Gemara, Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 7

Table of Contents

• Approaches in the Talmud regarding the koy: domestic animal, doubt, or special status
• Factual doubt: mixed signs versus mixed lineage
• “Both a wild animal and a domestic animal” versus “a third species”: doubt in the law or double certainty
• The model of “half-slave half-free woman”: positive legal rules versus absence of a rule
• Cases of two conflicting positive legal rules: the baby who is fifty-fifty and the question of Torah study
• Examples of “certain doubt” and “doubtful certainty”: conditions in divorce, legal effect, and acquisitions
• Kiddushin not fit for intercourse: a difficulty for Maimonides and a doubt that is not lack of information
• The implication for the koy: double doubt, the forbidden fat of a koy, and a qualitative half-measure
• Back to the passage in Yoma: “a creature unto itself” according to Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish
• Tosafot: “a creature unto itself” in two different senses and the proof from covering the blood
• Nachmanides: “a creature unto itself” to exclude ordinary doubt, and the meaning of “the Sages did not decide about it”
• Conclusion and continuation in the next lecture: moving to the law of education

Summary

General overview

The text summarizes the approaches of the Tannaim and Amoraim in understanding the halakhic status of the koy, and distinguishes between factual doubt, halakhic doubt, and a view of the koy as a complex definite reality of “both and” or as a third species. It expands on halakhic models of mixed situations through examples like a woman who is half-slave and half-free, Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath according to the Or Sameach, and the law of education through a story about the Avnei Nezer. It then draws a distinction between an “ordinary doubt” based on lack of information and a “certain doubt,” where even “if we asked the Holy One, blessed be He,” there would still be no decision about a defined particular, and it applies this to the topic of “kiddushin not fit for intercourse” and to the discussion whether a koy is doubt or certainty. Finally, it returns to the passage in Yoma and presents the disagreement between Tosafot and Nachmanides in understanding “a creature unto itself,” and closes by indicating that the next lecture will open the subject of the law of education.

Approaches in the Talmud regarding the koy: domestic animal, doubt, or special status

The text presents that there are different views in the Talmud about the koy, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel argues that there is no doubt at all and that it is a domestic animal. It sets out as the main track the majority of opinions that the koy is in doubt whether it is a wild animal or a domestic animal, and clarifies the nature of the doubt: whether it is a factual doubt about the identity of the koy or a halakhic doubt about which laws apply to it. It defines factual doubt to mean that they do not know “what this koy is” — whether it is a wild animal or a domestic animal — whereas halakhic doubt deals with the question of which laws to apply to a known reality.

Factual doubt: mixed signs versus mixed lineage

The text attributes to Tosafot the view that the doubt concerning the koy comes from mixed signs of a domestic animal and a wild animal, “like an androgynos,” so that the doubt is created by the visible results and not by lineage itself. It presents another approach attributed to Nachmanides and the Pleti, according to which even without special signs, the mixed lineage itself — a he-goat that mated with a gazelle — creates a classificatory “family” doubt between wild animal and domestic animal. It adds that the Pleti sees the forbidden fat of the koy as a “qualitative half-measure,” meaning a faint but definite prohibition rooted in the fact that it has both a wild-animal aspect and a domestic-animal aspect by virtue of its lineage.

“Both a wild animal and a domestic animal” versus “a third species”: doubt in the law or double certainty

The text suggests the possibility that a koy is both a wild animal and a domestic animal, and in a certain sense there is no doubt in reality here, only a need to clarify what one does halakhically when different laws depend on the distinction between wild and domestic animals. It describes a possibility that the doubt is only a doubt in the law, because the Torah did not say what the law is for “this third type,” and therefore one hesitates whether to apply the laws of a wild animal or those of a domestic animal. It presents another possibility that there is no doubt at all even on the halakhic plane, and that the Sages “left the koy with the status of both a wild animal and a domestic animal” and did not decide to classify it under one side or the other.

The model of “half-slave half-free woman”: positive legal rules versus absence of a rule

The text compares the strange status of the koy to the situation of a woman who is half-slave and half-free, where there is no doubt but certainty of a mixture of statuses. It states that when one side creates a prohibition or obligation and the other side is only permission, the positive legal rule is the dominant one and permission is defined as an absence of a rule. It sharpens the point that such a case resembles the laws of doubt, in that it looks as though one rules stringently, but it is not actually “doubt,” and therefore even in rabbinic law there is no rule of “in a rabbinic doubt, rule leniently”; rather, one follows the existence of the positive rule.

Cases of two conflicting positive legal rules: the baby who is fifty-fifty and the question of Torah study

The text cites the Talmud in Ketubot about an abandoned baby found in a city that is exactly half-and-half, and presents the question what should be done regarding Torah study and Sabbath observance, where a Jew is obligated and a non-Jew is forbidden. It presents the point that the problem arises when both sides have conflicting positive legal rules, and not a case of “a rule and absence of a rule,” and it adds a yeshiva joke as a verbal solution that does not solve the principled difficulty. It applies the principle also to the example of covering the blood on the Sabbath, where from the side of a wild animal there is an obligation and from the side of a domestic animal there is a prohibition.

Examples of “certain doubt” and “doubtful certainty”: conditions in divorce, legal effect, and acquisitions

The text quotes Rabbi Shimon Shkop, who argues that in the case of a woman divorced conditionally there is a status in which she is “both divorced and a married woman” until fulfillment of the condition becomes clear, and it brings practical ramifications such as her prohibition to a kohen. It argues that there is no logical contradiction if one distinguishes between properties and legal effect, and formulates that it may be that there are upon the woman both the legal effect of a divorcee and the legal effect of a married woman, as two legal effects carried together. It expands this through examples of ownership of items from which benefit is prohibited and a slave whose bill of emancipation is being withheld, in order to argue that the legal effect of ownership is a legal bond that is not identical with the list of practical rights.

Kiddushin not fit for intercourse: a difficulty for Maimonides and a doubt that is not lack of information

The text presents the topic of “kiddushin not fit for intercourse” in the case of a man who betrothed one of two sisters without specifying which one, and defines that the prohibition to have relations with either of them does not stem from ordinary doubt but from a situation in which no particular woman was defined. It raises a difficulty for the view of Maimonides that a Torah-level doubt is ruled leniently, because the Talmud calls this case “not fit for intercourse,” and it suggests, following Rabbi Shimon Shkop, that the kiddushin take effect with certainty on “one undefined woman” and not as a doubt that can be resolved. It distinguishes between a situation in which there is a hidden truth that the Holy One, blessed be He, “could answer” — who is betrothed — and a situation in which there is no answer about a defined individual at all, because the definition itself is missing, and it calls this “a certain doubt and not a doubtful certainty,” while arguing that probability is not the right tool in such a case, and mentioning “fuzzy logic” as the kind of logic that deals with vagueness.

The implication for the koy: double doubt, the forbidden fat of a koy, and a qualitative half-measure

The text applies the distinction to the koy and argues that if the koy is the certainty of “both this and that,” then “the forbidden fat of a koy is prohibited” because of the wild-animal dimension within it, and therefore an additional doubt whether this is forbidden fat or ordinary fat does not create a double doubt that would allow leniency. It connects this back to the Pleti, who defines the prohibition as a “qualitative half-measure,” a faint but existing Torah-level prohibition. In this way it presents a practical difference between seeing the koy as an ordinary doubt and seeing it as a definite but complex state.

Back to the passage in Yoma: “a creature unto itself” according to Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish

The text argues that from the passage in Yoma it appears that at least according to Rabbi Yohanan, the koy is “a creature unto itself” in the sense that it is not a doubt, and notes that even regarding Reish Lakish there is a difficulty if it were merely a doubt, because without a verse one would in any event have ruled stringently. It emphasizes that the Talmud itself asks, “Is a koy a doubt? Do we need a verse to include a doubt?” and concludes, “A distinct creature is different,” from which it follows that the derivation from the verse is not coming to be stringent in a doubtful case but to include a case that does not automatically fall into the framework of wild animal/domestic animal. It sets this against the tension with parallel passages in the Talmud that present the koy as a doubt.

Tosafot: “a creature unto itself” in two different senses and the proof from covering the blood

The text brings Tosafot, who distinguish between “a creature unto itself here,” meaning that it is not in doubt whether it is a wild animal or a domestic animal, and the wording of Rabbi Yosei in Hullin, “it is a creature unto itself and the Sages did not decide about it,” which according to Tosafot means that it is in doubt whether it is a wild animal or a domestic animal. It presents Tosafot’s proof from the law of covering the blood, that “one may not slaughter a koy on a Jewish holiday, and if one slaughtered it, one does not cover its blood,” and argues that Tosafot conclude that if it were clearly a third species not subject to blood-covering, it would have been permitted to slaughter it on a Jewish holiday. It notes that on this understanding it becomes difficult to see what Rabbi Yosei adds compared to another opinion, and suggests a possible difference between doubt in reality and doubt in the law, but emphasizes that in the passage in Yoma one cannot explain “creature” as doubt, because the verse should not be coming to include a doubtful case.

