Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 9

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, not only can she, she should burn it. Because she is obligated in the commandment to burn impure terumah just like men are; it’s not time-bound. But the positive commandment that is being overridden is the prohibition of doing labor on a Jewish holiday. So from her perspective, what is being overridden is only a prohibition and not a positive commandment. Okay? By the way, regarding tzitzit, the Raavad says at the beginning of Sifra that women may perform semikhah voluntarily. The Raavad claims that even a positive commandment that is time-bound for women overrides a prohibition, even though they are not obligated in it. Because they still fulfill a positive commandment if they do it, so even here one could say that the principle that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition applies even when the woman is not actually obligated in that positive commandment. But that’s just in parentheses. So that’s the example. So Tosafot says: and if you say, then so here too—then so here too. A woman really would be able to burn impure terumah on a Jewish holiday. What’s the problem? Who said she can’t? Why did no tanna ever happen to say this? Rather, what must you say? That a positive commandment accompanied by a prohibition—the prohibition too is stronger, and it does not get overridden by a positive commandment; so here too the prohibition is stronger. He wants to argue: we’ve never heard of such a thing. After all, we’re always used to the fact that we’re stuck with this oil for burning on a Jewish holiday; there’s nothing to do with it. What’s the problem? Let women burn it. Women, pigs, or gentiles can burn whatever they want. If I have a “Sabbath woman,” she can do it. So he says: we’ve never heard such a thing, so clearly a woman can’t do this. And what does that mean? That from the woman’s standpoint there is also an obligation of a positive commandment. But he says no—the woman is exempt from the positive commandment. The whole question is only what practical difference it makes. Therefore he answers, as he says to him: rather, what must you say? That a positive commandment accompanied by a prohibition—the prohibition too is stronger, and it does not yield to a positive commandment; so here too the prohibition is stronger. What is he saying? Even though, if this prohibition comes attached to the positive commandment, then that prohibition is a stronger prohibition. And then, even if women are exempt from the positive commandment that comes with the prohibition, the remaining prohibition is still a strong prohibition, because the very fact that a positive commandment comes with it—even though women themselves are exempt from that positive commandment—still, the Torah imposed a positive commandment in this matter. Since that is so, it is a stronger prohibition, and that prohibition is not overridden by a positive commandment. Therefore with women too it is not overridden. Practically, in the final analysis, according to the Ri it comes out that women really are exempt from the positive commandment, even though next to it there is a prohibition. He is only asking what practical difference it makes, but in principle women are exempt from the positive commandment even when a prohibition is attached to it. At the beginning of Tosafot, I’m saying, there is room to hesitate—at the beginning of Tosafot, the question is whether he means what practical difference it makes, or whether he means to say that women are actually obligated, to assume that women are obligated. In any case there are many more medieval authorities (Rishonim) on this.

[Speaker C] What happened? Men fulfill a positive commandment and women don’t? In what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a parapet? No, a parapet is not time-dependent. All Tosafot is asking is that if it had been time-dependent, it wouldn’t be a good example of a commandment that is not time-bound, because even if it were time-dependent, women would still be obligated because of the prohibition involved. This is also the Talmudic text about which Nachmanides says the principle I mentioned in one of the previous lectures: Nachmanides says that where the prohibition supports the positive commandment, women are exempt from the prohibition as well. He answers the same difficulty in the opposite way from Tosafot. What did Tosafot ask about sending away the mother bird, returning a lost object, and a parapet? Tosafot said: there too there is also a prohibition. So even if it were time-bound, women would be obligated. Nachmanides says: not true. In all those places the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, and whoever is exempt from the positive commandment is also exempt from the prohibition. The whole purpose of the prohibition is to ensure that you fulfill the positive commandment. If you are exempt from the positive commandment, then you are exempt from the prohibition too. So those really are good examples, because if they were time-dependent, then women would indeed be completely exempt. This is very interesting, because according to this there are really three opinions about what happens with women in all commandments of this type if they are time-dependent, like oil for burning on a Jewish holiday, say, or labors on a Jewish holiday. One example, one approach, is Nachmanides’ view: that they are exempt both from the prohibition and from the positive commandment. In a prohibition that has a positive commandment alongside it, if it is time-dependent then women are exempt from the prohibition as well.

[Speaker G] But that’s not always the case; it’s only if it supports the positive commandment. What does “supports the positive commandment” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That it comes to make sure you fulfill the positive commandment—that is the content of the prohibition. It is not a prohibition standing on its own; its whole point is to make sure that you fulfill the positive commandment. That is Nachmanides’ view. And the two approaches we saw in Tosafot: one approach says women are obligated in the prohibition and exempt from the positive commandment. What practical difference does it make? Whether another positive commandment would override it or not. A third approach says that because women are obligated in the prohibition, they are obligated in the positive commandment too. Meaning, there are three possibilities here; all the possibilities come up here. In any case, for our purposes, also on Yom Kippur, if I return to our Talmudic text, then our Talmudic text really leaves room for hesitation depending on the different approaches. Our Talmudic text assumes that if Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah, then clearly women are obligated on Yom Kippur—even though on Yom Kippur the affliction is mainly a positive commandment; it’s not a prohibition. There there is a prohibition too, but let’s say there is a prohibition. Still, why don’t we need the novelty of “the native-born” to teach that women are obligated also in the positive commandment? What is bothering the Talmudic text? The Talmudic text assumes that if they are obligated in the prohibition, they are obligated in the positive commandment too. So if there is such a general principle according to Tosafot in his question—Tosafot in Kiddushin, in his question—then according to the view called “some commentators,” who say that really women are exempt from the positive commandment and there is just no practical difference, maybe that is also what the Talmudic text here is saying: really women are obligated in the prohibition and not in the positive commandment, and this has no practical difference because from the side of the prohibition they still have to do everything. And yes indeed, they are exempt from the positive commandment of Yom Kippur. They of course are liable to karet, because according to these approaches karet is attached to the prohibition, not to the positive commandment. So everything remains as it was; it’s just that women have only the prohibition and not the positive commandment. The practical difference would be if there were a positive commandment that overrode it. Although since this is a prohibition involving karet, it’s not so simple that a positive commandment would override it. But if theoretically there were such a positive commandment—say, the positive commandment of circumcision that would override it—then it could be that from the standpoint of women it would indeed override it, because there is no positive commandment here, only a prohibition. Okay? That is a second possibility. A third possibility says that if the prohibition comes together with the positive commandment—Nachmanides, who says there is neither prohibition nor positive commandment here, women are exempt from everything—then the Talmudic text is difficult altogether. So what does it mean, “Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah”? So of course you would have to say that this is only in places where we assume the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, not every place where there is a prohibition and a positive commandment in the same matter. That is an interpretive question. But then of course the result has to be that on Yom Kippur this is not such a case, because otherwise you can’t understand the Talmudic text here. I remind you in what context I brought this Nachmanides in the previous lectures. I brought it in the context of Divrei Yechezkel, who asks—and we’ll see this later—how is it permitted to feed minors on Yom Kippur? After all, there is the prohibition of “do not make them eat”—you may not feed a minor a prohibition with your own hands. So Divrei Yechezkel says that according to this Nachmanides in Kiddushin, since the prohibition here comes to support the positive commandment, all the minor violates is a positive-commandment prohibition. And regarding a positive-commandment prohibition, this rule was not said, that one may not feed it to him with one’s own hands. Exactly the opposite, in fact. Because according to Nachmanides here, if we take Nachmanides’ approach and try to read the Talmudic text in Sukkah according to that Nachmanides, it comes out the opposite: that here this is absolutely not a case where the prohibition supports the positive commandment. Because if it were such a case, then why does the Talmudic text assume that being obligated in the prohibition also means being obligated in the positive commandment? According to Nachmanides, the opposite: according to Nachmanides, women should be exempt from both the prohibition and the positive commandment. Right? So that doesn’t work so well. Really, one has to remember that this—and this is the point someone made earlier—that the Talmudic text in Berakhot 20, when it makes the juxtaposition of “remember” and “observe,” it is not doing that about the positive commandment of ceasing from labor on the Sabbath. It does it about the positive commandment of kiddush. That is a different positive commandment. There is a positive commandment of refraining from labor, “to cease,” and a prohibition, “do not do any labor.” Besides that, there is also the positive commandment of “remember,” meaning kiddush—and havdalah too according to some views, but kiddush. Okay? And when the Talmudic text says that “remember” and “observe” were said in one utterance, it is speaking about the positive commandment of kiddush and the prohibition of labor. What about the positive commandment of labor and the prohibition of labor? The Talmudic text does not discuss that. So it’s one of two things. Everything is open, of course. Either the Talmudic text takes it as obvious that there women are clearly obligated. The whole discussion of “remember” and “observe” concerns a case where there is no overlap in content between the prohibition and the positive commandment; they are simply both said in the same general area—they both concern the Sabbath. Then I say, without the juxtaposition I would ask: what connection is there? So what if it’s in the same general area? They are still a prohibition and a positive commandment that are different commandments. Why assume that whoever is obligated in the prohibition is obligated in the positive commandment? Only if the Torah juxtaposes them. If the Torah does not juxtapose them, then no. But where there is overlap in content, where the prohibition and the positive commandment are the same thing—like labor on the Sabbath, which is the same instruction, exactly “do not do labor,” only one time it is said in the language of a positive commandment and one time in the language of a prohibition—in such a case you do not need a juxtaposition. There it is clear that whoever is obligated in the prohibition is obligated in the positive commandment. Therefore the Talmudic text does not deal with that at all. And if that is so, then what Tosafot in Kiddushin initially assumes—that with a parapet, sending away the mother bird, and all those things, when the prohibition and the positive commandment come together, clearly women are obligated in the positive commandment too—that does not contradict the Talmudic text in Berakhot. The reason the Talmudic text in Berakhot needed a juxtaposition is because there it is dealing with a prohibition and a positive commandment that do not overlap in content. But a prohibition and a positive commandment that do overlap in content do not need a source; that is obvious. Good question why, but somehow it is obvious, at least according to Tosafot. So certainly there is no difficulty against him from the Talmudic text in Berakhot. And then it could really be that in a prohibition and a positive commandment that overlap in content, this is a general principle unrelated to the juxtaposition of “remember” and “observe”: that if women are obligated in the prohibition, they are obligated in the positive commandment too. In the approach of “some commentators” in Tosafot we see the opposite: even when there is overlap in content, women are still exempt from the positive commandment and obligated only in the prohibition. Tosafot hesitates over what the practical difference is, and says the practical difference is that a positive commandment would override it. Okay, but women are exempt from the positive commandment. What about the juxtaposition of “remember” and “observe”? There this is an entirely different story; it is not a question of content-overlap between the prohibition and the positive commandment. In that case, between “remember” and “observe” there is some kind of juxtaposition, that’s all. But then it really comes out that in a place where there is overlap in content, women specifically are not obligated in the positive commandment—the opposite of Tosafot’s conception in his question. “Some commentators” go in the opposite direction. And neither of them is difficult from the Talmudic text in Berakhot, because in any event the Talmudic text in Berakhot is apparently either a juxtaposition specifically about “remember” and “observe,” or about cases where there is no overlap in content between the positive commandment and the prohibition.

