Messianism – Rabbi Michael Abraham – Lesson 1

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and therefore I say: even though there was no ordination there, and there was already no Sanhedrin, I’m talking about the Talmud in relation to the generations that came after it, going forward. The Jewish people accepted upon themselves that this text is binding, even though it was not actually produced in a Sanhedrin. Some of the things it records were in fact produced in a Sanhedrin, but the mere fact that something is written in the Talmud does not mean it passed the Sanhedrin’s stamp. But the public accepted it upon themselves as something binding. Nobody disputes that. Meaning, in that sense it is binding. What is the meaning of that acceptance with respect to me? What does it mean? Fine, that can be discussed. There’s an article by Rabbi Shlomo Fisher about this, where in a certain sense he takes it from Rabbi Kook and, characteristically, doesn’t mention him. But in Beit Yishai, siman 15, I think, in the second part, in the homilies, he goes on at length about the meaning of public acceptance. Why is it binding? Even Mount Sinai is built on that. At Mount Sinai they accepted it, so what? Why does that obligate me? Presumably there’s some assumption that if the public accepts something, that obligates me. Like here too: the public accepted the Knesset upon itself—so on what basis do they come to me with claims? I don’t want it; I didn’t accept the Knesset. It won’t help. They’ll still come to me with claims. Why? Because I’m part of the public. That’s just how it is. Meaning, there’s a point where you start from some premise that can’t really be justified to you—but that’s how it is, and that’s always the case. If I justify that to you, you’ll ask why about that too. Anyway, that’s formal authority, but substantive authority can continue. Substantive authority in the sense that if there is someone who is an outstanding Torah scholar, then presumably if he says something and I disagree with him, he’s probably right. The fact that he’s right still doesn’t mean I’m obligated to obey him. Okay? First of all, the assumption is that if he is an outstanding Torah scholar, he is probably more right than I am. Now we can discuss—and we already spoke about the value of autonomy—we spoke about the fact that it isn’t always clear that even if he is right, I need to obey him, because there is some value in a person making decisions for himself autonomously. Fine. But substantive authority—not formal authority—always exists wherever there is a Torah scholar whom you respect and who probably gets closer to the truth than you do. So substantive authority exists later as well. Now the question is: with respect to what are these things being said? Or before that—why do people really mix up these two types of authority? Because when you want to explain to people why they need to obey the Talmud—or fine, the Sanhedrin—what will you tell them? Because they are the authorized ones. People—no, that’s not enough for them. Fine, but maybe they were mistaken. Why should I do it? So you have to explain to them: no, they were never mistaken, they are saints, heavenly beings, they never make mistakes, angels. Everyone mentioned in the Talmud has divine inspiration. You know these funny statements. Fine, so what does that actually mean? It means that this answered some need. In other words, people don’t understand that there can be some authority you cannot argue with, even though it may be mistaken. That requires a certain maturity, a certain ripeness, to accept such a thing. I think that is true. I mean, I don’t dismiss authorities; there are formal authorities, and it’s important that there be such things. That’s just reality. And therefore very often people resort to this kind of explanation, which replaces formal authority with substantive authority. Meaning, it explains: look, why do we need to obey the Talmud? Because everyone there was heavenly fire, there were no mistakes there at all, and therefore clearly what they said is pure truth, and everyone has to do it. Every child understands that. Meaning, obviously, if they’re such exalted beings, then what they say must be done. To tell a child, listen, maybe they were mistaken, but there’s nothing to be done—we have to do it because they have authority—that’s a recipe for trouble. Because afterward he’ll say: wait, who said so, and no… My guess, again, is that this is why all these stories were created, these myths about the extraordinary greatness of the sages of the Talmud and the medieval authorities (Rishonim), beyond anything we can even grasp, in worlds in which they moved. I’m not inclined to accept that. I think they were human beings, like me and like you. Fine—wise, righteous, maybe, some more and some less, everything’s fine—but I don’t think there was some phase transition with the sealing of the Talmud, nor in the fifteenth century when the era of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) ended. Fine. There were Jewish Torah scholars; you can see in their writings that they were Torah scholars. I’m very far from belittling them—on the contrary—but it’s obvious that they too could make mistakes. What do you mean? In the Talmud, Rav Ami and Rav Asi swear about what Rav said. Each one argues over what Rav said—he was their rabbi—and both of them were from the Land of Israel, because Rav was in the Land of Israel for a certain period, and each one swears to what he remembers. Then they go to Rav, in tractate Shevuot 26. They go to Rav afterward and say: wait, what did you really say? The Talmud doesn’t tell us which one was which, because that would be gossip, but the Talmud says that one was right and one was mistaken. Rav said to him—and the second one says to him: what, so I swore a false oath? How can that be? If I did it in good faith? Rav said to him: ‘a person in an oath—excluding one under compulsion.’ Meaning, don’t worry: if you swore because you were under compulsion, because you genuinely thought that was the truth, then this is called ‘a person in an oath—excluding one under compulsion,’ and that’s a big novelty. You might say: what are you swearing for? Why are you swearing there at all? No—because if he thought it was true, then he can swear. It is not a false oath. That’s an interesting novelty. In any case, you see that Rav Ami and Rav Asi were the leading sages of the generation in the Land of Israel. One of them was mistaken. He didn’t even remember what his rabbi had said—not just a mistake in judgment. He didn’t remember what his rabbi had said, and he swore about it. So what, mistakes can’t happen? Human beings like me and like you—they can make mistakes, however wise they may be. Therefore it seems to me that the more reasonable view is the one written by the Kesef Mishneh at the beginning of chapter two of Hilkhot Mamrim, where he says that their authority is because we accepted them upon ourselves, not because they were heavenly beings or something like that, but because we accepted that this is the framework. I once spoke about this and said that the meaning of this decision—to grant authority to the Talmud—is, in my view, a brilliant decision. I stand amazed before this decision, really. A brilliant decision. I think we talked about this once, right? That they decided to give some authority to a text that says nothing. It’s unbelievable. Meaning, you give authority to a text—whatever it says, we do not dispute it. Except what? It says nothing. Meaning, for every question it addresses, you can find contradictory passages, or a dispute within the passage itself. In the vast majority of cases there is no decision in the Talmud itself. You can argue now over whose view Jewish law follows. There are a few rules, and as is well known there are exceptions even to the rules. Meaning, there’s nothing—you’re basically doing something like a contradiction in terms here. You’re throwing out the baby with the bathwater, if you grant authority to something that says nothing. But that’s not true. In my view it was a very intelligent step, because they really did not want to establish final bottom lines; they wanted to establish a framework for discourse. So now everyone who argues has some framework, some common platform within which the discussion is conducted. So I bring proof from this passage, and he says no, this passage can be understood this way, and there’s another passage that contradicts it. They can discuss, reach conclusions, or remain in dispute—but we all belong, we all sit around the same table. And I think that was a brilliant idea. Meaning, again, I don’t know whether they thought of it in advance, but looking back, in retrospect, it turned out to be a brilliant move. If they had established a binding Shulchan Arukh, I don’t think we’d be here today. If they had established a binding Shulchan Arukh instead of the Talmud.