Nachmanides: “a creature unto itself” to exclude ordinary doubt, and the meaning of “the Sages did not decide about it”

The text brings Nachmanides in Yevamot chapter 8, who argues that “the expression ‘a creature unto itself’ was said specifically to exclude ordinary doubt,” and he bases this on the passage in Yoma: “Do we need a verse to include a doubtful case?” Therefore, “creature” means that it is neither a wild animal nor a domestic animal at all. It quotes Nachmanides, who explains “and the Sages did not decide about it” to mean that its signs do not determine its belonging either to the species of wild animals or to the species of domestic animals, and therefore “they made it into a third species unto itself.” It highlights that Nachmanides insists on a uniform meaning for the phrase “a creature unto itself” everywhere, unlike Tosafot, who distinguish between different contexts.

Conclusion and continuation in the next lecture: moving to the law of education

The text concludes with an announcement of a break and return, and then states that up to this point a survey has been presented of the possibilities for understanding the doubt concerning the koy, and it returns to complete the reading of the passage. It marks that the continuation of the discussion will be on the subject of the law of education in chapter 8 of Yoma, skipping the aggadic material and the discussion of the five afflictions, and referring to the location “page 82a” and to the instructions in the Dropbox file. It closes by coordinating the next lecture and with a concluding blessing.

I want to begin—that is, begin and finish—the topic of the koy, which we’re still in the middle of. I’ll just mute things so there won’t be noise here. Okay, so first of all, a summary of what we’ve seen. We saw that there are already several approaches in the Talmud itself—Tannaim and Amoraim—in understanding the halakhic status of a koy. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel claims that there is no doubt at all, that it is domestic livestock. But according to most views, a koy is some kind of animal about which the Sages were uncertain, or did not decide, whether it is a wild animal or domestic livestock.

As for the nature of the doubt, we saw two directions, which split further into several sub-directions. Either we’re dealing with a factual doubt, or we’re dealing with a halakhic doubt. A factual doubt is basically a doubt about what this koy actually is. The halakhic doubts derive from the factual doubt, but first of all there is the basic issue that we simply do not know the nature of this fellow—whether it is a wild animal or domestic livestock.

Now, we saw three directions under this heading of factual doubt. Tosafot understood that there is a doubt because the koy has signs of both domestic livestock and wild animal, like an androginos. Since that is so, we do not know how to classify it—under wild animal or under domestic livestock. We are uncertain because of its signs. True, in terms of its origin it is a goat that mated with a gazelle, but according to Tosafot it seems that what generates the doubt is not the origin but the outcome. Because of that mixed origin, it has mixed signs, and what generates the doubt is the signs. Another approach is that of Nachmanides, which we’ll see below, and the P’leiti also seems to imply this—we saw him in the topic of half-measures—that regardless of the signs, let’s say even if this koy had no signs at all, still the very fact that it has mixed parentage, and its parents are a mixture of wild animal and domestic livestock, leaves us in doubt how to classify it, regardless of whatever signs it currently has physically. Something that comes from a wild animal is a wild animal, something that comes from domestic livestock is domestic livestock; this comes from both, and we do not know—even if there were no signs—to which “family,” so to speak, to assign it. Basically it’s some kind of hybrid creature.

You could say that there is some status here of “this and that together cause it.” There are two things here that created this koy, two causes, and the question is how we relate it to each of those causes. I remind you that the P’leiti we brought in the topic of half-measures treats the koy like a half-measure in quality. Meaning that the forbidden fat of the koy is really the forbidden fat of a partial wild animal, because it is the forbidden fat of something that comes from a wild animal and comes from domestic livestock. It has something of the wild animal in it and something of the domestic livestock in it. So because of that, it is basically a mixture of wild animal and domestic livestock because of its origin—where it comes from. And this is clearly not a problem of signs, as Tosafot says, but a problem of origin.

The third possibility is to say that the koy is both a wild animal and domestic livestock. In a certain sense there is no doubt here at all; it is both a wild animal and domestic livestock, of course. Now we have to discuss what to do with it, and here several possibilities arise. One could say that since in many laws we distinguish between wild animal and domestic livestock—covering the blood and various things like that, forbidden fat, covering the blood, and the like—the Sages hesitated and did not decide whether to place it with the wild animal category or with the domestic livestock category. But not because it is doubtfully a wild animal or doubtfully domestic livestock. We know what it is; it is a creature unto itself. But in terms of the laws, we do not know whether to associate it with the set of laws of wild animal or with the set of laws of domestic livestock, because the Torah did not say what the law is for this third type. So there is room to say that there is still a doubt here, but the doubt is not a doubt in reality. In reality we know what the koy is. The doubt is in the law. The question is whether this koy, whose identity we know, is subject to the law of wild animal or the law of domestic livestock. The doubt is not about who the koy is, but a halakhic doubt about which laws to apply to it, okay? Therefore this is really a doubt in law. Rather, the doubt is halakhic: which laws to apply to it. Okay, so this is really a doubt, a doubt in law.

A second possibility is that there is really no doubt here at all even on the halakhic plane. The koy is simply a creature that we know exactly what it is. We have no doubt, neither factual nor halakhic. Rather, it has both sets of laws. It has the law of a wild animal and the law of domestic livestock. When the Talmud says that the Sages did not decide about it, it does not mean that they were in doubt. On the contrary: the Sages left the koy in the status of both wild animal and domestic livestock and did not choose to classify it either under wild animal or under domestic livestock. They chose not to decide, meaning they left it in its known condition. This is not doubt; it is certainty—both wild animal and domestic livestock. And on this I want to expand a little.

Basically, this strange status is something a bit like half-slave half-free. A half-slave half-free woman is basically a case where a woman has a mixed status—she is both a slave and a free woman. For example, if two people jointly owned her as a slave, and one of them freed his share. So now the half that belonged to him is free, and the other half of her is a slave. In a woman of this type there is no doubt at all. We have no doubt about what her status is; we know exactly what it is. It is not even a halakhic doubt. It is certainty—certainty that there is a mixture in her of slave and free woman together. Things like this are sometimes called doubt, as we’ll soon see.

Maybe I’ll bring one or two more examples. Another example: the Or Sameach writes on Maimonides, in the laws of the Yom Kippur service. Maimonides writes there that, of course, the service on Yom Kippur is assigned to the High Priest; the High Priest has to perform the service. During the rest of the year, the service is performed by an ordinary priest. What happens when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath and we need to bring the additional Sabbath offerings besides the sacrifices of the Yom Kippur service itself? We need to bring the Sabbath offerings. Which priest brings the Sabbath offerings? Maimonides writes that it is the High Priest. In other words, the High Priest does all the service that day, including the Sabbath additional offerings.

So the Or Sameach asks: why? The Sabbath offerings come because it is Sabbath on that day, not because it is Yom Kippur, and Sabbath service is performed by an ordinary priest, not by the High Priest. Why must the High Priest also bring the Sabbath offerings?

So the Or Sameach says that Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath is really a day of a certain type—it is not a mixture of Sabbath and Yom Kippur; I’ll put it in my own language—it is a fusion of Sabbath and Yom Kippur that merged to create something new, with a dimension of Sabbath and a dimension of Yom Kippur. Now, regarding each of the laws of that day, we have to determine what the law is—whether it is like Sabbath or like Yom Kippur—but after we determine it, that determination is certain, not a matter of doubt. Such a day has both the laws of Sabbath and the laws of Yom Kippur, and therefore all the sacrifices brought that day, including the Sabbath additional offerings that are brought on that day, are actually part of the service of that day. That day is called Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. And the service of that day is done by the High Priest, not by an ordinary priest. Meaning: regarding whether Sabbath offerings must be brought, we determine yes—there is a Sabbath dimension here. Regarding whether the service is by the High Priest, we determine yes—that there is a Yom Kippur dimension here. But it is not that we do the Sabbath offerings with an ordinary priest and the Yom Kippur service with the High Priest. Once we have determined that Sabbath offerings are brought, then Sabbath offerings are brought. Now those offerings are the offerings of Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath; they are not just Sabbath offerings. There is no plain Sabbath here now; there is Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. This is one day. It is not a joining of two different days—it is a fusion, with a chet, yes? It is their fusion and the creation of a new day. But now it is one day. If its service is by the High Priest, then all the service of that day is by the High Priest. And by that point we no longer remember where each component in the day’s service originally came from.

