Time in Halakha 8
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- From time to quality and quantity
- Leaven on Passover: leaven “from before the time” versus leaven “within the time”
- Muktzeh on weekdays, on intermediate festival days, and sukkah decorations
- Migo de-itkatza’i and twilight: preparation versus “one unit of time”
- Migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day: Tosafot versus Ritva
- Deferral in commandments: a minor who comes of age on the Sabbath, and mourning renewed upon adulthood
- If he singed it before its time: Meiri versus Maharam Halawa and the object’s status
- Splitting “two time axes” and freezing the object’s time versus the action’s time
- Time as an indirect obligating factor: counting the Omer and sanctification of the moon
- Time as defining a commandment: tefillin, slaughter by a minor, and dividing obligations into “commandments of the day”
Summary
General overview
The text completes the discussion of time through Talmudic and halakhic examples that show how time is not merely a “background” for a prohibition or a commandment, but sometimes defines the object, the act, and the application of obligation. It suggests viewing Jewish law as containing situations in which there is a split between different “time axes,” a stopping or freezing of status at a certain moment, and a conception of the Sabbath and holidays as one unit of time, as opposed to weekdays as a sequence of separate moments. On that basis, it interprets topics such as leaven singed before its time, migo de-itkatza’i at twilight, and deferral in commandments regarding a minor who comes of age, and connects them to a broader principle in which time creates essential categories within the object and the person.
From time to quality and quantity
The general framework is a choice to deal with “general” topics and to examine in parallel their philosophical and halakhic aspects, including the possibility of connecting the two levels. The close of the topic of time is meant to serve as a seam leading into the next topic, quality and quantity, because one point originally planned for the discussion of time turns out to belong there as well.
Leaven on Passover: leaven “from before the time” versus leaven “within the time”
The Mishnah at the beginning of the second chapter of tractate Pesahim states that before the time of the prohibition of leaven, one may feed it to cattle, wild animals, and birds, sell it to a non-Jew, and derive benefit from it; but once its time has passed, it is forbidden for benefit, and one may not fuel an oven or stove with it. The immediate difficulty is that this seems trivial, and so a reading is proposed according to which the novelty is not “when it is permitted and when it is forbidden,” but that there exists a reality of leaven defined as leaven of the permitted time and leaven defined as leaven of the prohibited time, and the difference lies in the type of leaven itself. The Talmud sets up the novelty in a case where one singed it before its time, and it is explained that one can create an object that remains associated with the time of permission even though it is used within the time of prohibition. This shows that time determines the object’s halakhic status and not merely the timing of a prohibition.
Muktzeh on weekdays, on intermediate festival days, and sukkah decorations
An inquiry is raised whether the concept of muktzeh applies even on an ordinary weekday as a descriptive category of “not fit for use,” even though there is no prohibition of moving it, or whether muktzeh belongs only to the Sabbath and holidays. Evidence is brought from Tosafot in tractates Sukkah and Shabbat regarding sukkah decorations, which are forbidden all seven days and are explained in terms of muktzeh and migo de-itkatza’i, even though the intermediate festival days are not times that have the ordinary prohibitions of muktzeh. From this it is argued that the concept of muktzeh can exist even outside the Sabbath and holidays, while the prohibition of moving such an object is what is unique to the Sabbath and holidays. That is why it is possible to understand how there can be muktzeh due to its designated commandment-use even on the intermediate festival days.
Migo de-itkatza’i and twilight: preparation versus “one unit of time”
The rule migo de-itkatza’i is stated: since it was set aside at twilight, it is set aside for the entire day, with examples such as laundry that was wet at twilight and dried on the Sabbath but still remains muktzeh, and a lamp that went out. A common explanation among the medieval and later authorities is presented, namely that there is no “mystical” spreading of a prohibition, but rather a law of preparation: an object that was not prepared at the moment the day entered does not become prepared in the middle of the day with respect to muktzeh. Alongside this, it is argued that there are medieval authorities for whom the preparation explanation is insufficient, and an alternative conception is needed: the Sabbath and holidays are one unit of time grasped at twilight, and therefore a status fixed at that moment “sticks” for the whole day, because the day is not a collection of moments but a single block.
Migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day: Tosafot versus Ritva
A dispute is brought regarding whether we say migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day—for example, leaven on the Sabbath after the seventh day of Passover, or an etrog, where the prohibition at twilight stems from the doubt that perhaps it is still the previous day. Tosafot distinguish and limit the rule, while Ritva applies it even in such a case. The proposed explanation is that if migo de-itkatza’i is a law of preparation, then even a doubt that prevented use at twilight creates a “lack of preparation” that projects onto the whole day, and so one would have reason to say that the rule does apply. But if migo de-itkatza’i depends on the prohibition “touching” the day itself as a single unit, then when the prohibition at twilight exists only because of a doubt about the previous day, there is no grasp of prohibition within the day itself, and therefore there is no migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day.
Deferral in commandments: a minor who comes of age on the Sabbath, and mourning renewed upon adulthood
The Rosh cites Maharam of Rothenburg as saying that there is no deferral in commandments regarding a minor whose father died while he was still a minor, and therefore when he comes of age he must mourn, with proof from a discussion in tractate Yevamot about a minor who grew two pubic hairs in the middle of the Sabbath and then became obligated in the prohibitions of the Sabbath from that moment on. The Rosh objects that the case is not comparable to the proof, because on the Sabbath the obligation applies at every moment, whereas in mourning the obligating factor is the event of the father’s death, which took place at a time when the son was exempt. A proposed understanding reconciles Maharam of Rothenburg on the basis of a conception in which the Sabbath obligation is grasped at twilight as one obligation for the whole day; accordingly, it makes sense to discuss it in the language of deferral, depending on whether the day is understood as a single unit.
If he singed it before its time: Meiri versus Maharam Halawa and the object’s status
The Talmud explains the Mishnah: if he singed it before its time, it is permitted for benefit even after its time, and the discussion emphasizes that this is not complete burning but singeing that removes it from the category of food without turning it into coals and ashes. Meiri explains that the singeing “freezes the situation,” so that the object enters Passover already no longer in the category of food, and therefore no prohibition takes hold of it. But if the prohibition of leaven took hold at the beginning of the forbidden time, that prohibition does not lapse until complete burning into ashes. Maharam Halawa explains that singeing within the time of prohibition is an act of deriving benefit from something already forbidden to him, so the prohibition is understood as a prohibition of benefit that stems from the act that rendered the object usable, and only total burning to ashes severs the connection to forbidden leaven. Practical differences are proposed, including the case of the sixth hour, when leaven is forbidden for eating but permitted for benefit, and the implication for whether after singeing it would even become permitted for eating.
Splitting “two time axes” and freezing the object’s time versus the action’s time
The singeing is presented as a mechanism that separates the time-axis of the action from the time-axis of the object, so that one could eat during Passover an object defined as pre-Passover leaven according to a frozen object-status. It is shown that something similar exists in understanding migo de-itkatza’i, where the object’s status on the Sabbath is determined according to twilight, so that the use “now” is attributed to the object as it was at twilight and not to the object in its later state. A further parallel is brought from the laws of conditions in divorce, where retroactive nullification creates two different states attributed to the same point in time, thereby producing a disconnect between the objective flow of time and the description of a legal state that moves backward.
Time as an indirect obligating factor: counting the Omer and sanctification of the moon
Nachmanides is cited as saying that counting the Omer is a positive commandment caused by time, and therefore women are exempt, while in Divrei Yehezkel it is said that the obligating factor is not “time itself” but the event of bringing the Omer offering, so that had the Omer been brought at another time, the counting would begin from then. This distinction is compared to Grace after Meals, which is not considered a time-caused commandment even though it is in practice done at a particular time, because the obligating factor is eating and not time. The author of Hokhmat Shlomo, Rabbi Shlomo Kluger, is cited as saying that sanctification of the moon is not a time-caused commandment, because there is no limitation here stemming from an “arbitrary time restriction,” but rather dependence on the reality of the moon’s renewal, which simply cannot be performed unless the moon exists in the appropriate state. It is noted that these distinctions do not fit well with the Avudraham’s explanation of women’s exemption in terms of time constraints.
Time as defining a commandment: tefillin, slaughter by a minor, and dividing obligations into “commandments of the day”
Ahiezer is cited as explaining why a minor is valid for slaughter even though he is not included in the prohibition of “it is not slaughtered,” because that very carcass would become forbidden to him once he comes of age, and so he is considered “fit for slaughter once he comes of age.” This is contrasted with writing tefillin, where the disqualification of a minor stems from the fact that the commandment of tefillin is a special obligation for each and every day, and while he is a minor, the commandment of that particular day does not rest on him. The distinction is presented as evidence that time defines the commandment itself, so that there is “the commandment of tefillin of today” and “the commandment of tefillin of tomorrow,” rather than one general commandment merely fulfilled at different periods. The conclusion is that Jewish law creates categories in which time is an essential component in the identity of the object and of the obligation, and not merely an external condition for the time of fulfillment.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A few more completions, and with that we’ll finish the whole issue of time, and then the next topic will be to try a bit to deal with quality and quantity.
