Agency Matters – Lesson 1

Table of Contents

• The lecture format and preparation
• The Mishnah in Kiddushin and the types of agency
• “It is more of a commandment when done by oneself than through an agent” and examples from preparing for the Sabbath
• The two versions in the Talmud: mere preference versus an actual prohibition in betrothal through an agent
• The woman’s agency and the reasoning, “Better to sit as a pair than to sit alone as a widow”
• A father who betroths his daughter: an adolescent girl versus a minor girl
• Tosafot on the prohibition from the man’s side even when the receiving agent belongs to the woman
• The rulings of Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh: combining preference and prohibition
• Whether “more of a commandment when done by oneself” depends on a formal commandment: the Ran, HaMakneh, and the Mishnah Berurah
• The Raavad’s innovation: repeating betrothal after an agent was used

Summary

General overview

The lecture sets out a learning format of two consecutive weekly classes and aims to deal with the foundations of the laws of agency against the backdrop of the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin. The lecturer opens with the Mishnah, “A man betroths by himself and through his agent,” and examines why the Mishnah repeats “by himself and through his agent,” explaining Rav Yosef’s answer, “It is more of a commandment when done by oneself than through an agent,” through examples of preparing for the Sabbath. He then presents the two versions in the Talmud regarding whether, in betrothal through an agent, there is only a preference or also a prohibition, and he clarifies the implications for the man, the woman, and a father who betroths his daughter, while analyzing Rashi, Tosafot, Maimonides, and the Shulchan Arukh. Throughout the lecture he argues that “it is more of a commandment when done by oneself than through an agent” reflects a broad principle in the service of God and not necessarily a formal rule in agency or in commandments, and he concludes by presenting the Raavad’s innovation about betrothal being repeated in order to complete an enhancement that was diminished through agency.

The lecture format and preparation

The classes take place on Sunday at two o’clock and on Tuesday at ten, and participation is intended for both classes consecutively. The lecturer asks participants to send him a WhatsApp message so he can add them to a group where preparation sheets, sources, and recordings will be sent. He recommends going quickly through the Talmudic text in Kiddushin 41a to roughly 43b so as to come with background for the topics.

The Mishnah in Kiddushin and the types of agency

The Mishnah presents three laws: a man betroths either by himself or through his agent, a woman becomes betrothed either by herself or through her agent, and a man betroths his daughter while she is an adolescent girl either by himself or through his agent. The lecturer identifies the first as an agent for delivery, the second as an agent for receipt, and the third as an agent for receipt on the side of the betrothed woman, with the father acting as a guardian. He asks why it is necessary to say “by himself and through his agent,” when the very possibility of using an agent already implies that the sender can act himself.

“It is more of a commandment when done by oneself than through an agent” and examples from preparing for the Sabbath

Rav Yosef answers that the duplication comes to teach that it is preferable as a commandment to do it “by himself” more than “through his agent,” and the Talmud brings proofs from Rav Safra and Rava, who personally prepared Sabbath needs such as “scorching the head” and “salting the shibuta fish.” Rashi explains that one who engages physically in the commandment receives “greater reward,” and the lecturer emphasizes that the Sabbath examples show that this is a general principle and not something unique to betrothal. He argues that the rule is not a law of agency, nor even a formal law of commandments, because it can apply even in situations that do not require agency and even in actions that are basically a “monkey’s act,” like placing an eruv.

The two versions in the Talmud: mere preference versus an actual prohibition in betrothal through an agent

The second version adds that in the man’s betrothal there is also a prohibition: “A man is forbidden to betroth a woman until he sees her,” out of concern that “perhaps he will see something unseemly in her and she will become repulsive to him,” which would violate “Love your fellow as yourself.” The lecturer suggests that the second version does not cancel the idea of preference but adds to it a prohibition when a man betroths through an agent without seeing her. He points to the way the Talmud shifts Rav Yosef’s statement to the latter clause of the Mishnah in order to introduce preference in a case where there is no prohibition.

