Halakha and Ethics, Lesson 2

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[0:01] Opening: negative attributes and the introductory chapter
[1:23] Conflict between Torah and morality: three levels
[3:18] The logical and philosophical analysis of the conflict
[4:56] Sartre’s example: a moral conflict in wartime
[8:09] Types of conflicts: essential versus incidental
[10:53] Conflict between Jewish law and morality: is it possible?
[12:56] Rabbi Kook’s and the Chazon Ish’s approaches to conflict
[17:06] The Euthyphro dilemma: is morality external to God?
[25:28] The discussion of lying according to Rabbi Dessler
[27:57] Permitted or overridden — a basic distinction
[29:47] Repentance in a case of saving a life
[31:24] The psychology of a soldier on the Sabbath
[33:15] The story of Rabbi Chaim — saving a life
[36:01] Dessler — lying when it is required
[40:36] First approach — Rabbi Kook
[43:58] Maimonides’ view — categories
[49:52] Chazon Ish — there is no morality
[51:24] The value of life and the hierarchy
[53:52] Logical contradiction: murdering a Sabbath desecrator
[54:53] Charity without intention — does it have halakhic value?
[57:48] The third conception — non-moral values
[59:54] The case of a kohen’s wife — a value conflict

Summary

General Overview

The speaker feels there is no point in continuing with Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed after the principle of negative attributes, the question of the superiority of the wise, and the parable of the elephant have already been exhausted, and he moves on to open a structured discussion of the relationship between Torah and morality within a conceptual framework before studying sources. He describes the usual tension around Torah and morality as a conflict that arises when the Torah or Jewish law seems to say one thing and morality demands another, and he organizes the discussion on three levels: logical, philosophical/meta-halakhic, and practical. He argues that a value conflict is logically possible even within a single value system, and on the philosophical level he maps out three approaches: two that eliminate the possibility of conflict by identifying morality and Jewish law with each other in different ways (Rabbi Kook versus a view attributed to the Chazon Ish), and a third approach that recognizes conflict because Jewish law also has non-moral aims that may prevail in certain situations. He gives examples such as wiping out Amalek, saving life and the Sabbath, the case of a kohen’s wife who was raped, and lying for the sake of peace through Rabbi Dessler, and concludes that the remaining question is what one does in practice when a conflict actually occurs.

From Guide for the Perplexed to a discussion of Torah and morality

The speaker says there is no point in continuing with Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed after the principle of negative attributes has been understood, and the chapters on the superiority of the wise and the parable of the elephant have already been dealt with and exhausted. He asks to begin a discussion of the relationship between Torah and morality and to build an introduction and conceptual analysis that will provide a framework into which written sources can later be integrated.

The sense of conflict and the three levels of the problem

The speaker says that the question of the relationship between Torah and morality usually arouses a conflict felt as a clash between what the Torah or Jewish law says and what morality says. He divides the concern into three levels: whether there is a logical contradiction in holding a value and its opposite, whether such a thing is possible on the philosophical/meta-halakhic level, and what one should actually do in a situation of clash and decision.

The logical level: a value conflict is not a contradiction

The speaker argues that there is no logical contradiction in the very possibility of a value conflict, because a conflict between values is not the same as asserting a value and its opposite in the same respect. He brings Sartre’s example of his student during the Holocaust, who is torn between joining the struggle against the Nazis and caring for his sick mother, and presents this as a practical clash between two independent values. He also gives the everyday example of wanting to eat chocolate because it tastes good versus not wanting to because it is unhealthy, and argues that the tension arises from different aspects rather than from an internal contradiction.

Types of conflicts: essential versus incidental

The speaker distinguishes between an essential conflict, in which realizing one value always involves harming another value, and an incidental conflict, which arises only in certain circumstances. He gives as an essential case the command to wipe out Amalek, which by definition clashes with the prohibition of murder, and argues that in such a case the Torah itself already takes the clash into account and instructs that the command prevails. He presents saving life and the Sabbath as an incidental case in which there is usually no clash, but in certain situations one arises, and then the need appears to look for a way to decide.

The philosophical/meta-halakhic level: is a Jewish law–morality conflict possible?

The speaker says that conflicts within morality or within Jewish law seem philosophically possible, but a conflict between Jewish law and morality is less plausible for someone who thinks that Jewish law necessarily defines the most moral behavior. He points to a common conception according to which if Jewish law commands something, that itself must also be the moral act, and therefore in that view there is no room for conflict between the two systems even though there can be conflicts within each one.

Two identity-based approaches that eliminate conflict: Rabbi Kook and the Chazon Ish as code names

The speaker presents two opposite conceptions that lead to the same conclusion, that conflict is impossible, because they create identity between the categories. He attributes to Rabbi Kook a conception according to which Jewish law is the best way to realize morality, and therefore the halakhic command is the highest moral outcome, and anyone who feels a conflict simply does not yet understand the depth of reality. He presents a conception attributed to the Chazon Ish according to which there is no independent category of morality at all, and morality is defined as whatever Jewish law says, so there is nothing to compare it with and no room for clash, and he also describes a Haredi totalizing tendency that reinforces this direction.

The Euthyphro dilemma and Leibowitz: what is and is not at stake

The speaker distinguishes between the question of Torah and morality as he formulates it and the Euthyphro dilemma about the relation between the Holy One, blessed be He, and the moral good: whether God wants the good because it is good, or whether it is good because God wants it. He says the Euthyphro discussion deals with the theological question of whether the good has an independent standing that supposedly subjects God, whereas he is dealing with the human relation to two systems of norms that obligate him. He mentions Leibowitz’s position that morality is an atheistic category and Ezra Goodman’s reading according to which there is no contradiction in Leibowitz’s being committed both to morality and to Jewish law, and the speaker states that he does not accept the assumption that atheistic ethics is coherent, even though he recognizes that secular people can be no less moral than religious people.

Rabbi Dessler’s example, truth and falsehood, and the parallel to permitted versus overridden

The speaker cites Rabbi Dessler, who argues that when Jewish law obligates a person to lie, that is not a lie at all but truth, and he interprets this as a value claim that such a lie carries no moral cost, not as a semantic argument. He compares this to the structure of permitted versus overridden in the context of saving life and the Sabbath, and presents the debate as a question of whether the act is a justified transgression or not a transgression at all. He argues that there is almost no practical difference resulting from the permitted-versus-overridden distinction, rejects suggestions such as repentance or permission to desecrate the Sabbath beyond what is required, and explains that the real significance of the discussion is more psychological and educational than halakhic and practical.

The third approach: conflict is possible because Jewish law has non-moral goals

The speaker presents an approach according to which there can be situations in which Jewish law requires an act that appears immoral through moral lenses, not because the Torah abolishes morality but because it also has other aims. He argues that Jewish law contains no anti-moral values in the sense of dismissing a moral principle as nonsense, but rather non-moral values that do not belong to morality and sometimes clash with it, and in cases of clash a non-moral value may prevail. He gives as an example the case of a kohen’s wife who was raped and is required to separate from her kohen husband, and interprets this as a clash between a moral value and the religious value of preserving priestly sanctity.

Maimonides: a division between moral commandments and “statutes,” and additional purposes of the Torah

The speaker says that Maimonides distinguishes between moral commandments and statutes that do not belong to morality, and cites chapter 6 of the Eight Chapters, where Maimonides reconciles the words of the Sages, “Do not say: I do not desire it; rather, I do desire it, but what can I do, since my Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me,” with the philosophers’ position, by saying that the example of pork represents a domain that is not moral. He says that Maimonides presents additional purposes for the Torah that are not moral purposes, including a mention of the ninth root, and emphasizes that this distinction makes it possible to understand conflicts without claiming either that everything is morality or that there is no morality at all.

Classic examples of difficulty and the response of the three approaches

The speaker mentions examples that raise difficulty, such as saving a non-Jew’s life on the Sabbath, killing Amalek, treatment of women, the kohen’s wife who was raped, a mamzer, and sacrifices, as well as the Binding of Isaac as a model for the claim that the act is the most moral one for whoever truly understands. He says that Rabbi Kook would interpret every case as a pinnacle of morality revealed only to someone who fully understands reality, the conception attributed to the Chazon Ish would abolish the very dilemma by definition, and the third approach would say that there is immorality here in the sense of harming morality for the sake of another religious goal. He cites the Maharal in Be’er HaGolah and the Ran’s Derashot, sermon 11, to the effect that Jewish law is sometimes less moral than gentile legal systems because it also aims at “the application of the divine matter,” and he compares this to a machine that performs several functions and therefore does not maximize each one separately.

Criticism from outside and criticism from within, and “My handiwork is drowning in the sea, and you are singing?”

The speaker says that criticism from outside assumes that there are only moral values in the world and therefore concludes that one who obeys commands such as the separation of a kohen’s wife is immoral, whereas within the world of Jewish law there are also additional values that may prevail. He says that criticism from within sometimes stems from Rabbi Kook’s basic assumption that everything must be moral, but while rejecting the claim that the solution is a hidden higher morality, he proposes giving up that assumption so as not to need such a solution. He uses the statement, “My handiwork is drowning in the sea, and you are singing?” as an example showing that the Holy One, blessed be He, acts according to multiple values and that there is room for the tension of “shooting and crying” without seeing in it a principled contradiction.