What happens, for example—and this relates to the next part of the lecture, which we’ll discuss regarding the laws of education—what happens if someone eats on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath? Do they have to recite kiddush? Someone who eats because he is ill, say. Or a child, if you want. Does he have to recite kiddush? The Or Sameach argues that he does not. Why? But because of Sabbath law, in that respect I am obligated in kiddush. In fact, some halakhic authorities wanted to claim that even on Yom Kippur that does not fall on the Sabbath, if there is a sick person who needs to eat, he must recite kiddush, because Yom Kippur is a festival like any other festival. It is only that we do not recite kiddush on it because we do not eat, and kiddush is made over food. But someone who does eat, because he is ill, would have the obligation of kiddush return to him, like on any other festival.

But the Or Sameach is speaking about Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. As for Yom Kippur itself, apparently it is obvious to him that kiddush is not defined for it. But Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath—he says you are obligated in kiddush, but you are obligated in kiddush because of the Sabbath that is in it. Okay? So now what? So if you’re… if you’re a sick person who eats, apparently you should have to recite kiddush, since there is a Sabbath aspect in it. The Or Sameach says no. Since this is Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath, kiddush is not defined for that day. Just as on an ordinary Yom Kippur kiddush is not defined. Consequently, even one who eats does not recite kiddush. It is not a composite of Sabbath and Yom Kippur, where on Yom Kippur there is no kiddush and on Sabbath there is kiddush, and if someone eats… we don’t eat, of course, because of the Yom Kippur side of it. But if someone is ill and therefore does eat, then because of the Sabbath aspect in it, he should have to recite kiddush. Says the Or Sameach: what are you talking about? This is not a composite of Sabbath and Yom Kippur; it is a third type of day: Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. Now on such a day, each law has to be considered on its own. But the Or Sameach assumes that on such a day, in effect, it has the character of Yom Kippur regarding kiddush, and therefore kiddush is not defined there. Consequently, the fact that we do not recite kiddush is not merely because we do not eat. There is no law of kiddush on such a day. Therefore even one who does eat, like someone who is ill, does not have to recite kiddush on such a day, because on that day there is no kiddush.

As an aside, I just remembered that this is a bit connected to the next topic we’ll discuss in education. It is told about the Avnei Nezer that when he was a small child, his father sent him to eat in the synagogue on Yom Kippur morning. When he came back, his father asked him, “Tell me, did you recite kiddush?” “Of course not—Yom Kippur!” “What do you mean? You need to recite kiddush—you’re eating! We don’t recite kiddush because we don’t eat.” Exactly that reasoning. “But you are eating!” So the Avnei Nezer answered him brilliantly. He says to him—not like the Or Sameach said. He says that even according to the view that disagrees with the Or Sameach, I still would not have to recite kiddush. A minor is not like a sick person. Why? Because the whole reason a minor is obligated to recite kiddush is because of the law of education, so that he will know what to do when he is an adult. But when he is an adult, he won’t go eat. So when he is a child and he goes to eat, he does not need to recite kiddush, because the obligation is not about what he is doing right now, but only to educate him what to do when he is an adult. When he is an adult, he will not eat, so in any case he will not need kiddush. One can quibble and say that he needs to be educated such that if he should be sick and eat, then he would need to recite kiddush. Fine, that already depends on the dispute we saw earlier. But this answer of the Avnei Nezer is an answer that works not on the plane I spoke about earlier. Because if what I said earlier is correct, then according to the Or Sameach he should have answered, “What do you want? On Yom Kippur, kiddush is not defined at all; even if I were an adult and eating, I would not need to recite kiddush.” He assumes against the Or Sameach that on Yom Kippur kiddush is defined; we just do not recite it because we do not eat. According to his view, for example, an adult who was eating because he was ill really would have to recite kiddush. The child who eats does not have to recite kiddush because the kiddush obligation for a child is only education, to know what to do when he is an adult, and when he is an adult he will not eat. But a sick person who eats on Yom Kippur—even on regular Yom Kippur, not Yom Kippur on the Sabbath—would need to recite kiddush. That is what comes out.

Okay, so that was just an aside. Remember it for the second part of the lecture when we get to the law of education. So the claim, basically—to return to the koy—is that there may be an understanding of the koy as both wild animal and domestic livestock. Maybe that is the meaning of “a creature unto itself” that we saw in our topic. We’ll see that in a moment. But it is also… it is both wild animal and domestic livestock, and in fact there may not even be any doubt here. Not only is there no factual doubt—that is obvious—that is what we said earlier in Maimonides’ approach, but there may also be no halakhic doubt here. Because if there is no factual doubt—it is both wild animal and domestic livestock—one might have said there is still doubt about the law, whether it has the law of a wild animal or the law of domestic livestock. And there is the possibility of saying: what do you mean, no. There is no doubt here at all. It has both the law of a wild animal and the law of domestic livestock. Each matter on its own.

What do we do in such a case, where it has both the law of wild animal and the law of domestic livestock? It is like half-slave half-free. Say, is she permitted to marry an Israelite? The answer is no. Why? Because from the slave side of her, it is forbidden. From the free side of her, it is permitted—but she is not obligated, only permitted, right? From the slave side of her, it is forbidden. So which side prevails? The prohibition prevails. Why? Because permission has no real standing. Permission means you are allowed to do it and allowed not to do it. But from the slave side, it is forbidden. Therefore it is clear that the law of the slave side here is the dominant one. The law of the free side is recessive, right? It basically has no effect here; it is only permission—there is no prohibition.

When we talk about permission in Jewish law, “permitted” means the absence of law. That is what “permission” means. Law means either obligation or prohibition. It is a state in which there is a law on the person or on the situation or on the object—either one must do something or one is forbidden to do something. That is called having a law. Permission means that you can do it, you can refrain from doing it—in other words, there is no law. Right? So if in the case of half-slave half-free, from the slave side she is forbidden to marry an Israelite, that means there is a law on her from the slave side, right? The law is a prohibition—she is forbidden to marry an Israelite. From the free side there is no law on her. She is permitted to marry an Israelite and also permitted not to; there is no law. Right? So if from the half-slave side there is a law and from the free side there is no law, then in the end the existent law prevails; the absence of law affects nothing. Therefore she is forbidden to marry an Israelite. Okay?

But also, in principle, she is forbidden to marry a slave—not a slave, a bondsman. Because from the free side in her it is forbidden, and from the slave side it is permitted. But this time it is specifically from the free side that there is a law on her. From the slave side there is no law on her. Therefore wherever there is a law, that is always the dominant factor—it always determines. Okay?

Do you think such a state should be called a state of doubt? You see that in some laws she is treated as a slave and in other laws she is treated as free. Is it correct to relate to such a situation as a state of doubt? What do you say? It is not doubt, because both these laws and those laws apply to her. There is no doubt here at all. No doubt at all. True, sometimes we see her as a slave and sometimes we see her as free, because in truth she is both. That is not because of doubt. It is very similar to the laws of doubt, and therefore sometimes you will see among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) that they use language as though it were a state of doubt. Because we always go stringently; we go stringently as a slave and stringently as a free woman, and it is really like the laws of doubt, like a Torah-level doubt treated stringently. But it is not really a state of doubt.

Where will the practical difference show up? Let me show you the practical difference. What happens when there is a rabbinic law, where from the slave side, say, she is forbidden, and from the free side there is no prohibition—it is permitted. Shall we go leniently because it is a rabbinic-level doubt and therefore lenient? No, we will go stringently. Why? Because this is not doubt. From the slave side she is forbidden, and therefore a prohibition applies to her, even if it is a rabbinic prohibition. From the free side there is no prohibition, so fine, but from the slave side there is. So the prohibition exists in the end, even if we are talking about a rabbinic prohibition. Therefore it has nothing to do with the laws of doubt, and this sharpens the point that this mixed determination has nothing to do with the laws of doubt. Rather, it is both this and this—not maybe this maybe that, but both. True, the practical laws come out similar to the laws of doubt, but even that is not entirely so. If this were doubt, then in rabbinic matters we would go leniently. But this is not doubt; it is both and both. Therefore even in rabbinic matters we go stringently. Not “stringently,” really, but rather we follow whatever the positive law is. There is always a positive law and a negative law. The positive law will prevail.

You know the yeshiva joke: is it true that in every mixed state like this, one law will always be positive and the other negative? Or can there be a state of two positive laws? There can be states where both laws are positive. For example, you know the Talmud in Ketubot at the end of chapter one. The Talmud discusses someone who found an infant abandoned in the street. Now we are uncertain whether the infant is a gentile or a Jew. The Talmud says that we go according to the surrounding population. If he found it in a city whose majority is Jewish, we rule that he is Jewish. If the city is majority gentile, we rule that he is gentile. Okay? The Talmud asks: what if it is half and half? What happens in a city with half gentiles and half Jews? Rabbi Yirmiyah asks. So the Talmud says: then it is a doubt; we apply the laws of doubt here. So they ask: okay, then every matter stringently—whether we clear rubble off him, whether we support him, all sorts of things like that.