[Speaker B] About quality, quality and quantity, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We always take these general topics and try to look at them—their general philosophical aspects and their halakhic aspects—and whether there’s any connection between them. Why did I think of this? Because there’s something connected to time that I thought I’d do today, but then I said to myself that actually it belongs to quality and quantity, so that’ll be the seam, the transition to the next topic. Okay, so there are a few points that really touch on Talmudic thought in the context of time. I touched on one of them, and I want to fill it out a bit with a few more examples, and another one that will be familiar to Shmuel because it’s what we dealt with in Ra’anana last time, and that also relates to the issue of time, so I remembered that actually there’s a point to it here too. Let’s start with that, maybe. The Talmud—the Mishnah at the beginning of the second chapter of tractate Pesahim—the Mishnah says: “As long as it is permitted to eat,” and we’re talking about leaven of course, “one may feed it to cattle, to wild animals, and to birds, and sell it to a non-Jew, and one may derive benefit from it. Once its time has passed, it is forbidden for benefit, and one may not fuel an oven or a stove with it.” All right? So the Mishnah basically says that leaven before the prohibited time—you can do anything with it, derive benefit, sell it to a non-Jew, whatever you need. After the time, once the time of prohibition comes in, from the sixth hour, say, on Passover eve, then it’s forbidden. You may not fuel an oven or stove with it, and it’s forbidden for benefit, and so on. The obvious question here is of course: what’s the novelty? Obviously you’re allowed to eat bread on Hanukkah. Meaning, is the Mishnah coming to tell me that before the time, leaven is permitted for benefit? Obviously the prohibition of leaven applies during the time of the prohibition. What’s the novelty here? So the Talmud struggles with that. Four, five, the sixth hour.
[Speaker C] Right, there’s also the rabbinic layer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m just saying the Mishnah itself isn’t dealing with that. The Talmud does indeed get into that a bit, but not really in the way—I’ll get to that. I’m talking about the core law, not the rabbinic law. Let me just insert a little note. I once had a kind of analytical inquiry, half joke and half serious: does the concept of muktzeh exist on a weekday too? Meaning, or is muktzeh only on the Sabbath and on holidays? Obviously it’s permitted to move muktzeh on a weekday—on the Sabbath and holidays it’s not—but the question is whether the item is muktzeh on a weekday too. There’s no prohibition on moving it, but is it still muktzeh on a weekday? Or perhaps the concept of muktzeh belongs only to the Sabbath or to holidays. I once had a proof from Tosafot in tractate Sukkah. Tosafot talks about—and also in tractate Shabbat—the Talmud in tractate Shabbat talks about sukkah decorations and says they are forbidden משום muktzeh. And sukkah decorations are forbidden all seven days, not just on the festival day. So Tosafot explains that there is migo de-itkatza’i and muktzeh, and therefore it is forbidden throughout the intermediate festival days because of muktzeh. That is very difficult, because what has migo de-itkatza’i and the prohibition of muktzeh got to do with weekdays? All these concepts belong only to holidays and the Sabbath. On the intermediate festival days there are no muktzeh prohibitions. Other categories of muktzeh, apart from this muktzeh for its commandment-use of sukkah decorations, are not forbidden on the intermediate festival days. There is no general prohibition of muktzeh then. So it seems to me that the simple interpretation is that something can be muktzeh even on a weekday, but on a weekday there usually is no prohibition. On the intermediate festival days there is a prohibition, at least for something designated for its commandment-use. But if the whole concept of muktzeh didn’t exist except on the Sabbath and holidays, then what would it even mean to forbid it on the intermediate festival days? So the same thing could be said here too.
[Speaker D] But there it makes sense.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker D] There’s a week of Sukkot, and anything meant for the use of that sukkah is set aside exactly like for the Sabbath. On the Sabbath—what’s the big novelty in muktzeh on the Sabbath? From the moment the Sabbath begins until it ends, there’s this thing called muktzeh. On Sukkot, from the moment Sukkot starts until it ends, there’s a similar idea called muktzeh for anything connected to that sukkah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the intermediate festival days are weekdays.
[Speaker D] But they’re the intermediate festival days. Right, but they have an element of the festival in them. Meaning, if a prohibition can rest there, it has something to rest on.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can forbid the sukkah decorations simply because they’re designated for use. The verse says don’t use them for another purpose. But don’t call it muktzeh. What does the prohibition of muktzeh have to do with it? It would be a prohibition of deriving benefit from sukkah decorations.
[Speaker D] No, it’s muktzeh. It’s anything that’s set aside during the time of the festival.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but Tosafot says more than that. There’s also migo de-itkatza’i there. So all the laws of muktzeh are involved, not just saying “it’s forbidden.”
[Speaker D] The fact that it’s forbidden—isn’t that migo de-itkatza’i in favor of this festival, in favor of the seven days? What’s the difference between seven days and the twenty-four hours of the Sabbath? Why should there be a difference?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because only on the Sabbath and holidays is there muktzeh.
[Speaker D] But why? There’s muktzeh on something belonging to the festival.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s a prohibition, not muktzeh.
[Speaker D] Here too there’s a prohibition. And what about the boards of the sukkah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The boards of the sukkah really are not muktzeh.
[Speaker D] But it’s forbidden to dismantle them on the Sabbath and so on. Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s forbidden, yes, but not because of muktzeh. It’s not because of migo de-itkatza’i.
[Speaker D] No, okay, but it’s something that is certainly permitted on, say, a Wednesday in Hanukkah. Right? Why? Because there it truly doesn’t belong under the law of muktzeh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but it’s not because of muktzeh. It’s just a plain prohibition. Like leaven on Passover.
[Speaker D] There’s no question why—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leaven on Passover is forbidden on the intermediate festival days.
[Speaker D] Obviously. I’m just trying to say that it’s not disconnected from everything. There’s a festival period called Sukkot, and during that period it’s forbidden. Exactly, that’s what I wanted to say. Then you can understand that it’s simply forbidden, exactly like—the element of “use” is a borrowed term.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right.
[Speaker D] It’s not a prohibition—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then there shouldn’t have to be migo de-itkatza’i and all the laws of muktzeh that belong to the prohibition of muktzeh.
[Speaker D] With ordinary prohibitions I can’t completely separate it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other words, with ordinary prohibitions, these rules of migo de-itkatza’i don’t apply. Just say it’s forbidden, fine, it’s forbidden, I understand. And with leaven—would anyone ever think to say, regarding leaven on Passover, migo de-itkatza’i?
[Speaker D] No, because it’s not the same thing. Because this thing in principle is permitted. These decorations are basically just ordinary non-sacred objects.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But they are designated for the sukkah.
[Speaker D] No, they’re set aside for the sake of the sukkah. Okay, just like a small saw is muktzeh on the Sabbath, or a hammer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Usually muktzeh on the Sabbath and holidays is something set aside specifically not for the Sabbath. And here it’s something set aside for the sake of the holiday. Meaning that the concept of muktzeh you’re using is the opposite of the simple understanding.
[Speaker D] That’s what’s difficult.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so. I mean, that’s what they’re coming to say with migo de-itkatza’i. So what is migo de-itkatza’i? Are they mistaken in bringing those rules in there?
[Speaker D] It’s also the same thing from the other side. There aren’t that many details. The details are: it was set aside from before Sukkot, that’s it, you’ve lost it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That means there is muktzeh even on a weekday. If this is just a shared term, then I wouldn’t import the laws of muktzeh into that prohibition. I would just say: it’s forbidden, okay, I understand. There are things forbidden on another day.
[Speaker D] So maybe it’s a shared principle, Rabbi?
[Speaker C] So maybe it’s a shared principle, that’s what he’s trying to say.
[Speaker D] No, because there is a shared principle.
[Speaker C] What is migo de-itkatza’i? Now I’m remembering it. Migo de-itkatza’i means: since it became forbidden at twilight, it became forbidden for the whole day. That specific law of migo de-itkatza’i—I transfer it to “it was set aside.” But why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? After all, that applies only in the original prohibition of muktzeh. Why would you transfer migo de-itkatza’i to an ordinary prohibition? Why should you? Only if it’s under the laws of muktzeh. Under the laws of muktzeh. I think Tosafot would also say this depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda as to whether there is or isn’t muktzeh.
[Speaker C] What is this whole migo de-itkatza’i? It determines that at twilight it’s considered…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It determines the whole day. What does that have to do with it? That belongs only to Sabbaths and holidays. Now I’m reminded of another topic we didn’t deal with regarding time, and that is exactly this migo de-itkatza’i. If I can find Mo’ed Katan here—if not, I’ll tell you from memory.
[Speaker C] Please. Yes, I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Since it was set aside at twilight, it was set aside for the whole day.” Migo de-itkatza’i at twilight, itkatza’i for the whole day. Since it was set aside at twilight, it is set aside for the rest of the day.