Conclusion: two levels clarified, and the practical question postponed

The speaker concludes that there is no logical problem in the existence of a value conflict and that there is a reasonable philosophical option that recognizes conflicts between Jewish law and morality without fully identifying the categories. He says that the remaining layer is the third level — what one actually does when there is a clash — and notes that later he will also enter into questions about morality itself, universality, and relativism.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My feeling was

[Speaker B] that there’s no

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] point anymore in continuing with Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed. All in all, we understood the principle of — it seems to me, I hope we understood the principle of — negative attributes. The next chapter is basically devoted to the question of what advantage the wise have over the fools, if at the end of the day the claim of negative attributes is that we don’t know anything. So what do we gain? But we already explained that in the course of the discussion, whichever way you look at it. And the third chapter — we talked about the parable of the elephant. So all in all I think that’s been exhausted. What I wanted to do now is start discussing a bit the relationship between Torah and morality, which we’ve also touched on a little, of course, in previous years, and try to have a somewhat orderly discussion of that issue too. I need to think about which texts would be worth looking at afterward, but today I want to say a bit by way of an introduction — you could call it a conceptual analysis — which will once again give some kind of framework, and into that framework we can later bring written sources. Okay, when we deal with the question of the relationship between Torah and morality, it usually arouses in us some sense of conflict. Basically, it comes up in contexts of clash, where the Torah or Jewish law says one thing and morality tells us something else. And this conflict is troubling on several levels. First, how can that be? Meaning, isn’t it a logical contradiction to believe in a value and its opposite? The second question is how this can be, not on the logical level but on the philosophical, meta-halakhic level — we’ll spell that out more later, but for now just a sketch. And the third layer is: what do you do? Meaning, there’s a conflict, and now you need to know what to do in practice. So we’ll come back to that — those are basically the three levels. Let’s try for a moment.

[Speaker C] Why is the starting assumption that there’s a conflict?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Where from? No, I haven’t said that yet. I’m only saying that when we talk about Torah and morality, usually, it seems to me, the connotation is a connotation of conflict.

[Speaker D] In this context the discussions of Torah and morality come up.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like Torah and science? Yes, exactly. It’s in that context that the discussions of Torah and morality really arise. In a moment I’ll talk about whether there is one, and how it could be, and so on — that’s part of the discussion. So maybe I’ll start with the logical level.

[Speaker E] There’s also a question here about the source of authority. What about the source of authority?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the dispute between—

[Speaker E] Morality — morality is natural.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, actually I don’t see it that way. I’ll talk about that in a moment. No, I don’t see it that way. So: the logical level, the philosophical/meta-halakhic/intellectual level, and the practical level — meaning what to do, the decision — that’s basically the order of work. So let’s start with the philosophical level. On the philosophical level, the question is whether there’s a logical contradiction in the very existence of a value conflict. Seemingly, how can you believe in or be committed to a thing and its opposite? Seemingly, there can’t be a conflict at all, so why even think about how to solve it? It can’t be — there’s some logical contradiction here, something is wrong, if there’s a conflict that means we got confused, meaning something in the calculation went wrong because this simply cannot be. That’s not correct. It seems to me that can be rejected out of hand.

[Speaker F] Why can’t there have to be a conflict? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying if — I’m saying assuming there is one, or whether there can be one. Afterward we’ll see. I didn’t say there must be one; I’m discussing precisely that question. First of all, I’m not even talking yet about a conflict between two value systems, morality and Jewish law or morality and Torah. Let’s talk within a single value system. Even within one value system there can be conflict, and there’s no logical problem in that. I obviously can’t say that I both endorse the supremacy of the value of life and do not endorse the supremacy of the value of life — that’s a clear logical contradiction. But that’s not what is usually called a conflict between values. A conflict between values is usually something of the following type. I think we once talked about Sartre’s example, about Sartre’s student. I think we spoke about it at some point; I don’t remember in what context. During the Holocaust, one of his students came to him and consulted him about a moral dilemma. His father collaborates with the Nazis, his brother was murdered by the Nazis, and his mother is old and sick and needs care. Now he’s torn: on the one hand, he thinks of escaping and joining the Free French army and fighting with de Gaulle, fighting against the Nazis. On the other hand, then who will take care of his mother? She’ll be left alone. There’s a dilemma here — what do you do in such a situation? Let’s try for a moment to see what this dilemma means. What is standing against what here? Is it a logical contradiction that such a dilemma exists? It seems clearly not. Meaning, there’s no problem here at all. It’s something that accompanies every person, I think — dilemmas, again, at different intensities, but a situation. Meaning, let’s put it this way: there’s a clash here between two different values, where the values in themselves do not contradict one another. The situation created a state in which, if I listen to one value, then I’m supposed to act X, and if I listen to the other value, I’m supposed to act not-X. The values as such do not clash. It’s not like believing in the supremacy of the value of life and also not believing in the supremacy of the value of life. That’s a logical contradiction, because it’s a value and its opposite. But here these are two values that don’t speak to each other. They’re just two independent values. One is to fight evil, and the other is to help your elderly mother. What connection is there between them? Usually, when you do one, that doesn’t contradict fighting evil, and vice versa. Here a situation arose in which those two values cannot be fulfilled together. I can’t — in halakhic language, it’s impossible to fulfill both.

[Speaker F] But in daily life we set priorities.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, fine. I’m only saying — I’m trying to show that even before the question of what to do, first of all the very fact that it exists involves no logical contradiction at all. My favorite chocolate example: I want to eat chocolate because it tastes good, and I don’t want to eat chocolate because it isn’t healthy. Is there any contradiction in that? No contradiction at all. There is one aspect that leads me not to want to eat chocolate, and another aspect that leads me to want to. If I were saying that in the very same aspect itself I both do and do not want it, that would be a logical contradiction. But if these are two different aspects, even though they lead to a conflict on the practical level, between the aspects themselves — the values themselves — there is no contradiction. So there’s no logical problem in that at all. This kind of thing happens every day. So these things shouldn’t trouble us on the logical level.

[Speaker D] There are lots of these in halakhic norms too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, also within morality, within Jewish law, certainly. There’s saving life and the Sabbath, all kinds of things like that. Now even in these conflicts — say, in a halakhic conflict for example — you have to distinguish between two kinds of conflicts. Halakhic, but also moral — meaning there are two kinds of conflicts.

[Speaker F] In Jewish law there’s usually a ruling.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We look for rulings. In the cases where the Talmud has a ruling, fine. But I can think of conflicts where you can’t find a direct ruling in the Talmud; maybe you can infer one one way or another. But we haven’t dealt with those. There are two kinds of conflicts. One kind is when the practical clash — and it’s always practical, because a clash between values as such would be a contradiction — when the clash is that realizing the values leads in opposite directions. And that clash is essential. Meaning, whenever I want to realize value A, I violate value B, by definition. For example, the obligation to wipe out Amalek always clashes with the prohibition of murder. By definition. Built in. Meaning, I cannot fulfill wiping out Amalek without violating the prohibition of murder. It will always involve a conflict with the prohibition of murder. That’s one type. Another type is saving life on the Sabbath. In principle, to keep the Sabbath you don’t have to endanger life under normal circumstances, and to preserve life you also don’t have to desecrate the Sabbath under normal circumstances. But there are situations in which a clash arises. That’s a different case. Now, if the clash is an essential clash, then in the Torah context the situation is simpler. Because if the Torah says to wipe out Amalek, then it itself should already be taking into account the problem of the prohibition of murder involved in that. Since there is no wiping out Amalek without killing. Therefore, if I’m committed to what the Torah says, then I assume the Torah took that into account and told me that nevertheless this overrides. Meaning, wiping out Amalek overrides the prohibition of murder, or at least the murder of Amalekites. It may also be that the prohibition of murder there is weaker — it doesn’t matter, you can analyze it in various ways. But where there is an incidental clash, like saving life and the Sabbath, that’s a dilemma. When there is an incidental clash, I have no way of deriving a decision from the Torah’s command itself, right? How can I know what to do? The Torah says keep the Sabbath, and the Torah says preserve life. The very statement about preserving life does not tell me that it overrides the Sabbath. The very obligation to keep the Sabbath does not tell me whether it overrides preserving life or not. You can’t derive that from the mere appearance of the verse in the Torah, unlike the Amalek dilemma. Okay, so now I have to look for a solution: how do you decide this conflict? Okay, but that’s already the third stage; we’re not yet on the third level. I’m still only on the first level. On the first level I’m asking whether, logically speaking, the existence of a value conflict is possible at all. Here we saw that the answer is pretty clearly yes. Okay, the more interesting question is whether it’s possible on the philosophical level. Now here, let’s say, a conflict within the world of morality or within Jewish law is obviously philosophically possible — there’s no problem with that. But a conflict between Jewish law and morality — that’s less clear, whether it is even possible. In fact, conflict between the systems is less plausible — in a minute we’ll see if it’s possible — but less plausible than conflict within morality or within Jewish law. And why? Because there are those who will say that what the Torah says must necessarily be the most moral behavior. Now, when I have a clash within the halakhic world, like saving life and the Sabbath, there’s no principled problem with that: the Torah says preserve life, the Torah says keep the Sabbath. Fine, no problem at all. But where I have a clash between Jewish law and morality, if Jewish law says in a certain situation to do such-and-such, then many will say that if so, that is probably also the correct moral behavior — otherwise why would Jewish law say it? So according to that view it cannot be that there is a conflict between morality and Jewish law at all, even though conflicts can arise within morality itself or within Jewish law itself. Okay, but that is of course not a logical consideration; it’s a philosophical or meta-halakhic, meta-Torah consideration, whatever you want to call it. Meaning, there is no logical problem in the existence of such a conflict, but in our conception of Torah or faith or our conception of the Holy One, blessed be He, our God, there are those who are very troubled by this. How can it be that the Torah commands me to do something that is not moral? So here we really need to enter into some mapping of the question on the second level. Meaning: is it possible, within the moral and halakhic or Torah worldview, that such a conflict exists — not logically, logically it is possible — but philosophically or meta-ethically, meta-halakhically? Is such a thing possible in terms of how we understand morality and Jewish law and the relationship between them? So here there are several possible approaches. I would divide them perhaps into two that are really three. Meaning, one approach says conflict is impossible, and a second approach says conflict is possible — that’s the broad two. The approaches that say conflict is impossible split into two, which is why I said two that are really three. Why? Because there are two conceptions, truly opposite to one another, that both lead to the conclusion that conflict is impossible. One conception, of course, identifies morality with Jewish law. The second identifies Jewish law with morality. What they have in common is that if there is identity, conflict is impossible. Let me explain a bit more. The conception that identifies Jewish law with morality says that since the aim of Jewish law, or of Torah in general, is to bring about the most moral world possible, it is clear that the halakhic command is the most moral possible outcome. So it is obvious that there cannot be a conflict between Jewish law and morality; if Jewish law says something, that is probably also what morality says. Okay, that would be, say, Rabbi Kook’s view. I may have mentioned this at some point; I don’t remember in what context. It’s a view you can find a lot in Rabbi Kook. The conception that says such a conflict cannot exist — the halakhic statement is necessarily the highest moral statement possible, and that is apparently the most moral morality there is. Okay?

