Study and Halakhic Rulings – Lesson 1
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Opening the series: study, halakhic ruling, and first-order and second-order halakhic ruling
- Rashi’s first comment on the Torah, the book of Genesis, and the Book of the Upright
- Rabbi Yitzhak’s assumption: the Torah as essentially halakhic
- Nefesh HaChayim, Gate 4: cleaving, Jewish law, and God’s will versus His speech
- Fear of Heaven as preparation for study, and Jewish law as God’s will
- Expectation, ethics, and going beyond the letter of the law versus halakhic command
- Truth, will, and speech: aggadic literature, dispute, and “these and those”
- The Torah as core and periphery: God’s will, God’s word, and views that are not the Jewish law
- Studying Jewish law is not just a commandment-enabler: cleaving and “great is study, for it leads to action”
- Rabbi Israel Salanter: the rebellious son, “study and receive reward,” and the blessing over Torah
- Women and the blessing over Torah, and defining Torah study versus learning in order to know what to do
- For its own sake, intention, and the words of Nefesh HaChayim on preparation before study
- Comments on “these and those,” Rabbi Gedaliah Nadel, and reasons versus decision
- Conclusion as an introduction to what follows
Summary
General Overview
The lecture opens a series on the relationship between study and halakhic ruling, with the goal of later arriving at a distinction between first-order and second-order halakhic ruling. At this stage, the discussion is framed through the relationship between Torah and Jewish law. The Rabbi reads Rashi’s first comment on the Torah and Rabbi Yitzhak’s statement as saying that the essence of the Torah is Jewish law, and develops, with the help of Nefesh HaChayim by Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, a distinction between “God’s will” as expressed in halakhic command and “His speech,” which includes aggadic literature and the other parts of Torah. The Rabbi emphasizes that studying Jewish law is not merely a tool for knowing what to do, but an intrinsic value of cleaving to God, and grounds this through the passage of the rebellious son according to Rabbi Israel Salanter, through “great is study, for it leads to action,” and through a discussion of the blessings over Torah and women’s obligation.
Opening the series: study, halakhic ruling, and first-order and second-order halakhic ruling
The Rabbi presents the series as dealing with the relationship between study and halakhic ruling, not with each one separately, and sets as a goal reaching a distinction between first-order and second-order halakhic ruling. He formulates the question of how free the halakhic decisor is, and how much he must adhere to precedents—and to which precedents—and emphasizes that it will take time before he reaches a full formulation of the various possibilities.
Rashi’s first comment on the Torah, the book of Genesis, and the Book of the Upright
The Rabbi brings Rabbi Yitzhak’s question in Rashi: why didn’t the Torah begin with “This month shall be for you,” which is the first commandment that Israel as a collective was commanded, and he cites Rashi’s answer, “He declared to His people the power of His works, to give them the inheritance of nations,” in order to ground a claim directed toward the nations. The Rabbi argues that on its face, Rashi’s answer seems to explain only the creation narrative, but suggests that the answer hints at a broader explanation: “and gave it to whomever was upright in His eyes” is connected to “the Book of the Upright,” and to the fact that Genesis describes the patriarchs as a model of natural inner uprightness. He explains that according to this, Genesis answers the value-based claim of why the land is given specifically to Israel, because the book presents the foundations of the uprightness of the patriarchs and the people, and not only the Creator’s legal ownership of the land.
Rabbi Yitzhak’s assumption: the Torah as essentially halakhic
The Rabbi emphasizes that the main point in Rashi is the question more than the answer, because the question assumes that the Torah should have begun with the first commandment. He concludes that the assumption is that in its essence the Torah is Jewish law—that is, practical instructions and commands—and that Torah, from the root meaning “instruction,” means instruction in Jewish law. He says that this basic assumption also bears on all parts of Torah that are not halakhic, raising the question of why they exist, and explains that Rashi opens his commentary this way in order to teach what “Torah” is as a fundamental category, not just to solve a local difficulty about Genesis.
Nefesh HaChayim, Gate 4: cleaving, Jewish law, and God’s will versus His speech
The Rabbi presents Nefesh HaChayim as the book of Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, disciple of the Vilna Gaon and founder of the Volozhin yeshiva, written in opposition to principles of Hasidism even without mentioning it explicitly, and notes a surprising similarity in its mode of thought to the book of Tanya, though with differences in nuance. He describes Rabbi Chaim’s polemic against the Hasidic conception that Torah study is a means to attain an experience of cleaving to God, and interprets Rabbi Chaim’s claim that Torah study is itself cleaving to God as a reality that does not depend on experience or feeling. The Rabbi brings Rabbi Chaim’s proof from the midrash that King David asked that Psalms be considered like “plagues and tents,” and emphasizes the “Lithuanian twist” Rabbi Chaim adds: it is never stated whether the Holy One, blessed be He, granted the request.
Fear of Heaven as preparation for study, and Jewish law as God’s will
The Rabbi reads in Nefesh HaChayim that it is fitting for a person to pause briefly before study in fear of God and purity of heart, and to confess his sins so that his Torah will be holy and pure, and presents this as preparation for study rather than an independent goal. He emphasizes Rabbi Chaim’s phrase “to cleave… to the word of God—that is Jewish law,” and explains that Rabbi Chaim focuses the cleaving specifically on Jewish law because the Zohar says, “He, blessed be He, and His will are one.” The Rabbi defines Jewish law as God’s will in the sense of binding command, and distinguishes this from non-halakhic parts that teach values or lessons but are not “will” in the commanding sense, even if one can derive expectations and a moral path from them.
Expectation, ethics, and going beyond the letter of the law versus halakhic command
The Rabbi sharpens the distinction between halakhic command and what the Holy One, blessed be He, “expects” without commanding, and places ethics, “beyond the letter of the law,” “a pious measure,” and “to satisfy Heaven” in extra-halakhic categories. He says that “and you shall do what is upright and good” is not counted by those who enumerate the commandments and therefore is an expectation rather than a commandment, and distinguishes it from “and you shall love your fellow as yourself,” which is a commandment. He explains that going beyond the letter of the law always involves giving up rights, and brings examples such as “we compel against the trait of Sodom,” “the law of the neighboring field owner,” and “this one benefits while that one does not lose,” to show that even when there is no monetary loss there is still an infringement of right, and the duty there is understood as a required waiver of one’s right, not merely nice treatment of the other.
Truth, will, and speech: aggadic literature, dispute, and “these and those”
The Rabbi explains that in aggadic literature a person cleaves to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, because the whole Torah was said to Moses at Sinai, though not necessarily to His will, and presents two “channels” of cleaving: through His will in Jewish law and through His speech in the rest of Torah. He cites the passage in tractate Gittin about the concubine at Gibeah, where the Holy One, blessed be He, says, “Evyatar My son says thus, Yonatan My son says thus,” and emphasizes that the phrase “these and those are the words of the living God” is said there in an aggadic context and also in tractate Eruvin in a halakhic context, but he interprets it to mean not that both sides are correct, but that both are “the words of God” in the sense of God’s speech. He connects this to the Ritva’s question in Eruvin 13 and develops a monistic position according to which in Jewish law there is one truth, and in a dispute one side is right and one side is mistaken, while the reasons can both be sound and the decision concerns their weight and priority. He distinguishes between truth and God’s will and argues that truth is a necessary condition for God’s will but not a sufficient one, and that God’s will in this sense is commanded halakhic truth.
The Torah as core and periphery: God’s will, God’s word, and views that are not the Jewish law
The Rabbi concludes that within the concept of Torah there is a core, which is Jewish law—that is, the commands that are God’s will—and around it a periphery, which is God’s word: moral and historical parts, aggadic literature, and even halakhic views that are incorrect but are stated within the framework of study. He says that all these receive the status of Torah so that engaging in them will not be considered neglect of Torah study, but they are “second-class Torah” relative to the core of God’s will, and he describes this as a “consolation prize” compared with “Torah in the full sense,” which is God’s will.
Studying Jewish law is not just a commandment-enabler: cleaving and “great is study, for it leads to action”
The Rabbi warns against the mistaken conclusion that if the essence of Torah is Jewish law, then the purpose of study is action, and rejects the view that Torah study is only a commandment-enabler in order to know what to do. Following Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, he interprets the study of Jewish law as cleaving to God through the very engagement with God’s will, even when the study concerns defining what is permitted and prohibited, liable and exempt. He interprets “great is study, for it leads to action” to mean that the greatness of study lies in its being study that ends in a practical conclusion, not that action is the goal and study only the means, and notes that Rashi there writes “apparently action is greater,” while our version reads “study is greater.”
Rabbi Israel Salanter: the rebellious son, “study and receive reward,” and the blessing over Torah
The Rabbi cites Rabbi Israel Salanter’s essay “Chok U’Mishpat” in Or Yisrael on the Talmudic statement that the rebellious and wayward son “never was and never will be,” and on the question “then why was it written? Study it and receive reward.” He says in Rabbi Israel Salanter’s name that the passage was not written in order to add more learning material, but to teach the principle of “study and receive reward”—that Torah study has intrinsic value even when there is no possibility of practical fulfillment. He also cites, in Rabbi Israel Salanter’s name, the Talmudic statement that the sons of Torah scholars often do not become Torah scholars because “they did not recite the blessing over the Torah first,” and explains his interpretation that someone who thinks study is only a commandment-enabler does not bless, because one does not make a blessing over commandment-enablers; and from that it follows that he “is not learning Torah correctly.”