[Speaker D] I can’t find it, so I’ll say it from memory. It’s like the Sabbath after Passover. What? It’s like the story of the Sabbath after Passover. There? Is one allowed to eat the leaven on that Sabbath?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there it really would be muktzeh. Because on the Sabbath the law of muktzeh applies, so the leaven is forbidden not because it is prohibited to eat, but because it is muktzeh. Because at twilight you couldn’t eat it.
[Speaker D] But there, some permit it if you received it, I don’t know, from—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s migo de-itkatza’i. No, according to the law of leaven it would be permitted; according to the law of muktzeh it would be forbidden. It’s the opposite—that sharpens the difference exactly. I’m now remembering a Rosh in tractate Mo’ed Katan, I think at the end of the third chapter. He brings there in the name of Maharam of Rothenburg a case: what happens if a minor—if someone’s father died while he was a minor, and then he grew up. The question is whether he has to sit shivah, to mourn. So he says there that there is no deferral in commandments. Since as a minor he wasn’t obligated in mourning because he was a minor and exempt from commandments, one might have thought that since he was deferred from the commandment… And his proof is from a Talmudic discussion in tractate Yevamot. The Talmud there discusses the principle that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another. So the Talmud there discusses what happens with a minor who grew two pubic hairs in the middle of the Sabbath, and then it turns out that he also offered a sacrifice in impurity, he offered in the Temple, did several things all at once. It sounds from there that the minor is liable for Sabbath prohibitions even though he only became an adult in the middle of the Sabbath. All right? So you see that there is no deferral in commandments, says Maharam of Rothenburg, the teacher of the Rosh. There is no deferral in commandments, and therefore mourning is the same. The Rosh himself immediately comments that this is astonishing. Why? What? The case is not comparable to the proof. On the Sabbath, you are obligated to observe the Sabbath every single moment of the Sabbath. If you were exempt the previous moment, what does that have to do with the next moment? Why call that deferral in commandments?
[Speaker D] Maybe it’s one commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Wait, you’re already at my next step. But in mourning, after all, what obligates me in mourning is the death of my father, right? That’s what obligates me in mourning. Now if he died at a moment when I was a minor, then with regard to this mourning I am already exempt. So here there is room to say that even once I grow up, the obligating event fell upon me when I was a minor, when I wasn’t obligated, and that’s it, I’m no longer obligated. Like someone who worked, I don’t know what, worked while he was a resident abroad and now came to Israel; they tell him, pay taxes. Pay taxes on what? When I earned that money I was abroad, I wasn’t a citizen of the state. What do you mean, pay taxes? The thing that obligates me in tax is the moment I earned the money. I think—I’m not familiar enough with tax law—but the moment I earned the money is what obligates me in tax. So now when I come to Israel, nobody’s going to demand taxes from me on what I earned there. Right. But obviously if I continue working here, then from the moment I’m a citizen I’m obligated to pay taxes. In other words, with an obligation that applies moment by moment as an independent obligation, then clearly even if I was exempt before, from the moment I become obligated, I become obligated. But if there is a prohibition or obligation rooted in a specific event, and that event occurred when I was exempt from the matter, then even the continuation—even if that obligation continues over time—it never takes effect on me at all. That’s why this has nothing to do with deferral in commandments. That’s the Rosh’s objection. So what does Maharam of Rothenburg say? He obviously didn’t misunderstand in such a silly way. So I once thought, as you said earlier, Itzik, that he probably understands—and there are several proofs from aggadic midrashim on this point and from a few other things—that the obligation of the Sabbath comes from twilight. Meaning, the obligation of the Sabbath is not an obligation of each moment separately. Whoever enters twilight as someone already obligated then becomes obligated to observe the whole Sabbath. And if not, then not. Now that depends on whether there is or is not deferral in commandments. If there is deferral in commandments, then the moment he was a minor at twilight, even if he came of age in the middle, he would no longer become obligated to continue that same Sabbath. The following Sabbath he’d already enter as an adult, but this Sabbath he would not be obligated. If there is no deferral in commandments, fine, then he would be obligated for the half-Sabbath that remains, because there is no deferral. But that’s why even with regard to the Sabbath it makes sense to discuss whether there is or is not deferral in commandments. What am I getting at? It’s a completely different topic, I just remembered that it also relates to time. Because usually, what is migo de-itkatza’i at twilight, itkatza’i for the whole day? Usually something that was forbidden to me at twilight was muktzeh for me at twilight, and then it continues to be forbidden all day. For example, laundry that was wet at twilight and dried out during the day, and in the morning I want to wear it—I can’t. Because if at twilight it was muktzeh—wet laundry isn’t fit for use—then it was muktzeh, even though now the reason for it being set aside has disappeared. But since at twilight it was muktzeh, it remains muktzeh for the entire Sabbath. And that is the idea of migo de-itkatza’i at twilight. A lamp that went out, or all sorts of examples—there are many examples of migo de-itkatza’i. There are those like Rabbi Akiva Eiger, I think, who want to say that the whole dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda as to whether there is or isn’t muktzeh applies only to migo de-itkatza’i, not to the basic prohibition of moving. Meaning, the essence of the law of muktzeh is really migo de-itkatza’i. Not for now. So what is the idea of migo de-itkatza’i? A simple explanation—it appears in Ba’al HaMaor, it appears in Ritva, most later authorities assume it as obvious, I haven’t seen anyone say otherwise—is that there is no mystical element in twilight, as if once you got caught in prohibition at twilight it spreads over the whole day. Rather, an object has to be prepared in order to use it on the Sabbath or holiday. Now if at twilight it was muktzeh, that means it still wasn’t prepared at the moment the Sabbath entered. If it wasn’t prepared, it is forbidden to use it for the whole Sabbath. What do I care that it dried out on the Sabbath? Bottom line, when was it prepared for use? It wasn’t prepared while it was still day, and therefore it can’t be used. There’s no mysticism here, where once at twilight it was forbidden, the prohibition spreads throughout the day. Rather, twilight is simply the first moment of the day. If by that first moment it wasn’t prepared, then what can you do—it wasn’t prepared. You can’t use something unprepared. That’s how later and medieval authorities explain this matter of migo de-itkatza’i. But it once turned out to me that there are medieval authorities in whom you can’t explain it that way. In a moment I hope I’ll remember that point too, but it apparently depends on the dispute between Tosafot and Ritva. There are medieval authorities where this basis just doesn’t work, and I think there one has to understand it as I said earlier about Maharam of Rothenburg: that the conception is that the Sabbath and holidays are one single obligation, not separate obligations at every single moment. It is one obligation that takes hold of you at twilight. So whatever is forbidden to you at twilight extends through the whole day, because the Sabbath or holiday is one unit of time, not a collection of moments. So if the prohibition took hold of you, it’s forbidden all day, and if not, then not.
[Speaker D] A minor who comes of age during the Omer?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? A minor who comes of age during the Omer—yes, there are all sorts of discussions like that, whether—
[Speaker D] Is it one commandment or several commandments?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Many later authorities love to debate that. On the simple level it’s connected to the Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot, right? If you bless over all seven complete weeks, whether you need the entire count in order to have one commandment, or whether each day is a separate commandment. I once argued that that’s not correct, but—
[Speaker D] So what is correct?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A minor—even if the counting is done as one unit, the question is whether it is the commandment of counting or the act of counting. Okay? Because the minor counted even while he was a minor, so the counting can continue onward, because he counted. It doesn’t matter that he did not perform the commandment of counting. It’s a law in the counting, not a law in the commandment of counting. Fine. But Rabbi Shimon Shkop has something on this, regarding counting seven clean days. Very interesting. Fine, that’s another story too. In any case, to sum up: it came out to me that there are medieval authorities where you can’t say that migo de-itkatza’i is simply a matter of something that wasn’t prepared by the first moment of the day. And there you really have to say the basis I mentioned from Maharam of Rothenburg: that once a prohibition takes hold of you at twilight, the Sabbath and holiday are one unit of time. And once it’s one unit of time, then the prohibition takes hold of the whole day. It’s a kind of mysticism—once you touched prohibition it doesn’t leave you until the end of the day. Some sort of metaphysical principle, I don’t know exactly, something else. Where does that come out? There is a dispute between Tosafot and Ritva, also in tractate Sukkah, about migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day. Tosafot in several places in the Talmud—there’s one in tractate Beitzah, one in tractate Sukkah, and in several places—discuss migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day. And the dispute is whether we say it or not. For example, you mentioned leaven earlier—that’s exactly the case. Leaven on the Sabbath after the seventh day of Passover. Or an etrog, doesn’t matter. Is it muktzeh or not? Tosafot wants to say that we do not say migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day. Meaning, if at twilight it was forbidden, but it was forbidden only because I am in doubt whether it is still the previous day, then that does not project onto the next day. In contrast, if at twilight it was forbidden because of that moment itself—not because of a doubt that maybe I’m still in the previous day—then that is ordinary migo de-itkatza’i. Ritva disagrees. Ritva says that yes, we do say migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day. Now my claim is that this dispute is really a dispute over what migo de-itkatza’i is. If you understand that the object was not prepared by twilight and therefore is forbidden all day, then practically speaking, since you couldn’t use it because of the doubt, what difference does it make? It still wasn’t prepared. In other words, as long as it was forbidden, it wasn’t prepared. Once it becomes permitted, it’s already too late, because it’s already within the day, and so it should be forbidden. So there should indeed be migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day. The one who says there is no migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day—how does he understand it? It’s simple. Why is there no migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day? Because twilight is, say, doubtfully Friday—which was the last day of Passover—and doubtfully Sabbath, okay? So what does that mean? All the reason it is forbidden during twilight between Friday and Sabbath is only because of the concern that maybe it is still Friday. Meaning that once the Sabbath really entered—when God knows exactly when the Sabbath entered, we are in doubt but He knows—once the Sabbath entered, it actually is not forbidden. I am stringent because I don’t know, but in reality… In other words, the prohibition never takes hold at any moment of the Sabbath day. The prohibition is not attached to any moment of the Sabbath day, and therefore there will be no migo de-itkatza’i.
