also invalidates with respect to the pouring out of the remaining blood and the burning of the fats. The answer is derived by means of the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general rule and singled out to teach”: just as sprinkling, which was singled out from the general rule to teach, is a service indispensable for atonement, so too all the rites in which piggul invalidates are only rites indispensable for atonement, excluding the pouring out of the remaining blood and the burning of the fats.

The Exposition in Sifra, Tzav, Parashah 8

In the Sifra on our portion, this exposition appears in a very similar form:

One might think that intention invalidates only at sprinkling. From where do we know to include slaughter and receiving the blood? Scripture says, “If it is eaten,” to include slaughter and receiving the blood. Might I include the remainder of the blood, the burning of the fats, and the eating of the meat? Scripture says, “the one who offers.” Sprinkling was included in the general rule; why was it singled out? To compare others to it. Just as sprinkling is distinctive in that it is indispensable for atonement, so too I include slaughter and receiving the blood, which are indispensable for atonement, and exclude the remainder of the blood, the burning of the fats, and the eating of the meat, which are not indispensable for atonement.

In neither of these expositions does the expression “a matter that was singled out from a general rule to teach” appear explicitly, and Rashi does not add it either. On the other hand, all the stylistic and substantive indications show that this is indeed an exposition by means of that principle.

Against this background, it is interesting to note that there are several changes between the versions in the two sources, and it seems that at least some of them have a principled basis.

Structural Differences Between the Two Expositions

In the midrash quoted in the Babylonian Talmud, the structure is as follows: from “if it is eaten” one includes everything that makes eating possible. This includes all four primary services, although the carrying of the blood is disputed among tannaitic authorities there on 13b, since it is not always necessary to carry the blood, and also the pouring out of the remaining blood and the burning of the fats, which admittedly do not themselves make eating possible, but there is nevertheless an ideal requirement to perform them before eating the meat; see Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 59b, and so too in the explanations of the Hafetz Hayyim to the Gemara, and also in Torah Shelemah here, sections 97 and 99.¹

The question then arises whether piggul applies even to acts that enable eating but do not enable atonement, namely the burning of the fats and the pouring out of the remaining blood. To this comes the exposition by means of the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general rule,” which teaches us that the “general rule” for this law is only the acts that enable atonement. In other words, not every act that enables eating is included for the law of piggul, but only those among them that enable atonement. Thus slaughter and receiving the blood remain included, while the pouring out of the remaining blood and the burning of the fats are excluded.

By contrast, in the Sifra text there are several changes. First, the inclusion derived from “if it is eaten” is not read there as including all things that lead to eating, as the Babylonian Talmud formulates it. The inclusion concerns only slaughter and receiving the blood, without any all-encompassing definition. Second, in the Sifra version, besides the pouring out of the remaining blood and the burning of the fats, the eating of the meat itself is also added. Third, in the Sifra there is a repetition of the inclusion of slaughter and receiving the blood by virtue of the principle of “a matter singled out from a general rule.” That is, this principle not only excludes the pouring out of the remaining blood, the burning of the fats, and the eating of the meat, but also includes slaughter and receiving the blood.²

What is the common root of all these changes? First, it seems that the Sifra is not including all the rites that lead to eating, but sacrificial rites in general. That is why the eating of the meat itself is added to the discussion, even though by definition it is certainly not among the rites that “lead to eating.” This is the picture that emerges from the first two differences. But from this the third difference also becomes clear, namely that the source of the inclusion cannot be only “if it is eaten,” for an inclusion from there would include only what leads to eating.

It is true that the Sifra text also contains an inclusion from “if it is eaten,” and it is not entirely clear whether this is not an addition caused by parallel sources, namely the Babylonian Talmud passage cited above. In any event, even if it does belong to the authentic text, it is still clear that it is not the only source of the inclusion.

Our conclusion is that the main issue on which the two versions of the midrash differ concerns identifying the “general rule” from which sprinkling emerged. According to the Sifra, the general rule is the totality of sacrificial rites; according to the Babylonian Talmud, the general rule is the rites that lead to eating. Where does this general rule appear? Where have we found that in all these rites there is a law of piggul?

The “General Rule” in the Babylonian Talmud

According to the Babylonian Talmud, it seems quite clear that this general rule is the result of the inclusion derived from “if it is eaten.” And in fact Rashi, ad loc., under the words “was included in the general rule,” explains:

“It was included in the general rule of the things that lead to eating.”

That is, the general rule is the totality of rites that lead to eating, and sprinkling is one service that emerged from among them in order to teach about all of them that the law of piggul applies to them.

But this identification raises several serious problems. First, the general rule and the particular appear in the same verse. In last year’s essay we saw that when the general rule and the particular appear in the same verse, we expound “general and particular,” not “a matter singled out from the general rule.” Only when they are far apart, and the problem of the principle that there is no strict earlier and later in the Torah arises, is it impossible to expound by “general and particular,” which are directional rules—the order of appearance matters: whether to judge “only what is in the particular,” or to judge “of the kind of the particular.” Therefore one then expounds by “a matter singled out from the general rule,” which is a non-directional rule, meaning that the order is not important.

Second, the general rule here arises from an inclusion of the verse, and is not written explicitly. If so, we have here a derivation from a derivation: “a matter singled out from the general rule” that is itself learned from an inclusion. And in sacrificial law, it is generally accepted that one does not derive one derived rule from another derived rule.³ Beyond that, in almost all the manifestations familiar to us, the general rule is found in the language of the verse and does not arise from a legal exposition by means of a hermeneutical principle. The reason is that the principle of “a matter singled out from the general rule” is a feature of the biblical text and not of the law itself. As we have noted several times in the past, midrash is not part of the biblical text, and therefore one cannot apply textual hermeneutical principles to laws that emerge from midrash. The discussion of a derivation from a derivation arises only in the context of substantive principles, not textual ones.⁴

The “General Rule” in the Sifra

It may be that the Sifra version solves the problems we raised above. According to the Sifra, the general rule is learned by reasoning. It was obvious to the author of the midrash that the law of piggul was not stated only with regard to sprinkling—perhaps he derives this from “if it is eaten,” although, as we have seen, there is no formal inclusion here of rites that lead to eating.