Women and the blessing over Torah, and defining Torah study versus learning in order to know what to do
The Rabbi cites the ruling of the Shulchan Arukh that women are obligated in the blessing over Torah, and the question of the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah how this fits with women’s exemption from the commandment of Torah study, and their answer that women study the laws relevant to them. He concludes from this answer that learning in order to know what to do is not the commandment of Torah study, because women are obligated in it even though they are exempt from Torah study, and defines the commandment of Torah study as learning for the sake of learning, not for the sake of knowing the practical action. He prefaces this by saying that studying the Kitzur Shulchan Arukh in order to know practical Jewish law is important, but is not Torah study in its fuller sense, whereas Torah study means studying a passage properly; and he adds that if the learner’s intention in studying the Kitzur Shulchan Arukh is also to learn Torah as such, there may be some fulfillment of Torah study in it.
For its own sake, intention, and the words of Nefesh HaChayim on preparation before study
The Rabbi explains that the demand in Nefesh HaChayim for preparation of fear of Heaven before study is aimed at improving the study and turning it into study for its own sake, similar to the principle that commandments require intention, and he notes that in Torah study the concept of intention is especially close to the concept of learning for its own sake. He cites the words of Nefesh HaChayim in the name of the Rosh in tractate Nedarim, “Do things for the sake of their Maker, and speak of them for their own sake,” and interprets Torah study for its own sake as for the sake of Torah itself, while emphasizing that study not connected to the foundation of serving God is deficient in level even though it still has some value.
Comments on “these and those,” Rabbi Gedaliah Nadel, and reasons versus decision
The Rabbi affirms something brought in the name of Rabbi Gedaliah Nadel, that “these and those are the words of the living God” refers to the fact that both sides have valid reasons, but insists that the halakhic decision is one, and therefore only one side is correct in the final analysis. He illustrates this with the question of weighing taste against health and clarifies that the dispute is not about the truth of the reasons but about their priority, and in the priority itself one side is correct.
Conclusion as an introduction to what follows
The Rabbi clarifies that everything said here is only an introduction to the future discussion about study versus halakhic ruling, and concludes by saying that the discussion will continue from the framework established here: Jewish law as God’s will, Torah as His speech, and study as an intrinsic value of cleaving to God.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, hello. Today we’re starting a new series: study and halakhic ruling. The relationship between them—not about study on its own and halakhic ruling on its own, but about the relationship between the two. But of course, the relationship between these two things does require us to deal a bit with each one separately as well, because in the end my main goal is to get to the distinction—yes, one I’ve already dealt with quite a bit on the website, also in the trilogy—the distinction between first-order halakhic ruling and second-order halakhic ruling. Meaning, to what extent the halakhic decisor is really free, and to what extent he has to stick to precedents, and to which precedents. He has to, whether it’s worthwhile, not worthwhile—in other words, obviously you can formulate several different options here, but it’ll still take some time before we get there. I want to begin with some initial definitions, maybe of the framework of the discussion. And at the first stage I want to say a bit about the relationship between Torah and Jewish law. So maybe I’ll start—here and there I’ve touched on these things in previous contexts—I want to start with Rashi’s first comment on the Torah. Rashi’s first comment on the Torah brings Rabbi Yitzhak’s question: why didn’t the Torah begin with “This month shall be for you the first of the months”? And why should it begin there? Because “This month shall be for you”—that is, the commandment of sanctifying the month—that’s the first commandment Israel were commanded in, at least as a collective. There’s circumcision and so on, all that is well known, but the first commandment we were commanded as a collective is “This month shall be for you.” And therefore Rashi asks—or Rabbi Yitzhak asks—why didn’t the Torah begin there? Why does it begin with Genesis? So Rashi’s answer is: “He declared to His people the power of His works, to give them the inheritance of nations.” The Holy One, blessed be He, created the land, and therefore He can give it to whomever is upright in His eyes. In other words, we needed the whole creation narrative and the book of Genesis and so on, in order to explain why the Holy One, blessed be He, is the owner and why He can give the land to whomever He decides. So if the nations come and claim against us what we’re doing here and so on—it sounds a bit timely—then we’ll have an answer. I’m sure Ikhs al-Nuar will throw up his hands the moment he reads this Rashi; he’ll understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the owner, and He gave it to us, and everything is fine. So that’s Rashi.
[Speaker C] The truth is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that what’s written here, sorry, the answer Rashi gives requires explanation. Because on the face of it, it seems that Rashi is explaining only the appearance of the creation narrative—that is, the first chapters of Genesis—and that’s it. Since in order to show that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the land and is the owner, it’s enough to write that. But the question was about a Torah-and-a-quarter—up to the portion of Bo. So we still lack an explanation for why basically the Torah includes all of Genesis aside from, say, the first two chapters, and the beginning of Exodus.
[Speaker D] Because once he started, he just keeps going. What? Because once he started, he just keeps going and telling the story. He continues.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He begins, he says the Holy One, blessed be He, created the heavens and the earth; after such-and-such years the people of Israel went down to Egypt; the Holy One, blessed be He, took them out, commanded them about sanctifying the month, the giving of the Torah, and then we move on. So Rashi’s answer actually leaves most—almost all—of Genesis and the beginning of Exodus unexplained; it explains the first two chapters. It seems to me that there’s a hint in Rashi’s words to a fuller answer, because Rashi says that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the land, and created it and gave it to whomever was upright in His eyes. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, gave the land to whoever was upright in His eyes. Now that of course immediately sounds familiar. One of the names of Genesis in the words of the Sages is the Book of the Upright. And the Netziv, in the introduction to his commentary, says it’s called the Book of the Upright because it is the book of the upright ones. Meaning, Genesis describes the conduct of the patriarchs, which is supposed to be some kind of model for upright conduct. What does upright mean? I mean some kind of—Rav Kook expands on this more—a kind of straight and conquering uprightness; he has this pair of concepts in which “upright” means someone who behaves naturally in the right way. He doesn’t need outside instructions, he doesn’t need commands. He has some inner uprightness that guides him in the right direction. And therefore Genesis basically—
[Speaker A] Like common sense? What? Like a kind of common sense that’s naturally embedded in a person?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Straight moral common sense—that’s basically the meaning of the phrase “the Book of the Upright.” So if that’s the case, Genesis teaches us—or describes for us—that the patriarchs were upright and conducted themselves uprightly. And if so, it seems to me—I think at least—that that’s what Rashi is really hinting at in his answer. Rashi’s answer really does explain the whole Torah-and-a-quarter, not just the first two chapters. The first two chapters describe the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world. He also created the land, of course, and therefore He is the owner; He can give it to whomever He wants. But that still seems arbitrary. True, He’s the owner and can give it to whomever He wants—but why? Why are You giving it specifically to the people of Israel? The moral claim—not the legal one—against the Holy One, blessed be He, would still remain. Meaning, legally You’re the owner, okay. But morally or in terms of values, why are You deciding to favor them over other nations? And the rest of the book comes to answer that—the book of Genesis—which shows us why the Holy One, blessed be He, chose to give it specifically to this people, because it has foundations of uprightness. That’s the claim, basically. I think that’s the meaning of Rashi’s answer, and therefore it really answers the whole question and not only the first two chapters. Fine, so that was just in parentheses. But what’s interesting in this question—and I’ve already mentioned this more than once—what’s interesting in this Rashi is much more the question than the answer. Let’s say, with the answer I have a lot—quite a lot—to argue about. But the question is an interesting question. I don’t argue with the question. It’s an excellent question. Why? Because it’s excellent in the sense that it teaches us, let’s put it that way: what exactly is the assumption behind the question? The assumption behind the question is that the Torah should have begun with the first commandment. But if I ask myself why—meaning, okay, I understand that this is the first commandment, but why do you assume the book should have begun with the first commandment? Why do you think that the whole first part is unnecessary because it comes before the commandment, because it’s not command-oriented, it’s not halakhic? You can see in Rabbi Yitzhak in Rashi that he really wants to say that in its essence, Torah is Jewish law. Jewish law. The meaning—the essential part of Torah—is the commandments, the commands; that’s basically what Torah ought to have been. Torah from the root of instruction—it’s instruction in Jewish law, meaning practical instruction. So basically the Torah should have contained only Jewish law, and therefore in principle the question isn’t really only about the first Torah-and-a-quarter but about all the parts of Torah that are not halakhic parts. Why are they there? And that interesting assumption basically tells us something about what Torah is. Torah basically comes to instruct us what to do. Basically the commands are the essence of Torah. Now okay, there are explanations for why the Torah also brings the other parts, but as a starting point, Torah is basically Jewish law. That is the meaning, the core, let’s say, of the concept of Torah. Now—of course, once the other parts are included too, then they too are part of Torah. There are no differences in sanctity between the various parts of Torah. But there is some statement here, and not for nothing, I think, that Rashi puts this at the beginning of his commentary on the Torah, because this statement is not just some question about Genesis. It comes to teach us what Torah is. It’s not for nothing that it appears at the beginning of Rashi’s commentary on the Torah. And Rashi wants to tell us—and I think the question teaches no less than the answer. The answer explains to us why we need Genesis, but the question teaches us what Torah is in general. And therefore I think the lesson of the question is, in my eyes, much more significant than the lesson that emerges from the answer. Maybe you can see an expression of that distinction in the book Nefesh HaChayim—I’ve mentioned this too already.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, does the Rabbi understand, in the conclusion, that Torah also comes to instruct us in moral ways, or is that not connected?