[Speaker D] But there also wasn’t a moment of preparation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? You don’t need that! That’s exactly what I’m saying. Because according to that conception it’s not—that’s the point. Someone who thinks this is a preparation problem, then you’re right, there was no preparation. Why should I care why? So it’s enough that it was forbidden the whole previous day for it to remain forbidden. But someone who understands that it has to touch the day itself—that it’s not enough that it was forbidden the whole time until the first moment, but it needs one moment in this very day in which it is also forbidden—then here it doesn’t happen. This is migo de-itkatza’i because of the previous day, and therefore we don’t say it. Fine, that’s the dispute regarding migo de-itkatza’i. But then it really comes out that this conception of Maharam of Rothenburg on deferral in commandments, and migo de-itkatza’i according to Ritva, basically say that the Sabbath is some kind of one unit of time. It is one unit of time, and once you touched prohibition for one moment of the day, it takes hold for the whole day. Time on weekdays is made up of moments, each one standing by itself. Meaning, we don’t see it as one unit. Time on Sabbaths and holidays is structured differently than time on ordinary weekdays. Again, in the halakhic perspective at least—I’m not trying to claim there’s some physical change here. But in the halakhic perspective, time is seen as one unit on Sabbaths and holidays, whereas on weekdays each and every moment is separate. And from here comes the idea of migo de-itkatza’i. Now it’s clearer, so I’ll close the parenthesis. Now it’s clearer why on a weekday, according to this conception, migo de-itkatza’i doesn’t apply. Because every moment—what does migo de-itkatza’i have to do with it? Just say it’s forbidden, fine, forbidden at every moment, forbidden at every moment. But what does that have to do with migo de-itkatza’i? So that applies only in the laws of muktzeh. So what do we see? Apparently that this thing does apply on the intermediate festival days too, on the intermediate festival days too. Except what? There is only no prohibition. But muktzeh—the concept of muktzeh—exists every day; only the prohibition of muktzeh, meaning that it is forbidden to move a muktzeh item, exists only on Sabbaths and holidays. Fine, that’s just a note. Now regarding leaven too, when I read the Talmud simply, the Mishnah simply, I would read it exactly that way. I would say that really…
[Speaker C] It’s forbidden to move muktzeh—laundry, for example—on a weekday, it’s not muktzeh?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? No, it’s not fit for use; it’s called muktzeh. It’s not fit for use. But what do I care that it’s not fit for use? Do whatever you want. Just because it’s not fit for use, is it not called muktzeh?
[Speaker C] It’s not forbidden by the law of muktzeh, that’s the difference. It’s not muktzeh? Who says? Maybe it is called muktzeh, but there is no prohibition on moving muktzeh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says the difference is in the prohibition rather than in the definition of the object itself? If it’s not fit for use, then it’s not fit for use on a weekday too. It’s wet—what are you going to do with it? Leave it until it dries. So it’s not fit for use; it’s set aside from your use. Right, so what do I care? On a weekday too, something that is muktzeh is permitted to move.
[Speaker C] Not a halakhic law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not a halakhic law, it’s just a concept. But if this concept also exists on weekdays, then I can understand how suddenly one of the medieval authorities tells me that on the intermediate festival days too there is a prohibition on this. If the concept didn’t exist on the intermediate festival days, what would it mean to prohibit it there? It exists there. Let’s connect this to the second part of the lecture, okay, afterward. So here too in the Talmud I say: what is the Mishnah saying? That leaven during the time of permission is permitted, and leaven during the time of prohibition is forbidden. Thank you very much. Obviously. So what does “time of permission” and “time of prohibition” mean—not when it is permitted and when it is forbidden. That’s why I’m showing you, even before we read the Talmud, that when you read the Mishnah in its simple language, really just its wording, you don’t need anything beyond that. What is written in the Mishnah is what I said before about muktzeh. The Mishnah says that leaven that belongs to a weekday is not forbidden for benefit. Meaning not merely that on a weekday there is no prohibition of benefit from leaven—that too I know. On a weekday, meaning not Passover, yes—there is no prohibition of benefit from leaven and no prohibition of eating leaven. Rather, we are talking about the type of leaven. Leaven that belongs to a weekday—even if it is leaven—there is no prohibition on using it. And leaven that belongs to the festival is leaven, and it is permitted to use it—sorry, forbidden to use it. All right? The difference is a difference in the kind of leaven, not in the prohibition, because otherwise this really would be completely trivial. Obviously before Passover it’s permitted and during Passover it’s forbidden. The Mishnah wants to speak to me about two kinds of leaven. Now let me show you.
[Speaker B] Leaven—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leaven from before the time and leaven from within the time. Both are leaven, but in one case there will be no prohibition and in the other there will be.
[Speaker C] For example, I’ll give—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you an example. I’ll give you an example that will—
[Speaker B] make it clearer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. I’ll give you an example. Suppose I could take leaven from before the festival and use it during the festival. Would that be permitted or forbidden? Let’s say I manage to draw a picture in which a piece of bread that I eat during Passover—
[Speaker C] In a moment you’ll see the picture.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment I’ll find it.
[Speaker C] What? Maybe “you shall destroy leaven”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found” would be fine. And even eating it would be permitted. Because it is leaven from before the festival; it’s a different type of leaven. Leaven from before the festival is not really leaven at all; no prohibition takes effect on it. Even if you find it during the festival. That’s what the Mishnah says. If before the festival there is no prohibition of leaven at all, then what’s the novelty? It wants to say: no, a type of leaven that belongs to before the festival—even if you could imagine some case in which it comes to your hand during the festival—you could eat it. Leaven on Passover. I told them over there that this could be a start-up: produce leaven that is permitted to eat on Passover. Here, I’ll show you. It’s in the Talmud.
[Speaker C] Who produces it? Wait, wait, but there are two things: a pit in the public domain and leaven on Passover.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t belong to a person, but Scripture treats it as if it were in his possession.
[Speaker C] Leaven on Passover. Right, yes. It’s leaven from before Passover.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, leaven on Passover? What difference does it make? After all, you found it on Passover. So that’s what the Mishnah says: leaven from before Passover is not really leaven, even if you find it on Passover. Let me show you. Look. The Talmud says as follows: “And one may derive benefit from it”—all these intricate analyses eventually show up, in the end muktzeh on a weekday. “And one may derive benefit from it”—that’s obvious. It is only needed for the case where he singed it before its time. And it teaches us in accordance with Rabbah, for Rabbah said: if he singed it before its time, it is permitted for benefit even after its time. And the Talmud asks: obvious! Is it permitted for benefit before its time? Of course, leaven before its time is permitted for benefit. The answer: he singed it. He singed the leaven before Passover. An interpretive setup.
[Speaker B] Right, it makes it into an interpretive setup.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not going to get into the whole issue of these interpretive setups here, but he singed the leaven before Passover, and then it is permitted for benefit even after its time. This is astonishing. Make toast. Not toast. Make it really charred and derive benefit from charred toast on Passover.
[Speaker D] No, it’s charred.
[Speaker C] Really charred, that’s not toast.
[Speaker D] No, it is toast.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If we were talking about actual burning, all the medieval authorities here say that then once again there would be no novelty—it wouldn’t be leaven at all. We’re not talking about burning. Burned leaven—obviously, ashes and all that—whether it’s fit or not, permitted or forbidden. But we’re not talking about burning. We’re explicitly talking about singeing, not burning. Again, how singed, I don’t know. It could be something al dente, some sort of in-between toast. But it’s not burned—we’re not talking about having burned the bread. We’re talking about singeing it. In principle, strongly toasted bread—you could eat it on Passover.