[Speaker A] And that’s what Maimonides was trying to do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. And that means that if he had been accepted, we wouldn’t be here today.

[Speaker A] And it didn’t work for him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, it didn’t work for him because of that.

[Speaker A] Are there more books on Maimonides than on the Talmud?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and that’s why it didn’t work. Meaning, by the way, that was one of the accusations against him too; what he tried to do wasn’t accepted partly for that reason. They weren’t willing to accept a binding codex. And why? Because there are circumstances and perspectives and different places, and you can’t determine that everyone must act the same way. They don’t think the same way, they are not in the same environment, and one code cannot bind everyone. It won’t work. Even regarding the Shulchan Arukh itself—in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the early halakhic decisors write that it is forbidden to rule on the basis of the Shulchan Arukh. It is forbidden to rule on the basis of the Shulchan Arukh. Except what? There are decisors who say—the Shakh and the Bach say—that since there are already commentaries around the Shulchan Arukh that bring the passages and discuss them and sometimes even disagree with it, then you actually can rely on the Shulchan Arukh if you have to. Because there are opinions there, and you can—it’s not really some rigid codex. You have some degree of freedom within it. The halakhic DNA opposes Shulchan-Arukh-ism. Meaning, even though on the face of it it looks as if we are constantly moving in that direction. And so there were two extreme possibilities, and both probably would not have worked, if I can speculate: either to establish a Kitzur Shulchan Arukh that would bind everyone—that would have broken immediately—or to establish nothing at all, and then again we would have had nothing; we simply would have become a collection of people with no connection between them, no common discourse, no nothing. It would turn into a hundred thousand religions.

[Speaker A] Like in the world generally; there was no internet either. There would have been completely different Torah developments over a hundred, two hundred, three hundred years.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As we see now when the Ethiopians arrive, right? That’s exactly an example of what would have happened. If that had happened to every community, what would things look like today? It would simply be a catastrophe. Now on the other hand, if not for a Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, then not even this would exist—it would just have ended and that would be that; nothing would remain of it. This amazing idea that says: we establish a canonical text that says nothing—says nothing in the sense that it gives no bottom line—it does speak, but there are no final bottom lines; it sets a framework for discourse. There are different opinions, you can play between them, you can find interpretations, you can see contradictory passages, but there is a framework. The discussions—we once talked about this, when I was once at the Israel Democracy Institute, I’ve spoken about it before too—there was a discussion there between rabbis and jurists, I think Tzohar organized it, and they invited me too; I don’t remember exactly what was going on there. And there were all kinds of accusations against the Supreme Court—it was during the heyday of Aharon Barak—and there were all kinds of accusations against the Supreme Court that basically it does whatever it wants, meaning it’s all agenda. When Aharon Barak explained that he didn’t want Ruth Gavison because she has an agenda, he was saying that it’s all agenda.