[Speaker C] And that’s also the Chazon Ish.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Chazon Ish goes in that direction — at least in certain places. I don’t actually accept that interpretation of the Chazon Ish, but let’s say in the famous Faith and Trust, with the two millimeters and all those things, there actually it’s the opposite conception that also leads to identity. Because he wants to claim there is no such thing as morality. Not that Jewish law always leads to the most moral solution, but that morality means whatever Jewish law says — that’s a definition, not a claim, it’s a definition. What is morality? Whatever the Holy One, blessed be He, decided should be done. In that conception too, we arrive at the conclusion that there cannot be a conflict between Jewish law and morality, obviously, because they aren’t even two categories. The first conception says they are two categories — categories in some sense, but only in a completely theoretical sense. In practice, they coincide. You said Rabbi Kook, right? What he says is that ultimately Jewish law is the best way to realize morality. So according to Rabbi Kook as well, these aren’t really two categories. Fine? Basically, Jewish law is the way to realize morality in the best possible way. The Chazon Ish says the opposite. Meaning, Rabbi Kook says there’s no such thing as Jewish law, everything is morality. The Chazon Ish says there’s no such thing as morality, everything is Jewish law. The Chazon Ish — again, I don’t think he says this, but that’s what appears from the example of the melamdim there in Faith and Trust. So these two conceptions, which are seemingly completely opposite, lead — what?

[Speaker E] According to the Chazon Ish there’s no such thing as morality?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there isn’t. Whatever Jewish law says is what needs to be done. There’s nothing beyond that — neither more nor less. Whatever Jewish law says.

[Speaker E] There’s nothing to compare it to at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, there’s no other category.

[Speaker E] Meaning, there’s no conscience in you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t deny the facts, but where it clashes with Jewish law, then take a pill. You’re built incorrectly.

[Speaker E] You’re sick.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. You’re built wrong, you need correction. Go to a sage and get fixed; a little asceticism in the snow and things like that will take care of all your problems. Okay? That’s the principle. Again, I don’t think the Chazon Ish said this, but many attribute this conception to him, so I’m using him right now only as a code name for those who hold this conception, okay? Because maybe it’s a bit slanderous toward him to say that.

[Speaker E] But basically, can this generally be called the contemporary approach in the Haredi world?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is such a Haredi tendency, yes. I wouldn’t say all Haredim are like that, but yes, there is definitely a correlation here with a Haredi versus non-Haredi worldview in this debate. Totalism? Yes. Now notice, there is another point here, which is another enormous philosophical dispute — you can call it philosophical in yeshiva language — and it’s not what I mean. I just want to explain it in order to clarify what I do not mean. What is called the Euthyphro dilemma. A Platonic dialogue, yes, called Euthyphro, where the question is whether the gods want a thing because it is good, or whether it is good because the gods want it. That’s a pagan formulation, but it doesn’t matter, you can translate it to the Holy One, blessed be He, as well. Does the Holy One, blessed be He, want us to act this way because it is good, or is it good because the Holy One, blessed be He, wants us to act this way?

[Speaker D] That’s exactly parallel to this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly. But I want to explain a bit why I think it’s not parallel. I do not mean that dilemma. Why? Because there the discussion is about whether the good has some independent status detached from the Holy One, blessed be He. You don’t need the Holy One, blessed be He, for the category — which is what Leibowitz always said, that morality is an atheistic category. Meaning, on the contrary, the essence of morality is that it does not need some higher transcendent commander, but rather it is a human category, a category that removes the Holy One, blessed be He, from the picture. And then the question is — now, someone who does believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, still — and by the way this is the solution to many contradictions in Leibowitz. I once saw an article by — what’s his name from the kibbutz — Goodman, Ezra Goodman, who talked about a very fundamental contradiction in Leibowitz. On the one hand he keeps saying morality is an atheistic category; on the other hand he keeps scolding us with moral rebukes — occupation corrupts, and this and that, and Judeo-Nazis and all kinds of things like that. How do these things fit together? It actually fits together very well. I think Goodman really hit the mark. There’s no problem there at all, it doesn’t contradict anything. It’s an atheistic category to which I am committed. I am committed to that category as a human being, and I am committed to the halakhic category as a religious human being. And yes, sometimes I’m in conflict — in a moment we’ll get to the question of conflicts. So that’s not a contradiction at all. But I do not agree with Leibowitz that this is an atheistic category. Meaning, the discussion in the Euthyphro dilemma is the question whether even the Holy One, blessed be He — it’s a theological discussion — whether even the Holy One, blessed be He, can be subject to something that is not His will; supposedly morality binds the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He, and dictates to Him what to demand of us. What does that even mean? He created everything, He made everything, everything depends on Him — it’s a very serious theological problem to say such a thing. On the other hand, Avi Sagi wrote about this in Religion and Morality — he has a book. He calls it DCT, yes, there’s an English acronym for it, I don’t remember the exact words — morality as divine command. Meaning, morality is simply the divine command, that is morality. It cannot be that there is a category independent of divine command called morality and that the Holy One, blessed be He, is somehow bound by moral principles. He cannot be bound by anything — He created everything. Yes? There is indeed a not-so-simple theological problem here.

[Speaker D] And that’s what you attributed to the Chazon Ish before. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the Chazon Ish. In a moment we’ll see whether that’s the Chazon Ish or not. One second. For now I’m dealing with the Euthyphro dilemma. In a moment I’ll return to—

[Speaker D] No, that’s what Avi Sagi says. What? What Avi Sagi says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Avi Sagi only presents the dilemma. He says there are two possible ways to understand it: either morality as divine command, or not — or morality has an independent status. He’s simply sharpening the Euthyphro dilemma.

[Speaker B] So morality doesn’t change?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? It could be that it does change, to some degree.

[Speaker B] That doesn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] mean it isn’t the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. The command of the Holy One, blessed be He, is a function of the circumstances, the society, its structure, its values. Not necessarily. Maybe we’ll talk about that later. So the Euthyphro dilemma talks about the relationship between the Holy One, blessed be He, and morality, not about the relationship between me and two levels of obligation, Jewish law and morality. I want to claim that the Euthyphro dilemma is nonsense in the religious context. I have no doubt that the Holy One, blessed be He, created morality too, as part of creating the world. And still, the first dilemma can be formulated. That’s why I’m saying it’s not the same thing. Because I say that morality too — and we talked about the proof from morality when we discussed proofs for the existence of God — I tried to explain why I think an atheistic moral conception is incoherent. There are secular people who, in my opinion, are no less moral than religious people. I do not accept this distinction that if there is no God then the place is a jungle, that if there is no faith then people are not moral or are less moral. I don’t think that stands up to the facts.