If so, the general rule in the Sifra is not written explicitly in Scripture at all. It probably does not really emerge from exposition either, but from reasoning that sees sprinkling as an example of a more general category of rites. Yet the author of the midrash still does not know what that category is. At this point the particular case that emerged from the general rule—sprinkling—comes and teaches that the relevant category consists only of rites that enable atonement.

Therefore, in this midrash there is a repetition of the definition of the general rule, as though it too—and not only the exclusion—were included by the emergence from the general rule. Indeed, only after the emergence from the general rule do we know what the broader category is to which the law of piggul by an out-of-time intention was extended.

As we explained in last year’s essay, in such a manifestation of “a matter that was singled out from a general rule,” the problem is not duplication. See the essay on Parashat Vayakhel-Pekudei regarding several kinds of difficulty that can serve as the basis for expositions of this type. In such a manifestation, we ask ourselves why the Torah chose precisely this example in order to teach about the whole category, instead of writing a general law or choosing a different example. From this we conclude that the Torah’s intention is likely to teach something about the general category—namely, that it should be of the kind of sprinkling.

It should be noted that even after the conclusion of the midrash, it is still not clear why sprinkling was chosen and not slaughter or receiving the blood, for these too are rites that enable atonement and eating. The conclusion we proposed above answers the question why the Torah presents the law through an example and does not state it as a general rule. But it still remains difficult why the Torah chose precisely this example. It may be that this is the source of other expositions that the Sages derive from this verse; see Torah Shelemah here.

This proposal resolves the difficulties that arise in the Babylonian Talmud’s version. First, it is not true that the general rule and the particular are found in the same verse. The general rule is not found in Scripture at all. It does not arise from an inclusion, and therefore it is certainly not in the same verse.

Resolving the Second Difficulty in the Babylonian Talmud’s Version: What an Inclusion Is

It may be possible to understand the Babylonian Talmud’s version specifically through these very difficulties. The fact that the general rule arises from an inclusion of the verse is a problem only if we assume that the inclusion from “if it is eaten” is an expansion of the text. But as we have already seen several times in the past, there are inclusive expositions that, once established, become the interpretation of the words in the verse.

In our case, the words “if it is eaten” are superfluous. We have no plain-sense interpretation for them. In such a case, after the inclusion we learn that their literal meaning is the meaning supplied by the exposition. If so, it is now as though the verse explicitly states that all the rites that lead to eating are subject to the law of piggul by an out-of-time intention.

We have already suggested in the past, in the essay for Parashat Pekudei, 5765, that perhaps Rabbi Ishmael does not count inclusion within his list of thirteen hermeneutical principles for precisely this reason. As the author of Keritut writes, hermeneutical principles whose conclusions are regarded as explicitly present in the text are not included in Rabbi Ishmael’s list, because they belong to the plain meaning and not to exposition. See the essays on Parashat Vayeshev and Parashat Pekudei, 5765, and on Parashat Miketz and Parashat Vayigash, 5766, among others.⁵

In the essay for Parashat Vayigash, 5766, we cited Tosafot to Menahot 78a, under the words “from it and another thing,” which states this principle explicitly. It maintains that we expound only from what appears explicitly in Scripture, because the hermeneutical principles are tools for textual interpretation, that is, textual expansion, and not tools for analyzing the law as such.

The First Difficulty in the Babylonian Talmud

From here we may perhaps understand why, according to the Babylonian Talmud, one does not expound here by “general and particular,” even though the general rule and the particular appear in the same verse. As we have seen, the general rule is written in the verse, but not explicitly. But the principle of “general and particular” is a wholly textual principle, grounded in the wording chosen by the Torah. If the Torah writes in the language of a general rule and afterward in the language of a particular, we expound by “general and particular.” But here the wording of the Torah did not choose the language of a general rule. The inclusion reveals to us that the intention of the words “if it is eaten” is some general class of rites, but there is no linguistic formulation of a general rule here. Therefore it cannot be expounded by “general and particular.”

This conclusion sharpens another difference between the principle of “general and particular” and the principle of “a matter singled out from the general rule.”⁶ “A matter singled out from the general rule” relates to the content of the “general rule” and the “particular” in the Torah. It identifies an unnecessary duplication in them, and from that duplication infers a conclusion regarding the entire category. But “general and particular” is a wholly textual principle. It concerns not the meanings of the commands, but the language in which they appear in Scripture. See the essay for Parashat Ki Tissa, 5765, and elsewhere.

This is what we noted in last year’s essay: the hermeneutical principle of “a matter singled out from the general rule” is indeed textual, but it has substantive dimensions as well—especially in its third manifestation, item 3 in the summary above, with which we dealt this year.

The Relation to Analogy

In last year’s essay we asked why a unique hermeneutical principle is needed in order to make us perform an analogy. We may now perhaps understand this. The analogy that we would make without the emergence from the general rule would be more uncontrolled, and we would not know where to stop it. Perhaps it would extend to all sacrificial rites, and perhaps only to those that lead to eating. The emergence from the general rule teaches us the boundaries of the analogy.

If so, the analogy itself does not require a unique hermeneutical principle. But the boundaries of the analogy, which are inherently vague, can be fixed in this way. Where an analogy has clear boundaries, there is indeed no need for special hermeneutical principles for that purpose.

Footnotes