[Speaker D] What does “overlap in content” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That they command the same thing. What?

[Speaker D] When we said it’s not overlap in content—when is it not overlap in content? In “remember”…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In kiddush and the prohibition of labor. What? Kiddush and the prohibition of labor—there is no overlap in content. What?

[Speaker D] What kiddush?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The obligation to make kiddush and the prohibition of labor. What overlap in content is there between them? They command me about completely different things. Overlap in content means the positive commandment of refraining from labor and the prohibition of doing labor. What? This has nothing to do with a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. I’m now talking about whether women are obligated in a positive commandment when there is a prohibition alongside it. If there is overlap in content—what do you mean, how is that unrelated to the prohibition at all?

[Speaker D] It has no connection.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That is why, without the juxtaposition, we would not say women are obligated in it, because it is just an ordinary positive commandment that is time-bound. Only the juxtaposition says that women are obligated. But where the positive commandment and the prohibition overlap in content, in such a case women who are obligated in the prohibition are obligated in the positive commandment too, because it is the same commandment—just saying the same thing in a different language. Even though it’s not so simple, as we saw: when the Torah formulates it as a prohibition and a positive commandment, it is not the same commandment. It means that one is a positive state, and the other tells you to avoid a negative state. We discussed this in one of the previous lectures. But that is certainly one way to resolve it in our topic.

[Speaker G] For Sabbath, do we define it as a positive commandment that is time-bound? Obviously. So that means the reason women are obligated is because the positive commandment and the prohibition overlap in content?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—or because of the juxtaposition of “remember” and “observe.” Whoever thinks that the juxtaposition of “remember” and “observe” is a paradigm for all…

[Speaker G] Is there a Talmudic text that says this explicitly? Or are we just relying on the general rule?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. That is the accepted view among halakhic decisors; I don’t know a proof for it from the Talmudic text. On this issue—and on the contrary, it may depend here on a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). According to “some commentators” in Tosafot in Kiddushin, in my view women are exempt from the positive commandment of labor on the Sabbath. It won’t really have much practical difference, because even regarding a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, it makes no practical difference here, since on the Sabbath this is a prohibition punishable by stoning, so it is not overridden by an ordinary positive commandment.

[Speaker G] When Sefer HaChinukh counts it, doesn’t he give a reason—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What reason does he give for obligating women? Who said he obligates women?

[Speaker G] That if a woman does not keep the Sabbath, then she transgresses—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The prohibition. But who said she is neglecting a positive commandment? I don’t know; we’d have to check. I don’t remember right now what Maimonides writes. In Maimonides too he does not always make a point of saying who is obligated, but in Sefer HaChinukh he usually does, so it would be worth checking there. I don’t know. What? About the Sabbath? In any case, the possibility that women really are exempt—it’s not…

[Speaker D] If the reason really is “remember” and “observe,” then how can one assume they are exempt when Sabbath is not time-bound? Who said Sabbath is not time-bound? Because of this juxtaposition of “remember” and “observe,” you have to say that Sabbath is time-bound.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sabbath is time-bound regardless of the juxtaposition. It’s simply a fact that it is time-bound. What do you mean? Sabbath is time-bound—what is the question? Of course it is. The question is what the law is for women regarding such a time-bound commandment. But that it is time-bound is obvious. What lies behind this point? Why indeed, in a place where the prohibition obligates women, would the positive commandment obligate them too—or not? What is the dispute here? What is the conceptual dispute, the logic of the matter? Theoretically one could say—and I mentioned in that lecture where I discussed the relationship between a prohibition and a positive commandment—I mentioned Rabbi Yerucham Fischel Perla, who claims that where there is a doubled prohibition and positive commandment, you do not count both at all. It is really one commandment formulated doubly. That is how he learns in Saadia Gaon’s view. I’m not sure he’s right even in Saadia Gaon’s view—there are contrary examples—but that is what he claims. Maimonides, of course—this is the whole point of his sixth root—is to say that it is not so. Maimonides says both are counted. I said: what is the difference? Rabbi Yerucham Fischel Perla assumes that it really is one commandment formulated in two ways. How do I decide whether it is a prohibition or a positive commandment? According to the substance of the commandment. If you understand the essence of the commandment, you understand whether it is a prohibition or a positive commandment; the wording is not what determines it. According to Saadia Gaon it is very clear that if women are obligated in the prohibition, they are also obligated in the positive commandment, because it is the same thing. It is not a question of being obligated in the prohibition or in the positive commandment; they are obligated just like men. There is no both prohibition and positive commandment here; there is only one thing, whether prohibition or positive commandment, it doesn’t matter. So according to Saadia Gaon it is very clear that the status would be the same. But Maimonides sees this as two separate things. Maimonides says that the prohibition and the positive commandment are both counted: the prohibition among the prohibitions and the positive commandment among the positive commandments. And we discussed why. Because the command to cease on the Sabbath says that cessation is a positive state. If you did labor, you are not in a negative state; you are simply not in a positive state. In contrast, the prohibition of doing labor says that if you do labor you are in a negative state; you directly clash with the Torah’s will. And if you refrain, you have not done anything positive; you have merely avoided the negative state. Right? We discussed this. Therefore for Maimonides, prohibition and positive commandment are two different things; there is no overlap between them. But if that is so—if they really are two different things—then what is the logic of saying that if women are obligated in the prohibition, and there is overlap in content, they are also obligated in the positive commandment? These are two different commandments. Who said that for them too it is defined as a positive state? Maybe for them it is only defined as an obligation to avoid a negative state, because according to Maimonides these really are two different obligations. So first of all, it could be that Maimonides consistently would say that there is no such general rule that whoever is obligated in the prohibition is also obligated in the positive commandment. We saw that there is a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). That is one possibility. Another possibility, though, is that it depends on why we exempt women from time-bound positive commandments. One possibility is to say that there is some principled idea that this just does not apply to women. Commandments that depend on time somehow are not for women; women don’t do this; it has no value at all for women. According to that, it would come out that even if women do perform it, they have not fulfilled a commandment. That is a very rare view among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). There is such a view—and maybe it is even forbidden for them because of “do not add,” a very rare view. According to most medieval authorities (Rishonim) and halakhic decisors, women are certainly permitted, and perhaps they even do fulfill a commandment in such a case; and perhaps they can even recite a blessing according to some views—Ashkenazim and Sephardim and all the well-known discussions. But there is such a view. According to that view, time-bound positive commandments simply do not apply to women at all. According to those approaches, I see no logic at all in saying that if they are obligated in the prohibition then they are obligated in the positive commandment. Why should one assume that?