[Speaker F] From the standpoint of morality—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but God commands, not fictions. What? There are laws in the state. No, laws in the state are something else.

[Speaker B] I’m talking about moral questions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About obeying the laws, fine, people are afraid of the police. I’m talking about moral questions — whether secular society is less moral than religious society. I don’t think that at all, not necessarily. But my claim is different — it’s a theoretical claim. Meaning, ethics in an atheistic world is incoherent. Meaning, those same people who behave morally are fools. They are moral, but fools. Meaning, there is no logic in behaving morally in an atheistic world. That’s my claim, but that’s another discussion; we did it once. I’m not going to go back to it here. So therefore — but I’m saying this only as an introduction to the point that, as far as I’m concerned, both horns of the dilemma, both the Chazon Ish and Rabbi Kook, assume one side of the Euthyphro dilemma. That is not the same dilemma. The side that says morality is the handiwork — or the utterance — of the Holy One, blessed be He. And there is still room to ask whether such a thing exists — meaning, whether really Jewish law is overall just the best way to realize morality, or whether morality has some independent existence. Independent existence does not mean detached from the Holy One, blessed be He. Morality too is the handiwork of the Holy One, blessed be He, but it is detached from Jewish law. Meaning, it has some independent status. And now the question is: what is the relationship between Jewish law and morality, when both are commanded by virtue of the Holy One, blessed be He, and my obligation to both is an obligation that draws on my faith or my obligation to His command — perhaps His expectations — of me?

[Speaker B] But you’re taking belief in God itself out of morality. Why? To believe that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded something or brought things forth, that He exists and that He — that too is a kind of morality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Why is that morality?

[Speaker B] Gratitude and—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Gratitude — if I don’t believe that He created me, why would I have gratitude toward Him? What I believe, I believe. A person does his philosophy and reaches his conclusions. What does that have to do with morality?

[Speaker B] Honesty — there’s something moral in believing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s making a judgment; he came to the conclusion that there isn’t. Why does that belong to morality? That’s metaphysics. The question is whether you believe in the existence of God or not. If you believe in the existence of God and that He created you and demands of you— our psychological makeup.

[Speaker B] No, what is morality? It’s something projected from our psychological makeup.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, now you’re already assuming another assumption there that I’m not sure I agree with. So maybe — maybe, but we’ll see that later. So I brought the Euthyphro dilemma in order to sharpen what I do not mean. Meaning, when I ask the question, I’m asking it on the level of what is the relationship between these two systems of norms from my standpoint. Not the question whether there is some norm that does not depend on the Holy One, blessed be He — they both depend on the Holy One, blessed be He. But I can still ask myself whether it is really two things, or perhaps the purpose of Jewish law is to achieve morality in the best possible way — in essence it’s only one system — or not. There is a category of morality, there is a category of Jewish law, and therefore it can be that there are conflicts. And even if there aren’t conflicts — I said there are two possibilities, Rabbi Kook and the Chazon Ish — either there is no such thing as morality or there is no such thing as Jewish law, but they do not argue with the claim that everything there is is the handiwork of the Holy One, blessed be He. Therefore the dilemma will be— and all of this is not the dilemma I’m talking about here, okay? It’s something else. So basically the two possibilities I’ve described so far are a branching out of the conception that says there cannot be a conflict between Jewish law and morality. Either because there is no such thing as morality — everything is Jewish law — or because there is no such thing as Jewish law, because everything is morality. There is Jewish law, but Jewish law is only the way to reach moral goals or moral behaviors. An example of this — again, my favorite example, which I’ve definitely brought more than once — is Rabbi Dessler on lying. Okay? Rabbi Dessler — the Talmud says there are several things for which one is allowed to lie, or even has to lie in certain circumstances. In what situations, for example? A Torah scholar modifies his speech in three matters. So he brings that, and there are other things too — for the sake of peace, there are various permissions or even obligations to lie in certain places according to, let’s call it, Jewish law, even though the prohibition of lying is not clear — what exactly its halakhic status is. There isn’t such a prohibition, outside of court, in general — formally speaking, there is no such halakhic prohibition against lying. There is “keep far from a false matter,” but even there it’s not a formal prohibition of that sort, it isn’t counted anywhere, it’s not a halakhic prohibition in the usual sense. So the claim is that in those cases it is permitted to lie. Rabbi Dessler says that when I lie in such a situation, that is not a lie at all — I am speaking the truth, because that is what should be said. When I say what should be said, that is truth, not falsehood. Now the question is what he means. If he means a semantic statement, then it’s uninteresting. Fine? So he defines truth and falsehood differently from me — who cares, that’s just a dictionary. About a fact? Yes.

[Speaker D] About an incorrect fact.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So he says this isn’t falsehood, it’s truth. So that’s why I say: it depends. If we’re talking on the semantic level, then you say that’s possible, and I say on the other hand, why is that interesting? Fine, you call that truth and I call something else truth. So what? Let’s synchronize the concepts so we can start talking, because there’s no point arguing about the meaning of words. So that’s why it doesn’t seem to me that that’s what he means—to tell me what the meaning of the word “truth” is. That’s a dictionary; that’s not interesting. Right? So then what does he mean? He means a value statement. He means to claim that when I lie in circumstances where it’s justified, or even

[Speaker C] a commandment, and even

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a commandment to lie—in those places there is no cost to what I’m doing. Meaning, there is no moral problem with it at all. As opposed to the view that says: there is a moral problem here, but what can you do—something else overrides that moral problem, and therefore one has to lie. Say, in the language of Jewish law, I would define it as “permitted” versus “overridden.” Okay? Saving a life on the Sabbath—that’s a question among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and among the later authorities (Acharonim): is it permitted or overridden? In the Talmud it doesn’t really appear so much about saving life on the Sabbath; it appears regarding ritual impurity being permitted for the community. But the expressions mean this: when I desecrate the Sabbath for the sake of saving a life, did I desecrate the Sabbath and it was only justified because it was for saving a life, or no—this isn’t even called desecrating the Sabbath at all, because after all I did what Jewish law says, so it isn’t called desecrating the Sabbath.

[Speaker D] In that kind of reality there is no desecration of the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not desecration of the Sabbath. Exactly. So that’s what’s called “permitted”: you didn’t violate any prohibition at all. “Overridden” means you did violate a prohibition, but the prohibition was set aside; it was set aside in the face of something more important. Okay? But there’s a cost here. Now, just as a side comment—this really deserves a separate class—there is no practical difference whether it’s “permitted” or “overridden.” I don’t know of a single practical difference in the world. All those who analyze this, medieval authorities and later authorities and so on—I know of no practical difference whatsoever. I’ll give a prize to whoever brings me a practical difference for this. Someone once told me that the most accepted practical difference is the question whether one may desecrate the Sabbath even for something not needed for the healing. That is certainly not a practical difference, because if it’s not needed for the healing, then it wasn’t permitted. What was permitted? Only what is needed for the healing. So what does it mean to say that if it’s “permitted,” then you may desecrate the Sabbath even when it’s not needed? The Maggid Mishneh really does say that one may desecrate the Sabbath even when it is not required for the healing. In a place where there is a sick person, today is Sunday, not Sabbath. Meaning that you can—yes, almost—meaning that you can do whatever you want, all the needs of the sick person, even though he doesn’t need it for the healing.

[Speaker B] But to base it on that—no, that’s a position of the Maggid Mishneh that needs to be discussed. But it has nothing to do with permitted versus overridden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not “permitted.” “Permitted” can still leave me with a prohibition for anything that doesn’t help the healing. It has nothing to do with permitted versus overridden. What was permitted? Even if it’s “permitted,” still—what was permitted? What was permitted is what’s needed for healing, right? A second practical difference they bring has to do with repentance. I desecrated the Sabbath in order to save a life. If I committed the sin of desecrating the Sabbath, only I did it in a justified way to save a life, at the end of the day I desecrated the Sabbath, so I need repentance. And according to the one who says it’s “permitted,” what would I repent for? I didn’t desecrate the Sabbath.

[Speaker D] Even with “overridden” you don’t need repentance. Obviously not. What repentance?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, you did what Jewish law obligates you to do. You’ll repent? The Holy One, blessed be He, should repent. He put me into a situation that forced me to desecrate the Sabbath. Did I create the situation? What do they want from me? I’m in a situation, and I did exactly what Jewish law requires of me. So for that I should repent? Repent for what? Part of repentance is resolving for the future. What’s the resolution for the future? That next time there’s danger to life I won’t desecrate the Sabbath? But I will do it! Of course I’ll do it—I’m obligated to do it! The fact is that you don’t have to bring a sin-offering. The fact is that for this too you don’t have to bring a sin-offering. Yes, you can say, fine, maybe you’re exempt from a sin-offering, but there’s still some dimension

[Speaker D] of transgression.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s “overridden,” then all the more so you’d have to bring a sin-offering. There are transgressions that don’t obligate a sin-offering. Unintentional ones. Right, but there are transgressions that don’t obligate a sin-offering; that still doesn’t mean there’s no transgression. Rabbinic ones. That still doesn’t mean there’s no transgression. Fine—even a rabbinic transgression on the Sabbath doesn’t require a sin-offering, but it’s still a transgression. But what’s the difference with indirect causation? That if it’s “permitted,” then it’s entirely permitted, and if it’s “overridden,” then you should choose the lesser option first. What? You’re saying to choose the lesser option first. Meaning, if I have a lighter option, I

[Speaker D] say

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—even with “permitted” it’s like that. Since if you can do it in a lighter way, why should we permit you the more severe one? True, what you need is completely permitted—but what you need. If you don’t need it, don’t assume it was permitted. I’m not saying there aren’t halakhic conceptions like that; I’m saying it’s not connected to permitted versus overridden. Now, in the language of the medieval authorities it’s called permitted and overridden, never mind, but I think that’s not precise wording. It doesn’t follow from permitted versus overridden. In my opinion there is no practical difference in the world.