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, we see that it does. Okay. In Nefesh HaChayim, Gate 4, he writes—Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, maybe just as an introduction for those who don’t know: Nefesh HaChayim is a book by Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, disciple of the Vilna Gaon, the father of the Lithuanian yeshiva world, because he founded the Volozhin yeshiva. And the book is basically intended to deal with Hasidism. He doesn’t really mention it by name explicitly, but the book is basically meant to grapple with the principles of Hasidism, to disagree with them. I’ve already mentioned more than once that, quite surprisingly, the similarity between the content of this book—or the mode of thought it describes—and, say, the book of Tanya, is surprising. Because as two opponents on opposite sides of the divide, I would have expected two totally different worlds, but no—it’s very, very similar. The differences are differences of nuance. In any case, in Gate 4 Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin talks about Torah. What is Torah? And I want to read chapter 6. There’s reason to read everything, but for our purposes we’ll suffice with chapter 6. And he says this: basically his claim—maybe I’ll preface a little—Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin before this chapter talks about the Hasidic view that says Torah study comes in order to attain cleaving. Meaning, the goal of study is the experience of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, which is basically the main thing. And it is with that Hasidic claim that Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin deals in Gate 4. And he wants to argue that that’s not correct; he even has a few proofs for it. For example, he brings—and this is especially amusing—that midrash where King David asked the Holy One, blessed be He, that the book of Psalms be considered in His eyes like studying the laws of leprosy and tent impurity. So Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin says: you can see from this that if I had thought Torah study is about attaining the experience of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, then I would have expected them to ask that the laws of leprosy and tent impurity be like Psalms. Psalms is perhaps the purest expression of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. If that were the goal of Torah study, the book of Psalms would be the core of Torah, and with leprosy and tent impurity we’d need analysis to know why that is even Torah—what kind of experiences does it produce? You’d have needed to ask that that too be considered Torah. But King David asks the opposite. He asks that Psalms also be considered like leprosy and tent impurity. And Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin adds—a Lithuanian pilpul—Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin adds: and it also doesn’t say what the Holy One, blessed be He, answered him. Did the Holy One, blessed be He, agree? Meaning, the fact that King David asks is very nice, but the question is whether the Holy One, blessed be He, agreed. In other words, it could be that even in the end the Holy One, blessed be He, did not grant the request, and in fact Psalms is not like leprosy and tent impurity. The fact that King David asked—okay, he asked. But who says the Holy One, blessed be He, was appeased? Fine, that’s a kind of Lithuanian twist. In any case, back to our matter: Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin wants to say that—the goal, sorry, not the goal of Torah study—Torah study is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. It is not a means in order to reach an experience of cleaving; rather, study itself is cleaving. It itself is cleaving. Meaning, when you engage in Torah, then by that very fact, by the very engagement, you are cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. This is not about an experience; it is not a feeling and not an experience; it is a reality. Meaning, if you engage in Torah, then by that very fact you are in a state in which you are cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. It doesn’t matter if you’re not thinking about it at all, and not feeling it, and not having experiences, and none of that—you are cleaving to Him simply by virtue of the fact that you are engaged in His words, yes, you are engaged in the Torah that He said or that He gave us. In that sense this is a description of a state: Torah is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. It is not a means to create an experience of cleaving, as they claim in Hasidism. Okay, that’s basically Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin’s fundamental claim. Now that’s the necessary background. Let’s move now to what he writes in chapter 6. I summarized what came earlier in this gate up to chapter 6. “This, in truth, is the true path, which He, blessed be His Name, chose: that whenever a person prepares himself to study, it is fitting for him to sit quietly before he begins, at least for a short time”—ignore the punctuation marks here completely, I have no idea who put them in—“at least for a short time, in pure fear of God, in purity of heart, to confess his sin from the depths of his heart, so that his Torah will be holy and pure.” Meaning, his discussion is how much a person should engage in matters of fear of Heaven, or maybe just forget it—go study Torah. Why are you neglecting Torah with matters of fear of Heaven? This is somewhat reminiscent of the Musar controversy. The Musar controversy basically dealt with the question not only of whether the study of ethics is important, but whether the study of ethics is Torah at all. I think people don’t really understand this. The essence of the controversy around Musar is not only the question whether ethics is important, but whether ethics is Torah at all. And so Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin here is basically relating, in one way or another, to the question of how much—or whether at all—a person should engage in fear of Heaven; should one study ethics? So he says yes: a short time you should devote to fear of God in purity of heart, to confess his sin a little before you study, and after that go learn, “so that his Torah will be holy and pure.” And now I’m reading from here: “And he should intend to cleave through his study to Him in the Torah”—to Him, to the Holy One, blessed be He. Okay, “that is, to cleave with all his powers to the word of God—this is Jewish law. And through this he is literally cleaving to Him, blessed be He, as it were, because He, blessed be He, and His will are one, as written in the Zohar. And every law and ruling from the holy Torah is His will, blessed be He, for His will decreed that the law be thus: valid or invalid, impure or pure, forbidden or permitted, liable or exempt.” Up to here—let’s stop here for a moment. What is he saying? Basically, the goal of fear of Heaven, of engaging at the beginning in fear of Heaven, purity of heart, confessing one’s sin and so on, basically all of that too is meant to prepare the study. It certainly is not a goal; at most it’s a means, because to Him you are supposed to cleave when you then move on to study, which is the main thing. This is, let’s call it, along the lines of “commandments require intention” or something like that. So that the study will be study for its own sake, first you need to devote a little to fear of God and to cleaving and to confessing your sin and so on, but all of that is only in order to turn the study into more meaningful study. In the end, the core is study. Now he says—notice this—he says: “to cleave with all his powers to the word of God—this is Jewish law.” Why Jewish law? Torah—everything that is the word of God is Torah. We already know that the Torah doesn’t contain only laws; Rashi explained that to us, right? The Torah also has parts that are not halakhic. So why does he focus his thesis on “the word of God—this is Jewish law”? So he says: because through this, “he cleaves literally to Him, blessed be He, as it were.” Why? “Because He, blessed be He, and His will are one,” as written in the Zohar. The Zohar says that the Holy One, blessed be He, and His will are one, meaning they are essentially one thing. Yes, this is the mirror-image of the Jewish holy trinity, so to speak. The idea of the trinity is of course a Jewish idea. “The Holy One, blessed be He, Israel, and the Torah are one.” Yes, that’s the trinity: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And he says that since the Holy One, blessed be He, and His will are one, then to engage in the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is basically to cleave to Him. Now notice: what is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He? The will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is not Torah. The will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is Jewish law. Not all Torah is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. The whole Torah has the sanctity of sacred scripture, of the word of God, however you want to call it. But God’s will is only the Jewish law. Why? Because what is the difference between the halakhic part of Torah and the other part of Torah—narratives, aggadic material, whatever you want to call it, the non-halakhic part of Torah? The difference is that in the halakhic part, the Holy One, blessed be He, expresses His wishes. What He wants us to do or not do. Those are His wishes. Jewish law is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He—that is the definition of Jewish law. The other parts of Torah come to teach us all kinds of lessons, or history, or ethical lessons of one sort or another, but they are not wishes of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the sense that Jewish law is will. I want to sharpen this a little. Obviously, even from the non-halakhic parts you can derive lessons, practical lessons too—what to do, what not to do, yes? “And the man Moses was very humble, more than any person on the face of the earth.” So I understand from that verse that it is proper to be humble, right? That’s pretty clear. If the Torah praises Moses for being humble, I assume humility is a worthy trait. Yes, that’s clear. Does that mean the verse “And the man Moses was very humble, more than any person on the face of the earth” is the will of God? The answer is no. Why? Obviously the Holy One, blessed be He, wants me to be humble, but God’s will in the sense he is talking about here, in the sense of Jewish law, is God’s will as expressed in command. Not things that I learn indirectly about what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects of me. So now I’ll call these the expectations of the Holy One, blessed be He, from us, and His wishes from us. His wishes are expressed by command. He commands us what He wants us to do or not do, and that is Jewish law. The rest of Torah, of course, contains lessons; you can perhaps learn things from it, though in my opinion not really all that much, but let’s leave that discussion aside for now. You can learn certain lessons from it that in the end will affect the way we behave even on the practical level. But when we do that, we are not fulfilling a command of the Holy One, blessed be He; we are doing something proper, but we are not fulfilling a command. And Jewish law is the collection of commands of the Holy One, blessed be He. Therefore, for example, one can learn from every verse in the Torah things that can guide us in our practical lives, but that does not turn all Torah into Jewish law. Jewish law is those things we are commanded in. Therefore, for example, there are things that are beyond the letter of the law, there are things that are ethics, there are things that are—I don’t know—all kinds of other things. All these things are things the Holy One, blessed be He, expects us to act in accordance with, but He did not command us in them. And when we do them, we are not fulfilling a command, but responding to an expectation. Those are two different things. And command is what defines Jewish law. Jewish law is the collection of the commands of the Holy One, blessed be He. That is what is called Jewish law. And when we study “the word of God—this is Jewish law,” only then are we engaged in God’s will, and He and His will are one. And therefore, engaging in Jewish law is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. In Jewish law—not in Torah, at least for now.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, “and you shall do what is upright and good”—how is that defined?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And you shall do what is upright and good” is not counted by any enumerator of the commandments as a commandment.