Now people ask: what is that half-and-half infant supposed to do regarding Torah study? Same thing, by the way, with Sabbath observance. Torah study and Sabbath observance are very special laws. Why? Because gentiles are not only not commanded in them, they are forbidden to do them. They are forbidden to observe the Sabbath, and they are forbidden to study Torah—“Moses commanded us the Torah, an inheritance”; it belongs to us, it is theft if they take it. Now here there is a problem. Why? Because if he is Jewish, he is obligated to study Torah. If he is a gentile, it is not just that he is not obligated. If he were merely not obligated, we would say to him: stringently, study—from the Jewish side in you, study. But no: if he is a gentile, then it is forbidden to him. So how do you decide such a doubt? From the Jewish side he is obligated, from the gentile side it is forbidden. So how do you decide?

So the joke in the yeshivot is that he should “talk in learning.” That is the yeshiva version of wasting Torah-study time. If one “talks in learning,” we have an excuse that we are not wasting time, but you know, we are not trying too hard in the learning either—just throwing around thoughts. So that is the yeshiva joke. But for our purposes, this is really an interesting situation, because it is a situation in which there is a positive law on both sides. Regarding Torah study, this is not law versus absence of law, but law and anti-law. The Jew is obligated and the gentile is forbidden. Usually if one is obligated then the other is permitted; if one is forbidden then the other is permitted. So one of them is a direct law and the other is a law of absence—one positive and one negative. In this situation there are two laws, both of which are positive—positive in the sense that they are actual laws. One, of course, is a law that forbids and the other is a law that obligates, but both are positive in the sense that actual laws apply there. Okay, what do we do in such a situation? There is nothing to do in such a situation. I do not know what to do in such a situation.

So also in our context, say with the koy or with half-slave half-free, this does not mean that in every situation that comes before us we will always be able to decide. It could be that there will be a situation in which both sides have contradictory positive laws. It will not be law and absence of law, but both sides will have laws. And then we will really have a problem what to do with the koy—for example, if in the matter of covering the blood, say covering the blood on the Sabbath, okay? So regarding covering the blood on the Sabbath: from the wild-animal side in it, one is obligated to cover the blood, right? Therefore one does that even on the Sabbath. From the domestic-livestock side in it, one is not obligated in covering the blood, and therefore it is forbidden to do so on the Sabbath. Not only is one not obligated—it is forbidden. So here there is a problem with the laws of doubt. Okay? Fine, but we do not have to solve every problem. So that is the status of the koy.

I’ll perhaps bring you one more example of this situation, which in the yeshiva world is called a “certain doubt” and not a “doubtful certainty.” Another example: Rabbi Shimon Shkop writes that if, say, a man divorced a woman on condition that she not drink wine for ten years, okay? What is her status during those ten years? Rabbi Shimon Shkop wants to argue that her status is that she is both divorced and a married woman until it becomes clear whether the condition was fulfilled or not fulfilled—and then this quantum wave function collapses. But in the meantime we are in superposition: she is both divorced and a married woman. Practical consequences: from the divorced side in her she is forbidden to a priest, and from the married-woman side in her she is forbidden to everyone.

Okay? Suppose her husband dies. Is she permitted to a priest? A widow is permitted to an ordinary priest, but from the side that she is divorced, what difference does it make that her husband died? She is divorced; she is forbidden to a priest. But to an ordinary man, just some person off the street, if her husband died she may marry, because a divorced woman may marry and a widow may marry. So here, regarding an ordinary man, we treat her as a widow. Regarding a priest, we treat her as divorced. Again, this looks like the laws of doubt—always going stringently, forbidding her both to a priest and to an Israelite. But it is not stringency; both laws are present. She is both a married woman and divorced. Both things together.

As an aside I’ll just say here: fine, in half-slave half-free I can understand what it means that she is both slave and… if she is a slave she is not free, if she is free she is not a slave. No, I’m half this and half that. But here it is not half and half. Here she is fully both this and that. What does that mean? If she is a married woman then she is not divorced; if she is divorced then she is not a married woman. How can you say that a certain woman is both a married woman and divorced simultaneously? Isn’t that a logical contradiction?

So about that I once wrote an article, and in the summary I give a link to it. And I said there as follows. They cornered me with this in Yerucham, when I taught in the yeshiva in Yerucham. We were learning the topic of conditions, and I told them this reasoning of Rabbi Shimon Shkop, that until fulfillment or cancellation of the condition, the woman has a double status—she is both a married woman and divorced at the same time. They asked me, what does that mean? If she is a married woman she is not divorced; if she is divorced she is not a married woman. So—one second, just a second. Half a minute. Sorry.

So what I said to them there was this: it is impossible for a woman to be both divorced and a married woman. That cannot be. But it can be that the legal status of “divorced” and the legal status of “married woman” both apply to the woman. My point was this: I asked them whether they had ever thought about whether there is anything that has no opposite. What do you think—is there anything that has no opposite? Zero? Zero—the opposite of zero. The opposite itself? Well, the opposite of the opposite is the straight. So at first I went around with this for a while and found nothing that has no opposite. I came to a good friend of mine, someone I liked philosophizing with—not religious, an old friend from childhood and later from the army, doesn’t matter. So he said to me, what do you mean? Lots of things have no opposite. A dove has no opposite, a cloud has no opposite, a table has no opposite. Are there not plenty of things with no opposite? So I began to think—wait, how did I not come up with that myself? There are so many things that have no opposite. And then I understood that all the time I had been thinking about properties. For properties, every property has an opposite. But objects have no opposite. What does it mean for an object to have an opposite? There can be an opposite property, but there is no “opposition” between objects. Opposition is a relation between properties, not between objects. I can say salty is the opposite of sweet, but salt is not the opposite of sugar. Right? Salt and sugar are two different things. What does that have to do with “opposite”? Not opposite—this is salt and that is sugar. The taste of salty is opposite to the taste of sweet, because salty and sweet are characteristics. Salt and sugar are objects.

Now when I say that a dish is both salty and sweet—salty all the way and sweet all the way—then I’ve said a logical contradiction; that is nonsense. But if I say that the dish contains both salt and sugar, there is no problem with that at all, right? There is no contradiction in saying it has salt and also has sugar. My claim is that the same is true with a married woman. To say that this married woman has two opposite properties—that she is both a married woman and divorced—cannot be. That is a contradiction, because these are properties and those properties are opposites. So it cannot be that a woman is both divorced and a married woman at the same time. But it can be that the legal status of “divorced” and the legal status of “married woman” both apply to the woman, because I claim that a legal status is a kind of object. Not a potential… it is as if she is carrying on her back a backpack called “the status of divorced.” And she has another backpack on her back called “the status of married woman.” So she has two statuses on her. There is no problem—just as a dish can contain salt and sugar.

Now I can only ask what the laws will be that pertain to this woman. The calculation regarding the laws is the calculation we made earlier. In these two statuses—divorced and married woman—the laws that stem from them are either laws of absence or positive laws. The positive law will always be dominant. Say if the status of divorced and the status of married woman both apply to her, and I ask whether she is permitted to a priest. From the divorced status in her, she is forbidden to a priest; a law applies to her. From her married-woman status, she is permitted—there is no problem there. So in the bottom line she is forbidden. Because the law is that she is forbidden to a priest. There is also an absence of law by which she is permitted, but that is nothing. Okay? By contrast, to an ordinary person who is not a priest, she will also be forbidden. Why? Because from the married-woman status in her she is forbidden to an ordinary man. From the divorced status in her she is permitted to him. The prohibition is a law. The permission is absence of law. Therefore she will be forbidden. What I said before.

What I said before is the halakhic calculation—meaning, what laws will apply to such a woman. But in terms of her factual status, she is both this and that. That is really the claim. And she has a potential, we said. What? That she has the potential to be both a married woman and… No, no, no, it is not potential. She is both right now. It will become clear in the future, but the potential currently exists. What will be in the future? No, it is not what will be in the future—it exists now, not potential. She is a married woman and divorced simultaneously. It will become clear in the future. It will become… clear in the future, but now she is both a married woman and divorced. By the way, “it will become clear in the future” depends on whether this is a condition of “from now” or a condition of “if.” We won’t get into that right now.

This whole idea of legal status… yes. Legal status. Isn’t that a fiction? Isn’t it just wordplay? Instead of saying “divorced,” one says “the legal status of divorced”? I don’t see a substantive difference. The analogy was very clear—properties and objects. But what is the point of the analogy? The point is exactly what I want to argue. That legal status is an object and not a property. And this is not a matter of wordplay. If you think it is wordplay, then you are not making this distinction. I am trying to suggest here that this is not wordplay. And to say that a woman is a married woman is not the same thing as saying that the legal status of “married woman” applies to her. It is not the same thing. The legal status of “married woman” can apply to her, but her laws will not be the laws of a married woman, because if an opposing legal status also applies to her, then sometimes different laws will emerge. The legal status is the cause of the laws; it is not the laws. The laws are a result of the existence of the legal status.