[Speaker B] Why the last point? Why, if we say that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it is something completely different; it does not apply to women. So why, if they are included in the prohibition, would they be obligated in the positive commandment? For them it is not a positive state. Not being there is indeed a negative state. Why assume there is a linkage between the prohibition and the positive commandment? That is the whole difference between them; that is why we make them two separate commandments. But if I understand that women’s exemption from time-bound positive commandments—and that is how most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand it—the exemption is just an exemption. In principle the commandment applies to women too, but I exempt them for some reason. Abudarham says, I don’t know, because we don’t want to tie them to performing the commandment at that specific time; they have things to do at home. I don’t know exactly what. Slightly strange explanations. But fine—it doesn’t matter to me now what the explanation is. What matters is that there is some logic here that exempts women from the commandment, not that it is inapplicable to them. A kind of “pushed aside, not fully permitted,” okay? If so, then there is a lot of logic in saying that women who are obligated in the prohibition are obligated in the positive commandment too. Why? Because what reason is there to exempt them from the positive commandment if from the side of the prohibition they have to do it anyway? From the side of the prohibition they will have to do it anyway, so there is no reason to say, fine, let’s exempt you from the positive commandment so you can deal with the children. They won’t be freed up to deal with the children in any case, because from the side of the prohibition they are obligated to do it. So if I say this is only an exempting factor, not a permitting factor—not a logic saying that for a woman this simply does not apply—then clearly, if there is a prohibition alongside it, there is no reason to exempt women. That is simple. Right? I’ll say it again, regardless of Abudarham’s explanation, which sounds questionable to me. But the prohibition and the positive commandment overlap; they overlap in content. I’m talking about situations where the prohibition and the positive commandment have overlapping content, like the positive commandment of refraining from labor on the Sabbath and the prohibition of “do not do any labor.” So what am I saying to the woman—that you are exempt from refraining on the Sabbath because it is a time-bound positive commandment; go take care of the children? Fine? But what do you mean? She would transgress the prohibition if she does labor. So in any case she cannot take care of the children by doing labor, and if she cannot in any case do that, then why exempt her from the positive commandment? So the positive commandment of refraining applies to her too; there is no reason otherwise. Similar to this, if you remember, I brought the Rogatchover in the responsa Tzafnat Pa’neach, section 2, where the Rogatchover says that someone who cooks on a Jewish holiday that falls on the Sabbath violates not only cooking on the Sabbath but also cooking on a Jewish holiday. Why? Because he holds that the permission to do food-preparation labor on a Jewish holiday is only “pushed aside,” not fully permitted. Not like Nachmanides, who says that what is forbidden is only occupational labor and not food-preparation labor. Rather, the accepted approach among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) is not like that. We have permission to cook for the needs of the Jewish holiday. But if from the side of the Sabbath you cannot cook for the Jewish holiday anyway, then why should the positive commandment permit it for you? There is no reason; it does not help at all. You have to refrain from it anyway. So clearly, if the positive commandment applies, there is no reason to permit it. So obviously you would be obligated in the positive commandment too, right? So that is the reasoning—if I learn, like Maimonides, the relationship between a positive commandment and a prohibition, this is the reasoning that says that if there is a prohibition, there is no point in exempting women from the positive commandment. Okay? Now one could perhaps say here a further principle. Returning to our issue, Yom Kippur: one could perhaps say something more fundamental, because as I said, our topic assumes that on Yom Kippur the prohibition and the positive commandment certainly go together. Anyone who separates prohibition and positive commandment in some situation has to explain this Talmudic text to us—why this Talmudic text does not raise the possibility that “the native-born”—the Talmudic text in Sukkah, yes?—comes to teach that a woman is obligated in the positive commandment of Yom Kippur. All that “Scripture equated woman to man” teaches is “for all punishments in the Torah”—that’s for the prohibition. So why does the Talmudic text ask why “the native-born” is needed? Answer: in order to teach me that a woman is obligated also in the positive commandment. What’s the problem? Okay? So it may be that here there is indeed some special principle, an exception, and here everyone would agree that whoever is obligated in the prohibition is also obligated in the positive commandment. I thought of two possible ways to explain this.

[Speaker C] First, that in other cases an additional derivation is needed to obligate women in the positive commandment—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other cases, yes. And here it isn’t needed, because here it’s something else. One possibility is that there is some sort of juxtaposition between the affliction and labor. After all, with labor, what is explicit in the Torah regarding Yom Kippur is the prohibition, not the positive commandment, unlike affliction. Fine? And the positive commandment and prohibition regarding labor on Yom Kippur are, plainly speaking, like an ordinary Sabbath. Meaning, there it is fairly clear that women would be obligated both in the prohibition and in the positive commandment. Okay? So since on Yom Kippur there is some kind of juxtaposition between the affliction and the labor, then if women are obligated in labor, both prohibition and positive commandment, then in affliction too they are obligated, both prohibition and positive commandment. Where do we find this juxtaposition? Two possibilities. Either one of those analogies of “very same,” all the things we saw; the Talmudic text itself keeps moving back and forth between labor and affliction on Yom Kippur. Even the warning for affliction is learned from the warning for labor by “if it is not needed for this matter.” Meaning, the Talmudic text ties affliction to labor. Another possibility, which is really just an extension of that one, is this whole idea of cessation. After all, that is how I opened the whole topic: that on Yom Kippur the prohibitions of affliction and the prohibitions of labor are two sections of a general obligation of cessation. One must refrain from pleasures and refrain from labor. If I really understand it as one principle, then it is more than a juxtaposition. Anyone obligated in this cessation is obligated in all its components. Since that is so, there is no need to look for another source obligating women. Therefore it is obvious that whoever belongs to the prohibition belongs also to the positive commandment, because really the person has to cease. So whatever you say about cessation on the Sabbath or anywhere else—if women are obligated there, then on Yom Kippur too they will be obligated. Another possibility is really what was said here earlier. In the Talmudic text in Berakhot, in that same topic on 20b—the Talmudic text, I didn’t bring it on the sheet—the Talmudic text discusses various commandments that women are obligated in, and it gives specific explanations. Look at some examples. The recitation of Shema—are women obligated? Obviously not! Women are exempt, obviously! Ah okay, it says, let me take it… wait. The commandment of reciting Shema—obviously, it is a positive commandment that is time-bound, and women are exempt from all positive commandments that are time-bound. The Talmudic text says: one might have said, since it includes acceptance of the kingdom of Heaven, therefore it teaches us. Fine. So it had to teach me that women are exempt, because in principle one would not have said that. I would have said: there is acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven here. What? So what? Why should I care that it is acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven? It is still a time-bound positive commandment. Rather, in a place where the idea of the commandment clearly applies to women as well, then by logic we would obligate women. We need a derivation or an explicit source saying that women are exempt. Look at more examples: And from tefillin? Obvious! One might have said, since it is juxtaposed to mezuzah—therefore it teaches us, and so on. And they are obligated in prayer, yes? Because it is supplication for mercy. The Talmudic text says: why are they obligated in prayer, even though it is a positive commandment that is time-bound? Because it is supplication for mercy. Notice—here it is not even merely the initial assumption as with Shema; here it is the conclusion. Women are obligated in prayer even though it is time-bound. Good question whether according to Maimonides and Nachmanides this is Torah law or rabbinic law; I’m not getting into that now. There is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot regarding rabbinic positive commandments that are time-bound: are women exempt from those too, or are women obligated? A dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. But for our purposes I’m ignoring that right now. The Talmudic text says—what?