[Speaker E] There is, there is psychology. Take the example of the soldier, right? What? So if you educate him, the religious soldier, right? When he goes on patrol on the Sabbath, he is fulfilling a commandment. Okay. But is it possible that he is still desecrating the Sabbath? Or are you turning him into… you’re putting him in a situation where he has to examine every little thing and then… no no no. Because he’s in the situation of a criminal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he’s not a criminal.

[Speaker E] No, psychologically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Psychologically—fine, so psychology. What do you want, to manipulate him for the sake of psychology? Then you manipulated him.

[Speaker D] We’re talking about whether he’ll have pangs of conscience that he desecrated the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there’s no reason for pangs of conscience, because if he’s doing the right thing, then what pangs of conscience?

[Speaker D] It very much depends on permitted versus overridden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In both cases, no. You’re only saying maybe tactically it’s worthwhile to educate in that way, but there’s no real difference between permitted and overridden in the halakhic conception. You can say there are such-and-such psychological effects, fine, but there’s no practical difference.

[Speaker E] Are you reaching a conclusion?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So it’s a psychological defect; it needs to be treated. He needs to explain the matter to him and solve the problem; there’s no need to manipulate him for that. After all, all I can do is explain the issue to him. Listen, it’s “overridden,” but there is no problem at all—you are completely righteous. Just be careful not to do anything beyond what you need, that’s all. Now, in a place where this could lead to dangerous hesitation, then of course. But again, that has nothing to do with permitted versus overridden; rather, we simply want to prevent hesitation, so we say: friends, don’t think, do whatever you need to do. Again, this has nothing to do with permitted versus overridden. It’s an approach that says: I don’t want to reach situations where we end up with danger to life, okay? The psychological approach…

[Speaker D] They tell about the Chafetz Chaim—there were many situations there with soldiers who were drafted and so on—he was very lenient in cases of doubtful danger to life, and they said to him, why are you so lenient about this? He said, I’m lenient? I’m very stringent! I heard that about Rabbi Chaim. Danger to life? Brisk. Rabbi Chaim, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A woman came to Rabbi Chaim—a woman came to him whose son had been seized for the Russian army. So she asked him whether she could travel by wagon outside the Sabbath boundary on the Sabbath in order to try to get him released. So he told her, of course travel—what kind of question is that? It’s a great commandment. So his students said to him, what, Rabbi Chaim, the great strict one, yes? They said to him, why are you so lenient in the laws of the Sabbath? He said to them, what are you talking about? I’m stringent in the laws of danger to life. Doubt on Yom Kippur—on Yom Kippur Rabbi Chaim was hysterically lenient. Rabbi Chaim and his son, the rabbi of Brisk, were hysterically lenient about Yom Kippur. Any illness, any concern—no messing around, eat everything, not “the lesser option first,” eat with a healthy appetite.

[Speaker E] He was hysterically stringent about real danger to life.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That was his approach. And it stemmed from a conception of genuine stringency, not genuine leniency. Because of his stringency, he arrived at that.

[Speaker E] That’s exactly the difference between permitted…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not the difference.

[Speaker E] Why isn’t that the difference? In a yeshiva or in a religious court that looks at this issue in terms of “permitted,” yes? That’s on the positive side. No, and why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I can tell a person, listen, it’s “overridden,” and still tell him that for any concern whatsoever he has, he should desecrate the Sabbath.

[Speaker E] There’s a commandment to override it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a philosophical or analytic conception, whether it’s permitted or overridden. But what difference does it make for practice? For practice we said: don’t hesitate; don’t hold back; do everything necessary. Why? Because the Sabbath is set aside for danger to life.

[Speaker E] Right, in practice…

[Speaker G] Rabbi, a beautiful captive woman—there it’s “permitted,” no? Because there too it seems to me from the side of “permitted,” like he says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, a beautiful captive woman is a more fundamental issue. With a beautiful captive woman, if we accept Hazal that “the Torah spoke only against the evil inclination,” then the claim is that if you’re not obligated to do it, then don’t do it. There there is a practical difference. The claim is that it really is forbidden, only Jewish law allows it so that soldiers won’t start getting confused in the middle of the war—do what you want. Fine, but if there is a soldier who can restrain himself and not do it, then it is proper that he restrain himself. That’s a very big practical difference in the question whether you view it as ideal from the outset or as only after the fact. That’s not the same as permitted, because permitted and overridden both say it is completely allowed; it is a commandment to do it. The only question is whether philosophically there is a cost or there is no cost. Okay? That sort of philosophical cost. But what difference does it make at all? It’s not—I don’t understand—there’s no practical difference whatsoever. Really, it’s just… I don’t understand this thing. In any event, yes—so what I want to say in the context of Rabbi Dessler is that when he says that when you lie in circumstances where Jewish law obligates lying, then that is truth, not falsehood—what does he mean to say? It’s not semantics. What does he mean to say? He means that when you utter a lie in a place where Jewish law obligates it, there is no moral cost to it. It’s “permitted.” Meaning: relax, there is no dilemma here, there is nothing problematic here in the fact that you lied. That’s what he wants to claim. Now here it’s a bit irritating to me. Again, I don’t know what the practical difference would be, because as I said, there’s no practical difference; it’s really only psychology perhaps.

[Speaker C] But there is some element of desecration of God’s name here, that others hear him lying and know that he’s lying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No—they understand that he’s lying for a worthy purpose. But no, fine, for a worthy purpose—after all, why was he commanded? He was commanded because of all sorts of things. There are situations where it is for a worthy purpose. So let’s say everyone understands that this is… whoever knows that he’s lying usually understands it’s for a worthy purpose. If not, then there’s a problem of desecration of God’s name; that’s a side issue that may happen in a given case, and we need to think about what to do with it. But on the principled level, let’s leave that aside. Right now let’s talk about the lie in itself, without the dimensions of desecration of God’s name involved in it.

[Speaker H] Like “I love you,” right? Love without a vow—that’s not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. That thing really is a serious mistake. So Rabbi Dessler here basically has something irritating in his approach. What he really wants to say, I think—I’ll use an example; I don’t think this is Rabbi Dessler’s general position—but this example sharpens very well what I want to say: the conception associated with the Chazon Ish. The conception that says there is no such thing as falsehood and truth on the moral plane. It’s not a moral question. If Jewish law says to lie, then it’s truth. It’s not falsehood. He’s unwilling to accept a state in which, look, on the level—we’ll call it—the moral level, it’s not okay because you lied, but there is another value that overrides the prohibition against lying, and therefore you did well to lie. Fine, true, that’s what you should have done, but that doesn’t mean the thing has no problematic aspects. Meaning, I’m not willing to give up seeing a lie as a lie. Meaning, lying is first and foremost something problematic. Afterwards I can say, fine, you had to do it, it was justified, fine. But you can’t empty moral concepts of content. Basically what he says there is that there is no such thing as morality; what Jewish law says is what defines morality. After all, that is the conception. Right? Again, I don’t think that was his general method, but I’m using this example to sharpen what I mean. That is the conception I mentioned earlier, what people attribute to the Chazon Ish. So these are two possibilities for identifying Jewish law with morality. Now, those are two sub-options of the identification. Right? Now there is the approach that says no, conflicts are possible. There can be situations of conflict between Jewish law and morality. That approach is problematic on its face; not for nothing what’s popular is mainly one of the first two, because otherwise it comes out that the Holy One, blessed be He, is basically commanding me in Jewish law to do something immoral. I said there’s a logical problem here. No—logically there is no problem with that. Why would there be a problem? Halakhically it’s permitted to do it; morally it’s forbidden to do it. The example of Abraham our forefather. What? The example of Abraham our forefather—of what?