For example… another example I brought in that same article is ownership. There can be a situation in which I own something, but have no rights in it at all. I cannot do anything with it. For example, things from which benefit is forbidden, according to the views that say there is ownership over things from which benefit is forbidden. I cannot do anything with it. So does that mean I am not the owner? What is the meaning of ownership? That I have rights of use, no? But I have no rights of use. In what sense am I the owner? How can there be a view that says there is ownership over things from which benefit is forbidden? My claim is that ownership is a metaphysical bond between me and the object. Usually it has halakhic implications that are a legal characteristic: I have rights of use, others do not have rights of use. But sometimes there may be a situation in which those implications do not appear. Something prevents those implications from appearing, and they do not. “A lion crouches upon it”—meaning, the Torah forbids me to make use of my rights. So my ownership still exists even though it has no legal expression. I cannot make use of that ownership. But that does not mean that there is no ownership. Okay?

Or a slave awaiting a writ of release. That was really my main proof. Because with things from which benefit is forbidden, one could say that I do have rights of use—it is just forbidden for me to make use of them. Like pork. Pork certainly belongs to me; the Torah simply forbids me to eat it. That is not a violation of my proprietary rights. I am forbidden to make that use of it. It is forbidden; it is not that it is not mine. If someone were to take that pork, then he would not be a thief? Of course he would be a thief. It is mine. And if I want, I can even eat it. I would violate a prohibition, but no one else can prevent me from eating it, because it is mine. On the legal plane, it is completely mine. So things from which benefit is forbidden are not such strong proof. But in the case of a slave awaiting a writ of release, I have proofs that a slave awaiting a writ of release is a slave who… but still, as long as I have not given him a writ of release, he is still my slave. For example, the Talmud says that someone who injures him pays his master. Pays me. Why does he pay me? I did not lose anything. He does not belong to me; I have relinquished all my rights. Why should he not pay the slave himself? The answer is: because I am still the owner. I am the owner even though that has no legal implication. And here this is already on the legal plane—not that there is a prohibition as with things from which benefit is forbidden; here it is a legal consequence. Because I am claiming that legally I have no rights of use; it is not mine; I relinquished it. So to that state you call “the legal status of ownership”? Yes. The legal status of ownership that does not express itself on the legal plane. I cannot make use of it. But here, the reason I cannot make use of it is because it really isn’t mine. In the case of things from which benefit is forbidden, it is because the Torah forbids me. “A lion crouches upon it.” But here it really is not mine. Those rights are simply not my rights. And still there is a legal status of ownership, which very much sharpens what I said earlier: that the legal status of ownership does not mean the bundle of rights it grants me. It is the reason that I have that bundle of rights, but it is not identical with that bundle of rights. Okay?

Maybe one last example. I’m drifting a bit here, but these are just interesting halakhic anecdotes in general. For example, Rabbi Shimon Shkop speaks about kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse. What is kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse? The Talmud in Kiddushin says that if someone comes to a man who has two daughters who are sisters, and he gives him a coin and says, “One of your two daughters is betrothed to me,” without specifying which one, and the father agrees—then now one of the two daughters is betrothed to me. Now the Talmud says: this is kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse. Why? Because if Rachel is betrothed to me, then Leah is my wife’s sister and I am forbidden to have relations with her. But if Leah is betrothed to me, then Rachel is forbidden to me because she is my wife’s sister. It turns out that now, because of the doubt, I cannot have relations with either Rachel or Leah. So if so, this is kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse. I cannot have relations with either of them. About such kiddushin there is a dispute between Abaye and Rava whether it is valid kiddushin or not—kiddushin that cannot be realized through intercourse.

Now how do you understand that situation? There is basically a doubt here as to which woman out of the two sisters is betrothed to me, and the prohibition of intercourse arises because of the doubt—because I do not know which of the two it is, so I have a doubt. Apparently. Then I ask you a question: what would this be according to Maimonides, who says that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently on the Torah level? Meaning, the obligation to be stringent regarding a Torah-level doubt is only rabbinic. But on the Torah level, a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. Well then, according to Maimonides this kiddushin is indeed fit to lead to intercourse. So why does the Talmud say that this is kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse? It is only rabbinically unfit to lead to intercourse, but on the Torah level I can have relations with either one, because after all it is a doubt, and a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. This Talmudic passage is therefore very difficult for Maimonides. How can the Talmud call it kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse? What do you say? I’ve already given you all the hints.

This kiddushin applies also to one sister and to the other sister in a certain sense. Do you hear? Not as a doubt, but the kiddushin definitely takes effect on one sister and on the other sister. We do not know which, but each one is fully, fully… That is how Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains it. He does not ask the question against Maimonides—that is my question—but he explains that doubts of this sort are really not doubts at all. The kiddushin definitely takes effect on one unspecified member of the two. But that is not… What is doubt? Understand, this is a subtle point. A doubt is a state where if you asked the Holy One, blessed be He, He would tell you what the truth is; only you lack the information. You do not know whether Rachel is betrothed to you or Leah is betrothed to you. But if you ask the Holy One, blessed be He, then He can tell you: “Yes, yes, it’s Rachel.” In the situation before us, even if we ask the Holy One, blessed be He, He cannot answer me which one is betrothed to me, because I did not define any specific one. Meaning, what we have here is not missing information.

Every doubt we know is lack of information. That is what doubt is, right? If I have a doubt, that means I do not have all the information. I am missing information; I have partial information; so I am in doubt. But here I have no partial information issue at all. I have the full information in the situation. Everything the Holy One, blessed be He, knows, I also know. This is not doubt. Or alternatively, even the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot resolve this doubt, because there is nothing to resolve. There is no true answer that I simply do not know. The true answer is that one undefined one of the two is betrothed to me. That is the true answer. There is no hidden layer here where only I am missing the information and do not know it. So I cannot go to the Holy One, blessed be He, and ask Him, “Reveal to me secretly what the truth is here, because I don’t know.” Here I know exactly the truth; I know what the Holy One, blessed be He, knows. So in such a state, says Rabbi Shimon Shkop, this is not a state of doubt.

In yeshiva language they call it: this is a “certain doubt” and not a “doubtful certainty.” Because if I sent an agent to betroth a woman for me—say between two women—I told him, “Choose one of them and betroth her to me,” and the agent betrothed one and died, and I do not know which of the two he… say he did the betrothal through her father, fine? And the father also died. I have no one to check with. Poor guy, there was some mass plague there, everyone died. I have no way of checking which one is betrothed to me. What do I do? I am in doubt. Now in such a doubt I can ask the Holy One, blessed be He, because He knows which one is betrothed to me, right? There is a true answer here; nobody in the world just knows it. That is a state of doubt. Therefore in yeshivot they call that a “doubtful certainty.” There is definitely a doubt here.

The earlier case—someone who betrothed one of two women without specifying which one, two sisters, two women—that is a “certain doubt.” What does that mean? I have certainty, as it were, on both sides. This is not a state of doubt. It is a doubt that is certain. There is no lack of information here at all; there is no doubt here. Rather there are two sides, both of them certain. A bit like half-slave half-free. Not exactly, because it is two women, but somewhat similar. Okay? Basically this is really quantum superposition. It is both that she is betrothed to me and that she is betrothed to me. So this is a case of “certain doubt” and not “doubtful certainty.”

Likewise, say I have two coins in my pocket and I consecrate one of them to the Temple treasury, without specifying which. What is that? Do I have a doubt which coin is consecrated? There is no doubt here at all. Even the Holy One, blessed be He, does not know which one, because I did not define which of the two coins I am consecrating. I consecrated one and did not define which one. That too is a case of “certain doubt,” not “doubtful certainty.” And so on and so forth. Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings several examples there of this point, that this is a completely different kind of doubt.

By the way, in a doubt of this kind, one cannot use statistics. Statistics means that the truth is one thing; I just do not know what the truth is. There is a probability that the truth is A, and another probability that the truth is B. So I do a statistical calculation. But here there are no possibilities; there are no possibilities here at all. There is one possibility, and it is clear and certain, and the possibility is that one woman out of the two is betrothed to me. It is not correct to say that there is a fifty-percent probability that it is Rachel and a fifty-percent probability that it is Leah. The concept of probability speaks about doubts, about lack of information. In a place where we are speaking about a certain doubt, not a doubtful certainty, you cannot use probability. The mathematical tool used in such situations, by the way, is called fuzzy logic—but not probability. Fuzzy logic is a logic meant to deal with vague states, with situations composed of several possibilities. But that is not probability; it is something altogether different. Therefore the distinction between these two states is a completely different distinction.

For example, a practical consequence—let’s return to the koy. After all, my whole purpose is to show that there is a possibility that perhaps I am not in a state of doubt at all, neither factual doubt nor halakhic doubt. Rather, it is both wild animal and domestic livestock. So which law applies to it? Always the positive law, not the absence of law, as we did in all the other examples.