[Speaker D] Why is prayer considered a positive commandment that is time-bound? It’s twenty-four hours.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only by day.

[Speaker D] There is a time limit for Shacharit and Minchah. Is that time limit only rabbinic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—that’s why I said it depends whether I’m speaking on the rabbinic plane or the Torah plane; it depends on Maimonides and Nachmanides. I’m not getting into that now. They assume here that it is time-bound. By the way, even if it is once a day, it could still be called time-bound. Once a day, no matter when? The day is twenty-four hours; sometime during those twenty-four hours you have to pray. Even then you can define it as a positive commandment that is time-bound. Why not? Why?

[Speaker G] Only with tzitzit can you say there is day and night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, with tzitzit it’s day or night. But now I’m saying, even assuming it’s twenty-four hours—

[Speaker G] Once a day—so that’s not called time?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? During the day. Fine. And if the prayer were only for three hours, then would that be called time-bound or not? Why?

[Speaker G] Because you limited the other time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I limited it here too; I limited it to twenty-four hours.

[Speaker G] A day is not a time. But within the twenty-four hours it’s all the same.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Within the three hours too, it’s all the same.

[Speaker G] But the other times are forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But here too, if the time passes—of course there is. When? If it passed—not forbidden; you just did not fulfill the commandment. There is never a prohibition. You did not fulfill the commandment. Same here. If twenty-four hours passed and you did not pray, can you pray twice tomorrow? You missed it. It’s gone; the time passed. It’s a commandment dependent on time. Of course it is. It depends on time. During those twenty-four hours you were obligated to pray.

[Speaker G] The problem is that it comes in twenty-four-hour cycles.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, it comes in twenty-four-hour cycles. Today’s prayer is only during these twenty-four hours; tomorrow you won’t be able to make it up. It’s gone; the time passed.

[Speaker G] Is Shema a positive commandment that is time-bound?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the Talmudic text says so.

[Speaker G] And circumcision? There’s the Shaagat Aryeh and the Kesef Mishneh.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s the Shaagat Aryeh and the Kesef Mishneh on that, by the way.

[Speaker G] So how does it work that it’s day upon day because of night and day?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is a dispute between the Shaagat Aryeh and the Kesef Mishneh. The Kesef Mishneh claims that by Torah law the time for Shema is the entire day, and only the rabbis limited it. That is a dispute. And the Shaagat Aryeh asks: according to that approach, why is it called time-bound? After all, you have the whole day and the whole night. So he wants to argue that it is because there is one by day and one by night, and each is separate; therefore it is called time-bound. Fine? Even though each lasts the whole day, they are two separate commandments, like the daily offerings. So each commandment separately is time-bound, because it lasts only twelve hours. But then the assumption is that if there were one commandment spanning the full twenty-four hours, that really would not be time-bound. And I claim: not true. Even if it were over the full twenty-four hours, it could still be time-bound, because the next day you already missed it. Meaning, there is still a deadline after which you can no longer fulfill it. So what if it is twenty-four hours and not three hours? What’s the problem? The question is whether this is Torah law or rabbinic law. That is the dispute. The Kesef Mishneh says that by Torah law its time is the whole day, and only the rabbis set the limit. So the Talmudic text here says, prayer is supplication for mercy. Since prayer is a request for mercy, obviously it applies to women too. What do you mean obviously? It is a positive commandment that is time-bound. We are doing “the rationale of the verse” here. Why are we doing the rationale of the verse? I’m not going into that now, but we are making some kind of attempt to understand what the commandment is meant to achieve. And if what the commandment is meant to achieve is something that applies to women too—like acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven, or mercy—then obviously women are obligated too. If so—same with Grace after Meals, and so on. What does that mean? So maybe on Yom Kippur too it is like that, and that’s what Moshe said earlier. On Yom Kippur, if the fast really is the basis for atonement, then I say: what difference does it make that it is time-bound? Women also need atonement, just like “it is supplication for mercy,” just like acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven. The whole idea of the commandment applies to women too. In such a situation, the formal rules—despite its being time-bound—do not compel exemption. Women are obligated in such a case too. And this is a very interesting case of expounding the rationale of the verse, but you can see it in the Talmudic text. They do it. Right? The question of when one does not expound the rationale of the verse is a separate question. Overall, the places where one does not expound the rationale of the verse are very limited. So that is another possibility for why the assumption in the Talmudic text in Sukkah is that women who are obligated in the prohibition are certainly obligated in the positive commandment too. No additional source is needed to obligate them in the positive commandment. I’ll say again: according to that last explanation, this assumes that the idea of the fast is the basis for atonement. Therefore women, who also need atonement, are obligated to fast. Even if we go with what I said at the beginning—or maybe I also said it here—that on Yom Kippur, really, the service of Yom Kippur is… no, I said this here in the first lecture. It is the condition for entering the holy place. Meaning, it is the backing the public gives to the High Priest when he enters the holy place, as emerges from the Torah in the portion of Acharei Mot. According to that too one could understand why women are certainly obligated. As I said there, like in Hakhel, where women are obligated in a commandment imposed on the community. Here really the whole community is supposed to afflict itself in order to give backing to the priest who enters the innermost sanctuary, and the atonement is a result. It is not that you must afflict yourself in order to be atoned for. You must afflict yourself because this is how one enters the holy place—“With this shall Aaron come into the holy place, with a young bull for a sin offering and a ram for a burnt offering,” and so on—and also the whole public fasts. All of this belongs to “with this shall Aaron come into the holy place.” Then the Holy One, blessed be He, atones for us if that whole process takes place. The entry into the holy place itself atones; the scapegoat too, as we discussed, atones. And if so, this fast is part of a procedure carried out by the community. If that is so, then women are certainly obligated. I brought Sefer HaChinukh, if you remember, regarding Hakhel—one of the commandments where, even though it is time-bound, women are obligated. The Talmudic text says: one does not derive from general rules, even where an exception is stated. Even though it is time-bound, women are obligated. Why? It does not explain why women are obligated. They are obligated because the commandment of Hakhel is imposed on the community, and whoever belongs to the community is obligated in it. The whole exemption of women from time-bound positive commandments applies only where the commandment is imposed on an individual person. Then the Torah says: if it is time-bound, it is imposed on men, not on women. Okay. Good. So that is regarding women’s obligation. Here one can discuss the extra time, and one can discuss the afflictions. The extra time may involve only a positive commandment—we saw several views on this, briefly, several views on it. If in the extra time there is only a positive commandment, then women ought to be exempt. But the Talmudic text itself says there was an initial assumption to exempt women from the extra time, and it teaches us that women are obligated. Right? It is an explicit derivation. But indeed, in the initial assumption, without that explicit derivation, women would be exempt because there is only a positive commandment there. And that is a bit of an indication that in the extra time, the positive commandment is a separate positive commandment; it is not just an extension of the positive commandment that applies on Yom Kippur itself into the period of the extra time. I said there are two possible ways to understand that, because if it were such an extension, there would be no reason to exempt women. If they are obligated in the positive commandment during the day itself, then in the extra time too—why should there be a difference?