The woman’s agency and the reasoning, “Better to sit as a pair than to sit alone as a widow”

The shifting of Rav Yosef’s statement to the latter clause leads to the wording, “It is more of a commandment when done by her than through her agent,” and to the removal of the prohibition in the woman’s case, “in accordance with Reish Lakish,” because “better to sit as a pair than to sit alone as a widow.” The lecturer emphasizes that even though with regard to the woman there is no prohibition stemming from the concern that she may become repulsive to him, there is still a preference that she act herself, and he sees this as proof that the term “commandment” here is being used in a broad sense of serving God and not necessarily in the sense of a formal positive commandment. He notes that there is a tendency to overextend the idea of “better to sit as a pair,” and argues that the presumption does not mean that a woman is completely indifferent to the choice of spouse, but only that generally this is not enough to invalidate the betrothal.

A father who betroths his daughter: an adolescent girl versus a minor girl

The Talmud infers from the Mishnah’s phrase “when she is an adolescent girl” and supports the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav: “A man is forbidden to betroth his daughter when she is a minor until she grows up and says, ‘I want this particular man.'” The lecturer explains that with an adolescent girl there is no prohibition as there is with a minor girl, because an adolescent girl has the capacity to consent and to authorize her father, whereas with a minor the concern is more severe. He notes that Tosafot distinguish between an adult woman who consents on her own and a minor girl who is betrothed by her father, and they add a customary reason, “because each day exile grows harsher upon us,” to justify the betrothal of minor girls in certain periods.

Tosafot on the prohibition from the man’s side even when the receiving agent belongs to the woman

Tosafot ask that when the man gives the betrothal to the woman’s agent, still “he has not seen her,” so there should be room for a prohibition from the man’s side. They answer that the Mishnah “is speaking from her perspective,” and therefore highlights the preferred commandment on the woman’s side, while the prohibition on the man’s side has already been learned from the first clause. The lecturer concludes that in practice the principle of preference and the principle of prohibition can coexist, and the distinction in the Talmud follows whichever side the Mishnah is dealing with in that specific law.

The rulings of Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh: combining preference and prohibition

Maimonides, in the laws of marriage, rules that “it is a commandment for a man to betroth his wife by himself,” and likewise that there is “a commandment upon the woman,” and he adds that it is “not proper” to betroth one’s daughter while she is a minor until she grows up and says, “I want this particular man.” He also writes, “A man should not betroth a woman until he sees her,” out of concern for divorce or a life of hatred. The lecturer explains that Maimonides presents the preference as a general principle and adds a separate prohibition connected to the concern that “perhaps she will not find favor in his eyes.” The Shulchan Arukh states that a man may appoint an agent, but “if it is possible for him to betroth her himself, it is forbidden to betroth her through an agent” unless he already knows her; nevertheless, “it is a commandment that he betroth her himself.” In parallel, regarding the woman, it emphasizes a commandment without a prohibition. With regard to betrothing a minor girl, the Shulchan Arukh writes, “It is a commandment not to betroth,” and the lecturer presents a dispute among later authorities as to whether this wording reflects a prohibition, as in the Talmud, or merely a preference.

Whether “more of a commandment when done by oneself” depends on a formal commandment: the Ran, HaMakneh, and the Mishnah Berurah

The Ran explains that the preference is learned specifically from the latter clause because there there is no concern of prohibition, and he even explains the term “commandment” in the woman’s case by saying that she helps the husband fulfill his commandment. HaMakneh finds it difficult to say “commandment” where there is no obligation of procreation for the woman, and proposes another source of commandment such as “He created it to be inhabited,” or to view betrothal as a commandment of the “permitting” type, similar to slaughter, separating terumah, and sending away the mother bird. The Mishnah Berurah defines preparation for the Sabbath as a law of “honoring the Sabbath,” which is itself a commandment, and in that way brings the examples of “scorching the head” and “salting the shibuta fish” into the framework of a formal commandment. The lecturer presents this as a tendency to narrow the rule to the laws of commandments, while expanding the definition of “commandment” in order to include the examples in the Talmud.