What is the difference between that and doubt? For example, what happens if I have something that is doubtfully the forbidden fat of a koy? Maybe it is the forbidden fat of a koy, maybe it is ordinary permitted fat. Then apparently this is a double doubt, right? And a double doubt is permitted even with a Torah prohibition. But if the first doubt is not really a doubt—if it is a certain doubt, not a doubtful certainty. Right? It is a doubtful certainty, not a certain doubt. Yes, it is a doubtful certainty. There is a definite state here. It is a definite state of tenuous forbidden fat. Like quantum superposition where you have… I can’t hear you well. Like quantum superposition where you have two states. Right, but both states are present; it is not that I do not know which one of the two. Both. And that is exactly the quantum superposition.

So in such a case, if I am now in doubt whether this is the forbidden fat of a koy or ordinary fat, may I be lenient? Is this a double doubt? My answer is no. Because the forbidden fat of a koy is forbidden. It is definitely forbidden from the wild-animal side in it, not from the domestic-livestock side in it. So now the doubt about it is only one doubt; it is not a double doubt. Think about the P’leiti I brought in the lecture on half-measures. The P’leiti says: this is a doubt of wild animal at a reduced intensity, of reduced quality. Therefore it is forbidden on the Torah level by the law of a half-measure—qualitative half-measure. It is not “maybe permitted fat, maybe forbidden fat.” It is not that at all. It is a full prohibition—just a faint one. So if I have a doubt about a faint prohibition, but that faint prohibition is Torah-level, then this is not a double doubt. It is one doubt, regarding which I should be stringent, not lenient. That, for example, is one implication of the conception that a koy is not a doubt but certainly both.

Okay? Fine, let’s take a five-minute break, and then I’ll return afterward to this topic.

Okay, we’re back. All right? You can turn on cameras. Michael, are you with us? Elad? Michael, Elad, are you with us? Fine, I’m continuing. I’m with you, yes, I just can’t turn on the… What? Okay.

So up to this point I basically gave a survey of the possibilities for understanding the doubt of the koy. What I still want to get to, although it took me longer than I thought, is to return to our sugya and see what it actually says in this context. So in our sugya the Talmud apparently understands—at least that’s how it seems, at least according to Rabbi Yohanan—that the koy is “a creature unto itself,” and maybe according to Reish Lakish as well. We discussed how to understand the sugya according to Reish Lakish. And indeed, if the state here were one of doubt, then according to Reish Lakish, regardless of the verse, we would have had to be stringent. If Reish Lakish says that this is merely a scriptural support and is really only a rabbinic prohibition, then by definition it cannot be that this is a doubt. A Torah-level doubt should be stringent even according to his view. So our sugya somehow seems to contradict what appears from elsewhere in the Talmud—that a koy is a state of doubt. In our sugya it seems to be a state of certainty, not a state of doubt. And the Talmud indeed says that if it were doubt, then we would not have needed a verse to teach me that one has to be stringent—either because the Torah would reveal to me what a koy is, or because of what Rashi and Tosafot explained—sorry, that is what Rashi and Tosafot explained—or because of what Tosafot Yom HaKippurim said, that with doubt we should be stringent even without the Torah’s novelty, so why would the Torah need to innovate and teach me to be stringent regarding doubtful forbidden fat. So from the conclusion in our sugya it seems that the koy is indeed certain and not doubtful; it is a creature unto itself, that is the language of the Talmud.

How does that fit with the parallel passages that say this is a matter of doubt? I’ll just remind you that in the parallel passages we saw that Rabbi Yosei’s view is that a koy is a creature unto itself. So one could say that our sugya follows the view of Rabbi Yosei. But then it comes out that according to Rabbi Yosei, in the other sugyot as well, the koy is not really a doubt—it is a creature unto itself. Most medieval authorities (Rishonim) did not understand Rabbi Yosei that way; they claim that even according to Rabbi Yosei it is a doubt. But that is a possibility that could in principle be put on the table here. Let’s see how this works.

So in Tosafot on our sugya—I’ll share it for a moment. Tosafot, of course, understood that a koy is a doubt. We saw that, right? Because Tosafot says, more than that, Tosafot understood that the koy is a factual doubt, because they say that it has signs pointing in both directions, and if it has signs pointing in both directions then there is a factual doubt whether it is a wild animal or domestic livestock, not a halakhic doubt. That was the earlier Tosafot. Now in Tosafot here he says as follows:

“A koy is a creature unto itself. This ‘creature unto itself’ here means that it is not a doubtful wild animal or domestic livestock. But that which Rabbi Yosei says in the chapter ‘It and Its Offspring,’ that a koy is a creature unto itself and the Sages did not decide regarding it whether it is a species of wild animal or a species of domestic livestock—that means, as an explanation, that it is doubtfully a wild animal and doubtfully domestic livestock.”

Tosafot basically says that the term “creature unto itself” in our sugya is not interpreted the same way as the term “creature unto itself” in that sugya. In that sugya, when Rabbi Yosei says that a koy is a creature unto itself, he means doubt. In our Talmudic passage, when they say a koy is a creature unto itself, they mean certainty, not doubt. What is the proof? In our sugya the proof is simple, because here the Talmud says that if it were doubt there would be a problem, right? Why does the Torah need to include for me the need to be stringent with doubts? Perforce, the answer must move away from that and apparently say that it is not a doubt, and that is why the Torah’s inclusion is needed. So indeed here, when they say “a creature unto itself,” the intention is that it is not a doubt.

But Tosafot says: fine, yet “a creature unto itself” in Rabbi Yosei’s language there is indeed interpreted as doubt. This does not follow Rabbi Yosei there, because Rabbi Yosei there, although he uses the same term “a creature unto itself,” means that it is a doubt and the Sages did not decide regarding it. It seems that in our Talmudic passage… yes, in the Talmud there it only says “a creature unto itself”; it does not say “the Sages did not decide regarding it.” Yes: “A koy is a creature unto itself. For if you do not say so, then with regard to that which Rabbi Idi bar Avin said: ‘also all’ comes to include… Is it a doubt? Does a verse need to include a doubt? Rather, a creature is different; here too, a creature is different.” Fine? So he says: it is “a creature unto itself,” and they do not add the phrase “and the Sages did not decide regarding it.” And in the parallel Talmudic passage with Rabbi Yosei, they say: “a creature unto itself, and the Sages did not decide regarding it.” From this Tosafot infers that Rabbi Yosei too, though he uses the term “a creature unto itself,” really means doubt. Unlike our Talmudic passage, where it means certainty.

What is Tosafot’s proof? In our sugya, of course, his proof is clear: when it says here “a creature unto itself,” it has to mean not doubt but certainty. But what says that Rabbi Yosei, who uses that same phrase over there, cannot also be interpreted in the same way—as certainty rather than doubt? What compels Tosafot to say that the sugyot differ and that the phrase “a creature unto itself” there means doubt? For that he needs proof. That here it means certainty is obvious. But why not say that there too it means certainty?

So he says: because we hear Rabbi Yosei saying in the chapter on covering the blood that “a koy is not slaughtered on a festival, and if one did slaughter it, one does not cover its blood.” And if it were clear to him that it is a creature and is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock, then it should be permitted to slaughter it from the outset, because it is not subject to blood covering. What does that mean? Tosafot says: after all, in the Talmud on covering the blood, the Talmud says that one does not slaughter the koy on a festival, and if one did slaughter it, one does not cover its blood. Now let’s see: if this were a matter of certainty, then the koy is really a third type; it is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock. What would the law of such a thing be regarding covering the blood? For wild animals and birds, one covers the blood; for domestic livestock, one does not cover the blood. So if a koy is a third kind, what should its law be? Not a wild animal, so one should not cover its blood, because it is not a wild animal. Right? “Because it is not subject to covering.” This law of covering was taught only regarding the three doubtful categories; the law of covering was taught regarding wild animals and birds; everything else is excluded. Who is “everything else”? Until now we thought “everything else” meant only domestic livestock; it turns out there is also a third type, but it too is included in everything else that does not require covering.

So what is the problem? Then why not slaughter it on a festival? After all, one need not cover its blood. What is the issue? It is clear, says Tosafot, that when they call it “a creature unto itself” there, the intention is doubt, not certainty. It is doubtfully a wild animal and doubtfully domestic livestock, and therefore from the wild-animal side it may require blood-covering, and therefore one does not slaughter it on a festival. But then it turns out that Rabbi Yosei is basically very close to the opinion there in Hullin which says that it comes from a goat and a gazelle. Meaning, there is no practical difference between Rabbi Yosei and that opinion—according to both of them it is a doubt. Right, and that is indeed one of Nachmanides’ comments on Tosafot’s view, which we’ll see in a moment. According to this, it is not clear what Rabbi Yosei added relative to the previous opinion. So he calls that doubt by a different term, “a creature unto itself,” but if he means doubt, then how is that different from the previous opinion? After all it appears there as a tannaitic dispute. There is no dispute at all; this is a doubt and that is a doubt. But that is Tosafot’s position.