[Speaker A] Now Shaked is going the same way too; she wants judges with—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An agenda. She wants judges with an agenda on the table. Until now there were judges with an agenda. In any case, there sat there Englard, who at the time served as a religious Supreme Court justice, and overall there was a common basis for discourse, and he didn’t understand what we wanted from him at all. He was like: what do you mean? It’s all purely professional work. It has nothing to do with agenda, just as I wrote afterward when I sent it to Lipskind—exactly the same thing. Meaning, the supermarket ruling caught my eye there. Hayut writes there that it has nothing to do with religious and secular people; it’s a professional ruling. Now there were seven judges: five secular judges said to open the supermarkets, the two religious ones opposed it, but it has nothing to do with secular and religious people at all. They write that in the very same ruling. Good Lord—what is going on in that woman’s head? I don’t understand this. Is she an idiot?

[Speaker C] But maybe she’s sophisticated enough that it just came out coincidentally—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everything came out coincidentally—

[Speaker C] There were lots of—

[Speaker A] Cases like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Consistently. Lipskind does more thorough work than I do; he brought a whole series of examples where it was exactly the very predictable distribution. Yes, of course, all coincidences and non-representative samples. Fine. In any case, the point is that Englard sort of said: what do you mean? It’s all professional work. There are professional disagreements, but it has nothing to do with agenda at all. It’s all mathematics. It was bizarre. People were tearing their hair out; they had no idea what to do with this detached creature. How do you argue with someone who says utter nonsense? You can argue with someone who disagrees with you, but this seemed bizarre. And at a certain point I said: listen, the man isn’t an idiot, I think. I didn’t know him, but I assume he’s not an idiot. If he says something, it’s worth thinking about it again. Then I thought that in fact, when people approach rabbinic decisions, the situation is exactly the same. People on the outside basically say: you rabbis just do whatever you want; it’s all agenda. A Religious Zionist rabbi will say this, a left-wing rabbi will say that, a right-wing rabbi will say that, a Haredi rabbi will say that, Hasidic, Lithuanian—you know in advance what he’ll say on the interesting questions. There are many questions that aren’t related—also in the Supreme Court there are questions unrelated to agendas—but in the places where it is related to agenda, you see that agenda determines what you say. And someone who is inside the discourse—and this is the important point, of being inside or outside—someone who is inside the discourse understands that this is not entirely true. And in this case I’m inside the discourse; in the legal world I’m an outsider, but in the halakhic world I am inside the discourse. It’s not true. It’s not entirely true. There is influence from agenda, obviously, but it’s not entirely true. There are rules of discourse, and there is right and wrong, and sometimes you can persuade and sometimes not. And even if someone isn’t persuaded, he knows he’s not entirely okay. We are all human beings, but you know when—many times, I’m not saying people always agree, that’s all true, there are disagreements, everything is fine—but there is also something that is right and wrong; it isn’t only agendas. And therefore I said to myself: maybe what Englard was actually telling us was that if you were inside, you would understand that certain modes of discourse had developed there, with right and wrong despite all the agendas. And fine, clearly agendas have influence, and within what is right and wrong you maneuver with the legal tools in a way that is influenced—

[Speaker A] But he described it—he claimed there is no influence at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he meant to say that this is legal work, it’s not—

[Speaker A] That’s not even possible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he formulated it in an extreme way. I don’t know exactly what he meant, but I understand that there is nevertheless something to what he said. I don’t know if that’s exactly what he meant, but it’s not as detached as it sounded. People there were literally tearing their hair out; it was bizarre.