[Speaker D] What is written as “a complete rest.” Huh? “A Sabbath of complete rest.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, one of the approaches—we discussed that there may be a dispute about it. Also regarding the other afflictions, we saw that for some approaches women are obligated where there is only a positive commandment. We said maybe it is rabbinic, maybe only a positive commandment, maybe a prohibition without karet. We saw three approaches regarding the other afflictions. Okay, according to the approaches where there is only a positive commandment, then once again there would be room to discuss why women are obligated in the other afflictions, since there is only a positive commandment here. And again I’ll return to the same point: what do you mean? If this positive commandment only comes to complete the general law of cessation that exists on Yom Kippur, then anyone who belongs to that cessation belongs to this positive commandment too. You do not need a special source for the positive commandment of afflictions. So even if there is no prohibition alongside the affliction, only a positive commandment, since it is just part of the cessation of Yom Kippur, or the entry into the holy place, or whatever you want to call it, then women would be obligated because of the idea of the commandment, not because of the formal definition of whether there is a prohibition here or not, and things of that kind. So one can connect the obligation in affliction to that as well. Good, up to here regarding women. I still want to get to the issue of minors here.

[Speaker D] On the subject of minors: when you say minors, up to age six? Up to what age?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Minors—up to what age, that is debated. Up to when they understand, simply speaking; there is no fixed age. What?

[Speaker D] Thirteen years and a day—is that minors?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are adults. Minors—thirteen years and a day is already adulthood.

[Speaker D] No, but up to thirteen years and a day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Up to thirteen years and a day they are minors. But from when? What? From when? From what age?

[Speaker D] From 30 days, when he’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Who said that? There is the commandment of education. Do you give a 30-day-old baby a lulav to shake? On day 31 do you give him a lulav? Did you give your son a lulav when he was 31 days old?

[Speaker G] That is Beit Shammai regarding challah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So no, there is no need. The age of education is from when he reaches the age of education, says the Talmudic text. There is an age for education. What is the age? That is debated. There are halakhic decisors—I have no idea where they get this from; well, I do know, but it doesn’t really come from there—who say we’re talking about around age six or seven, some universal age for education. The simple understanding is that this is not correct; rather, it is from when the child understands, and according to what he understands you educate him, each child according to his pace. But there is some age from which onward there is an obligation of education. But the obligation of education is a rabbinic obligation. How do I know that? From the Talmudic text in Sukkah. The Talmudic text in Sukkah speaks about Queen Helene, who seated her sons in the sukkah, and the Talmudic text discusses there: after all, the sukkah was more than twenty cubits high—how did she do that? And then the Talmudic text has an initial assumption that perhaps this is only a rabbinic obligation, and with rabbinic matters we don’t pay attention—and it teaches us that all her actions she performed only in accordance with the sages. Fine? So we see that the obligation to educate children—the women, after all, are exempt from sukkah, since it is a time-bound positive commandment, but she seated the children there. That was the Talmudic text’s difficulty, and it says this is rabbinic. From here all the halakhic decisors learn—it is simple, this is what the Talmudic text says—that the law of educating children is rabbinic. The obligation to educate children is rabbinic; one has to know that. There is “and you shall teach them diligently to your children,” the commandment to teach them Torah—that is a different matter; that is probably Torah law, according to most decisors. But that is a separate section entirely: teaching them Torah. Educating them in commandments is rabbinic law. That is clear. More than that… well, wait, I’ll continue with the “more than that” in a moment. But it is rabbinic law.

[Speaker G] I would ask whether it is from the side of—

[Speaker C] The minor, who becomes obligated, or from the side of the father, who becomes obligated?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that too. There is—so that’s the law of education, that’s the first law. The second law… or the father? We’ll see in a moment. I said I’d get there, I’ll get there, trust me. The second law regarding minors is: if a minor is eating forbidden foods, the religious court is commanded to stop him. When it says religious court, according to almost all views it generally means anyone who sees him; the religious court is the public’s agent, it doesn’t specifically have to be the local court. The religious court has to make sure people do this, but in principle this is a public obligation. Anyone who sees a minor eating forbidden foods would seemingly have to stop him. Except—this is a dispute in the Talmud, and the Talmud’s conclusion in Yevamot 113–114 is that if a minor is eating forbidden foods, the religious court is not commanded to stop him. If you see a minor eating pork, you can tell him bon appétit. You do not have to stop him. Okay? In a minute I’ll qualify that a bit. That’s the rule of a minor eating forbidden foods, the second law, which in fact does not exist in practice as Jewish law: there is no obligation to stop minors. The third law is the prohibition of feeding with one’s own hands. They derive it from three sources concerning blood, creeping creatures, and fat: “you shall not eat them” is expounded as “you shall not feed them,” to warn adults regarding minors. In the Torah it says not “you shall eat them” but something that is interpreted as “you shall not feed them.” What does that mean? You are forbidden to feed minors prohibited food. And according to the overwhelming majority of views, this is a Torah prohibition. Meaning, if I take a minor—and by the way, not only a minor who has reached the age of education; according to almost all views this applies to any minor at any age, even one week old, not only from thirty days old—it is forbidden for me to put prohibited food directly into his hands, prohibited food. If I do that, I have violated a Torah prohibition, even though the minor himself violates nothing; he is not obligated in this. But if I give him prohibited food with my own hands—not merely cause him to stumble, notice. Causing a minor to stumble is one thing, but if I actually place the prohibition in his hands, I am actively doing the prohibited act through him, then I have violated a Torah prohibition. There is no age threshold—just one second—there is no age of education in this matter, because the age of education was said with respect to the commandment of education; it has nothing to do with the prohibition of feeding. Just an aside: according to Maimonides at least—and this is debated, the Rosh disagrees—the prohibition of feeding applies to adults too. Maimonides at the end of the laws of forbidden mixtures says: one who dresses his fellow in a garment of forbidden mixture—if the wearer was inadvertent and the one dressing him acted intentionally, the dresser is flogged. Now you have to understand: what does it mean that the dresser is flogged? You could say the dresser did something wrong, maybe he violated “do not place a stumbling block.” But for that there is no flogging. “Is flogged” means he violated the prohibition of forbidden mixtures itself. For the prohibition of forbidden mixtures there is flogging. How? He did not wear the forbidden mixture; he dressed someone else in it. So you see: one who causes his fellow to violate a prohibition—Rashi at the beginning of the portion of Matot says, one who causes his fellow to violate a prohibition enters in his place with respect to punishment. Meaning, he himself is considered as though he violated the prohibition. That is similar to “you shall not eat them” / “you shall not feed them,” or at least according to a certain understanding of that principle. Maimonides—this appears in two other places too, in the laws of naziriteship, and regarding impurity of a priest; in naziriteship there is an initial assumption with a source saying no, but regarding impurity of a priest yes. And the Rosh in a responsum asks about this and says he has no idea where Maimonides got it from; there is no source for it, and he disagrees. But that is Maimonides’ view.