[Speaker B] That’s what the Talmud says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does this thing mean? What does it mean that you charred it before Passover? Exactly. If you charred it before Passover, you can take that same thing and eat it on Passover. If you actually burned the bread completely, then even if you did it on Passover you can do whatever you want with it. That’s why I’m saying this is not burning. If you actually burned it during Passover, you can—if you burned it completely—then a completely new reality has come into being, finished. You can benefit from the ashes, that same dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but certainly according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) you can benefit from the ashes afterward. There’s no problem with that. But here, when you char it—if you char it during the holiday, it won’t help you, it’s leavened food. But if you charred it before the holiday, that same toast itself you can eat; you could sell toasts for Passover, provided they buy them before the holiday. During the holiday—even if you charred them before the holiday. Okay? Yes. To char. Yes. What’s the meaning of this? How does it work? So here there are two—I just photographed them, emailed them to myself. Where is it here? Here, toasts. I photographed two paragraphs from the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that explain this. The Meiri explains it like this: “And when it later mentioned, ‘and it is permitted for benefit,’ this was not needed at all.” Right, the Mishnah says before the prohibited time it is permitted for benefit. Obviously—what, that didn’t need to be said at all. “And therefore they explained in the Talmud that even after the time of its prohibition, if one charred it before its prohibition, to the point that it left the category of food”—meaning it was charred even on the inside—“it is permitted for benefit, such as for fuel or something else.” But don’t think that this is only for benefit; the same applies to eating—it’s permitted to eat it too. This is toast for eating. “For even eating it is not considered eating once it has left the category of food, since no prohibition takes hold on it, seeing as it is mere ash.” Ah—wait, continue, I’m not done yet. “But if he charred it after its prohibited time, it is forbidden for all benefit.” If you charred it after the time, it’s forbidden. Why is it forbidden? After all, complete burning is permitted even if you did it after the holiday? “Since once the prohibition of leavened food took hold of it”—it was leavened food at the beginning of the holiday—“its prohibition does not lapse until complete burning,” meaning that it becomes coals, “and in that case it is entirely permitted even after its prohibited time.” Meaning, if you burn it completely, then even if you do it after the time, it’s permitted. Why? “Because with everything that must be burned, its ashes are permitted.” By the way, that’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim); Rabbi Chaim is famous for this in the stencil. “And coals have the status of ashes. But anything that has not reached that point”—charring has not reached that point—“even though it has been fully charred, it is forbidden,” if you did it during the holiday. “For since the prohibition of benefit took hold of it, it does not lapse.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does the Meiri say? Just as you defined it nicely before: charring freezes the situation. What does that mean? If you charred it before the holiday, at a stage when it was leavened food, then it remains with the status of leavened food—sorry, the status of permitted leavened food. It remains the leavened food of before the holiday. It stays leavened food from before. We’ve found the example where we have leavened food that is associated with before the holiday, even though we’re holding it in our hands during the holiday and eating it; but the leavened object itself is leavened food that belongs to before the holiday. Okay? And since that’s so, no prohibition takes hold of it, and you can eat it during the holiday. But the point is that the charring freezes the time of the object, not the time when I eat it, but the time to which the leavened food belongs. This leavened food is leavened food from before the holiday, and therefore no prohibition takes hold of it even when I am in the middle of the holiday.
[Speaker C] No—why? Why should it work like that? Rather what? It has a designation, it has a designation, because it was on the eve of the holiday, you charred it, it entered the holiday when it was already unfit to be eaten as leavened food. No, because if it’s not leavened food, then why should it be forbidden during the holiday? Why should it be forbidden? Because I’ll tell you why—no—it was leavened food, exactly, it was leavened food; this object had the designation of leavened food. What’s the difference between that and having burned it completely?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you burned it completely, it’s permitted.
[Speaker C] And therefore what? And therefore what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now it’s not leavened food—but it was leavened food, so what? But if you freeze—if you, Rabbi, it freezes the situation.
[Speaker C] No, but if you burn it completely, it was leavened food, so it should be forbidden for benefit. So if you burn it completely, it’s permitted—it’s completely permitted. Yes, but it’s permitted for benefit because it’s dust.
[Speaker B] But charring isn’t! What? Charring isn’t! Why?
[Speaker C] No, if you do it during the holiday.
[Speaker B] But it’s not leavened food.
[Speaker C] But if you
[Speaker B] do
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it on the holiday, that’s something else. You do it during the holiday and then it’s forbidden. In the Talmud it says that if you char it and do it after the holiday—sorry, after the time—it is forbidden.
[Speaker D] I’ll tell you why—no, no—but Rabbi, I can understand him.
[Speaker B] He says that if you do
[Speaker D] it during the holiday, it’s forbidden.
[Speaker B] I can understand him. There’s something here—he acquired here a designation
[Speaker D] of—no, there’s something to it. He can’t do it after the holiday, he can’t do it, because you need—there are two situations here. He explicitly emphasizes in the Meiri that it “left the category of food.” Now that’s the reality. Leavened food before Passover, okay? If you charred it, it left—once that second of Passover arrived, already within Passover it is not leavened food. Because I charred it before that, no problem, that we accept.
[Speaker B] During Passover,
[Speaker D] I’ll tell you: during Passover it crossed into “not leavened food” at the moment Passover began, and now you want to char it. That is forbidden.
[Speaker B] Why? And if you burn it completely?
[Speaker D] Who says “char it completely”?
[Speaker B] That too is forbidden. Permitted!
[Speaker D] No! Its benefit is forbidden.
[Speaker B] Permitted! Permitted! He says explicitly—I just read it—permitted. It left—you know, if you burned it completely,
[Speaker D] if it was
[Speaker B] leavened food and you burned it completely during
[Speaker D] the holiday, Rabbi, it’s unfit for eating. He emphasizes that. It’s as if once it crossed the boundary, that’s a different question. Right, but that’s the point, that’s the point. Rabbi, I’m not convinced. There’s leavened food before; when it crossed the line, I need it to cross the line into Passover when it’s unfit to eat. Now as for use, I agree, that’s difficult—the difference between charring and burning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what you’re talking about? That’s difficult.
[Speaker D] But Rabbi, you permitted toasts. We’re—this is a different department.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I know toasts.
[Speaker D] Toasts are fit to be eaten.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what do you mean toasts? Toasts well done.
[Speaker D] Well-done toasts are still fit to be eaten. What I want to say, Rabbi, is that he’s talking about toast that if they served it to you in the cafeteria you’d say, “Sir, this is not toast.” That’s what he’s talking about. Only that. So those kinds of toasts—you can—this is not a startup, don’t build on it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, I’m joking. I’m only saying: it’s toast made very hard, whatever, but it’s not coals.
[Speaker D] It’s not coals, no, it’s not coals, because otherwise the rest would be difficult. It’s not coals; it’s unfit to be eaten.
[Speaker B] There’s an intermediate state.
[Speaker D] Of course, yes, but that intermediate state—simple! Simple! There are lots of things like that. I can’t think of an example off the top of my head, but there are plenty of cases. The distinction, the reasoning, is simple: before, it crossed the threshold of Passover while still as leavened food.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it freezes the situation.
[Speaker D] I agree with the definition of freezing the situation, but not for the purpose of saying it is permitted to eat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is permitted—but it is permitted to eat.
[Speaker D] To eat. You’re also allowed to eat toothpaste. There’s no problem. What do you mean, “permitted to eat”? You may eat something unfit for eating.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Toothpaste has no rule of leavened food, so then you can also eat this if it was made after the holiday.
[Speaker D] I’m not talking from the angle of leavened food. You’re telling me it’s permitted to eat. Of course it’s permitted to eat. Why don’t they rule that if
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you did it during the holiday, why is it forbidden to eat?
[Speaker D] I’ll explain to you: because it crossed that line of Passover while it was leavened food. You’re eating leavened food.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi, it’s toothpaste, not leavened food.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, one may eat leavened food—I’ll make it simple for you, I have no internal contradiction. In Israel, it’s forbidden to eat leavened food; in Jordan, it’s permitted to eat leavened food, okay? Now if you crossed the border between Israel and Jordan with leavened food in your hand, your leavened food in Jordan is forbidden to eat. Forbidden. Now wait a second—it was forbidden to eat. Shmuel, you crossed the border with the leavened food. It matters where you are. It definitely matters.
[Speaker B] Forget eating, let’s talk only about the prohibition of benefit.
[Speaker D] That’s where it’s difficult for me,
[Speaker B] but there I agree with you. So why?
[Speaker D] It’s difficult for me only there; I don’t have an answer to the second part. What’s the difference between coals and
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Rabbi—
[Speaker D] is it difficult for me between coals and not? Fine, no, but that’s only half the problem—the other half, the
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] first, original half of the problem remains difficult.
[Speaker D] I agree, but not from here—you permitted something else from here. I haven’t permitted anything yet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You want to propose a theory that explains all the facts? I’ll set out all the facts for you; if you have an alternative theory, try to think of one.