[Speaker A] In the end it’s like with most things, as you often describe—it’s something in the middle. Yes, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the point is whether you are inside or outside. If you are inside and you know the modes of discourse, then you understand that it’s not true. Meaning, there is influence from agenda, but there is also right and wrong. Someone looking from the outside doesn’t understand: with the mathematics you can explain both this and that. Mathematically you can’t pin it down. Meaning, it looks as if in fact both possibilities exist, and each person picks the option he wants because of his agenda. That’s not how it is. There are sources here and a way of thinking and things develop—a developing discipline. Right. So why—how did I get to all of this? Because of the Talmud. In the Talmud too, it’s not that everything is open. That’s a mistake. Someone looking from the outside thinks that. There is discourse, there is right and wrong, there is proof from the Talmud and one has to contend with proofs. Someone who says otherwise won’t always succeed in holding his ground; sometimes he will have to admit, if he is honest enough, that it’s not right. For all that the Talmud does not provide bottom lines, there is a kind of discourse that the Talmud instills in the halakhic world. And in that sense there is meaning to this framework that says the Talmud is binding, even though there are no bottom lines in it. And this art of walking between the raindrops in this way—in my view it is inspiring, truly. I stand amazed before this thing. It is an amazing phenomenon in my eyes, entirely unique. I think it has no equal. Really: a completely scattered world, living in entirely different places, thinking completely differently. They work with the very same text, with the same proofs, they send letters from one end of the world to the other. There is no overarching system like in an orderly state, with hierarchy and exchanges of views—nothing. There is some correspondence, and everyone speaks the same language. They learn a bit differently; there are methods of study; but they can speak. I bring you proofs, you answer me, you don’t answer me, you are persuaded, you are not persuaded—we are talking. That leaves some kind of community speaking the same language. It’s genius. It is an amazing phenomenon in my eyes. People don’t appreciate enough the power that there is in this. To me it’s amazing. Fine, in any case, let’s return to our matter. So the point is that formal authority ended with the Talmud; substantive authority can continue afterward as well. Formal authority—to the extent that one can even speak of it in the context of the Talmud, which is an open text. Now the question is: with respect to what is this said? As I said earlier, if you mix these two things together, then you basically say they were heavenly beings and they made no mistakes, and therefore one must obey them. But that’s for children. In the end the more reasonable explanation says that we accepted the Talmudic framework upon ourselves as binding. Not because there are no mistakes in the Talmud. There are quite a few mistakes in it—clearly there are. There are mistakes I can point to, and I assume from that that there are also mistakes I can’t point to, but statistically there were probably mistakes there in Jewish law too. They are human beings, and human beings can always make mistakes. But I accept it because it is the law. Meaning, just as I accept the words of the legislator because it is the law. That’s a somewhat more complex statement, but it is the correct one. And that statement preserves the distinction between formal authority and substantive authority. Why is that important? Because now I want to ask: what about authority regarding facts?

[Speaker A] And not regarding norms.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Regular legal authority, halakhic authority, deals with norms. Meaning, what is permitted and what is forbidden. It’s behavior, yes? What is permitted, what is forbidden, what you’ll be punished for—these are the regular halakhic rules. Regarding that, I defined the two types of authority: formal authority, substantive authority, all fine. But with respect to facts, one cannot speak of formal authority at all. There is room to discuss substantive authority, but one cannot speak of formal authority regarding facts. Even if Moses our teacher were standing here, it wouldn’t help. Why? Because if he imposed on me his formal authority in connection with the fact that there is formal authority—even if Moses our teacher were standing here and telling me there is formal authority, I wouldn’t accept it, because there is no formal authority, so I won’t accept it. The reason is: what does formal authority mean? Formal authority means: look, you think that such-and-such is permitted on the Sabbath. You may be right. But we said it is forbidden, so that is what you need to do. You do not have to think that we are right. What you think is your decision. If you have to think it, it won’t help. If you think we are not right, then we are not right—what difference does it make that you have to think so? What you think is that we are not right. Rather, what we demand from you is that you do it even though you think it is not right. That is the meaning of formal authority. Now when we are talking about facts, we are not talking about the question of what we should do; we are talking about the question of what we think and what we should think. But the question of what we should think—what does that even mean, ‘should think’? The question is what I think, not what I should think. Let’s say I reached the conclusion that there is no messiah—yes, now I’m getting to our example—I reached the conclusion that messiah is fiction; there’s no such thing. Fine? Now they tell me: that is heresy against a principle. Meaning, you are a heretic; there are thirteen principles, and one of the principles is belief in the messiah. Okay, so what can I do if I’m a heretic? What do you want me to do now? So what, I should now tell you that there is a messiah? But what I think is that there isn’t. So what good does that do? Formal authority regarding Jewish law can require me to behave in a way that I think is incorrect. That is a demand that is logically possible. One can accept it or not, depending on whether one recognizes that formal authority. But it is a demand that makes logical sense; it is not self-contradictory. But a demand for formal authority regarding facts is a contradictory demand.

[Speaker D] A heretic also has halakhic significance. What? A heretic also has halakhic significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but it starts with the factual question.

[Speaker D] And even if we don’t agree with the factual plane, still—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then lower me into a pit afterward and don’t pull me out—that’s another discussion. But first of all, what do you want from me? You say I’m a heretic? Okay, more power to you, so I’m a heretic. What am I supposed to do with that? After all, that’s what I think. So what are you telling me? That all our tradition says it isn’t so. Fine, our tradition says that, but I reached the conclusion that what our tradition says is wrong. What can I do? That’s my conclusion. What do you want me to do—that I shouldn’t think it? But that’s what I think. That’s a fact. That is what I think. And if in my eyes the fact is such, then even if everyone tells me you are forbidden to think that way, in my eyes that is the fact. What good does that do now? You can tell me a hundred thousand times—I very much want to obey you, I want not to be a heretic, I just can’t. This isn’t a demand I can fulfill. At most I can say verbally, ‘I believe with complete faith in the coming of the messiah.’ I can say it, move my lips if I’m able, but I can’t think it if I’ve reached the conclusion that it isn’t true. It won’t help. What can you say to me? You can come with substantive authority and not formal authority. Here there is room to discuss it. You can say there are very wise people, there are people who received information from Mount Sinai, I don’t know, they have other sources of information. And then what does that mean? Believe them, because they know better than you. Now here too this is not a simple claim, because if I’m persuaded that they know better than I do, then I’m simply persuaded that they are right, so there’s no need to tell me anything.