[Speaker C] It’s like with both the one who rounds off and the one whose hair is rounded off—why do you need to learn it specifically there if anyone who performs a prohibition on someone else takes it on himself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re back to what we discussed earlier. The question is whether the examples are establishing a general principle, or whether the examples came to say that this is an exceptional case. There is an Atyavan De’oraita that discusses all cases in which a person performs a prohibition on another and thereby does it on himself. When a person rounds off his own hair, does he violate both the active and passive sides, or only the passive side? So it’s connected to these issues. In any case, for our purposes, this is the prohibition of feeding with one’s own hands. The prohibition of feeding with one’s own hands is a Torah prohibition. It applies at every age; according to most views, there is no age limitation. There are exceptional opinions also in two of the things I said here, but this is the accepted understanding. And that’s it—those are the players on the field here regarding minors in Jewish law. So I’ll start discussing education. The law of education, as I said, is rabbinic. There is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about the nature of this law of education. Rashi…

[Speaker D] Is that in Torah commandments or also rabbinic commandments? Presumably both.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Regarding feeding with one’s own hands, there is a dispute between Maimonides and Rashba concerning a rabbinic commandment. With education, on the face of it there is no difference. In the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot, both in Megillah and in Berakhot, the question is how to define the law of education. Rashi understands that the law of education is an obligation placed on the father: to educate his son, to accustom him to perform commandments, yes—to teach him so he will know what to do when he grows up.

[Speaker D] Why does it say “you should open for him” regarding a woman educating, on the Seder night—“you should open…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …for him,” well—

[Speaker C] What’s the question?

[Speaker D] “You” there is in the feminine form.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi says that “you” there is feminine. The Talmud really does say—Rashi really does say—that the law of education is imposed on the father, so what’s the question?

[Speaker D] Maybe the woman has no…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t mean whether it’s on the father or on the child himself—I mean father and mother for the moment. There is a Talmudic discussion in Nazir, maybe a dispute. Reish Lakish says that education is only on the father and not on the mother. The question is whether Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with him or not—that’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim). There are medieval and later authorities who claim that, as Jewish law, the commandment of education applies only to the father and not to the mother.

[Speaker D] There’s… what? “You,” right, “you should open,” so that also includes the mother.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Without homiletics—among the Sages, that form is not specifically feminine. “You should open for him” means you. There are medieval authorities who rule like Reish Lakish in practice, that the commandment of education is imposed on the father, because from the Talmud itself it isn’t clear that Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with him. Rabbi Yohanan said something else, but it’s not clear that he disagrees. There are medieval authorities who claim that the commandment of education is imposed on the mother as well. And that Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with Reish Lakish, so we rule like Rabbi Yohanan and the commandment is imposed on the mother—this is a dispute among the medieval authorities. About the father it is clear; about the mother there is a dispute. But conceptually there is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. Rashi claims that the law is an obligation on the father and not on the child himself to perform commandments; rather, it is an obligation on the father to make sure the child performs the commandment in order to educate him. According to Tosafot, from several places it is clear that this is not so. There is a rabbinic obligation on the child himself to perform commandments. It is not an obligation on the father to make sure the child performs them; it is an obligation on the son. A rabbinic obligation on minors, even though they are exempt by Torah law, they are rabbinically obligated to perform the commandment. That, says Tosafot, is the law of education. By the way, the concept of education takes on a different meaning. If we think about what “dedication of the altar” means—it means the beginning of the service, right? The start, the inception of the matter, right? According to Tosafot, that is also the meaning of the law of education. Essentially, the child has to begin his training in commandments; he has to start performing the commandments already as a child. Education in the sense of beginning, not what we today call educating him. Education in the sense of dedication of the altar—meaning this is how he initiates his performance of commandments: as a minor he begins his performance of commandments. According to Rashi, the concept of education means what the father is obligated to do—educate, in the way we use the term today. He has to educate his son, the father or the parents—as I said earlier, as I discussed earlier—it is imposed on the parents or on the father to educate his son; the concept of education, and of course there is a connection between the things, but the meaning here is different. Now, in Tosafot Yeshanim, in our passage on page 2a, Tosafot Yeshanim says: at age eight or nine one begins education, and the Talmud there discusses this at length. I’m not getting into education for hours of fasting right now. It starts with a short Mishnah and then the Talmud expands the discussion. There is education for part of the day two years earlier, one year earlier—from age twelve for a boy, age eleven for a girl. There is completing the fast for twenty-four hours. So there is a fairly precise definition of the parameters of the commandment of education regarding fasting on Yom Kippur. Unlike, by the way, all the other commandments, this is a unique case where the Sages gave a very specific definition of exactly how the education is done—at what age, to what extent; a very special definition. And we’ll get to that shortly. In any event, that is what the Talmud says there. So Tosafot Yeshanim on page 2a asks—whoever has a Talmud can look. It says: at age eight or nine one educates. This is difficult for me, because in Nazir, in the chapter “One who said: behold, I am a nazirite,” it says that a man can impose naziriteship on his son according to Reish Lakish, who says this is in order to educate him in commandments; his son yes, his daughter no—regarding his daughter he is not obligated to educate her. Whereas in our Talmudic passage we see that one educates even a little girl to fast for part of the day. So Tosafot Yeshanim asks: this does not fit with the law of education. And one can answer that there it is speaking specifically only with regard to naziriteship; but certainly with regard to other commandments he is obligated to educate her. That law of Reish Lakish is a special law about naziriteship. But regarding other commandments he is obligated to educate her. By the way, this is a source for saying that maybe what Reish Lakish says—that the commandment is on the father and not on the mother—is perhaps also a special law regarding naziriteship, and that is another way to explain the medieval authorities who say there is a commandment of education also on the mother, against Reish Lakish there in Nazir. Okay? Moving on. And if you say that we say everywhere: if a minor is eating forbidden foods, the religious court is not commanded to stop him. I said that as Jewish law we rule that one need not stop a minor from prohibited things, so why do we educate him? Or alternatively, if by the law of education one does have to stop him, why do they say one does not have to stop him? What does it mean, after all, that we educate him? Does “educate him” mean we tell the parents not to give him food, or that if we see him eating we have to tell him not to eat? Both, on the face of it. Meaning, you have to make sure he fasts—

[Speaker G] —for those hours, for the hours he needs to. Meaning, “don’t eat,” to stop him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s the plain meaning. Yes, and that really is the simple straightforward meaning, that’s not in doubt. So it is forbidden to give him food.

[Speaker G] So it’s forbidden to give him food; if you educate him to fast for certain hours, you have to make sure he does that. If the commandment of education is on the father, then he is only forbidden to give him food—but what difference does it make…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean only? The education is on the father—the father has to educate him not to give him food. So Tosafot Yeshanim answers; he says like this: Rabbi Eliezer of Metz says that education applies only where one performs a commandment, not where one abstains from a prohibition. Education is about fulfilling positive commandments; one is not obligated to stop him regarding prohibitions and negative commandments. Meaning, to educate a person is with respect to actions he needs to do; you have to accustom him to perform actions. Refraining from things—you are not obligated. When he grows up, he’ll already do that, apparently. There is some educational conception here that says that education is needed for active deeds a person performs. For non-active matters, it is enough to tell him it is forbidden, and then he’ll understand that it is forbidden and that’s it; no further training is needed. What? No, not by one’s own hands. All of this is regarding the law of education—regarding stopping him and education, not regarding feeding with one’s own hands. That is the first answer. Then he continues: and here, the education involved in afflicting him on Yom Kippur is not stopping him from a prohibition by keeping him from eating; rather, it is education in which one educates him in the commandment of “you shall afflict yourselves.” Even though on the face of it this is about not eating, it is still the positive commandment of fasting, not a negative prohibition against eating, and therefore education really does apply here. So the passage here discusses the law of education without any connection to the fact that there is no obligation to stop him from a prohibition. And then a very major novelty comes out of this: there is no law of education with regard to negative commandments. There is no law of education regarding negative commandments. Even the father does not have to stop his son from prohibitions, even after he has reached the age of education, only with positive commandments. That is a very significant practical novelty. Second answer: and Rabbi says, education applies only to the father, but not to another person. Therefore too, people are not careful to stop him. If you see a minor eating, some other person does not need to stop him. The father has to make sure he fasts because the obligation of education rests on him, and he in fact must also stop him from prohibitions. And the second answer says: not a distinction between negative and positive commandments, but between father and other people. What was ruled—that if a minor is eating forbidden foods, the religious court is not commanded to stop him—means the religious court, the public. But the father certainly must stop him. The father must stop him by rabbinic law, under the law of education. Then on Yom Kippur you do not need to stop minors who are eating—but the father does have to, minors who are at the age of education, who are eating during those hours when they are supposed to fast. The father does have to make sure they fast. And there was an incident with Queen Helene, who sat with her seven sons in the sukkah. Could it be that they had no father, and she educated them in that way? For the mother is exempt. And even if they had no father, she was educating them in the commandment merely as a pious practice, fine, that could be. So on this the Kehillot Yaakov asks, in Sukkah section 2. He asks about this Tosafot Yeshanim, and he brings Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who raises a difficulty. Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks that in the passage in Sukkah it says: if you say it means a minor who no longer needs his mother—that is, he has already reached the age of education—then he is rabbinically obligated, and could she have ignored a rabbinic obligation? What do we see? Clearly that there was a rabbinic obligation on her to educate the minor; only she treated even a rabbinic commandment carefully, and therefore they say there that all her acts were only in accordance with the words of the Sages, and she was careful even about rabbinic commandments. If it were merely an extra pious practice, as Tosafot Yeshanim says, just a matter of voluntary education, then what is the big difficulty? So she didn’t do it. But the Talmud says it is a rabbinic obligation, not merely a pious matter. And she was the mother. So if it is not merely a pious matter, how can Tosafot Yeshanim in his second answer say that it is?