[Speaker C] So that’s not considered a command?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. “And you shall do what is upright and good” is an expectation; it’s not a commandment.
[Speaker C] And “you shall love your fellow as yourself,” that’s also something—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. “You shall love your fellow as yourself” is a commandment.
[Speaker C] And if there’s, say—as the Rabbi mentioned several times—about a lost object, where the Sages say that even if the owner despaired, you still have to return it because of “and you shall do what is upright and good.” Yes, but why not “you shall love your fellow as yourself” if it’s halakhic? No—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand.
[Speaker C] If the command of “you shall love your fellow as yourself” is a halakhic command, then why in returning a lost object, even if the owner despaired, don’t I have to return it because of “you shall love your fellow as yourself”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, who says not? Maybe you do. But I think it’s hard to say that “you shall love your fellow as yourself” means that I’m supposed to give up my own property. Why should I give up my property? A lost object—after despair—it belongs to me. Now, true, he is upset, fine, but I’ll also be upset if I have to give it to him. Why is his blood redder than mine? So there would certainly be room to say that from “you shall love your fellow as yourself” I would not infer that one has to return a lost object after despair.
[Speaker C] But “and you shall do what is upright and good,” yes. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. “And you shall do what is upright and good,” “so that you may walk in the way of good people”—there are a few verses brought in that context, in such contexts. And yes, from them we understand that we are indeed required also to act beyond the letter of the law. When one acts beyond the letter of the law, it always involves some relinquishing of my rights. That’s what beyond the letter of the law means, as opposed to “you shall love your fellow as yourself.” In “you shall love your fellow as yourself” I’m not giving up anything of my own. I’m just treating the other person nicely, respecting him, loving him, all fine—but I’m not giving up any right of mine. But with beyond the letter of the law, a pious measure, all these things, it always involves giving up my right. Think about the passage in tractate Bava Batra about the trait of Sodom—“we compel against the trait of Sodom,” first chapter of Bava Batra there, page 9, page 10—what is “we compel against the trait of Sodom”? We compel against the trait of Sodom, for example, in the law of the neighboring field owner. Okay, so there are two brothers dividing an inheritance between them, and one of the brothers has a field adjacent to their father’s field. Now we’re dividing their father’s inheritance between them; in principle they should cast lots as to which half of the father’s field each one gets. But the one who has a field next to the father’s field very much wants the half of the father’s field that is next to his field, because then he can plow them together; it’s more convenient for him to work. And for me it doesn’t matter—what do I care whether it’s this half or that half, assuming both halves are equal in value. So what do I care? That’s almost by definition, because we always divide it so the values are equal—that’s how inheritance division among brothers works. So if that’s the case, what do I care to give it to him? So the Talmud indeed says that we compel against the trait of Sodom; the law of the neighboring field owner is part of the law of compelling against the trait of Sodom; and they compel me to give him the half adjacent to his field. But notice: in principle, according to strict law, it was my right not to give it. I want to insist. I want a lottery. I want a lottery. The moment you take that half, you infringe my rights. Never mind that maybe I didn’t lose money, but say that all the same I prefer that half for some reason. That’s my right, no? I’m allowed to demand a lottery. Equal division among brothers is always done by lottery. They require me to give up my right to a lottery and give the other his half. “This one benefits and that one does not lose”—Tosafot also connects that to compelling against the trait of Sodom. Pnei Yehoshua in tractate Bava Kamma, Tosafot in tractate Bava Batra, connect it to compelling against the trait of Sodom. Why? What is “this one benefits and that one does not lose”? Someone enters my courtyard. The courtyard is not for rent. Meaning, it isn’t intended to be rented out. Okay, so I’m not losing anything from the fact that he lives in my courtyard. I wouldn’t have rented it out anyway; I didn’t lose money because of it. So what do you care? Let him. It’s the trait of Sodom not to let him. But the courtyard is mine. Meaning, in terms of my rights, of course I’m allowed to tell him: no, I don’t agree, don’t enter my courtyard. Therefore the trait of Sodom requires me to waive my rights when? In a case where the other profits and I do not lose—this one benefits and that one does not lose. But “this one benefits and that one does not lose” doesn’t mean my rights were not infringed. My rights are infringed. It’s just that I won’t lose money from it, so what do you care if you give it up? Okay, that’s as opposed to “you shall love your fellow as yourself,” which I think doesn’t talk about injury to my rights; it talks about treating the other person well.
[Speaker F] Rabbi, Rabbi, still—what exactly is the difference between Jewish law and beyond the letter of the law? After all, the Rabbi said that clearly this is God’s will. And if I asked the Holy One, blessed be He, He would say yes, the truth is I do expect you to do it; it would give Me great satisfaction if you did. So I say, listen, I’m not obligated, I have rights, I’m not obligated according to the letter of the law, I’m ignoring Your will and moving on. Does that sound reasonable?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You won’t be considered righteous, but fine—if you’re not obligated according to Jewish law, then you’re not obligated.
[Speaker F] But I mean in terms of serving God that’s involved here. The Holy One, blessed be He, says: I want—if we were privileged with prophecy and could ask Him, He would say: I would very much want it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I say: I’m blowing it off.
[Speaker F] I mean, that’s the difference?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The difference is whether you do it because you want to serve God, or whether you do it because you are obligated. The second is Jewish law, and the first is not Jewish law. Yes, the example I always bring in this context—and some of you have surely heard me say this several times—is running a red light. Suppose the Knesset had not legislated the prohibition against going through a red light, okay? But still, traffic operated in such a way that you go on green and stop on red. Meaning, it is dangerous to go through a red light. Dangerous for me, or dangerous for others—I’m in a car, so it’s dangerous for pedestrians, say, whatever. So it’s dangerous to go through a red light, but there is no law forbidding it. So do you say the law is unnecessary? There’s no difference between whether they enacted that law or didn’t enact that law? Of course there’s a difference.
[Speaker F] If, let’s say, this is a clear danger to life and you ignore it because they didn’t think of it and didn’t write it into law, then morally you’re a very serious offender. Isn’t that so here too?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not. I’m a moral offender, not a legal offender. That’s exactly the difference. I’m in the wrong—that’s obvious, I’m in the wrong—but you can’t sue me in court. I’m not a legal offender. They’ll settle accounts with me morally—I don’t know how one settles accounts for immoral acts. In the Torah context, then the Holy One, blessed be He, is in charge of that. But in the legal context, I don’t know—the society will condemn you, but you cannot be punished, you cannot be sued. Why? Because that doesn’t belong to legal obligations. In Jewish law there is the same distinction. Legal obligations—that’s what is called Jewish law, the parallel to legal obligations within Jewish law.
[Speaker F] But in society I’m not serving society. But in serving God, I serve God—that’s the beginning and the end, the aleph and the tav. It’s really not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, you're serving God, so what's the problem?
[Speaker F] What's the question? But if the Holy One, blessed be He, wants me to go beyond the letter of the law, and He wants it without any hemming and hawing, He really wants it, that would give Him a lot of satisfaction, maybe even more satisfaction than what I'm obligated to do, which is the baseline.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I'm ignoring that.
[Speaker F] That's a very great satisfaction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For Heaven. I don't know if it's more satisfaction, but never mind, that's also satisfaction. Okay, so therefore what?
[Speaker F] That's my role in the world, if I want to serve God, if I decide that that's the value.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All that's true. What's the question?
[Speaker F] So how is that different from plain Jewish law? From Jewish law that actually is Jewish law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now that's an Olympic leap. The fact that it's your role and therefore it's appropriate that you do it is true, but that doesn't mean it's the same thing as a command. These are two completely different statuses. It's exactly the same as morality telling you not to drive through a red light, but there's still a difference if they also legislated a law prohibiting it. Then it's legally forbidden, not just morally inappropriate. It's the same thing in the Torah / halakhic context. There's a difference between those two things.