[Speaker E] The binding of Isaac.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—the question is how you relate to that. So there are those who will say: that is the most moral act possible, the binding of Isaac. You don’t understand why? Fine, study more and then you’ll know. Maybe you’ll never know; it needs analysis, doesn’t matter. But on the principled level there is some layer there such that whoever understands it understands that it is the most moral thing possible, because it cannot be that the Holy One, blessed be He, would command you to do something immoral. That is how proponents of that approach usually explain conflictual cases. But in a certain sense one has to understand that this really is a problematic approach, this third approach. So in a certain sense one has to understand that this really is a problematic approach, this third approach I just mentioned, because it basically says that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands me to do something immoral. How can it be that Jewish law tells me to do something immoral? That’s why people really say—let’s take examples, right? The examples that always come up in this context: saving the life of a gentile on the Sabbath, killing Amalek, attitude toward a woman, I don’t know what, a priest’s wife who was raped—one of my favorite examples that I’ve talked about several times already. A mamzer, yes, lots of examples. Sacrifices maybe, yes, exactly—there are many; examples are not lacking. And the question is what to do with such examples. So let’s demonstrate the three approaches, okay? So the first approach, Rabbi Kook’s approach, says that if you understood reality to the very end and the meanings of the act to the very end, you would understand that this is actually the true call of morality. You just don’t understand; you need to study more. Maybe after you study you still won’t understand, fine—not everything. Does that mean that in this approach Rabbi Kook himself understood? I don’t think so. It doesn’t seem to me that there is anyone who understands the moral significance of all the laws; I don’t see how that’s possible, I don’t know.

[Speaker I] Well, if he didn’t

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] understand, he wouldn’t explain. Right. Therefore I think that it’s not… there are things he tried to explain—we even studied some of that in “For the Perplexed of the Generation”—let’s say we’ve already seen better explanations. So the claim—Rabbi Kook, of course, is nourished by the conception that says it is impossible for there to be a conflict. Meaning, Jewish law is necessarily the best way to realize morality. Rabbi Kook goes even further in several places: he says Jewish law has no purpose other than morality. There aren’t even things that are non-moral, not only anti-moral; everything is moral. And if we don’t understand, then the problem is with us.

[Speaker F] Everything is moral? Every law? No, everything is moral.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Kook—it’s

[Speaker D] after all all moral,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] every law

[Speaker D] that exists

[Speaker F] is to do something moral. Don’t say that pork is not good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Do not say, ‘I do not desire it,’ but rather, ‘I do desire it, but what can I do—my Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me.’” Because pork—Maimonides himself, in chapter six—he distinguishes there. Maimonides asks in chapter six of the Eight Chapters: there is a contradiction between the words of the philosophers and the words of Hazal, because Hazal said: do not say, “I do not desire to eat pork,” but rather, “I do desire it, but what can I do—my Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me,” okay? On the other hand, the philosophers say that greater is the one who has internalized the principles of morality with which he identifies than one who does it as if forced by a demon, than one who does it as one commanded and performing against his ordinary nature. So he says: how do you reconcile this? And it’s interesting that Maimonides sees this as a contradiction. Hazal versus the philosophers—okay, so apparently the philosophers are wrong and everything is fine. No—Maimonides says: no, if the philosophers say this and Hazal say that, it requires reconciliation, so there is a contradiction here. And that itself is interesting. What reconciliation does he propose? And by the way, it fits very well—look there at all the examples that Hazal bring; he himself points this out—all the examples are of the type of statutes. Meaning, for moral commandments there is value in internalizing them, acquiring a good nature, and not only identifying with the moral act and not only doing it as if forced by a demon. But with pork—“do not say, ‘I do not desire to eat pork’”—it’s no accident they took that example, because it doesn’t belong to morality. So there indeed—actually the reverse—be a Leibowitz type; be a servant of God because you are obligated to do what He says, not because you identify with it, okay? That’s what Maimonides says. But in moral contexts, he really does say yes, you need to identify with it. Okay? So “I do not desire it” isn’t connected to morality.

[Speaker F] But you can’t project everything from that “I do not desire it,” can you?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s the question; that’s the argument. Even in moral matters?

[Speaker F] That’s the argument.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Chazon Ish will say, “I do desire it, but what can I do—my Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me,” even in morality, in everything. Meaning, there is no morality; everything is Jewish law. He doesn’t accept that distinction. Rabbi Kook too doesn’t accept that distinction, but in the opposite direction: he says everything is morality, not everything is Jewish law.

[Speaker J] Even putting on tefillin comes

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to fix some moral thing in society, in the person, in the soul, whatever it may be. Maimonides himself explicitly disagrees with both of these conceptions, and he says there is this category and there is that category, in many places. Maimonides in the ninth root at the beginning, Maimonides in this sixth chapter I just mentioned from the Eight Chapters, makes them into two different categories, in many places. Meaning, it’s quite clear that Maimonides understands that Jewish law has goals beyond morality; there are values.

[Speaker B] And a statute—isn’t that something moral? What? Divine law—isn’t that part of morality?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is what the purpose of the statute is.

[Speaker B] Again, what is the purpose of the statute?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not eat pork? Does not eating pork achieve a moral purpose? In order to be subordinate to God.

[Speaker B] Why did the Holy One,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] blessed be He, want me not to eat pork? Not why I don’t eat it. Why did He want me not to eat pork? What did He want to achieve?

[Speaker B] Again, in order to be subordinate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Let him create subordination through moral commandments alone. What’s the problem? Is there a shortage of moral commandments? Let Him detail all the moral commandments to the end and organize my subordination in the moral sphere. Why invent pointless reasons just in order to create subordination? I don’t see the logic.

[Speaker B] Creating subordination is something very moral.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem—create it. But create it through real commandments. Why create fictitious commandments just in order to… create subordination?

[Speaker B] No, because with the real commandments then I would say: I understand, and it makes sense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So understand! “I do desire it, but what can I do—my Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me?” But you are subordinate. Explain that in moral commandments too: “I do desire it, but my Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me.” It’s strange.

[Speaker B] Then you would say, no, I understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I saw—once I mentioned—there’s an article…

[Speaker B] If you make the distinction, then apparently there’s another layer here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I agree with the distinction, but in a moment we’ll see what it means. One second—I don’t agree with the conclusion you draw from it. There’s an article by Eliezer Berkovits, Rabbi Professor Eliezer Berkovits, where he says this. He’s not the first, but he presents it nicely. In my opinion there are several philosophical errors there, but it’s actually an interesting article. In his book of collected essays—“Collected Essays”—I think it came out through Shalem Press. Not Yossi’s book, not Ruth’s, but Rabbi Berkovits’s essay collection, where one of the essays is devoted to the reasons for the commandments, and there he develops this strongly: that the system of commandments is basically meant to create religious obligation, subordination to the Holy One, blessed be He, while in the end the goal is only morality. But you need to be subordinate so that in morality you won’t veer right and left and all sorts of things of that kind. Okay? It’s that kind of approach. Fine. There’s room to argue it out. So again, we were at the question of what each approach does in a conflictual case. Right? So Rabbi Kook tells us: study more; if you succeed in understanding everything, then you’ll see that this is actually the pinnacle of morality. Everything is morality. Then I said that in Maimonides it is clear there are values that are non-moral, that do not belong to morality; they are other values. And there indeed one really has to say, “I do desire it, and I do desire it, but what can I do—my Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me,” unlike moral commandments. In Maimonides it is not written that there can be anti-moral commandments. It says non-moral. Meaning, there are commandments that have another purpose, not morality, but something else. Can there be a halakhic instruction that is anti-moral? Not moral? Not just non-moral, morally neutral, like eating pork. It has nothing to do with morality—but fine, it also doesn’t contradict morality. But the question is whether there can be a situation in which Jewish law contradicts morality. That is not written in this Maimonides, at least. Okay. What will the Chazon Ish do with that? He says: of course there is no problem at all. What do you mean? There’s no question, because what does it mean that morality clashes with Jewish law? What Jewish law says is morality. There’s no second category, so where is there room for clashes? The third direction…

[Speaker E] Sorry, but what is morality? Just… for example, I don’t read Haaretz continuously, but let’s say… what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, is that the part he does read or the part he doesn’t read?

[Speaker E] Since the murder at the Mercaz, of the eight children, it’s… now… what is morality? Meaning, what is it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What we all understand, without getting into definitions right now.

[Speaker E] Do we all understand it, or…?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again, I’m not talking about what we do with moral disagreements. There is some basic standard that by and large almost all of us agree on, and of course there are arguments too. Fine, I’m not entering that question there. How objective is morality? What is the meaning of moral relativism? Right now I’m dealing only with Torah and morality. We still need to define morality itself; with God’s help we’ll deal with that too. Okay? So the conception that does not accept the identity between Jewish law and morality and says: true, there is a halakhic command to kill Amalek, I don’t know, to bring sacrifices, all the examples I gave earlier—and it contradicts morality. Morality says not to do that. Anti-moral, not non-moral. Okay? And I am in conflict. That is the third conception, which of course raises the theological problem, let’s call it that: how can it be that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands me to do something that is immoral? Okay, that is basically the map in general, these three possibilities. So how indeed can it be that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands me to do something immoral? So if we take Maimonides’ conception, which says that there are at least non-moral parts of Jewish law, even if not anti-moral but non-moral—say keeping the Sabbath. Keeping the Sabbath is a non-moral matter. It has no connection whatsoever to morality, contrary to the social ideas that people often attach to it; I don’t think it has to do with social matters.