The Raavad’s innovation: repeating betrothal after an agent was used

The Rivash brings in the name of the Raavad that one who betrothed a woman through an agent should go back and betroth her again, “because it is more of a commandment when done by oneself than through an agent,” and he even discusses whether to recite the blessing again. The lecturer explains that this innovation assumes a certain deficiency in the result of the betrothal done through an agent, not just a deficiency in the quality of fulfilling the commandment, and therefore there is room for an additional, more enhanced legal effect. He compares this to discussions about beautifying commandments, such as taking a more beautiful etrog after already having fulfilled one’s obligation, and to similar questions discussed by medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim), and he concludes by asking people to send WhatsApp messages in order to receive materials, a summary, and the recording.

Okay, first of all, hello. We’re basically learning in two consecutive classes each week, meaning one continues the other. Right now it’s Sunday at two; at first it was supposed to be at twelve, but it got switched to two, and Tuesday at ten. Okay? So in principle, whoever participates is doing so on the understanding that he’s participating in both classes. We’re going to study a bit, touch as much as possible on the laws of agency. We don’t have many meetings until Yom Kippur, but we’ll try to touch a bit on the foundations of the laws of agency, with the Talmudic text that forms the background here being, of course, the beginning of chapter two of tractate Kiddushin. I suggest—we won’t go in the order of the Talmudic text—but I do suggest that you run through the Talmudic passage a bit, so that it’ll be in the background and we can talk more freely about the things that appear there. I’ll try to send you sources before the classes so that you can prepare a bit, get yourselves ready, and that’ll also give you a bit of occupation for your study hours on the days you devote to this topic. Okay? On the days you devote to this topic. Fine. So basically, as I said, at the beginning of the chapter—that is, the beginning of chapter two of Kiddushin—really from folio 41a, which is the Mishnah at the start of the chapter, until about the middle of 43b, that’s more or less the sugya of agency. It also appears a bit afterward, and in the middle there are a few things that aren’t exactly agency, but broadly speaking that’s the passage that deals with matters of agency. And as I said, we’d be happy if you had the Talmudic text in the background; go over it quickly just to see what’s going on there, and if we need to get into a particular section I’ll send it in the source sheets beforehand. What I actually want for this purpose—if you can send me—does everyone have WhatsApp? Yes? So if you can send me a WhatsApp message, I’ll add you to the group, and there I’ll send the preparation sheets and the relevant materials. I’ll also upload the recordings of the classes there, so if someone missed a class or something, he’ll be able to make it up. So just write down my number: zero five two—I’ll write it here for all Israel to see. All right? Uh, one second. All right? Now you can see it. Okay. I think it’s also on the institute website, so you can find it there too, but send me a message as quickly as possible so I can already start sending materials. If there’s someone else you know is supposed to participate in the class and for some reason didn’t come today, tell him to send me a WhatsApp too so he can get into things as quickly as possible. Okay? Fine.

All right, so at the beginning of the chapter, the Mishnah itself deals with agency in betrothal. And the Talmud discusses a topic that seemingly deals with agency; as we’ll see later, apparently not really, but from within that passage we’ll also be able to illuminate certain aspects of the topic of agency. Since you didn’t prepare for this class, I’ll deal with that passage even though it doesn’t directly concern agency, but I’ll also use it to shed light on something that does concern agency. So maybe I’ll start with the Mishnah. All right, this is the Mishnah, you can see it, right? “A man betroths by himself and by his agent; a woman becomes betrothed by herself and by her agent; a man betroths his daughter when she is a young maiden, by himself and by his agent.” So there are three laws here: “A man betroths by himself and by his agent” — that’s what’s called an agent for delivery, right? The man sends an agent in order to betroth the woman. The woman—an agent of the man who betroths is an agent of delivery. He delivers to the woman what? He delivers—wait. I don’t know if this enlarges too? No. Where can this be enlarged? Yes. Okay. All right? “A man betroths by himself and by his agent” — that’s the agent for delivery. “A woman becomes betrothed by herself and by her agent” — that’s what’s called an agent for receipt. Right? The woman receives the betrothal; this also exists in divorce, doesn’t matter, this is an agent for receipt. “A man betroths his daughter when she is a young maiden, by himself and by his agent.” We’ll see later why it says specifically a young maiden and not a minor; seemingly with a minor too it’s possible, but—but what is this? What type of agent is the third one? There’s something else here. What, agent of delivery, receipt, other—what? Receipt. Right? Because “a man betroths his daughter” means this is really the woman’s agent, not the agent of the man who betroths, but the agent of the woman being betrothed. It’s just that here the guardian of the woman being betrothed is the father. But fundamentally it’s an agent for receiving betrothal, not for giving betrothal. Okay? So, an agent of receipt.