[Speaker C] It seems to me, Rabbi, that the difficulty here for us is that we don't understand why moral values aren't also included in Jewish law, if that is His will.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Factually, they aren't included. What can you do? Halakhically they aren't included. There are explanations. Nachmanides asked this, Rabbi Chaim Vital asked this, and I discussed it in the series on Torah and morality. I have a fairly broad and somewhat complex doctrine there about the relationship between Jewish law and morality. And in a simple sense, the claim is that there is no relationship. But you have to explain why, and what the meaning of that is. But first of all, for our purposes here, it's enough just to point to the fact. Factually, that's how it is. All along the way you see that morality is an extra-halakhic category. That's why “and you shall do what is right and good” is not counted among the commandments, and that's why there are categories like going beyond the letter of the law, piety, fulfilling one's duty in the eyes of Heaven, and all kinds of things of that sort. All these categories were born because we're dealing with extra-halakhic realms. These are, of course, expectations. The Holy One, blessed be He, expects us to do this, but He does not command us to do this. Jewish law is something that He commanded. So first of all, let's look at it factually. Factually, what did He command? He commanded this. Why did He decide to command only this and not other things? That's an interesting theological question. Right now I'm working empirically, and empirically He did not command that. Okay? Good. So now look at the continuation: “And even if he is occupied with aggadic literature that has no practical implication for any legal ruling, he is still attached to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, because the whole Torah, with its general rules and details and fine points, and even whatever a young student asks his teacher, all of it came from His mouth to Moses at Sinai, as our Sages wrote at the end of chapter 2 of tractate Megillah and in Berakhot and in all sorts of places.” Okay? Everything a student asks the rabbi, all those well-known citations. What is he really saying? What's the subtext? When he begins, “And even if he is occupied with aggadic literature that has no practical implication for any legal ruling,” what is that sentence coming to do? There is a hidden question here.
[Speaker A] Torah too, that's also Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. There's a hidden question here, right? It sharpens the distinction I made above. Above he said that if he cleaves to the word of God, that's Jewish law, so he cleaves to the Holy One, blessed be He. The will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is Jewish law. The speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, is the rest of Torah. And the point is that you can cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, through His will, and you can cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, through His speech. These are two channels, yes, two channels through which one can cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He. When you study aggadah, you cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, through His speech. When you study Jewish law, you cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, through His will. By the way, in the Zohar it says, “He and His will are one.” It doesn't say, “He and His speech are one.” But here, that's why he brings all these citations: everything came from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai, so everything is the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He. But does it say that His speech and He are one? Where does it say that? It doesn't say it. So the fact that you are occupied with the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He obviously has an element of cleaving, that's clear. The question is whether it's the same thing as being occupied with the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. I don't know. Not certain. Yes, let's go back to tractates Negaim and Ohalot. I don't know what the Holy One, blessed be He, answered. So here too, I don't know. People say, yes, cleaving to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He is also called cleaving to Him. But the same as cleaving to His will? I don't know. The Zohar writes, “He and His will are one.” It doesn't say that He and His speech are one. Now more than that: in Jewish law it's clear that Jewish law is also the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, not only His will. He spoke the whole Torah, right? He didn't speak only the aggadah. So He spoke the Jewish law too. So clearly in Jewish law it is also God's will and also God's word. Aggadah is not God's will; it is only God's word. It is God's word, it is part of Torah. That's what Rabbi Yitzhak pointed out to us, yes? There are also parts of Torah that are not Jewish law. But notice: it seems that even in the conclusion there is some hierarchy. Jewish law is basically the core of Torah; it is the will of God. The will of God is Torah. True, a new thing was introduced—after Rabbi Yitzhak introduced this, it was newly clarified that even the parts that are not Jewish law are part of Torah, and through them too one can cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, to some degree or another.
[Speaker D] And then he said it like this: but if aggadah is only His speech, then He also wants what He speaks, meaning the opposite—aggadah is what He expects from him, so—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Expects, but not wants. I said there's a difference between wants and expects.
[Speaker A] You could say the difference is between expects and absolutely demands, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Wants” here means “demands,” yes. In this context, when I say “wants” I mean “demands.” All right, in Hebrew you can also call what He expects what He wants. Yes, I agree. Meaning maybe “demands” is really better—between demands and expects. Okay, so he continues and says: “Moreover, even at the very moment when a person is occupied with Torah below, every word that comes out of his mouth—those very words, as it were, also come out of His blessed mouth at that very moment, as we find in the first chapter of tractate Gittin regarding the concubine at Gibeah,” yes, page 6 there: “And his concubine played the harlot against him.” Rabbi Evyatar said: he found a fly in her. Rabbi Yonatan said: he found a hair. “And Rabbi Evyatar found Elijah.” Yes, Rabbi Evyatar met Elijah the prophet after he had disputed with Rabbi Yonatan about what exactly the man wanted from his concubine. He said to him: “What is the Holy One, blessed be He, doing now?” What is the Holy One, blessed be He, doing right now? He said to him: “He is occupied with the concubine at Gibeah.” He is occupied with the topic of the concubine at Gibeah—unbelievable—exactly what they are occupied with down here. “And what is He saying?” Well, interesting. So now we have a dispute, let's hear what the truth is. What is the Holy One, blessed be He, saying? “My son Evyatar says this; My son Yonatan says that.” Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, does not state a final position. Rather, He says, “My son Evyatar says this, My son Yonatan says that,” and that's it. He leaves the matter open in dispute. And that is because Rabbi Evyatar and Rabbi Yonatan were engaged with each other in the matter of the concubine at Gibeah, so at that very time He, blessed be He, also repeated their words exactly. “And He, blessed be His Name, and His word are one”—suddenly he adds that too. He, blessed be He, and His word are one, as is explicit in the holy Torah, in Deuteronomy: “to love the Lord your God,” and our Sages interpreted in tractate Nedarim that this refers to Torah study, and the end of the verse says, “and to cleave to Him.” It doesn't say that He and His word are one in exactly the way His will is; rather, engaging in His speech is also called cleaving to Him. To what extent? Maybe like Jewish law, maybe less, I don't know. Okay, another interesting point in this context: in the story of the concubine at Gibeah, in the part he does not quote, later on, there appears there one of the two places in the Talmud where “These and those are the words of the living God” appears. Right? There Rabbi Evyatar says this, Rabbi Yonatan says that, and “Heaven forbid”—so he asks, Rabbi Evyatar asks Elijah. Elijah had told him what the Holy One, blessed be He, is doing; He says, “My son Evyatar says this, My son Yonatan says that.” So Rabbi Evyatar asks Elijah: “Heaven forbid, is there doubt before Heaven?” What, the Holy One, blessed be He, doesn't know what happened there with the concubine at Gibeah? Was it a hair or a fly? It's a factual question. The Holy One, blessed be He, doesn't know what happened there? So he says: “These and those are the words of the living God. He found a fly and did not mind; he found a hair and did mind.” “He found a fly and did not mind; he found a hair and did mind.” Meaning that there the phrase “These and those” appears in an aggadic context. There is “These and those” in the halakhic context regarding the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel in tractate Eruvin 13. Okay? Those are the two places where the phrase “These and those are the words of the living God” appears. Now, what is the Talmud really saying here? Notice this too—it is another interesting linguistic nuance in light of what we saw in Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin. What does it say? It says, “These and those are the words of the living God.” Not the will of God. “These and those are the words of the living God.” Now notice: this phrase is also brought when it concerns the halakhic plane. In Eruvin too they don't say, “These and those are the will of God,” but “These and those are the words of the living God.” Why? I'll tell you why. The Ritva's question is well known, the Ritva's difficulty in Eruvin 13, there on that passage. The Ritva brings the question of the sages of France: how can it be that he is right and he is right—what is this, the judge's wife? He's right and he's right and you're right too. Meaning, how can it be that both are right? They are saying contradictory things. So he engages in pilpul there and says something that's not entirely clear. I want to claim that “These and those are the words of the living God” does not mean that both are right. Only one is right. In the topic of halakhic monism I spoke about this—that Jewish law is monistic, not pluralistic. There are not multiple halakhic truths; there is one halakhic truth in principle. And when there is a dispute, one side is right and the other is mistaken. So what does “These and those are the words of the living God” mean? It means both are the word of God, not that both are the will of God. The will of God is only what the one who is right said, because he says what the Holy One, blessed be He, actually wants. The other is mistaken, so that is not the will of God. The will of God is the first one. But it's still true that the second one is also the word of God. And therefore when the Talmud speaks, it says, “These and those are the words of the living God.” And that's interesting, because it appears in that very passage of the concubine at Gibeah, which Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin brings in order to explain the difference between the will of God and the word of God. In that very same passage the Talmud says, “These and those are the words of the living God.” Because the Holy One, blessed be He, spoke both of them, because “everything that a seasoned student will one day innovate, the Holy One, blessed be He, showed Moses at Sinai.” He spoke all of it. But it is not true that He wants all of it. He wants us to do the correct thing. And if there is a dispute, then one is right and the other is wrong; both are not right when there is a contradiction. And therefore, what's the plain meaning? Only the correct opinion. But “these and those” are the words of the living God—He spoke both. That's what the passage says: that the Holy One, blessed be He, speaks what human beings are engaged in within Torah; that's the topic of the passage. That's why Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin brings that passage. What I'm only trying to show is that even later in the passage, which Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin did not bring, it continues in exactly the same way. This passage comes to say exactly this point, the tension between the will of God. The word of God is a consolation prize; the will of God is Torah in the full sense. What is Torah, what does the Holy One, blessed be He, want? Incorrect halakhic opinions or words of aggadah are also Torah, but they are the word of God and not the will of God.