[Speaker A] But it’s a way of persuading you to think differently.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously. That’s why I’m saying this isn’t a question of authority. Rather, if you tell me that they know better than I do, and I really am persuaded that they know better than I do, then fine—I am simply persuaded that I was mistaken, no problem. That’s an argument. So it doesn’t come to me as some authoritative demand—

[Speaker D] But rather as another argument that persuades me that I was mistaken before, and now I understood my mistake. But I’m not persuaded they—how do they know this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They didn’t explain to you how they know it.

[Speaker D] It doesn’t matter to me. I’m persuaded it’s true—why does it matter how? I’m persuaded they are probably right. It’s like a doctor. I don’t know how, so what difference does it make? It’s like a doctor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know anatomy like the doctor. Right, right. So what’s the problem? But it’s still true what he says. Once I’m persuaded, just as he told me to take the medicine, I really believe the medicine works. Okay. I really believe the medicine works. I don’t know how it works, because I didn’t study medicine, but I’m persuaded that it works, so what’s the problem? I’m convinced the medicine works without knowing how. But still, my conclusion is that the medicine works. I’m not taking it because of authority; I’m taking it because I am persuaded that it’s true. I wasn’t persuaded through direct knowledge; I was persuaded by other means. Fine. Everyone has his own means of persuasion. A person can’t understand everything, so sometimes you rely on experts. That’s perfectly fine. So whoever thinks there are experts in the realm of thought—by the way, I’m not sure about that, but there are those who think so—fine, in my opinion that’s legitimate. But one must understand that this is not a concept of authority. What is it? I’m simply persuaded that it’s true. Fine. Whoever is persuaded is persuaded. It always sounds tautological. What is that? But you can’t come with claims against someone who isn’t persuaded. Because if he isn’t persuaded, what claim can you make against him? Tell him: they know better than you? If you manage to persuade me of that, I’ll be persuaded. But if not, what do you want from me? I don’t accept it. More than that: even a doctor who indisputably knows medicine better than I do—yes? If I am not persuaded, if I reach the conclusion that he definitely made a mistake here, it can’t be, I checked online, I researched, I don’t know, all sorts of reasons. I went to another doctor, whatever. All the doctors—I reached the conclusion that they are all mistaken—then I will not accept what they say. Maybe I’ll be doing something foolish, maybe I’ll be making a mistake, doesn’t matter. Nobody can come at me with claims. Since everything the doctors tell me is not by virtue of authority, but rather because they know, I’m supposed to accept what they say because they know better than I do. But if I have considerations that in my view are good enough and I don’t accept what they say, then no—nobody can come at me with claims. What—is there some prohibition against not accepting what the doctor says? That makes no sense. Because you don’t understand it, but if I decided I don’t accept it, then I don’t.

[Speaker A] Is it possible that in both cases—both formal authority and substantive authority—if you don’t accept it, the result is simply that you don’t belong to that group? Fine, you don’t belong—no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you don’t belong. End of story.

[Speaker A] No authority, yes authority.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Belonging—everyone can determine that for himself. I’m only saying that in the sense of a claim directed at me, trying to persuade me on the grounds that what I’m saying is heresy—that is not a relevant claim. That’s what I mean. You can afterward say lower me into a pit and don’t pull me out, afterward I don’t know what—say that I don’t get called up to the Torah, I don’t count for a prayer quorum, fine—that’s all about belonging.

[Speaker D] That’s also interesting for the person himself, who thinks that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He should jump into a pit and not come out? What does he want to do?

[Speaker D] Not join a prayer quorum. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He thinks he does join a prayer quorum.

[Speaker D] Why? If he sees that one of the beliefs is the coming of the messiah, and he doesn’t believe in it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, one of the beliefs? What, the Holy One, blessed be He, demands of me that I believe an untrue belief? I don’t understand.

[Speaker D] What? On that there is already formal authority.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where? What has formal authority?

[Speaker D] On the fact that anyone who doesn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Believe—where does that formal authority come from?

[Speaker D] If there’s no authority—is there formal authority of the sages to say such things?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where? Where is there formal authority from? Who said there is formal authority? There is no formal authority with respect to facts. None. Categorically. Not for the Talmud, not for the Sanhedrin, not for anyone.