And regarding all three of these laws in the Mishnah, we’ll see later what the difference is between these types of agents, and there are substantive differences between them. Why does it need to mention these three agents at all in the Mishnah? But the Mishnah, I assume, isn’t coming to teach us that a man can betroth a woman. Okay? That’s a simple assumption, that he can. It’s coming to teach that he can also betroth through an agent. Okay? And that the woman can also become betrothed through an agent, and that the father of a young maiden can also betroth through an agent. So on that the Talmud indeed asks: “Now if he betroths by his agent, is there any need to say by himself?” Meaning, if he can betroth by means of an agent, then certainly he himself can betroth. As I said earlier, basically you didn’t come to tell me here that betrothal is possible, that there is such a concept as betrothal. That I assume. Okay? As the Talmud says at the beginning of Berakhot—the Talmud there says, yes, “From when do we recite the evening Shema?” So the Talmud asks there: “Where is the tanna standing?” Meaning, who said we recite the evening Shema at all? First tell me that we recite it, and then tell me when. No—it’s obvious: the tanna is standing on the verse. What does that mean? The Torah already says that we recite the evening Shema. Now I’m only coming to tell you the laws of when we recite it. So here too, the Mishnah isn’t coming to tell me that there is such a concept as betrothal. I know that. I also know it from chapter one—this is chapter two—but I also know it from the Torah; that needn’t be told to me. So what is it coming to tell me? Agency.

Fine, if it’s coming to tell me agency, then why does it write “by himself and by his agent”? Right—“Now if he betroths by his agent, is there any need to say by himself?” That’s much stronger than a mere a fortiori argument. Meaning, if there were no such thing as betrothal, then it would make no sense to talk about agency for betrothal. If you’re talking about agency for betrothal, then by implication you can understand that the concept of betrothal certainly exists—that the husband can betroth a woman. That’s much more than a kal va-chomer. Okay? Rav Yosef said: “There is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.” Meaning, it comes to tell me that there is a value in his doing it himself, more than when he does it through an agent. Fine, that’s the novelty; that’s why it mentions “by himself” and not only “by his agent.” Like Rav Safra would singe the head, and Rava would salt the shibuta fish. We have examples: we know that the great amoraim would personally do the preparations for Sabbath. Right? Salting the fish, singeing its head—all these actions for Sabbath. On weekdays apparently they weren’t the ones doing it in the kitchen, but for Sabbath they would do the preparation, the food preparation, themselves. What do we see from here? That there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.

Fine, we’ll still talk about these examples and their meaning, because it’s not entirely clear what exactly these examples are doing here. But that already gives us some hint about what “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” means. Because we might have thought this is a specific rule regarding betrothal. “There is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent”—for example, what might be the reason that in betrothal it is preferable for him to betroth personally and not through an agent? For example, what the Talmud says immediately afterward: “A man is forbidden to betroth a woman until he sees her.” As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: A man is forbidden to betroth a woman until he sees her, lest he see something objectionable in her and she become repulsive to him, and the Merciful One said: “Love your fellow as yourself.” Then I might have thought maybe that is the reason it is better to betroth by oneself than through one’s agent, and that this is really a rule specific to betrothal. Why is it obvious that this is not the explanation here? Because then it would make no sense to bring the examples, like Rav Safra singeing the head and Rava salting the shibuta fish. If this were a rule specific to betrothal, why are you bringing me proofs from preparations for Sabbath? So it’s quite clear that we’re dealing here with some general principle, not a law specific to betrothal. What? That’s another question—we’ll discuss it later.