[Speaker E] And according to this, does the will of God also apply to aggadic teachings?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn't hear.
[Speaker E] According to this, does the will of God also apply to aggadic teachings? Because they're arguing there about what is true, so somebody is saying the truth; each one thinks something else is the truth. Why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What isn't true is not the will of God. I didn't say that everything true is the will of God. It's also true that there's a table in front of me, so therefore that's the will of God? What does that have to do with anything?
[Speaker E] No, anything that is Torah, connected to Torah, like morality, values, all kinds of things that are written in Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. Why are you identifying the will of God with truth? I'm claiming that what is not true—then obviously the Holy One, blessed be He, did not will it, so it cannot be the will of God. But that doesn't mean that everything that is true is therefore the will of God. It's a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Meaning, for something to be true—
[Speaker E] It's a necessary condition for it to be—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] will—
[Speaker C] of God, but it's not a sufficient condition. It has to be true Jewish law for it to be the will of God. So it has to be both Jewish law and true. Okay, I understand. Rabbi, I didn't understand regarding this: if Jewish law is will in the form of command, then how can something that is not the practical Jewish law—because then it's not the command—still be called the word of God, because the Holy One, blessed be He—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly here. That's what he says: “Everything that a seasoned student will one day innovate,” and even when there is a dispute between two sides where one side is actually mistaken—by the way, in some versions it says “a young student will innovate,” not “a seasoned student will innovate”; there are different sources in the words of our Sages—“was said to Moses at Sinai,” or “the Holy One, blessed be He, showed it to Moses at Sinai.” The Holy One, blessed be He, spoke all of it in order to give it the status of Torah, so that when you engage in an opinion that is not the practical Jewish law, we won't say that you neglected Torah study. Because otherwise, it would be neglect of Torah study; you would be engaged in something that is not Torah. But it's a consolation prize. Meaning, at the principled level, Torah is only what the Holy One, blessed be He, truly wants. Except that the Holy One, blessed be He, says: okay, but there are other things too, and I care about morality, and I care about history, or whatever appears in Scripture, and I care that people should analyze a halakhic passage and express their opinion freely even if they are mistaken. All those things the Holy One, blessed be He, wants to happen—expects to happen, yes, not wants, expects to happen—so therefore He includes all those things in the concept of the word of God. But that is not the will of God. Okay? It gives it the status of Torah, but it's second-class Torah, if one may say such a thing.
[Speaker C] I saw in the novellae of Rabbi Gedaliah Nadel, where he writes regarding “These and those are the words of the living God,” that the intention is that both of them have a valid rationale. Now as Jewish law, what is more probable. So does the Rabbi accept that or—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I accept that completely. I also wrote about it at length in several articles. And I think that “These and those are the words of the living God” really refers to the rationales that people brought, but on the bottom line one is right and the other is wrong. He holds—
[Speaker E] a scriptural decree.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are 150 reasons to declare the creeping creature impure and 150 reasons to declare it pure. All 300 reasons are correct. There are no incorrect reasons here. The question in dispute is not which reasons are correct, but which reasons outweigh or carry more weight than other reasons. And on that there is a dispute. And in that dispute, one is right and the other is wrong. Not that both are right.
[Speaker A] In other words, can one parallel the distinction between words and wills to the distinction between Torah and Jewish law? Is that what Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin is hinting to us here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Though really you need to decide that yes. Meaning, I think you can parallel them, because if you—meaning, in the earlier division it's obvious that you can parallel them. What I added now is that if there is an incorrect halakhic opinion, that too enters into the category of the word of God.
[Speaker A] Yes, I meant Jewish law that actually is the decided ruling and is what we'd call the truth.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. By the way, what we rule isn't always the truth either; it's possible we made a mistake.
[Speaker A] Right, exactly, so yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi—
[Speaker D] But once you said, if I remember correctly, that when there are two different reasons and both of them are true, and only on the bottom line there is a dispute, then there isn't really a side that is not true. You gave the example of this chocolate. Only the side that says to eat thinks you should eat because of X, and the side that says not to eat says you shouldn't eat because of Y.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But both reasons are correct.
[Speaker D] Yes, so both reasons are correct and the bottom line is also correct…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the bottom line is not correct; only one is correct. Because on the bottom line, what is the dispute? The dispute is over whether one should prefer taste over health or health over taste. And in that dispute only one is right. That's the halakhic, practical question—what to do. In the reasons, everyone is right, but in the halakhic question only one is right. Fine. Fine.
[Speaker D] So—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What we basically learn from here is that the concept of Torah is actually a mixture of several components. The core component of the matter is halakhic teaching—Jewish law. Jewish law, not instruction in Jewish law. Jewish law. That's the core of Torah. Beyond this core there are other parts that are also Torah. Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin calls this the word of God and not the will of God. And those parts are the moral parts, historical parts, incorrect halakhic opinions that arise מתוך the learning, in order to study Torah, so that too counts as Torah. All these are basically—let's call it—the periphery, the periphery of Torah. Okay? Now, I want to emphasize that despite the claim I just made, one has to be careful. First of all, this is an introduction to a series on study versus ruling. So I want—I'm now beginning to get to our topic. One might have understood from the picture I have described so far that basically our goal is to know what to do: Jewish law, to know what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants us to do and not do. Or in other words, study is a means in order to know what to do. That's called studying Torah in order to know what to do. And then it turns out that Torah study is basically an instrument of a commandment. It's a means, where the end goal is to do the correct thing. Just as in order to sit in a sukkah, you need to build a sukkah. That doesn't mean building the sukkah is a commandment. Building the sukkah is an instrument of the commandment. It enables me to fulfill the commandment. So here too, seemingly, in light of the picture I've described until now, Torah study is only an instrument of a commandment. Because basically the goal is to know what to do, to do the correct thing, only without studying I won't know. So therefore one must study. But that's a mistake. It's not true. Despite the picture I described earlier, that's not true. And why? Because the concept of Jewish law is really concerned with the question of what I am to do or not do. That's true in terms of defining the concept. But what I said in the previous sentences—that the purpose of study is action—that is no longer true. Meaning, when I study Jewish law, I study what is permitted and forbidden and obligatory to do. Does it follow from that that I can conclude that the study is done in order to do the correct thing or refrain from doing what is incorrect?
[Speaker F] No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are completely different things. When I defined Jewish law up to now, I did not define the purpose of study. I defined a certain category within Torah and called it Jewish law. That category is the collection of commands that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands us. That's called Jewish law. Now, when I study Jewish law, I study what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants. Am I studying this so that I'll be able to fulfill it? Is the study only a means? I claim not. That certainly does not follow from what I said before. I claim it is also simply not true. All right? That's an important point.
[Speaker C] Can the Rabbi explain how that makes sense? Can the Rabbi explain—if everything is, as the Rabbi says, command, then maybe—I'll explain. We explained.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We read it. Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin already explained it. And what he said was: why do I study Jewish law? In order to know what to do? He explained—we just read it—regarding the will of God.
[Speaker C] When I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] engage in the will of the Holy One, blessed be He—He and His will are one—then I cleave to Him. Meaning that when I study Jewish law, the value of the study is not because afterward I know what to do. It is—
[Speaker A] an end in itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. It's just true that Jewish law is the commands of what to do and what not to do. That's in terms of defining the domain. But when I engage in that domain, I am not engaging in it as a means to know what to do. I engage in it because that engagement is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, because I am studying Torah, and Torah study is an intrinsic value. It's not a means to know what to do.
[Speaker A] Also, Torah study is a commandment in its own right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, correct, and wait, I'll get to that.
[Speaker G] So what does “great is study because it leads to action” mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I'll get to that too. According to what I'm saying now, yes, they asked whether study is greater or action is greater, and they concluded: great is study because it leads to action. I read that like this. When you ask whether study is greater or action is greater, you assume that study stands on its own, action stands on its own, and it's possible to discuss which of the two is greater. The answer is: the whole picture on which your question is based is mistaken. What is great is this chain of study that leads to action. That is called study—not because action is the goal and study is the means, but because what is called study? Study is something that ends in a practical conclusion. That's what is called study, or in other words, studying Jewish law. Such study, that leads to action, such study that ends in a halakhic conclusion—that is the greater study. And the proof is that the Talmud says there that great is study because it leads to action. Now if action were the goal and study the means, then plainly action would be greater, not study. You're telling me that study is greater, and the explanation is an explanation that tells me why action is greater. You're telling me: why is study greater? Because it leads to action. Well, if it leads to action, that means action is greater and study is only the means. So why is that an argument for the determination that study is greater?
[Speaker G] Actually, Rashi there says, “therefore action is greater.” What? Rashi there actually says, on “great is study because it leads to action”—therefore action is greater.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don't remember Rashi at the moment. The Talmud does not say that. If we need to look at Rashi, I don't remember right now what he says and how that fits with the Talmud. The Talmud says that study is greater.