[Speaker D] But here it’s already about behavior; it’s not about the facts themselves.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but it starts with facts.

[Speaker D] Someone says: I don’t think, in this sense, that the messiah will come.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the behavior is a result of norms. The halakhic norms here are a result of facts. So first discuss the facts. And regarding facts, nobody can demand that I accept that the messiah will come because the Sanhedrin decided that the messiah will come. If in my view the fact is that the messiah will not come, then the Sanhedrin can dance the hora—

[Speaker D] What do I care—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What they decided.

[Speaker D] True, they’re mistaken, true, they’re mistaken, but there is some formal authority.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What formal authority? To think that the messiah will come? But I am convinced he will not come.

[Speaker D] What do you want me to do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem. Let them lower me into the pit, that’s fine. What do you want from me?

[Speaker D] But I need to jump into the pit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s completely absurd. What do you mean, jump into the pit? I think they’re mistaken, the Sanhedrin—that there are things there that are nonsense. So what do you mean, jump into the pit? This isn’t one of the beliefs at all.

[Speaker D] Of course it matters, because a heretic—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is someone who does not accept what the Holy One, blessed be He, said.

[Speaker D] But the Holy One, blessed be He, did not say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That, because it’s nonsense.

[Speaker D] They are mistaken in the definition of a heretic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, right. So let them lower me into the pit; I’m not going to jump into the pit. But also formal authority—that you need to listen? Huh? But also formal authority. No. Formal authority exists only in areas that concern action. In areas that do not concern action, there is no such thing as formal authority. In fact—in fact—there is no such thing connected to formal authority. There is no formal authority, even for the Sanhedrin, even for those who in the halakhic context do have formal authority. It is all in the halakhic context. That’s what I’m saying. In the factual context there is no formal authority—not because we don’t have a Sanhedrin today. Even if there were a Sanhedrin today, the Sanhedrin cannot determine facts. If the Sanhedrin decides that now it is day, it won’t help—now it is night. I am not choosing that example accidentally. After all, there can be ‘left that is right’ and ‘right that is left.’ But this—there’s no such thing. Now, now it is night. No Sanhedrin standing here will help. Unless they persuade me that they are such wise and clear-sighted people that it’s a sign that I have some impairment in my vision and I’m not seeing things correctly. Fine—if they persuade me of that, I’ll accept it, no problem. I’ll accept it not because they are the Sanhedrin; I’ll accept it because I was persuaded. So there is never any claim here based on authority. At most you can use that as a persuasive argument. Then either you succeed in persuading or you don’t.

[Speaker E] Okay, and how is that different from commanding you to love, to hate, not to covet? Meaning, those too are matters of fact.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there it’s somewhat different. Because it may be that I can control my love and love someone whom naturally I might not have loved. But after I work on myself, I genuinely love him as well. Not that I work on myself in the sense of fooling myself. Those are also emotions, not facts.

[Speaker E] Yes, but you can create some kind of cognitive dissonance and cause yourself to believe something even though you’re not inclined to believe it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that I won’t do.

[Speaker E] You’re saying ideally you won’t do that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I won’t do that, because why should I believe something I think is not true? Wait, wait, wait—there’s an important point here.

[Speaker C] The Rabbi’s claim—is it a normative claim, that this is absurd, or a practical claim? Meaning, the claim is that it’s absurd.

[Speaker A] What is it logically, what is it logically?

[Speaker C] Logically it’s not, logically—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t demand that I think what I do not think. Because I do not think it.

[Speaker C] What does that have to do with logic? You can demand that I work on myself, cause myself to—why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Because to work on myself does not mean that I believe it.

[Speaker C] After you work on yourself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—even then I won’t believe it, because I worked on myself. You can demand that someone hypnotize me and cause me to believe in the coming of the messiah. After that hypnosis, I still do not believe in the coming of the messiah. That is not called that I believe in the coming of the messiah. Someone hypnotized me. That’s a Talmud in Berakhot 9. The Talmud says there—‘and they emptied Egypt’—‘the one who says against their will, against whose will?’ One teaching says against the will of Israel; another teaching says against the will of the Egyptians. Fine? So the Talmud there says: what does ‘against the will of the Egyptians’ mean? So the Talmud says there—I don’t remember the details, look there on page 9—the Talmud says there what—

[Speaker A] It says. I’ll try to find it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Berakhot. Berakhot, the first chapter. Which tractate do we have here, in these sets that—ah, here, Berakhot. ‘And they borrowed’—yes, 9b. Rav Ami said: this teaches that they lent to them against their will. Some say against the will of the Egyptians. The one who says against the will of Israel—because of the burden. Israel didn’t want to carry this on their backs, so they gave them all this equipment against Israel’s will. And against the will of the Egyptians—it is written, ‘the comely abode divides the spoil,’ meaning they turned their minds around so that they would give to Israel as though of their own will, yes? The Holy One, blessed be He, somehow changed their attitude, hypnotized the Egyptians, persuaded the Egyptians, basically, that they really love Israel and should give them all these things, and this is called against the will of the Egyptians. Why is it against their will? After all, that is what they want. After the hypnosis, that is what they want, right? No—that is called against their will. So after you hypnotize me and I believe in the messiah, that doesn’t mean that I believe in the messiah; it just means hypnosis. That’s not me.