[Speaker B] So on that—what does he mean by “merely a pious matter” in Tosafot Yeshanim? The second answer says that others do not need to stop him, only the father.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That Queen Helene… no, but he says: and what happened with Queen Helene? Queen Helene is the mother; the commandment of education is not incumbent on her, so why does the Talmud assume that she should have seated them in a valid sukkah? So he says: that was merely as a pious matter; she wanted beyond the letter of the law to educate them in commandments. Fine? But it says in the Talmud that this is a rabbinic law, not merely a pious matter. That is a direct difficulty on what Tosafot Yeshanim says. So the Kehillot Yaakov wants to make the following claim.

[Speaker D] She did it, but maybe ordinarily women do not need to do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Talmud asked; the Talmud objected: “if it is rabbinic, would she not have cared?”

[Speaker D] The Talmud objected—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, it is a rabbinic law, so how could it be that she would ignore a rabbinic law?

[Speaker D] The Talmud objected—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everything was according to the words of the Sages.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So they answer that she acted according to the words of the Sages. I’m asking the underlying difficulty: what is the Talmud’s objection? What bothers it? She did it merely as a pious matter; it’s some enhancement of the commandment that she did not do—what’s the problem? The Talmud doesn’t say it’s an enhancement; it says it is an obligation. How could she not have done that obligation? Okay? But according to Tosafot Yeshanim, it is not an obligation; it is merely a pious matter. So the Kehillot Yaakov wants to claim the following. He says that according to Tosafot, the commandment of education is not only that the minor should perform commandments in his childhood—not just that the minor should perform commandments while a child. According to Tosafot there are two laws here. There is an obligation on the minor to perform commandments in his childhood, and there is an obligation on the father to educate him. Two laws of education. And what it says here, that “if it is rabbinic she would not have ignored it,” means that the rabbinic obligation on the minor to sit in the sukkah—she did not ignore that because really… “rabbinic obligation” means the rabbinic obligation on the minor to sit in the sukkah. About that they said: no, she was a righteous woman; all her deeds were only in accordance with the words of the Sages, and therefore yes—and then the question becomes why she did it. Okay? That is how he explains it. But for our purposes, what matters is that he understands Tosafot to mean that when Tosafot says there is an obligation on the minor to perform commandments, that’s not all; besides that there is also the regular law of education. But it seems to me—and here I veer a bit from the Kehillot Yaakov’s path, I think, or maybe this is what he means, I’m not sure—Tosafot does not mean that the second law is like Rashi’s law. According to Rashi, the law of education is an obligation on the father to educate his son, to accustom him to commandments, to teach him what he needs to do when he grows up. According to Tosafot’s law of education—where do these two laws of education come from? Where does that come from? We have not heard anywhere of two separate laws. What—two rabbinic enactments? Or is there some verse here? Where does this come from? Clearly these have to be two laws that complement one another, such that the law of education itself is made up of two components. What does that mean? There is an obligation on the minor himself to perform commandments by rabbinic law, an obligation on him himself—that’s what I said, education in the sense of beginning, not in the sense of educating him. That is an obligation on the minor himself. But the minor, after all, lacks legal understanding. What does it mean that he lacks legal understanding? It means there is no responsibility imposed on him; we do not place responsibility on him. The Pri Megadim even says that a minor is obligated in all commandments by Torah law, only that a minor lacks understanding, so if he does not do it he is under compulsion, and therefore exempt from punishments, but essentially he was obligated. The commandment of education says: you parents, you who do have legal understanding, make sure that the minor fulfills his obligation. But according to this, two things emerge. First, that the two aspects of the law of education are two aspects of one and the same thing. These are not just two separate laws; it is one matter. That obligation placed on the minor is the obligation whose responsibility is placed on the parents—to see that the minor actually does it. It is not—this is a continuation of it, an additional detail within the same obligation. It is not two commandments of education; it is the completion of the same commandment. And second, we see here that the obligation on the parents is not to educate him so he will know what to do when he grows up; it is simply to ensure that he performs his obligation now, while he is still a minor. Because on the minor himself I cannot rely to do it; he has no responsibility. So I place the responsibility on the parents. But the parents’ responsibility is not like Rashi’s, where he understands that the responsibility on the parents is so that when he becomes an adult he will know what to do. No. The Rabbis obligated the minor, rabbinically, to perform commandments, and they placed the responsibility for that on the parents. Responsibility for what? For making sure that while he is a minor he performs commandments. No, this is not educational responsibility in the sense of making sure he will know what to do when he grows up; it is responsibility to ensure that he fulfills his obligation now, as a minor.

[Speaker G] So according to that, the religious court too. What? If they see a minor who isn’t taking a lulav, the religious court would have to give him one. Exactly, exactly. Is there a proof for that? No, in Tosafot’s second approach that wouldn’t apply. What do you mean? How is that a proof?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a proof. There is a proof for that. That is the Kehillot Yaakov’s explanation of Tosafot. So I’m saying, include that explanation too.

[Speaker G] No, that about the parents we already know, don’t we?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From where do we know it? Most later authorities learn Tosafot differently—no. The minor has to do it; the parents help him, fine, but the obligation is on the minor. The Kehillot Yaakov’s novelty is that even according to Tosafot, where the obligation is on the minor, there is also an obligation on the parents. That is the Kehillot Yaakov’s novelty in Tosafot.

[Speaker C] And that comes out to mean that a minor has to work in order to acquire a lulav.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—or no, he can get help from his parents, he can ask his parents for a favor, that’s fine.

[Speaker C] But—

[Speaker D] In Tosafot’s second approach that doesn’t apply. What do you mean?

[Speaker E] That it’s only on the parents—it’s not, because he said that the religious court too—

[Speaker D] —has an obligation to educate him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if it really is an obligation to perform the commandments that are imposed on him himself, then the religious court too would in principle have to make sure that a person fulfills the commandments imposed on him.

[Speaker C] In Tosafot’s second approach, where the obligation is on the parents.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. But if the obligation on the parents is not of the type of educating him, but rather making sure he fulfills his obligations now, then on the face of it the religious court also has such an obligation—to make sure every Jew fulfills his obligations. What do you mean? The religious court has to make sure every person fulfills his obligations. Why not?

[Speaker D] The religious court is obligated regarding each person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. The religious court compels observance of commandments. If someone does not build a sukkah, they compel him until his soul departs.

[Speaker D] Circumcision is something else. Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Circumcision is not something else. It’s the same thing. The same thing. What’s the difference? Whoever does not fulfill his obligation, the religious court has to see to it that he fulfills it.