[Speaker C] The Chazon Ish and Rabbi Kook would say that keeping the Sabbath is a moral thing, each according to his method.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Chazon Ish says so because there is no such thing as morality; the Chazon Ish says it’s moral like everything else. But Rabbi Kook would say it has a moral purpose. From the Chazon Ish’s point of view there is no such thing as morality. There is simply only Jewish law; morality is just words. It’s not—the law obligates because the law obligates. The fact that with some things we feel identification, fine, so we have psychological defects; that doesn’t say anything. In the end, what obligates is what is written in Jewish law. He doesn’t really accept the existence of such a category as morality. Again, this isn’t the Chazon Ish; it’s what people attribute to him, okay? Again, be careful about that. So how can it be that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands commandments that are not moral? So here I return to the point with which I opened. If there is a value that says human life has no value at all—human life is nonsense—then I would have a theological problem. There I would have a real theological problem. How can the Holy One, blessed be He, say such a thing, which contradicts the foundations of basic morality? But I don’t think there is any such thing. What there is, though…

[Speaker B] Why not worship idolatry and die rather than worship idolatry? No, no, wait.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That says that human life is not… wait.

[Speaker B] What he’s saying,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] fine, what he’s saying is that there are situations in which the value of human life is overridden. He will never say human life has no value, period. As a moral value? No, that’s not true—it doesn’t exist, nonsense, just human delusions, that’s how one was born, there’s no meaning to it. No, I don’t know of such a thing in Jewish law. What I do know in Jewish law is situations in which Jewish law instructs me to do something that, when I examine it through moral lenses, looks immoral.

[Speaker D] The closest thing to that—and even that you could call a situation—is wiping out Amalek.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but even there you can still say there is some issue involved in wiping out Amalek. True, the price is that here you are harming human life.

[Speaker D] Not that you can call it a situation—it’s a somewhat broad situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, a broader situation. But still, clearly no one told you human life has no value. They didn’t even tell you Amalek’s life has no value. What they told you is that because of what Amalek did, that obligates us to kill him. It doesn’t say his life has no value; it doesn’t say crush him like a bug. Rather, what it says is that you have to kill him. “Shooting and crying” could exist there too, yes, like “Soldiers’ Talk.” Fine?

[Speaker C] Say an idolatrous city—you kill everyone, kill everyone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. Still. It doesn’t matter—but with Amalek too it’s like that, according to some opinions. But the claim is still that there is some reason. It’s not just because human life has no value. There is some reason.

[Speaker F] It’s not obvious. I’m saying it’s stronger than human life—if someone committed a crime whose sentence is death.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, like with desecrating the Sabbath, in many places, right. Therefore there are many halakhic contexts in which we will see that there are things that override the value of life. But nowhere in Jewish law is it written that life has no value.

[Speaker B] But why do they override it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the hierarchy there is something higher, right, right.

[Speaker B] Meaning

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that life—this doesn’t mean life has no value. Obviously.

[Speaker B] There is the great value of the image of God, so it’s not that they are valueless, no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is already a very problematic assumption. Rather, there are certain values that are stronger than the value of life. Right, there is a scale. That I do accept. But there is no claim saying life has no value.

[Speaker B] Why are they stronger? They receive their value from the values of life.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes, maybe no. So there is room to discuss what the explanation is. But right now the explanations beyond that don’t matter to me. This is what one does find in Jewish law: there are situations that, if I were detached from Jewish law and looked through moral lenses—why kill a Sabbath desecrator? Are you crazy? Why kill him? Fine, educate him, I don’t know—why kill him? But okay, there is some religious issue in killing him. That religious issue overrides the value of life. That’s what Jewish law says.

[Speaker D] The Meshekh Chokhmah asks about this—it’s a logical question. Why do you kill a Sabbath desecrator? After all, if there is doubtful danger to life, you save him. So how can it be that for desecrating the Sabbath you kill him? There’s a kind of logical contradiction here

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in

[Speaker D] that

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but I want to return again to the different types of contradiction with which I began. There is—I don’t think there is any halakhic statement that says a certain moral value is nonsense. There is no such thing. I don’t know of any halakhic statement like that. Yes, there are halakhic situations in which moral values are overridden by other values.

[Speaker F] Does Jewish law relate to morality?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker F] Jewish law is Jewish law, not a question of outlook.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly what we are discussing. What is the relation between Jewish law and morality?

[Speaker F] No, but does Jewish law as Jewish law relate to morality?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Kook says that all of Jewish law leads toward morality. And this is exactly what we’re talking about. Meaning, how you conceive it. It’s a meta-halakhic question, not a halakhic question.

[Speaker F] For example, if you give charity without intending to fulfill a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So

[Speaker F] it has no halakhic value, even though with charity the Talmud

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not exactly that, but say another commandment—it has no halakhic value, but you’re a good person, yes? Fine. What does that mean?

[Speaker F] It means you didn’t fulfill Jewish law, meaning you didn’t fulfill Jewish law, but

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you still gave charity, but

[Speaker F] you didn’t fulfill Jewish law because you didn’t think about it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, you didn’t fulfill

[Speaker F] a commandment, but you’re a good person, you did a good deed. So you’re saying Jewish law is saying, as it were, I’m detached from morality—not because you did a good deed did you fulfill Jewish law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can understand that as a statement meant to crystallize halakhic obligation, while the content of the commandment does fit morality. The commandment is to give charity. And you can in fact say that the Holy One’s purpose when He commanded giving charity is a moral purpose. Only there is some halakhic requirement that you do it as one obligated by the commandments of the Holy One, blessed be He. Why? So that if tomorrow morning you wake up on the wrong side of the bed and don’t feel like giving charity, you’ll still give because you’re obligated by the commandment. But still, the purpose of the commandment is a moral purpose. At least that is one possibility. Yes, interpretations are possible in all directions, and therefore you can’t bring proof from here. Yes, so therefore all that one can find in Jewish law are situations in which a certain clash sees another value as stronger than a moral value, and it overrides it. There is no halakhic statement that says a certain moral value is nonsense. I don’t know of such a thing.

[Speaker K] It doesn’t say “nonsense” about anything in the world.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Idolatry is nonsense, and it is simply forbidden. It is not overridden by something else. It is simply forbidden. Eating pork—the same. All prohibitions are exactly things that are negative, period. Not because of circumstance. But I don’t think you will find an example of a halakhic command that simply tramples a moral principle just like that, in every situation. There isn’t one. Jewish law does not reject that moral principle in every situation. In no situation does it recognize that value—sorry, in no situation does it fail to recognize that value. I don’t think there is an example of that. Okay? Therefore one has to be a bit more careful with that statement. And still, of course, once Jewish law says that something else overrides the moral value, there is here some statement that there are values whose purpose is non-moral, not immoral, non-moral. If Jewish law were to say the value of human life is nonsense, that would be anti-moral, because that would basically mean Jewish law does not recognize that moral command or that moral value of human life. Here I’m saying no—Jewish law has purposes that are non-moral, not anti-moral,

[Speaker D] and sometimes they clash.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and sometimes they clash with moral values, and when there is a clash, sometimes they even prevail.

[Speaker B] That’s the definition you gave—that it’s non-moral.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. I’m now speaking about the third conception. Everything is possible, everything is possible. Rabbi Kook says it is a higher morality. I’m now proposing the third definition. Maimonides says explicitly that there are things that are morality and things that are not morality. No, but he says one must also relate to them differently. Here I need to say, “I do desire it, but what can I do—my Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me,” and there not. Maimonides likes these two separate categories, by the way, in several places. At the beginning of the ninth root Maimonides lists all the purposes of the Torah; there too he lists purposes that are not moral purposes. He has other purposes as well. Fine, there are four or five kinds of purposes there that he lists, and he simply says what a commandment can be for in general. So my claim is basically this: there are no anti-moral values in the Torah. And that’s what Maimonides says. There are non-moral values in the Torah. But then, like any value—even within morality we saw that there can be clashes—there can also be clashes between a non-moral value and a moral value. Now when there is a clash, we are in conflict. There will be situations where the non-moral value prevails. But there will never be a situation where the moral value is not recognized by Jewish law as a value. There is no such thing. So in that sense one has to be careful. On the one hand. On the other hand, the very fact that Maimonides says that Jewish law has purposes that are non-moral, by definition it seems to me—almost by definition—it follows from this that there can be conflicts between the non-moral purposes and the moral purposes, just as there can be conflicts within the moral purposes. What do we do in such a situation? A priori, sometimes this will prevail and sometimes that will prevail, but sometimes also this—for after all, we are obligated to the whole system of values. Wait, I haven’t said that yet; that’s already the third stage, what to do. I’m still only at the second stage. I’m only saying that the mere fact that there can be conflict poses no principled problem, because all I need to say in order to understand it is that Jewish law has other purposes besides morality. Other purposes, different ones—let’s call them religious. So if I speak about that priest’s wife who has to separate from her husband after she was raped, then Rabbi Kook will say that is the higher morality. We don’t understand, but in fact there is some need here to put her through a second trauma. After she was raped she also has to separate from her husband, the children will suffer, everything—a second trauma. Rabbi Kook will say we don’t understand; basically there is some higher morality here. The Chazon Ish, or what he represents for our purposes here, will say: there is no dilemma. This is what the Torah said, and that’s all. There is no morality. The third conception says no, it is immoral, period. Immoral. But what? It comes to achieve another purpose. In that case, preserving the holiness of the priesthood. Does preserving the holiness of the priesthood—say, that living with such a woman somehow harms the holiness of the priesthood—I don’t know why; that’s what the Torah says. So let’s translate it into our language. Is harming the holiness of the priesthood a moral harm? Is that a moral value? I don’t see in what sense. You can call everything morality, like the Chazon Ish, and empty the concept of morality of content. But on its face, it doesn’t relate to morality. But clearly there is such a value, and “you shall sanctify him”—the Torah says that one must sanctify the priests. Right. So there is a religious value of preserving the holiness of the priesthood, and that value can clash with moral values. Okay, and therefore conflicts arise. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, never says that morality is unimportant; rather, He says that besides morality, other things are also important to Him, and automatically clashes can also arise, and then one has to know what to do. Now we are arriving at the third layer of what to do when there is a clash. But until now I have only explained why there is no principled problem in the possibility of conflicts between Jewish law and morality. There is no reason to slide into one of the extreme conceptions that identify Jewish law with morality, whether in this direction or in that direction. No—there is no principled problem with a conflictual situation. Okay?