[Speaker D] All the facts—the facts are these:
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you char before the time, then it is permitted to eat and to benefit from it afterward, within the prohibited period. That I accept. Fine. If you char after the time, it is forbidden to benefit. That too I accept. If you burn it, whether before or after, it is permitted. I don’t have a theory that explains all those facts.
[Speaker D] So now you’ve narrowed the field for me. I now need only look for the difference between charring and burning. Okay. That’s where it sits. In all the pilpul about “before,” we permitted toast—remember that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, the Talmud’s claim is that if it became ash, then it’s already something else entirely, it’s a different object. If it’s charred, it’s the same object, but the object’s condition is frozen at the moment you charred it, because once you charred it, it already left the category of food—at least ordinary food—so its status is determined at the stage when it still was food. That’s the designation it received, and now this charring froze the situation.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, pasteurized wine. That’s the claim. Pasteurized wine. Right? Fine. Wine—if someone touched it before it underwent cooking, it has one status; after it underwent cooking, that’s it, it’s cooked wine, the status changes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Pasteurized is disputed, yes.
[Speaker D] Not pasteurized—cooked. Okay, fine. Same thing, same idea: something undergoes some process.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I understand all that. Now explain to me what happens with charred bread.
[Speaker D] That’s what I’m searching for. That’s what I want to answer. Help me—but we’re waiting, we’re searching.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On this point we agree. On this we agree. I wanted to gain that much.
[Speaker B] So if we agree, then what’s the argument? We agree completely. Once that’s true, then even if it’s hard for you, everything collapses.
[Speaker D] No, only the eating collapses. Shmuel, don’t build on the cafeteria, don’t build on the cafeteria—the toast thing won’t work for you. Logically there’s no other solution.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in any case, that’s one formulation of the Meiri. One formulation of the Meiri. The Meiri basically argues that it freezes the situation: once a prohibited designation applies to it, that prohibition does not leave it until it is burned completely, but charring freezes its state, okay. There is another formulation, from Maharam Halava, and he explains it like this—I’ll read you his language: “And Rava said: If one charred it before its time, it is permitted for benefit after its time,” meaning he charred it until he removed it from the category of bread and it became invalid even for a dog to eat, “and it is permitted for benefit after its time.” Up to here, that’s only an explanation of the Talmud. “And it says ‘for benefit’ because it is unfit to eat; therefore it simply said ‘benefit,’ but the same applies if he wants to eat it—he may also eat it, for it is like mere dust. And specifically if he charred it before its time; but after its time, since it was prohibited once as leavened food, it is forever prohibited, for then it turns out that he is benefiting from that which was prohibited to him—unless he burned it completely until it became ash, for then it is permitted.”
[Speaker C] What do you mean, “unless”? What? How does he get that “unless”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “It turns out that he is benefiting from what was prohibited to him”—yes—“unless he burned it.” What does that mean, “he is benefiting from what was prohibited to him”? What does that concept mean? In my opinion, what he says is something different from the Meiri. The Meiri sees this as freezing the situation. Maharam Halava argues that there is no freezing of the situation here at all. The toast now is not leavened food; you can eat it, do whatever you want with it on Passover. But what? If you charred it during the holiday, then what happened is that now, when you eat it charred, you are in fact benefiting from the leavened food—from the charring of the leavened food that you did. The charring of the leavened food effectively turned the prohibition—the leavened food that was forbidden to eat and to benefit from—into something that you can now use. So the charring was producing benefit from the leavened food. Not the eating that you do now, because the charring turned it into something that can be eaten. So it turns out that on Passover you performed an act on the leavened food that enabled you to derive benefit from it.
[Speaker B] He isn’t violating the prohibition of eating leavened food; he’s violating the prohibition of benefit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The practical difference will be that in such a case, when I now eat the leavened food, the prohibition will be a prohibition of benefit, not a prohibition of eating. Because what happened is, when I eat it, it’s not leavened food—except that when I eat, what happens is that this clarifies for me that when I charred the leavened food I actually created food. But that reveals that the charring itself was an act of producing benefit.
[Speaker E] What’s the novelty of the Mishnah, that leavened food before the time is permitted?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That you charred it before the time.
[Speaker E] You charred it before the time?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Right. The novelty is that when it’s charred, it isn’t leavened food. But…
[Speaker E] But from the standpoint of the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t incur liability if you charred it before the time. It’s not leavened food, and producing benefit from the leavened food—that’s leavened food from before the time, so there’s no problem with deriving benefit from leavened food on the eve of Passover. But if you charred it on the holiday itself—if you charred it on the holiday itself—then you are deriving benefit from leavened food on the holiday.
[Speaker E] But again, I haven’t learned anything about the state before the holiday. The Mishnah didn’t teach anything new.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Mishnah taught that charring turns it into non-leavened food.
[Speaker E] But would I incur liability if I eat it? If it’s not leavened food, then why if I eat
[Speaker C] it on Passover am I liable? No, you’re not liable. If you charred it before the time, you’re not liable. Charring during the holiday—if you charred it beforehand, you’re not liable. If you charred it during the holiday itself, then you are liable. Why? Because the charring was an act of producing benefit done on the holiday itself. Why not explain it differently? Before the holiday I look at it objectively. Objectively it’s ash, okay? Objectively. And now, when the holiday comes in, yes? If you burned it, yes? Then even though subjectively for you, for you, it’s food, it’s leavened food.
[Speaker B] No, but in the end he benefits. Forget for a second—you can’t eat—what, what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After I charred it.
[Speaker C] After you charred and burned it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Burned it completely?
[Speaker C] If you
[Speaker B] eat it…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you eat it, look at the benefit.
[Speaker B] Look at the benefit. The eating is—eating ash—look only at the benefit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’ll see there’s some serious benefit here.
[Speaker B] That’s what Maharam Halava says: what happens when he burns it. What benefit? Only benefit. Benefit—if you do it before that, everything is permitted.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you do it during the holiday, benefit is forbidden. If you do one further stage, it is already permitted. Because the ash is no longer within the category of the leavened food. I’m adding another point: when you eat the leavened food itself, then
[Speaker D] right
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] even though it is no longer considered food, it is still that same leavened food that was there. So you derived benefit from that leavened food; the benefit is still being derived from that very leavened food. After you burned it, it’s no longer leavened food, it’s
[Speaker D] you’ve already crossed the boundary into something else, already
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it disappeared and a different object was born. Maharam Halava—obviously there is a difference.
[Speaker B] So then if one person burns it and another eats it, then who…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. So he created from it something fit for benefit. Now as for… say I sell forbidden orlah fruit. I took the money. Orlah fruit is forbidden for benefit. I sold the orlah fruit, got money, and now I threw the money into the sea. Did I violate a prohibition? I threw the money into the sea. Of course I violated a prohibition. The fact that I didn’t make use of the benefit I created—fine—but I gained money for it. So the same here.
[Speaker B] So Reuven burns it, and who
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] violates the prohibition?
[Speaker B] Shimon eats it and Reuven violates the prohibition according to this.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s a good practical difference; I hadn’t thought of that. Right—if Reuven burns it and Shimon eats it, then Reuven violates the prohibition according to Maharam Halava, not Shimon. I had thought of another practical difference. The Ritva brings here the case where I did this charring in the sixth hour. In the sixth hour, leavened food is permitted for benefit but forbidden to eat. Okay? Now I charred the leavened food. According to the Meiri, the leavened food will remain forever permitted for benefit and forbidden to eat. Sorry—permitted for benefit and forbidden to eat. Because it is fixed in place, right? According to Maharam Halava, it would be permitted even to eat it. Why? Because when I eat it, that reveals that the charring was an act of producing benefit, and in the sixth hour one is permitted to produce benefit. So this Ritva gives a practical difference between the Meiri and Maharam Halava. Okay? But yes, what you said is a nice practical difference. What happens if Reuven burns it and gives it to Shimon to eat? Then Reuven violated the prohibition according to Maharam Halava, because he produced this thing, and afterward he chose to throw it into the sea or give it to someone else—so what? But for our purposes, what does this basically mean? It basically means that what the Talmud is really learning here from the Mishnah is that when you read the Mishnah—notice—this is such a wild interpretive setup: he charred it before the time, etc. Where did this invention come from? I’m saying the Talmud read the Mishnah in its plain sense. No need to add a single word. That’s what the Mishnah says. It’s really written in the Mishnah—without adding even one word. The Mishnah says that leavened food from before the time has no prohibition take effect on it. Now obviously they don’t mean to say that when I eat it before the time—this isn’t Passover. What? Eating bread on Hanukkah doesn’t need a novelty from the Mishnah for that. The Mishnah comes to say that there is such a thing as leavened food from before the time. And that you can eat within the time and there still won’t be any prohibition. It’s just that you don’t understand how such a thing can exist. If you eat it within the time, then it is also leavened food from within the time. What does “leavened food from before” even mean? So the Talmud says: the case is where you char it. That’s all. But that is what the Mishnah says. It’s not some forced reading.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what they are doing here is some kind of separation between two time axes. That’s why this relates to the topic of time. Because there is one time axis that determines to whom the leavened food belongs: is it weekday leavened food, or Passover leavened food? There is another time axis that determines when I perform the act of eating. Now, when do I perform the act of eating? Whenever I physically do the act of eating. I am eating it during the holiday.