[Speaker D] In any case there are people performing a commandment—the father and the son.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they are not both performing a commandment. The son performs a commandment, and the father’s responsibility is that the son perform the commandment. The father is not himself fulfilling a commandment here. The father makes sure the child fulfills a commandment. I’ll give you an example. I’ll give you an example, look. I’ll give you an example—no. I’ll give you an example. Sefer HaChinukh says regarding the commandment of Hakhel—I mentioned this—that the commandment is communal; therefore women too. And women and children are obligated. It is a communal commandment, a commandment on the whole community. Now suppose most of the community came to Jerusalem, fine? The commandment was fulfilled. I stayed home. Did I neglect a positive commandment? Who—the father? I mean just one person, neither father nor son. Just a person who stayed home. Did I neglect a positive commandment? The community is commanded in this commandment, not I. The community fulfilled it. Most of the community was in Jerusalem, the commandment was fulfilled, right? And I can sit at home. I did not neglect a positive commandment. But Sefer HaChinukh writes at the end of the commandment that everyone who did not come neglected the positive commandment. So how can that be? It’s a communal commandment—understand, this is a strange thing. You have a positive commandment that was simultaneously fulfilled and neglected. Meaning, the one commanded in it fulfilled it, and someone else neglected that commandment even though it was fulfilled. How can there be neglect of a positive commandment that was fulfilled? The entity commanded in it is the community. How can I have neglected the commandment? The answer is—and I’ve mentioned this before, I don’t remember where—the community must fulfill the commandment, but if we exempted the individuals from responsibility,

[Speaker E] there would be no community.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then each individual would stay home and there would be no community. That’s the categorical imperative—I mentioned the categorical imperative.

[Speaker E] Like in the Temple, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In every communal commandment it will be like that. And then it means that if I exempt each and every individual from responsibility, then the community will not fulfill the commandment. So with communal commandments something very interesting happens. The one commanded in the commandment is the community, not any individual. But each individual can neglect the commandment. Why? Because the responsibility that the commandment be fulfilled is imposed on him. He does not fulfill the commandment when he comes. The one who fulfills the commandment is the community, of which he is of course a part, so he fulfilled it as part of the community. But as a private individual who came there, he did not fulfill the commandment. The fulfillment does not belong to him; the fulfillment belongs to the community. The neglect of the commandment can belong also to the individuals. And why? Exactly for the same reason as the parent and the minor. Where the entity obligated in the commandment is one that we suspect is not an entity capable of bearing responsibility for its fulfillment—like a minor, or like a community—the Torah places responsibility that it happen on another entity on whom direct responsibility can be imposed. The parent in relation to the minor, and the individuals in relation to the community. Each of the individuals must ensure that this commandment will be fulfilled. How is that responsibility expressed? If you did not do your part, you have neglected a positive commandment, even though the fulfillment is not your fulfillment; you are not the one commanded in the commandment. That is how the Torah expresses the responsibility involved. By the way, I think I mentioned this—there is a certain contradiction in the Mishnah Berurah, and in many places they discuss it, regarding leaving in the middle of the Torah reading, which is on the one hand a communal obligation, and on the other hand he says not to leave. Even though there are ten others who will read without him, I can leave. No—because although it is a communal obligation, the responsibility to fulfill it rests on every individual. Therefore if one person does not contribute his part, then he has neglected that commandment, even though if he stays there he does not fulfill it. The community fulfills it. He is not the factor that fulfills the commandment. Again?

[Speaker G] Someone who missed a weekly portion—there are people who come from abroad to the Land of Israel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying if he was compelled, then there is no problem. But if he is part of the community already, or if he is someone who potentially ought to be there, like someone who could ascend for Hakhel, then the obligation rests on him, and if he did not do it he neglected the positive commandment, yes.

[Speaker C] Someone who comes late to prayer, then he doesn’t need to hear it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he came late to prayer and the Torah reading was at the beginning, or he had to leave early, whatever. So that is exactly the question. The Mishnah Berurah says not to leave.

[Speaker G] What does it mean that it’s communal? Once you say it’s communal, does every individual have to fulfill every part, or only because it’s… for example like I said, if he missed a weekly portion. Suppose he comes sometimes from abroad and the portions are not the same. You come from abroad, you missed a portion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He cannot fulfill it even if he wants to. He cannot, even if he wants to make it up.

[Speaker G] For example there’s a story about Rabbi Ovadia, that he got the first aliyah and then read the whole portion…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not relevant. It’s… certainly not. After all, there is no community obligated in that. You have to do your part if you are part of a community and the community is obligated. That’s all. I’m claiming—my claim is that this is a communal obligation, not a personal obligation. I decide that investigation in favor of that side: it is a communal obligation. I’m just claiming that the practical consequence people bring—that if it is a communal obligation each person can leave—is wrong. Even if it is a communal obligation, an individual cannot leave.

[Speaker D] Exactly. You can only neglect it, not fulfill it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fulfill it, you can only do within the framework of the community. Someone who left in the middle of the Torah reading for some reason and knew…

[Speaker D] If you were compelled, then fine… but the whole community didn’t leave…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you neglected the commandment.

[Speaker D] I neglected it, but the community itself fulfilled it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The community fulfilled it, and you neglected it. Exactly like Hakhel. The community fulfilled the commandment. Right, exactly like Hakhel. At Hakhel most of the community… listen to what I’m saying. Most of the community was in Jerusalem and performed the commandment of Hakhel. I stayed home and neglected a positive commandment, says Sefer HaChinukh. How? The commandment was fulfilled. It is imposed on the community and the community was there; most of the community was there. In what sense did I neglect the commandment? We see that when the commandment is communal… then every private individual, even though he is not the one commanded, still has to do his part; he is responsible that the community fulfill it. If he did not do that, he has neglected the positive commandment, even though the commandment was fulfilled. The same thing here. So I say the same thing regarding parents and minors. It’s not just two separate laws of education. The minor has no responsibility, like a community—he can’t bear responsibility; you cannot place responsibility on him. True, he has an obligation to fulfill. Who is responsible to see that the minor does it? His parents—father or mother, depending on the different views—but that is the responsibility imposed on them. It is not that they are fulfilling a commandment in this regard; he is the one fulfilling the commandment. The parents are responsible to see that he does it. And therefore I say that even according to Tosafot, as explained by the Kehillot Yaakov, where there is an obligation on the father that his son fulfill the commandment, that is not Rashi’s law. Rashi’s law is that the obligation on the father is to educate the child, to teach him what to do when he grows up. Tosafot’s law—the understanding of Tosafot—is that the obligation on the father is to make sure the child does what he is obligated to do now, not to worry about what he will do when he grows up. And we’ll see implications of that later.

[Speaker D] I’ll read it now, with your permission, just a bit farther, because I’m putting money into the half-shekel fund. Private money that I took a vow—I donated this into that box of money. You didn’t vow; the half-shekel—so the half-shekel is collected in… no, communal funds, meaning, in order to give the… You didn’t vow; everyone has to give a half-shekel, it’s a personal commandment, not a communal one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a vow, but—

[Speaker D] If I first of all, like the community, communal funds.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After that, they have to be given properly, as the Talmud says.

[Speaker D] Private money, a vow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not a vow! You are giving the half-shekel.

[Speaker D] The money itself that I put into such a…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s not a vow! There is a commandment of half-shekel on each individual to put it there.

[Speaker D] And I stipulated concerning this money that no one may derive benefit from it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Then you didn’t give it. What? Then you didn’t give it!

[Speaker D] Ah, that’s it—I didn’t give it, I just put it inside.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You put it inside; you could also have put a flowerpot inside. Put decorations in there too. What does that have to do with anything? You need to put in a half-shekel with which public offerings will be bought. If you put in a half-shekel from which you prohibited benefit to the public, you did not put in a half-shekel. Okay, I see I need to stop here, so I’ll complete this next time, and then we’ll move on to the prohibitions of eating and drinking, which are really the main discussion—that will be in the final sessions. Thank you very much.