[Speaker L] It’s not—this isn’t “My handiwork is drowning in the sea, and you are singing?” All these situations show that for the Holy One, blessed be He, many other things are important. It’s both

[Speaker F] together—on the contrary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “My handiwork is drowning in the sea, and you are singing?” Exactly. The Holy One, blessed be He, drowned them, and He cries out to the angels: what are you singing for? Shooting and crying—that shows these are two different categories. Yes, right. Shooting and crying, it really is shooting and crying. Meaning, My handiwork is drowning in the sea—I drowned them—but don’t start singing here. It really is shooting and crying. So I think the very existence of the conflict is really not problematic. The criticism, of course, from outside, from outside the halakhic world, is criticism that assumes there are only moral values in the world. So the critics are actually right when they say: if you tell a woman to separate from her husband the kohen, then apparently you’re not moral. They don’t understand that in my world there is—the moral value that matters to you matters to me too, but I also have another value that overrides it. Now, maybe you argue with me—that’s an argument, fine, maybe. But understand that this is my approach; meaning, you can’t judge me by your approach. Okay? Now, there is also criticism from within, internal criticism, about things like this, and it comes from people who assume Rabbi Kook’s premises but don’t believe him. They assume Rabbi Kook’s premises—that everything has to be moral, there are no non-moral values. But practically speaking, don’t tell me that separating from her husband is moral. That I’m not buying.

[Speaker C] Don’t tell me I’m incapable of understanding.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. What do you mean, incapable of understanding? Nobody is capable of understanding, so no—there’s no such thing. What are these inventions? And on this point I completely identify with that approach. Precisely because of that, I don’t agree with Rabbi Kook on the fundamental conception. I agree with the difficulty; I don’t agree with the premise. They assume Rabbi Kook—that everything has to be only morality—but they don’t believe the solutions he offers. I say: don’t assume Rabbi Kook, and then you won’t need to accept the solutions he offers.

[Speaker B] Is being a Jew who observes Torah and commandment moral or not moral? That’s the root issue.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking: what is the purpose of the commandment? Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, impose this commandment on me—not why do I observe it? I observe it in order to obey Him, fine. But I’m asking why the Holy One, blessed be He, forbade me to eat pork.

[Speaker B] That’s one of those ultimate things that I don’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re going back to obligation; we talked about that earlier. Fine, so you think that obligation has moral value in it. Fine, I’m not inclined to accept that. I’ll accept that—for now I haven’t proven the third approach, I’m explaining it. I’m laying out the three approaches. I side with the third approach, but I haven’t brought proof for the third approach. I can try to explain the rationale behind it, why it seems logical to me. Fine, that’s the claim. Whoever accepts it will accept it, and whoever doesn’t, won’t. I’m only saying that a lot of times people slide into the first two approaches because there’s some problem with the third approach, and it’s theological. How can it be that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands me with a non-moral command, and people feel forced to adopt one of those two conceptions with all the problems they involve? I’m saying, leave it—I’m presenting you with a third option; you don’t need to slide there. There is no theological problem with saying this. I think this is the straightest interpretation of what we see in the Torah. Don’t tell me about hidden dimensions, that there’s some morality here that nobody understands. The Torah says that we have additional goals besides moral goals. I already mentioned here once the statements of both the Maharal and the Ran’s homilies. The Maharal in Be’er HaTorah—Be’er HaGolah, yes, not that—in Be’er HaGolah, sorry; in Netivot, it’s in Be’er HaGolah—and in the Ran’s homilies, Homily 11, both of them say that Jewish law is often less moral than non-Jewish legal systems. Why? Because Jewish law has additional goals—what the Ran’s homilies call “the realization of the divine matter,” that’s from the Kuzari, right? In other words, religious goals, in our language. And when you want to achieve—like a washer-dryer, right? A machine that is both a washing machine and a dryer usually dries less well and washes less well. And something that performs two functions—necessarily one comes at the expense of the other, unless it’s terribly expensive, of course. This product is fixed; meaning, the price times the efficiency of the washing and drying—or food, right? Taste times price times health is constant. Now decide what you want to increase and what you want to decrease, but there are no miracles. Meaning, either price or taste—there’s no—you can’t come out ahead in every direction.

[Speaker K] There’s also kashrut. What? Kashrut is also in the factor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I said that. In kosher meals? Oh, kashrut. There are no meals…

[Speaker C] Yes, exactly, there’s no such thing as a free lunch.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore, therefore, once Jewish law tries to achieve more goals, obviously it will be less successful in each one separately compared to a system that wants to achieve only that goal. If there’s a system that wants to achieve only morality, it has no conflict at all; it will always behave in the most moral way possible, theoretically. Okay? In contrast, Jewish law often has conflicts that arise because it has other values. So therefore sometimes the solutions will be less moral. That’s what they say there. Okay? And I think this is a very clear phenomenon. That doesn’t mean there is less—that moral values are not recognized in Jewish law; it means they are not the only ones there. They’re not only children; there are other values.

[Speaker C] But many times, you too as a person—as Rabbi Kook says here as well—you won’t understand why the amoral value is preferred over the moral one. Right. And then you don’t understand it, so again you have to cling to Rabbi Kook, that they know this, someone said this…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but you know, religious values I don’t understand in advance, essentially. I was never in eternity to see what happens there when I do something. Morality—I know what that is. So don’t tell me there’s some morality that I don’t understand, but if I knew, then I’d understand. I understand what morality is.

[Speaker D] That, in the religious sense, you’re willing to accept that… Yes, exactly, yes, by definition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Whoever doesn’t accept that really doesn’t accept it, and then the criticism from outside comes. I’m talking about someone who criticizes from within. Okay, so actually we need to finish. So we’ve finished the first two planes: there’s no logical problem here, and there’s no philosophical problem on the principled level; at least such an option exists. Everyone can adopt for himself what seems reasonable to him. Now the only question is what to do with it. Okay? That’s the third layer, which we’ll deal with next time, including all the questions of morality, universality, relativity, and various other things.

Halakha and Ethics, Lesson 2

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

From Guide for the Perplexed to a discussion of Torah and morality

The sense of conflict and the three levels of the problem

The logical level: a value conflict is not a contradiction

Types of conflicts: essential versus incidental

The philosophical/meta-halakhic level: is a Jewish law–morality conflict possible?

Two identity-based approaches that eliminate conflict: Rabbi Kook and the Chazon Ish as code names

The Euthyphro dilemma and Leibowitz: what is and is not at stake

Rabbi Dessler’s example, truth and falsehood, and the parallel to permitted versus overridden

The third approach: conflict is possible because Jewish law has non-moral goals

Maimonides: a division between moral commandments and “statutes,” and additional purposes of the Torah

Classic examples of difficulty and the response of the three approaches

Criticism from outside and criticism from within, and “My handiwork is drowning in the sea, and you are singing?”

Conclusion: two levels clarified, and the practical question postponed

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

From Guide for the Perplexed to a discussion of Torah and morality

The sense of conflict and the three levels of the problem

The logical level: a value conflict is not a contradiction

Types of conflicts: essential versus incidental

The philosophical/meta-halakhic level: is a Jewish law–morality conflict possible?

Two identity-based approaches that eliminate conflict: Rabbi Kook and the Chazon Ish as code names

The Euthyphro dilemma and Leibowitz: what is and is not at stake

Rabbi Dessler’s example, truth and falsehood, and the parallel to permitted versus overridden

The third approach: conflict is possible because Jewish law has non-moral goals

Maimonides: a division between moral commandments and “statutes,” and additional purposes of the Torah

Classic examples of difficulty and the response of the three approaches

Criticism from outside and criticism from within, and “My handiwork is drowning in the sea, and you are singing?”

Conclusion: two levels clarified, and the practical question postponed

Full Transcript

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