[Speaker B] So the time when I eat—usually these are
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] two things that coincide, except that the act of charring—the charring disconnects the two time axes from each other. Charring says: the time of the object stops. The moment you char it, you stop the time axis. Time no longer continues flowing with the object. I myself continue flowing with time. So if I eat it during the holiday, then I perform an act of eating during the holiday, but what I eat—the leavened food, the object that I eat—is leavened food from before the holiday, because with respect to it, time stopped. I’m just saying…
[Speaker B] What? According to the first explanation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also according to the second explanation, basically there is a split between two time axes. It’s just that there I am basically producing benefit—when do I perform the production of benefit? In that earlier time. Though there it may very well be that even my own time stops, not just the time of the leavened food. But still there is a stopping of the time axis here. So therefore I am now basically eating leavened food—the act of eating is done there. Not only does the leavened food belong there, but even the act of eating belongs there. And if I charred it during Passover, then the act of eating is done during Passover, or the benefit is produced during Passover. So this is basically a kind of laboratory that separates the two time axes. You manage to create a situation in which the leavened food belongs to one point in time and the act of eating takes place at another point in time. And if you remember, this is exactly the same thing I talked about at the very beginning when I spoke about two time axes, one flowing over the other, or when you go back retroactively on condition. What does it mean to go back retroactively? It means that you are basically separating two time axes. There is one time axis that is objective time—time always flows forward, nobody jumps backward in time. But there is some internal time axis that can create and go backward in time, and then it comes out that at one and the same point in time there are two states of the world that belong to that same point in time—two different states that belong to the same point in time. Say I divorced a woman on condition that she not drink wine for a week. Okay? So I divorced her, and now she is divorced. After a week she drank wine. What happens? The divorce action is then void retroactively. So that means that at the very moment you thought she was divorced, in fact she was not divorced. But this isn’t just a retroactive revelation, right? Rather what? It’s causal, not retroactive revelation. What does that mean? That when I experienced that moment, she really was divorced; and afterward I go back to that same moment and in that very same moment she is not divorced. So decide: at that moment was she divorced or not divorced? There are two different states in the world assigned to the same point in time. Fine—again, this is a disconnect or a stopping of the time axis.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now in this context, a few halakhic / of Jewish law examples that I now see are really also connected to this. That is, the connection to migo de-itkatzai seems pretty clear to me. There too, basically, we somehow stop the time axis at twilight. Meaning, the object is an object of twilight when you use it on the Sabbath. It’s not an object of now; it’s an object of twilight. That’s why it doesn’t matter that now the laundry has dried. So what? When I use the laundry now, I am using twilight-laundry, not laundry of now. Now it’s dry, it’s not set aside. But its status stopped—that is, it froze; at twilight its designation attached to it, time froze. It’s basically the same process.
[Speaker C] Now look at a few examples from migo de-itkatzai. It seems to me that there is also there “his mind was on it,” I think there’s there that “his mind was on it” in…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “He sits and waits, and his mind is on it.”
[Speaker C] Right, so “his mind is on it” — that’s not a time axis and not anything of the sort. Meaning, since his mind was not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s the explanation of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there.
[Speaker C] No, the Talmud says “his mind is on it.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says that concerning Rabbi Shimon, that this is the practical difference between him and Rabbi Yehuda. Fine. So it didn’t say that this is the definition of migo de-itkatzai. The Talmud says that this is the category of set-aside that applies even according to Rabbi Shimon: something where his mind is on it and that remains in place until you know it will become fit again, become permitted again. “He sits and waits,” as they say. He sits and waits and his mind is on it. Fine,
[Speaker C] the idea is that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, in that Rabbi Shimon agrees. Okay. So migo de-itkatzai is a different passage. As I mentioned earlier, Rabbi Akiva Eiger actually argues that migo de-itkatzai is the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, and then these definitions really are the definitions connected to migo de-itkatzai according to that. But the Ran disagrees there, and that… fine, we won’t go into that now. But I want to bring a few more examples of places in Jewish law where you basically see the involvement of time in a non-trivial way, where time actually defines the reality itself—it’s not an external characteristic of reality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think I spoke at some point about “and you shall rejoice on your festival,” right? Already at the beginning. “And you shall rejoice on your festival” basically means that the festival is the cause of the joy; it’s not the time in which we rejoice. We rejoice because the cause is that the time arrived. Meaning, it’s not that we rejoice in something and only have to do it when the time comes. So maybe I’ll bring a few more examples of this matter, all of which are also connected to what I said before, that time actually defines the object. Look, for example, there is Nachmanides in tractate Kiddushin. Nachmanides speaks about counting the Omer and says that counting the Omer is a positive commandment caused by time, and therefore women are exempt. The question is: how can that be? Why is counting the Omer not time-caused? It runs from the day after Passover until Shavuot. So in Divrei Yechezkel he writes as follows—in Divrei Yechezkel and Imrei Moshe, these are two analytical books that were common in Lithuanian yeshivot from before the Holocaust. Both were heads of small yeshivot, Moshe Sokolovsky and Yechezkel—I don’t remember who. He says that Nachmanides holds that the counting from the sixteenth of Nisan is not because the essence of the time itself obligates the commandment of counting the Omer—otherwise it would be a positive commandment caused by time, just as the fifteenth of Nisan obligates matzah. Rather, because the verse says, “And you shall count for yourselves from the morrow of the Sabbath, from the day that you brought the Omer of the waving,” etc. And if the time for bringing the Omer were on another day, we would also be obligated in counting. If we were to bring the Omer in Kislev, then we would count the Omer from Kislev. Meaning, counting the Omer is not intrinsically tied to Nisan, but to bringing the Omer—it just so happens that the Omer is brought in Nisan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Think, for example, about Grace after Meals. I say Grace after Meals—let’s say I eat breakfast every morning at eight, and finish at 8:15, so at 8:15 I say Grace after Meals. Fine? So is Grace after Meals a positive commandment caused by time? No. Why not? Because it’s not because of the time, but because of the food; it’s just that I eat the food at 8:15. So here too, he says, counting the Omer is because of bringing the Omer; it just happens that bringing the Omer is done in Nisan. But it depends on the event, not on a point in time. So this is exactly the same idea as “and you shall rejoice on your festival.”
[Speaker B] But that event has a fixed time. Okay, the event itself is what causes it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] נכון, but it still depends on the event and not on the time.
[Speaker B] Only the event depends on time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Fine. Passover itself, for example—no, Passover itself really is time-caused. On that he doesn’t disagree.
[Speaker B] No, I’m talking about this one,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and waving the Omer is also time-caused; bringing the Omer is also time-caused.
[Speaker B] time-caused. If that is time-caused, then why isn’t this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the commandment is
[Speaker B] to count, which is connected to it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. It depends on time, and counting the Omer depends on it, but it is not the time. For it to count, it has to depend directly on time. We spoke about explicit dependence on time and indirect dependence on time, remember? A function of x of t versus a direct function of t. Meaning, those are two different things. So it turns out that the fixed time of counting the Omer exists only by necessity, not because of its intrinsic time, and in such a case it is not considered time-caused. That’s what he wants to argue. In other words, time itself doesn’t cause the counting; the day of waving does. It’s just that the day of waving is the day after Passover. That’s one example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a second example, taken from an article I once wrote on the roots. Regarding the blessing over the moon: we recite it every month, what’s called sanctifying the moon. It says that women are exempt from this. So the Magen Avraham writes that it is a positive commandment caused by time. But the Chokhmat Shlomo says this—Rabbi Shlomo Kluger: “In my opinion this is very puzzling, and it has no connection at all to a positive commandment caused by time.” Rabbi Shlomo Kluger was a famous phenomenal prodigy. I like him just because of a story I once heard about him. He was the rabbi of Brody, a very famous Torah scholar in Brody and the surrounding area. Once two fellows came to him from a nearby town to ask a question. He sat there and said, “I don’t know, I have no answer.” Fine. They’re walking back to their town. There’s some young rabbi there in town; they ask him the question, he goes into a room to look into it, comes back with an answer. They go back to Rabbi Shlomo Kluger and say, “Look, this Jew answered us.” He was so impressed by his Torah power that he invited him to his home, office, whatever, and said to him—the man comes trembling—“Tell me, what’s your secret? How did you manage to answer a question that I couldn’t answer?” So he says, “Look, Rabbi, I’ll explain. I went into the room, prayed to the Holy One, blessed be He, to enlighten my eyes, okay? Then my eyes fell exactly on some book that was sticking out a bit on the shelf. I opened it, and boom—there exactly appeared that question they had asked me.” Rabbi Shlomo Kluger threw him out of the house and said, “I thought you knew how to learn. All you know how to do is whine.” And that’s why I like him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says: “In my opinion this is very puzzling, and it has no connection at all to a positive commandment caused by time.” Why? “This rule was only said about a commandment where the very body of the commandment is always relevant at any time, such as matzah or sukkah or lulav and the like, where this commandment could be fulfilled in Cheshvan just as in Tishrei and in Iyar just as in Nisan. Even so, the Torah said that on these days one is obligated, and from then onward exempt.” Meaning, a commandment that can be done at any time, and nevertheless the Torah limits it only to specific times—that is a positive commandment caused by time. It is clear that it is a positive commandment caused by time, because time causes it and not something else. And therefore women are exempt. “But regarding the moon, is the obstacle really because of time?” Meaning, the issue is that you can’t do it at any other time except when there is a new moon. It’s not that Jewish law told you to do it at this time and not another.