It may be that the difference is that according to Rabbi Yosei this is a doubt in law, while according to the earlier view it is a doubt in reality. You do not know whether it is a wild animal or domestic livestock. According to Rabbi Yosei, you do know: it is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock; it is a third type, a creature unto itself. But I have a doubt which laws to apply to it, those of wild animal or those of domestic livestock. So de facto I am indeed in the laws of doubt. We discussed that in one of the earlier possibilities for understanding the doubt of the koy. Then perhaps one can understand, even according to Tosafot, what the dispute is between Rabbi Yosei and the earlier view. One just has to understand that in our sugya there is no such option. So perhaps in our sugya too, when they say that the koy is a creature unto itself, they mean that—it is a third type, and there is a halakhic doubt which laws to apply to it? No, one cannot say that, because if it were a doubt then the question returns: why do we need a verse to tell me the doubt? Right? So Tosafot concludes that this cannot be so here, whatever the Talmud there may mean. However we explain whether Rabbi Yosei disagrees with the earlier view or not, we had two possibilities. In any case, in our Talmudic passage the claim is that there is no doubt at all, neither factual nor halakhic. The koy is both wild animal and domestic livestock.

And in a certain sense maybe one could even say that if you say it is a creature unto itself, then you are really saying it is both wild animal and domestic livestock, and then there is no doubt. The question is which laws to apply to it. When you say it is certain and there is no halakhic doubt regarding it, then you are saying it is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock—not that it is both wild animal and domestic livestock, but rather a third type. That is also what Tosafot says, right? Tosafot says that if it were both wild animal and domestic livestock, then one would be obligated in blood-covering from the wild-animal side in it. Right? Therefore the claim is that when Tosafot says “a creature unto itself” in our sugya, meaning not a doubt, it means neither wild animal nor domestic livestock, but a third type.

So Rabbi Yosei, who says “a creature unto itself,” can be understood to mean that it is both wild animal and domestic livestock. There is really no factual doubt about it, but there are halakhic doubts—whether to treat it as a wild animal or as domestic livestock regarding blood-covering, forbidden fat, and the like. That is Rabbi Yosei’s view, in contrast to the earlier opinion, which says that there is a doubt even at the factual level. But in our sugya the claim is that there is no doubt, neither factual nor halakhic, because it is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock—something third.

That of course raises the question: how can Amoraim in our sugya—after all, Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan—disagree with Tannaim? Over there this is a tannaitic dispute. How can it be that Amoraim disagree with all the Tannaim? After all, a possibility is being raised here that was not raised there. There, one possibility was that it is domestic livestock; one possibility that it is factual doubt; a third possibility of doubt in law. And here Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan say: no, it is not doubt either in reality or in law. Are they disagreeing with Tannaim? The answer is yes. Why? Because we have a baraita that includes the koy from “all forbidden fat,” right? That baraita was stated by Tannaim. And Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan infer from that baraita that if it were a state of doubt, there would be no reason to derive it from a verse. It follows that the tanna of the baraita holds that a koy is not a doubt. And Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan rule like him, but he is a tanna. So he can disagree with the tannaitic views that appear in the sugya there. Okay, so that is Tosafot’s view. According to Tosafot, then, our sugya says this is certainty—that is, a third type, neither wild animal nor domestic livestock. The sugya there presents a dispute whether it is both wild animal and domestic livestock and therefore a doubt in law, or whether there is a doubt in reality—it is either wild animal or domestic livestock and we do not know. And of course there is also Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion that it is entirely domestic livestock, but that is not important for us here. So that is what emerges from Tosafot, and accordingly there is a dispute between the sugyot—a tannaitic dispute, a dispute between the sugyot.

Nachmanides—I already mentioned him, in Yevamot chapter 8—writes that this is not a doubt, but unlike Tosafot he claims that it is not a doubt anywhere in the Talmud. Even Rabbi Yosei there in that sugya, where Tosafot proved that he holds it to be a doubt, Nachmanides says: what do you mean? Rabbi Yosei says it is a creature unto itself. “A creature unto itself” is language that implies not doubt, just like the language in our sugya. Therefore it is clear that our sugya also follows Rabbi Yosei there, and Rabbi Yosei there says that a koy is not a doubt; it is a creature unto itself. Of course, that brings us back to the question: so what do we do with Tosafot’s proof from blood-covering? We’ll see in a moment.

So let’s look at Nachmanides. “Furthermore, at the end of chapter HaArel, regarding that which Rabbi Yosei said: an androginos is a creature unto itself, and the Sages did not decide whether it is male or female. The French Sages explained that what does ‘creature’ mean? A distinct creature, about which the Sages did not decide whether it is male or female, meaning that it is a doubt. To exclude the one who says that an androginos who is a priest and married a woman may feed her terumah”—meaning, he is both this and that. “No; he is a doubt. You can know this because it says, ‘the Sages did not decide regarding it,’ and if ‘a creature unto itself’ really meant not a doubt, on the contrary, they did decide regarding it that it is neither male nor female.

“And they brought proof for this from that which we say in tractate Niddah, chapter HaMapelet: Rabbi said in the name of Rav, a tumtum and an androginos who saw white and red—one is not liable on their account for entering the Temple, and one does not burn terumah on their account. If they saw white and red together, one is not liable for entering the Temple, but one does burn terumah on their account, as it is stated: ‘From male to female shall you send out’—a definite male, a definite female, but not a tumtum and an androginos. Evidently, according to Rav, an androginos is a doubt. For if he is male, he becomes impure due to white discharge, and if female, due to red discharge. And if you would think that according to Rabbi Yosei, ‘a creature unto itself’ means neither male nor female, then even with white and red together, there should be no impurity at all, and we should not burn terumah and sacred foods on that account. For Rav holds like Rabbi Yosei of the baraita, as I explained there in its place. Rather, we learn from this that according to Rabbi Yosei, an androginos is doubtfully male and doubtfully female, and ‘creature’ means a doubtful creature.

“And so they explained that which is said in tractate Hullin regarding the koy: Rabbi Yosei says it is a creature unto itself, and the Sages did not decide whether it is a species of wild animal or a species of domestic livestock—meaning that it is a doubt. And they brought proof that Rabbi Yosei himself says: a koy is not slaughtered on a festival, and if it was slaughtered one does not cover its blood.” Yes, Tosafot in Hullin is the Tosafot parallel to our sugya in Yoma. “And if it were truly a creature, then the commandment of blood-covering would not apply to it at all, for the verse says ‘wild animal.’ All this is explained in Tosafot in tractate Niddah, and they elaborated further.” Up to here that is Tosafot’s view, which we saw.

Nachmanides says: “In my opinion, these are not correct words, for the phrase ‘a creature unto itself’ is said precisely to exclude doubt. In every place,” because when someone says to you “a creature unto itself,” the literal meaning is that this is not a doubt. It comes to exclude the view that it is a doubt. “In every place, as we say regarding koy in the final chapter of Yoma: ‘all forbidden fat’ to include koy and a half-measure. And we ask: what does he hold? If he holds that koy is a doubt, does one need a verse to include a doubt? And we answer: he holds that koy is a creature unto itself. And if you do not say so, then with regard to what Rav Adda bar Ahava said, ‘all blood’ comes to include the blood of a koy—does one need a verse to include a doubt? Rather, he holds that koy is a creature unto itself, meaning that it is neither a wild animal nor domestic livestock at all.”

So you see that the phrase “a creature unto itself” is interpreted everywhere as something that is a third type—it is neither domestic livestock nor wild animal. Just as an androginos is neither male nor female, so too here. Although what will he do with the phrase “and the Sages did not decide regarding it”? I explained that before. “The Sages did not decide regarding it” means, on the contrary, that the Sages did not assign it one of the two known statuses, but left it as it is. They did not decide it in one direction; rather, they left it as an independent, mixed status. Or not mixed, but third—doesn’t matter. And one should have said “the Sages decided regarding it that it is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock.” No—the reality decided. They did not decide; reality decided. “The Sages decided” would mean that because in reality it is something between wild animal and domestic livestock, one could have thought that the Sages would tell you halakhically to treat this type like the type of wild animal or like the type of domestic livestock. That would mean that the Sages decided. But the Sages did not decide; rather, we remain with what reality dictates. And what does reality dictate? That it is a type unto itself. That is what one has to say according to Nachmanides. I agree that this is not the plainest reading. On the other hand, “a creature unto itself”—he is right that that is the plainest reading. So there are arguments in both directions.

Now notice there is a proof here… I’ll continue. “And we learn from this that the phrase ‘a creature unto itself’ is said to remove it from the category of doubt. And the verse needs to include it regarding blood, which applies to wild animal and domestic livestock, and certainly this is one expression and is interpreted in the same way everywhere.” Notice that in the middle he inserts something that is easy to miss. Look for a moment at our sugya. One second.