[Speaker G] Rabbi, if we suppose we lived in a world of angels, with no commandment at all that could be fulfilled—you could study theoretically, like theoretical physics, but there would be no possibility of fulfillment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I needed to study Jewish law, then obviously yes, it would still be great, because it is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. And in a moment I'll bring a clear proof of that: the wayward and rebellious son—I'll already tell you now—that never was, was never created, and never will be. But in another moment I'll get to that. So the claim is basically that when I say the main thing in study is Jewish law, that does not mean the purpose of study is to know what to do. That's not the same claim. Not only is it not the same claim, I'm claiming that the first is true and the second is not. Two different things. Now let me try to illustrate these things. First of all, I'll maybe bring what Rabbi Israel Salanter writes. Rabbi Israel Salanter has an essay called “Law and Justice”; it also appears in Or Yisrael. He writes there as follows. He says: the Talmud says there is a dispute regarding whether the wayward and rebellious son ever existed—whether it existed or “never was and never will be.” Okay? And if it never was and never will be, then the Talmud asks: so why was it written? “Study it and receive reward.” So Rabbi Israel Salanter asks: what does that mean, “Study it and receive reward”? All the rest—meaning, these three verses of the section of the wayward and rebellious son—do I need them because otherwise I won't have what to study? Torah was worried that I had finished everything else and added another three verses so I'd have something to study and receive reward for the study? That's absurd. Therefore, says Rabbi Israel Salanter, it has to be read differently. The section of the wayward and rebellious son, because according to the opinion that says it never was and never will be—yes—comes to teach us the principle of “Study and receive reward.” Not that it was written so that we should study and receive reward, but that it comes to teach us the principle of “Study and receive reward.” What does that principle say? That when I study Torah, even Jewish law—because the wayward and rebellious son is the halakhic part of Torah—I study it not in order to fulfill it. Look: the wayward and rebellious son will never happen; I will never fulfill it. So what is the value of the study? “Study and receive reward.” There is value in the study because study itself is a value; it is not a means to know what to do. That idea is what the wayward and rebellious son teaches us. That's what Rabbi Israel Salanter says. He also brings there a Talmudic statement: the Talmud asks why it is uncommon for the sons of Torah scholars to themselves become Torah scholars, and one of the explanations is: because they did not recite the blessing over Torah first. So he asks: that's a very strange explanation. These Torah scholars devote their whole lives to Torah. And for some reason they're sloppy about the blessing over Torah? Why? And all of them? Because it says it's uncommon for the sons of Torah scholars to become Torah scholars, which apparently means most Torah scholars did not recite the blessing over Torah first. It's not just one individual. Why? What's the meaning of this strange sloppiness? So he says: it's not sloppiness. The Torah scholars thought that study was a means to know what to do. And the Talmud in tractate Menachot says that anything that is not the completion of the commandment, one does not recite a blessing over it. One does not recite blessings over instruments of commandments, only over the commandment itself. So Rabbi Israel Salanter says: why did those Torah scholars not recite the blessing over Torah first? Because they thought there was no need to recite a blessing over Torah study, since Torah study is an instrument of a commandment. The goal is to know what to do—that is, to do. And therefore they did not recite the blessing. They thought it was incorrect to recite it. He assumes it is a blessing over commandments; there is a long discussion about that too. I, for example, think it is not a blessing over commandments. But he assumes it is a blessing over commandments. And therefore he claims that this is why their sons do not become Torah scholars. Because someone who thinks study is just a means to know what to do—his sons will not become Torah scholars, because he does not study Torah correctly; he does not understand what Torah study is. That's his claim. Now let me bring you a strong proof regarding this matter. The Shulchan Arukh—not the Talmud—the Shulchan Arukh rules that women are obligated in the blessing over Torah. Siman 47, I think. Women are obligated in the blessing over Torah. So the Magen Avraham and Mishnah Berurah ask there: but women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. They are not included in the commandment of Torah study. So why do they need to recite the blessing? And once again the assumption is of course that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over commandments. I think that assumption is incorrect. And therefore this question is not a question. It's a blessing of praise, not a blessing over commandments. But they assumed it was a blessing over commandments. So they asked: then why are women obligated to recite the blessing over Torah? And they say there: because women need to study the laws that apply to them. And then what? Then they are indeed obligated in the blessing over Torah?
[Speaker A] That's the hint that study is just an instrument. So I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I ask: in the end, tell me the answer. Are women obligated in the commandment of Torah study or not?
[Speaker A] It sounds like yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Talmud says no. The Talmud and all the halakhic decisors say no. Out of all the commandments, the commandment of Torah study applies to men, not women.
[Speaker C] Like the Rabbi said, they aren't obligated in the study itself, only in knowing what to do.
[Speaker A] Because here the concept being presented is as an instrument. Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite. Not as an instrument. The commandment of Torah study is to study Torah not as an instrument for knowing what to do. No—in the context of women, it is an instrument. In the context of women, it is an instrument. The commandment of Torah study is study for its own sake, the study itself. Now, women are connected to Torah study too, but not to the commandment of Torah study, since they study Torah in order to know what to do. Yes, in the phrase they say, to learn the laws relevant to them.
[Speaker A] When you study Torah in order to know what to do, that is not the commandment of Torah study. Because women are obligated in that, and they are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. In other words, the commandment of Torah study is to study as a value in itself—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not in order to know what to do, not as an instrument of a commandment.
[Speaker C] So according to that, why do they recite the blessing? What? So why do women recite it then?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I find that hard to understand. Because they are still studying Torah. But in fact they are not reciting a blessing over the commandment, a blessing over commandments. They are exempt from the commandment of Torah study.
[Speaker E] It doesn't have to be a proof like that, because maybe really they are obligated in everything, only according to the view of that period they held that because for women learning Torah is frivolity, therefore there's something in reality that forbids them to study Torah. But in principle they really do have an obligation. In principle they have an obligation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what if they have an obligation? The fact that you are obligated to take an etrog—do you recite a blessing over the etrog without taking it? No. So what? So what if they are obligated?
[Speaker E] I didn't understand. They are obligated in Torah study in principle all the way through. It's only that there is the problem of frivolity. So they tell them: listen, study this and recite the blessing over Torah. Only on things that are really in-depth Torah study—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short, you're saying that women are obligated in the regular commandment of Torah study?
[Speaker E] Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And all the halakhic decisors say no, and the Talmud says no.
[Speaker E] Fine, one can argue, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Frivolity. “Frivolity” means that one may not teach them. I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about the fact that they are exempt from the commandment.
[Speaker E] It's not only that it's forbidden to teach them; it's also forbidden for them on their own. They're not allowed to study either. There's a problem with their studying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not according to the Derishah, not—
[Speaker E] According to the Derishah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What it says in the Talmud that— But leave it, even if it were forbidden for them themselves, that doesn't interest me. That's not the plane I'm speaking about. I'm speaking about the question of who is obligated in the commandment. After you say that women are exempt from the commandment—and that's definitive, that's clear, that's agreed by all—women are exempt from the commandment, there still arises the question whether one may nevertheless teach them despite the fact that they are exempt from the commandment. About that the Talmud says no: don't teach them, because that's frivolity. But the frivolity is not the reason they are exempt from the commandment.
[Speaker E] But why, and where, what is the Rabbi's proof that the proof women are exempt is because they are exempt from the commandment itself? Maybe they are obligated, as I explained before, they are obligated, only the frivolity exempts them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can say whatever you want, but everyone who follows the Talmud says otherwise. Women are exempt from Torah study.
[Speaker E] The question is why. Is it because of frivolity or because of the thing itself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. They are exempt from the commandment, not because of frivolity. Frivolity is the reason why it is forbidden to teach them.
[Speaker A] Can we know why they are exempt?
[Speaker C] “And you shall teach them to your sons”—it says “your sons,” and not your daughters. So? I didn't understand. Well, the Talmud expounds it. I'm just answering simply. It's simple that they are exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.
[Speaker A] Wait—
[Speaker E] What does that exposition mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is what does that exposition mean? Why?
[Speaker E] If it's from the perspective of the exposition itself, the question is whether it's because of frivolity or because of the thing itself. That's exactly the question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. It's not because of frivolity, but the exposition says that women are exempt.
[Speaker E] The question is why.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exempt, period.
[Speaker A] Wait, why are they exempt?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if nevertheless to teach them—that's a different discussion.
[Speaker A] Wait, but why are they exempt? Meaning, why was that established?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don't know why they are exempt; they are exempt.
[Speaker E] So you can say it's because of frivolity. I don't understand why not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, you see—you are deriving the reason of the verse.
[Speaker E] Not the reason of the verse, not the reason of the verse. The opposite: I'm looking at why they said this and explaining why the Sages expounded it this way. What's reasonable? They expounded it this way because of the frivolity in their generation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. That is precisely deriving the reason of the verse.
[Speaker E] Not the reason of the verse—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sages expounded it this way.