[Speaker B] That too is also indirect dependence on time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly the same thing—indirect dependence on time. The same principle. Meaning, you do it only because of the new moon; it’s not a restriction that time imposed. It’s just that the new moon happens then and not at another time. Therefore it is not called time-caused. Parenthetically, this approach certainly does not fit with the well-known Avudraham. Yes, the Avudraham who says that women are exempt from positive commandments caused by time because they are busy in the home and we don’t want to—yes, we don’t want to bind them to fixed times and impose constraints on them, all kinds of constraints. Such a strange explanation. Well, it’s so simple that it’s strange; that means it can’t be correct.
[Speaker C] But that’s a bit surprising regarding counting the Omer, because you can’t count…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying. These explanations don’t fit with the Avudraham.
[Speaker B] Ah, this is Avudraham, this is counting the Omer? No, counting the Omer is what I said earlier. Yes, but I’m saying that’s not exactly the same thing, right? No, in principle you can count only with the waving of the Omer, and the waving of the Omer is only on Passover. Right? No, so that’s indirect dependence on time, just like here. You can sanctify the moon only when the moon is in that state, and that happens
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] only once a month, and so on.
[Speaker B] So we said it’s not essential here; it
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] depends on the event, only the event happens in time. But according to the Avudraham, what difference do all these analytical pilpul distinctions make? Bottom line, you are imposing on women a constraint that depends on time. What difference does it make whether analytically it depends not on time but on an event that depends on time? As long as it’s something that has a fixed time and obligates you, constrains you, then what difference does it make what it is? Yes, fine, it’s clear that usually people don’t learn like that explanation.
[Speaker B] It’s a category; not all details fit that category. What? There’s a certain category, not all…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why invent this category? Don’t invent this category—leave it as it is. If all these distinctions are an invention—if it were written in the Torah I’d understand, fair enough. But why are you making these distinctions? They aren’t correct.
[Speaker C] This is exactly the first example, with the Omer—say in our time when there is no waving.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Since it’s the day of waving, that doesn’t matter. On the day of waving you count. By the way, there really are opinions that counting the Omer nowadays is rabbinic / of rabbinic origin and others that it is Torah-level / of biblical origin; it depends on the dispute.
[Speaker C] Fine. So that would turn it into not a positive commandment…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. But even according to the opinions that it does not depend on the day of waving and it is Torah-level / of biblical origin, “the day of waving” means it depends on the day of waving. You’re not dependent on the sixteenth of Nisan, but on the day of waving. True, even when there is no waving, the day of waving determines it—but that is because it is the day of waving, not because it is the sixteenth of Nisan. And that’s not a date; it’s not an arbitrary time restriction. It depends on an event.
[Speaker C] Suppose one year it were determined in the Temple—suppose it were impossible to wave now and they could only wave it a week later. When would they count?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe they’d count from there? Count from there? I don’t know. According to his position, it needs discussion. Or maybe the day of waving determines it no matter when they actually wave, like today when they don’t wave.
[Speaker C] Fine. But…
[Speaker B] But then isn’t time what causes it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not time. Because time is a date, not the day of waving. If the sixteenth of Nisan were what caused it, you’d be right. But no—the day of waving. But the day of waving is the sixteenth of Nisan.
[Speaker B] So that’s just how you understand the Omer? No, the day that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it’s indirect dependence. That is exactly the issue of the blessing over the moon.
[Speaker B] Why? It’s the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The blessing over the moon happens at the new moon; there was simply a new moon now, that’s all.
[Speaker B] But you can’t do the waving of the Omer on another date because of the date, not because of the one doing the waving—the waving itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the counting I can do whenever I want. They just tell me to do it from the day of waving onward. But
[Speaker B] it won’t ever be except on Passover. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Grace after Meals too—I say it after breakfast, and breakfast is always at eight. Does that make it time-caused? The moon, the moon is not…
[Speaker B] You can also do it at another time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can, but I always eat at eight.
[Speaker B] And sanctifying the moon is also indirect dependence; it’s some physical fact that the moon rotates once every… with the moon it’s not even indirect dependence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because… it’s simply because that’s how the natural world works, that the cycle takes twenty-nine and a half days. But I attach it to the moon, not to time. The Holy One, blessed be He, took the Israelites out of Egypt specifically on the fifteenth. So what? Then Passover also depends…
[Speaker D] We spoke about that once—that “because of this the Lord did for me when I went out of Egypt,” for its own sake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that’s the case—“because of this”—then it works out.
[Speaker D] We once mentioned some Beit HaLevi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the Beit HaLevi. You need…
[Speaker D] So that resolves it: the Exodus from Egypt…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that the Exodus from Egypt happened on the date; the date is not there because of the Exodus from Egypt. Yes.
[Speaker D] That really explains it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Without
[Speaker D] that, it doesn’t work.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. There are a few more examples of this idea. For example, the Achiezer writes about a minor. He says that the Noda B’Yehuda basically asks: why can minors perform ritual slaughter? After all, someone who does not belong to the matter cannot render it valid either. Minors, since they are not subject to the obligation of putting on tefillin, cannot write tefillin. They are not fit to write tefillin, because they are not subject to putting on tefillin; they are not obligated in the matter. Now, with slaughter too, a minor is not included in the prohibition of “not properly slaughtered.” Meaning, something not slaughtered is permitted for him to eat, because he is not subject to the prohibitions. So why is a minor allowed to slaughter? An adult stands over him in order to make sure he does it correctly, but in principle a minor’s slaughter is valid slaughter; he is not disqualified for this. So the Achiezer writes as follows: “However, it seems primary that a minor is fit for slaughtering once he grows up. And it is not comparable to tefillin, where a minor is disqualified from writing tefillin because he is not subject to tying them. So why is it not comparable? Because there it is a positive commandment applying anew each and every day, and since as long as he is a minor he is not obligated in this commandment, he is considered not subject to tying. That is not the case with slaughtering. And this is like the distinction they made between not being subject to tying and, regarding a bill of divorce, being subject to severance. And it further appears that this very carcass would be forbidden to this minor himself once he grows up. That is not the case with tefillin, where each day is a separate obligation in its own right, and the fact that an obligation will arise for him when he comes of age does not mean he is considered subject to tying now, in his minority, when the commandment does not yet obligate him.” What is he saying? That the commandment of tefillin is one where every day you have a commandment to put on tefillin. Okay? So in fact, when the minor grows up he will be obligated in the commandment of tefillin. But that will be a different tefillin commandment from the tefillin commandment of now, because it will be the tefillin commandment of that day. But in the tefillin commandment of this day, he does not belong at all. Okay? So therefore, the fact that he will be obligated in tefillin when he grows up does not make him someone subject to tying right now. But as for the prohibition of a carcass, this very carcass now—say he slaughters something improperly and it becomes a carcass—this very carcass will be forbidden to him when he grows up. It is not a new prohibition; it is not a prohibition dependent on time. The tefillin obligation is that each and every day he has an obligation of tefillin. So the tefillin obligation of now will not apply to him forever. In fact, he will never be obligated in the tefillin of this day. What he will be obligated in when he grows up is a different tefillin commandment, not the tefillin commandment of this day.
[Speaker D] If he started writing them five minutes before sunset and finished writing those tefillin five minutes after, and he is thirteen?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then those words that he wrote at the beginning were written by someone who was not yet obligated, so they are invalid. Okay? So again we see that time defines the commandment. And it is not one tefillin commandment that applies today and tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. No, no, no. There is the tefillin commandment of today, there is the tefillin commandment of tomorrow, and they are not the same tefillin commandment. Like leavened food of Passover before the time and leavened food of Passover after the time. Meaning, time here defines the object; it defines the commandment. It is not that there is one commandment, except that it exists at one time and not at another. No, no, no. Time is part of what defines the commandment. The commandment at this time is a different commandment from the commandment of tomorrow. And therefore, the fact that you will be obligated in tomorrow’s commandment does not make you someone obligated in today’s commandment; it is a different commandment. And there are various other examples I collected of this same principle, but we’ll stop here already; that’s enough for now.