[Speaker C] So if so, then likewise also regarding the commandments of love and hatred one should say the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because there I myself do that work. I really think one ought to love him, because if the Holy One, blessed be He, says one must love the convert, then one really must love him. The fact that my personal tendency is not to love him—then I need to work on myself in order to love him, because I truly believe that I should. That’s not the same thing. Therefore I will work on myself in order to—again, work on myself not in the sense of lying to myself. Work on myself in the sense that I will actually work, ethical refinement, work on myself in order to do what I truly think ought to be done.

[Speaker A] No, because you believe that you ought to. Yes, exactly, I genuinely believe it. So now I’m trying to internalize within myself what I truly think ought to be.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why do you truly believe?

[Speaker C] You truly believe that it’s important to believe what the Sanhedrin said, even though—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. I believe that it’s important to believe—not belief in the thing itself; that’s not the point. So I fulfill the commandment of belief in what the Sanhedrin said, but I do not fulfill the commandment of belief in the messiah. That’s not—because I do not believe in the messiah. I begin by saying that here too you fulfill that you love the convert—you fulfill the love of God who commanded. No, I love the convert. Do you reach a state where you really love him? Yes. After I worked on myself, I reach a state where I really love the convert. What do you mean?

[Speaker A] And then you really love him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I worked on myself—that doesn’t mean I tricked myself. I worked on myself means through ethical self-work, not by lying to myself.

[Speaker E] In any case, the question doesn’t even start there, because even if they demand that you work on yourself, that demand itself has no formal authority because it is based on facts. It draws from a fact, as though you need to believe in a certain fact—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which in my view is not true.

[Speaker E] Yes, so that demand itself has no force with respect to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I said. That’s what I’m saying. No—you’re trying to explain—

[Speaker E] No, if I understood correctly, you’re saying you can’t work on yourself. I’m saying not only can’t you—you also need not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously. No, obviously, I also need not. It’s the same thing; those are two sides of the same coin. And even if I work on myself, I still don’t believe it. It’s not a matter of inability. On the contrary, clearly there is no room for such a demand at all. It’s irrelevant. It’s not what I think. At most you can say: he is mistaken and compelled by his own understanding. That’s why I also say that they need not lower me into the pit either—but that’s another question.

[Speaker C] But maybe similarly the commandment—maybe the demand does not refer to the belief being truly deep and consistent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a matter of depth and consistency. That is not called believing something.

[Speaker C] Not called belief, fine—maybe to place it in one’s mind, to lodge it there. To lodge it in the mind—maybe someone who held that one can say there is such an obligation meant that. Meaning that in practice you should think this way about it—that it is so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So on that point, he’ll have to persuade me on that point, because I do not accept that definition. To believe something is to believe something, not to lodge something in your mind.

[Speaker D] To lodge in the mind—I once heard that regarding whether something is called selecting or not selecting. Is there formal authority for—yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Formal authority not to think that it really is selecting. Formal authority not to do it,

[Speaker D] Not to do it because the Sanhedrin said that this is selecting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To act in accordance with the fact that the commandment is… but I don’t agree with the Sanhedrin.

[Speaker E] With what they said, because it’s not a fact that it’s selecting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a fact. From my perspective, if you ask me what I think about selecting, that’s a fact. There, there is no authority. But as for what to do, there can be authority. The Knesset also doesn’t tell me what to think; it

[Speaker A] tells me what to do or what not to do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You may think a law of the Knesset is wrong, but you’re obligated, you do it. You’re allowed to think it’s wrong; nobody requires you to think it’s right. You need to do it. And this is simple—it’s logic. It has nothing to do with law or with halakhic thinking. I just think it’s logically impossible.

[Speaker A] The issue of belief in the messiah doesn’t obligate you to anything practical. You don’t have to do anything as a result of it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—even if you had to, say, believe… not to say it and not to think it—that’s not doing something.

[Speaker A] If you were obligated to do some action, say, to go to some quiz once a year and pray that he should come.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even then you’d be obligated. Even then, I think I still wouldn’t have to do it. Why? Because it rests on a fact. No, because it starts from a fact. Obviously, it’s not called praying for the coming of the messiah if I don’t think he’ll come. It’s like not praying to offer a sacrifice.