[Speaker E] What do you mean they expounded it this way?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That's deriving the reason of the verse. I'm explaining the Sages, I'm explaining the Sages, not the reason of the verse. You won't finish explaining the Sages by tomorrow, so—
[Speaker E] The Sages derived the reason of the verse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, they did what they did. You are not doing what they did, because they didn't do that either. You have to decide that they did it, but we rule that we do not derive the reason of the verse. Women are exempt, period. There is no question here at all. According to your view, once it is decided that yes, we do teach women Torah because maybe today it's no longer frivolity, say in our time, even in Beit Yaakov, then are they fulfilling the commandment? Nobody says they are fulfilling the commandment. By the way, I do say that, but that's a different discussion.
[Speaker A] Yes, interesting why—meaning that no one—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says. I don't understand what you mean by “no one says.”
[Speaker A] The question is whether—
[Speaker E] they're exempt. I'll ask the Rabbi what the Rabbi thinks.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I'm telling you what I think: that women are exempt from Torah study. That's what all the halakhic decisors write and that's what they derive from the verse. That's all.
[Speaker A] Wait, but what reasoning does the Talmud give for that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no reasoning. It's an exposition from the verse; that's how it's learned.
[Speaker E] The Rabbi himself explained in his book, in the trilogy, that there is a difference in what deriving the reason of the verse means—whether it means looking at it from above, in which case it's okay, or looking deeply into it, in which case that's called deriving the reason of the verse and that's the problem. The Rabbi brought this in the book. We grew up on this for two weeks.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it's not a difference between from above and in depth, it's something else. Never mind.
[Speaker E] The Rabbi said, he explained it with—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not with above and in depth; those are different distinctions. But leave it, I don't want to get into that now. It's a marginal point; there's no point.
[Speaker A] Wait, but in your opinion they are exempt, but if they study is it still a commandment? I mean according to your view?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly yes, and not only according to my view, seemingly yes. Except that there is the problem of frivolity, and there it's another story—the question where that applies and whether it applies and to which women and when. But in principle that's what the Talmud is discussing: that even if they study, even if they are exempt, in principle one could have taught them, only don't do it because it's frivolity. Like every commandment from which women are exempt, positive time-bound commandments: there is no reason to assume that here, if they fulfill it, it would not count as a commandment for them, just like every other commandment from which they are exempt.
[Speaker C] The Rabbi is saying that they do the commandment of Torah study as one who is not commanded and does, not as one who is commanded and does?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. I claim more than that. I claim that the men also do it as one who is not commanded and does. Because the commandment of Torah study is reciting Shema in the morning and evening; with that you fulfill your obligation. Everything else you do as one who is not commanded and does. “When you walk on the way, and when you lie down and when you rise up”—is that only Shema? What? I can't hear.
[Speaker C] Everything that says “when you walk on the way and when you lie down and when you rise up,” that's only Shema?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does the— Shema morning—The Talmud in Menachot 99, also in Nedarim 8, says that with Shema in the morning and evening one fulfills the obligation. “When you lie down and when you rise up”—morning and evening.
[Speaker C] Yes, one fulfills the obligation, but that's not an expansion of—you can't, as it were, do the commandment continuously?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course you can. You are also required to do that, but it is not part of the definition of the commandment. Okay, that's a whole separate matter…
[Speaker C] Ah, it's not part of the command of obligation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. On the contrary, you must do it not because of the command, but because you understand how foundational and important it is. That's why you need to do it. And that obligation, by the way, applies to women too in my opinion—the obligation to be a Torah person in the halakhic sense. Fine, let's leave that; that's a lesson in itself. Here for our purposes, what I only wanted to show is that according to the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah, it comes out fairly clearly that when someone studies in order to know what to do, that is not called the commandment of Torah study. Even someone who is exempt from the commandment of Torah study is obligated in that. The commandment of Torah study is to study Torah not in order to know what to do, but in order to study Torah. When you study Jewish law, you study what to do and what not to do, but you do not study it in order to do and not do. Those are two completely different things. And therefore the claim in the end is that although the main thing in Torah is Jewish law, even when I'm speaking here about Jewish law, I'm speaking here about studying that Torah category called Jewish law. Not studying in order to know what to do. I'll jump ahead a bit and say: studying the Kitzur Shulchan Arukh is not this. Studying the Kitzur Shulchan Arukh is not Torah study in my view. It's not Torah study because you study it in order to know what to do. That's important, but it's not the commandment of Torah study. Torah study is studying in order to study, not in order to know what to do. You need to study the passage properly.
[Speaker C] Why isn't it both, Rabbi?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because here you are studying in order to know what to do. If you really want to study, you don't study Kitzur Shulchan Arukh. Why?
[Speaker C] I study in order to know what to do and also in order to study, maybe in a more superficial way. Why isn't that included in the definition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can call it some kind of superficial Torah study of one sort or another; some would say it’s a lower-quality neglect of Torah study, it doesn’t matter. But yes, it is not Torah study in its full sense. It depends: if your intention in studying the Kitzur Shulchan Arukh is also to learn pieces of Torah, then it could be that you are also fulfilling the commandment of Torah study. If you’re learning it in order to know what to do, then no. And this is not because of the rule that commandments require intention; it’s an essential definition of the learning. Meaning, it’s not connected to the law of commandments requiring intention. All right, I’ll stop here; this is just the introduction that starts us on the way. If there are comments or questions, then go ahead.
[Speaker E] In Birkat Shmuel, section 14 in Kiddushin, he discusses what the Rabbi is talking about. There, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch really thought—or they claimed that he held this way—that it’s enough as a commandment to study without in-depth analysis; it’s enough just to know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Birkat Shmuel there discusses—no, it’s not the same thing. There he discusses the relationship between learning in order to know and learning for the sake of learning. But what does it mean to learn in order to know? It could be that you’re doing full-fledged in-depth study, not Kitzur Shulchan Arukh. His discussion there is not necessarily about Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, but rather the question of whether the definition of the commandment is to know the Torah or to engage in Torah.
[Speaker E] What’s the difference between knowing and engaging?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, if you study something you already know.
[Speaker E] So according to Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, that wouldn’t be a commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know about Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch; I’m talking about Birkat Shmuel.
[Speaker E] He brings Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch there; he brings that there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember.
[Speaker E] And there was a question there that the community leaders of Germany didn’t want to study.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that part there I no longer remember. But this Birkat Shmuel that we’re talking about—that’s his distinction.
[Speaker E] Okay, Rabbi,
[Speaker C] Just regarding the fact that you really don’t need it—why does Nefesh HaChayim seemingly write that there has to be intention for the service of God? It comes out for us that Torah is something that in reality just happens, the way the Rabbi presented it—that’s what came out of the Rabbi’s lecture.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In reality, if I take a lulav, then I took a lulav. And still, when you do it with intention, it’s a more elevated commandment. So too with cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He: if you do it with the intention of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, that makes the cleaving more elevated.
[Speaker C] Is that because of the rule that commandments require intention?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, commandments require intention, yes; that’s learning for its own sake. The difference between intention and for-its-own-sake is a common mistake in the world, that people identify the concept of intention with the concept of for-its-own-sake. But specifically in Torah study it’s very close. In other contexts it’s not similar. But specifically in Torah study, when we talk about Torah study for its own sake and intention in the commandment of Torah study, it’s very close.
[Speaker C] Nefesh HaChayim brings that Rosh in Nedarim, that for-its-own-sake means for the sake of Torah. For the sake of Torah, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that would seemingly not be for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He? No—“Do things for the sake of their Maker, and speak of them for their own sake.” The Rosh in Nedarim, which Nefesh HaChayim brings there in Gate 4, says: “Do things for the sake of their Maker”—for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He—that’s with performing commandments; “and speak of them,” when you study Torah, “for their own sake”—that is, for the sake of Torah itself. What does “for the sake of Torah” mean? For the sake of Torah itself. For the sake of Torah itself as God’s will. Not for the sake of Torah in some abstract sense—if some non-Jew studies it because he’s learning Talmud at the university, that is not called Torah study.
[Speaker C] So the Rabbi is saying that someone who studies Torah now without the foundation—the foundation of Torah—that is not considered Torah study.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doing commandments without intention doesn’t mean it has no value, but there are different levels of value in this matter, and also different levels of cleaving to God, I believe. Therefore he says: do it—and he also says: do it beforehand. Not during the learning, while you’re thinking about miggo, about the thief and the liar. Before the learning, dedicate a certain amount of time to fear of Heaven, to confessing one’s sins, and so on.
[Speaker E] Thank you very much. One second. May I? Yes. The Rabbi brought proof from the fact that their children do not become Torah scholars—those who did not recite the blessing over Torah first.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Israel Salanter writes that.
[Speaker E] Yes, yes. According to this explanation, there’s something interesting here. It comes out that basically they don’t—he isn’t saying that this is how it ought to be. He’s saying: look at reality, it doesn’t work if we do it this way, so do the opposite. Meaning, he doesn’t really know on an essential level what is actually correct—whether one really does it in order to know, or in order to study, simply to study. He says: look at reality; if you do it this way, look what comes out, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since reality is like that, apparently it’s because, essentially as well, it isn’t correct to work that way.
[Speaker E] There’s no proof from reality to essence; essentially, we don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no logical proof, but it’s very reasonable. Okay, thank you. All right, Sabbath peace, and may we hear good news.
[Speaker A] Thank you very much, Sabbath peace.