In our Talmudic passage the phrase “does a verse need to include a doubt?” appears twice, remember? At first Reish Lakish says that half-measures are only scriptural support. The Talmud says, “That also makes sense… and if you think it is Torah-level law: koy is a doubt—does one need a verse to include a doubt?” What does that mean? So Rashi and Tosafot explain: since this is a factual doubt whether it is a wild animal or domestic livestock, then instead of the Torah telling me to forbid the forbidden fat, let it just tell me what a koy is already. Simply tell me what a koy is. That is the first place.

The Talmud continues and says: “If because of that, that is not a proof. They hold that koy is a creature unto itself. And if you do not say so, then with regard to what Rabbi Idi bar Avin said, ‘also all’ comes to include koy—koy is a doubt? Does one need a verse to include a doubt? Rather, a creature is different; here too, a creature is different.” What is Rabbi Idi bar Avin speaking about? Have you thought about that? What is “also all comes to include koy”? What law is he discussing? The prohibition of eating blood. There is a verse forbidding blood of a wild animal and a verse forbidding blood of domestic livestock. Now here, with Rabbi Idi bar Avin, I do not understand how Tosafot can say what he says at all. Blood is forbidden both from wild animal and from domestic livestock. So if a koy is doubtfully wild animal and doubtfully domestic livestock, then its blood is forbidden whatever you say. If it is a wild animal, it is forbidden as blood of a wild animal; if it is domestic livestock, it is forbidden as blood of domestic livestock. So why should it matter that it is a doubt?

Therefore when the Talmud says here “koy is a doubt—does one need a verse to include a doubt?” what is it talking about? What does “a creature is different” mean? If you say that koy is a doubt, then why do you need a verse to include the doubt? Rather, “a creature is different.” And what does “a creature is different” mean? According to Tosafot, it means a “doubt of a creature,” right? But what does that mean? If it truly were a creature that is both wild animal and domestic livestock, would one need a verse to include that its blood is forbidden? After all, blood of a wild animal is forbidden and blood of domestic livestock is forbidden. So if the koy is both wild animal and domestic livestock, then clearly its blood is forbidden. If one needs a verse to forbid the blood of a koy, there is only one solution: the koy is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock. As Maimonides claims, and he is right. The koy is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock. Right? Then what do you say? It is a third type. If it is a third type, then maybe blood of wild animal is forbidden from one source and blood of domestic livestock is forbidden from another source, but blood of a koy might be permitted? You need a special source to forbid the blood of a koy.

Notice: here the derivation is not a “whatever-you-say” argument. It is not “on the side of wild animal or on the side of domestic livestock, be stringent out of doubt.” Here it is clear that we are not dealing with doubt. Because if it were a doubt, you would not need a source to teach it. Therefore here it is clear that “doubt” means that it is neither domestic livestock nor wild animal. “A creature unto itself” means a third type. By the way, here Tosafot agrees as well. Except Tosafot claims that this is the meaning in our sugya. In Rabbi Yosei’s sugya there he claims that it means doubt, and in our sugya we are forced to say that “a creature unto itself” means certainty rather than doubt—that it is a third type. Okay?

But Maimonides proves from the sugya here the general principle, because unlike Tosafot he assumes that the same phrase appearing in two places cannot be interpreted in two different ways. If in our sugya, where it says “a creature unto itself,” the meaning is not doubt but a third type, then that is how one must also explain Rabbi Yosei. What does he do with Tosafot’s proofs? After all, Tosafot brought proofs. Let’s see. He goes on later regarding “These are blemishes” and more proofs further on. Then he says as follows:

“As for what they said, ‘and the Sages did not decide regarding it’—as you asked just now—that is to say that it is a type unto itself, whose signs do not determine it to be included among the species of wild animals or among the species of domestic livestock. Rather, they found in it signs of both. Therefore they made it a third type unto itself.” “The Sages did not decide” means they did not place it on one of the two scales between which it wavers. To “decide” in the language of the Sages means to tip the scale to one side out of the two. And no, they did not tip it to this side or that side, but made it a third type. And regarding androginos he says the same thing.

He did not answer what he does with Tosafot’s proof. Tosafot said that regarding blood-covering, what is the question? If it is a third type, then clearly one need not cover the blood. So why say that one does not slaughter the koy on a festival? Slaughter it—after all, it does not require blood-covering. Blood-covering was innovated only for wild animal and birds, not for domestic livestock and not for a koy, which is a third type. What does Nachmanides answer this? He does not write it, and that is strange.

It seems to me that what he would answer is this: after all, he says that it has the signs of both. And in this sense he is learning like Tosafot. What does that mean? They made it into a third type, but really it is a combination of wild animal and domestic livestock—not out of doubt, but it is both together. Only this state, in which the two things are fused together, itself constitutes the third type. It is not the third type Tosafot speaks of, where it is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock—a third type. Rather, it is a third type that is both wild animal and domestic livestock. And the Sages determined that we are to treat it as a third type. That is the meaning of “the Sages did not decide regarding it”: they did not decide it toward the signs of wild animal, and they did not decide it toward the signs of domestic livestock; instead they determined that it is a third type. But it is not a third type in Tosafot’s sense—that it is neither wild animal nor domestic livestock—but a third type that is both wild animal and domestic livestock.

If so, that is something else. Because then if you ask me whether one may slaughter it on a festival, then certainly one must cover its blood. Why? Not out of doubt—it is certain, not doubt. Because it is certainly a wild animal. Remember what I said earlier? It is both wild animal and domestic livestock. This is a certain doubt; not a doubtful certainty. This is Nachmanides. Nachmanides claims that a koy is a certain doubt, like the P’leiti. In contrast to Tosafot, who says it is an ordinary doubt—or not a certain doubt but simply a third type. In our sugya it is a third type; in the parallel sugya it is an ordinary doubt: maybe wild animal, maybe domestic livestock.

Nachmanides says no. “A creature unto itself” means a third type, but notice the difference: in our sugya, “third type” apparently means neither wild animal nor domestic livestock, if I understand correctly, because otherwise its blood should already be forbidden—that is Rabbi Idi bar Avin. In Rabbi Yosei’s sugya there, where it says “a creature unto itself,” it means both wild animal and domestic livestock, and still not as doubt. It is a bit forced. There is no hint of this in Nachmanides. He seems to want to explain it in the same way in all places. But again, that is not so terrible, because I explain it in all places the same in the sense that “a creature unto itself” is not doubt. In that sense, every place where it says “a creature unto itself” is the same. Only there it says “a creature unto itself, and the Sages did not decide,” so there it means both wild animal and domestic livestock, and “the Sages did not decide” means they established it as a third type. Here it could mean neither wild animal nor domestic livestock; it is a creature unto itself. Therefore here there is also no addition of “and the Sages did not decide.” Because there is nothing to decide: it is not both wild animal and domestic livestock; it is neither this nor that.

So it may be that Nachmanides agrees there is a distinction between the sugyot, even though in both of them “a creature unto itself” means not doubt. But it may also be that Nachmanides claims that in all the sugyot it is both domestic livestock and wild animal—even in our sugya. In both our sugya and there. So what? What about Rabbi Idi bar Avin? Exactly. Rabbi Idi bar Avin brings a source forbidding the blood. How can that be? Why is a source needed, if it is both wild animal and domestic livestock? No, because the Sages determined that something that is both wild animal and domestic livestock is a third type. So if the Torah forbade the blood of wild animal and the blood of domestic livestock, that does not yet mean that it forbade the blood of something that is both wild animal and domestic livestock. “Both wild animal and domestic livestock” is a third type. Who says its blood is forbidden? In the end it is indeed forbidden, but one needs a source. Therefore Rabbi Idi says that one needs a source. Then Nachmanides makes good sense, because then according to Nachmanides it really is “a creature unto itself” in the same sense throughout the Talmud, both in our sugya and elsewhere. And in all places it is not like Tosafot’s “creature unto itself” in our sugya, where it is neither this nor that. According to Nachmanides it is both this and that, but fixed as the status of a third type. Okay?

There is… well, I think we’ll stop here, because what comes next is less important. I didn’t manage to begin the law of education; we’ll start the law of education in the next lecture, which means tomorrow. Tomorrow, on Monday, I sent it to you. Where is it—in chapter eight? The law of education? Where exactly is it? On what page? Education in chapter eight of Yoma, yes. Where lower down? 82a. 82a? Okay. I sent it to you in the file that goes up on Dropbox; at the end there are always directions for next time.

Okay, now I’m skipping to 82a because until there it is all either aggadah or discussion of the five afflictions, which I did in previous years, and I won’t repeat that here. So now I’ll deal a bit with the law of education. That will take us at least two meetings, but that is the next topic. Okay? Thank you very much. More power to you. All the best.