[Speaker D] To offer a sacrifice so that he’ll come.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not called offering a sacrifice so that he’ll come. What good would it do? He won’t come. This action—you need to do this formal action? What? This formal action? I wouldn’t do it. You’re asking whether one must—I wouldn’t do it. No, and you also don’t have to, because it’s an obligation that rests on a fact. I wouldn’t… I wouldn’t do it. Wait, and you also don’t have to, but because you said earlier

[Speaker D] that every

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] obligation that rests

[Speaker E] on a fact also has no formal validity. That’s my claim.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, the Sanhedrin could come and say: no, we think the obligation has validity even apart from the fact. Even if you don’t believe the fact, do what we say, even though it relates to a fact. Yes? Killing a louse on the Sabbath. Even though you’re sure that a louse does reproduce, and in fact it’s an ordinary living creature, but the Sanhedrin tells you: kill the louse now on the Sabbath in order to uproot from the hearts of heretics who think that a louse reproduces. Fine, kill the louse now on the Sabbath. So now the question is whether that instruction has validity. Understand? Because they’re sure that a louse does not reproduce. Good question. I’m not sure. I think not.

[Speaker C] Ah, that’s already a further stage. It’s not… it’s not connected to what you said earlier, that it’s impossible to do that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s why I said it. Here they can make that demand. I don’t think, for example, that the instructions of the Talmudic text have validity when it’s clear to me they were given on the basis of a factual mistake. In my view they have no validity. They have no validity. You don’t even need a religious court to revoke them.

[Speaker D] What’s the difference between a mistake about what Rabba said and a mistake about what Rav… what? What’s the difference between a mistake that Rabba assumed and what Rav held?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no difference. Correct, there too there is no authority.

[Speaker D] So with regard to what mistakes do we accept formal authority?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A halakhic mistake. Something in thought, in calculation? In interpretation, in exposition, in… I don’t know, whatever they did there. A halakhic mistake. I think that such-and-such a thing may be done on the Sabbath, but they derived from an exposition or a reasoning that it is forbidden. I think it is permitted, but I won’t do it on the Sabbath. They have authority.

[Speaker D] Where’s the difference between that and reality?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in reality it’s impossible. It’s logic. It’s not… I have no halakhic source for what I’m saying now. It’s simply a logical distinction.

[Speaker C] You can’t demand that I think what I do not think. No, no, no—not think. What’s the difference between saying that if it seems to me they erred in matters of interpretation, then I need to do what they say even though I think they erred, and saying that if they erred in reality and from that arrived at a norm?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since interpretation—interpretation yields norms. And when in the Talmudic text… and when in the Torah there is a concept of authority for the sages, then I say: if there is a concept of authority—which itself is open to discussion, but it is written—if there is a concept of authority for the sages, then apparently it is only norms. I see no logic in extending that somewhere else. Therefore I say: where the norms come on the basis of a factual mistake, if they themselves had understood the facts correctly they too would not have said it. So no—their instruction has no validity in that case. Someone can say that it does; most halakhic decisors say that it does. So it’s not an absurd thing to say. I don’t think so. I said—but that’s another side issue, another whole topic.

[Speaker D] And does this also depend on whether I myself would join the prayer quorum, whether I myself would join the prayer quorum or go down into the pit? What? And does this also depend on whether I myself would join the prayer quorum…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, but that’s not the same thing. Because with joining the prayer quorum, the problem is the wickedness involved in it. Or the breaking away from the community involved in it.

[Speaker C] But breaking away from the community can also be with prayer quorums.

[Speaker D] What difference does it make?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What difference does it make what you call it, some category? What difference does it make? Because this rule is a mistaken rule. What do you mean? This rule is based on something the Holy One, blessed be He, did not say. So if I don’t believe in what the Holy One, blessed be He, in any case did not say, then there’s no breaking away from the community in that at all. It’s breaking away from the community of fools. Someone who leaves the community of fools does join the prayer quorum. On the contrary, maybe they don’t join the prayer quorum.

[Speaker C] You can’t join a prayer quorum with them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I can join a prayer quorum with them because I’m a liberal; I’m prepared to accept even fools in a prayer quorum. But they can’t accept me. According to my view, they can throw me out, but I say: I don’t feel I have a problem joining the prayer quorum. In any case, the claim is that regarding facts, formal authority has no meaning. Regarding substantive authority, there it depends. Either we were convinced or we weren’t convinced. If we were convinced that they really understand better than we do, and if they say it then it’s probably right—we were convinced. Then the question doesn’t arise. But assuming we weren’t convinced, then what do you want me to do with the fact that he’s a great sage? There are great sages in every direction saying lots of things, all kinds of great sages. Really great sages, I’m not saying this dismissively. What am I supposed to do with that? As they always say, the Steipler—once they gave me the Steipler’s book Chayei Olam. Yes, I was in a yeshiva week in some yeshiva in Bnei Brak, I was still in Midrashiya… when I was a kid, they sent us for a yeshiva week to Ohel Yitzhak.