Okay, so Rashi here indeed explains—can you see it? Yes. “There is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” — because when a person’s own body is involved in the commandment, he receives greater reward. Meaning, if a person is involved in the commandment himself, not through an agent, then he receives more reward. Where did Rashi get the idea that this is really the Talmud’s point? Why doesn’t he say that a person should betroth the woman himself so that she won’t become repulsive to him? As I said earlier—because of the examples. The examples that Rav Safra singed the head and Rava salted the shibuta fish make it clear that this is a principle that applies to all commandments, not specifically to betrothal. Right? So Rashi says: what is the idea here? If you are personally involved in the commandment, then yes, that’s something more choice, you honor the commandment more, and you deserve more reward. Again, the reward here is apparently an indicator. There is some more excellent form of commandment here. The practical upshot is the consequence of the fact that you receive more reward for it.

Now here’s a remark. Seemingly, already at the beginning of the Talmudic discussion we know—we see—that the Talmud already knew that there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent. It didn’t need to innovate that. How do I know? Because the Talmud said: “Now if he betroths by his agent, is there any need to say by himself?” What’s the assumption here? That “by himself” is stronger than “by his agent,” right? If you say that by his agent it’s possible, then by himself certainly it is possible. So actually the Talmud already at the start assumed that “by himself” is something stronger than “by his agent.” That means this assumption—that there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent—the Talmud seemingly already assumed from the very first question. There’s an issue of possible or impossible, and there’s an issue of commandment or not commandment. No—but why possible? Possible or impossible is binary. Either it’s possible or it’s impossible. And the Talmud says: if by his agent, then certainly by himself. Why is that certain? Anything an agent can do, the principal can do. Meaning the principal is stronger than the agent, right? Stronger—and indeed he does it and receives more reward for it. Okay, that’s a formulation I can accept more. What the Talmud assumes in the objection is that the husband, or the person himself, has more power to effect the legal status than his agent does. That doesn’t necessarily mean that when he does it he receives more reward for it. Maybe it means that the legal effect is superior if he did it himself rather than through an agent—superior from the standpoint of outcome. We’ll see later.

Simply speaking, there’s no such thing as “more superior” here: either there is betrothal or there isn’t betrothal. There’s no type-A betrothal and type-B betrothal. We’ll see later that perhaps there is. But for now let’s leave that. In any case, for our purposes, when the Talmud asks at the beginning it is speaking about the very application of the betrothal. And it says that obviously if an agent can create betrothal, then certainly the person himself can create betrothal. The question which commandment is of higher quality and for which one receives more reward is a completely different question. Here the question is: who has greater legal power? There the question is: who is serving God better? Not the same thing. Two completely different things. Therefore Rashi says that this is really only the Talmud’s conclusion. In the initial assumption, the Talmud understood that the person’s power is greater than the power of his agent to effect the betrothal. And it remains with that—that initial assumption is correct. His power is stronger than that of his agent. So why does the Mishnah say “by himself and by his agent”? Why does it need to say both things? In order to say that also from the standpoint of reward, or the quality of the commandment, the fulfillment of the commandment—not the result, not the betrothal itself, but the quality of fulfilling the commandment—when a person does it himself, that is more than when his agent does it. Okay.

Now even so, of course, also in the answer, when the Talmud says that “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent,” it does not mean that the commandment takes effect in a more superior way. Right? “There is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent,” as Rashi explained, and as emerges from the plain sense of the Talmud, does not deal with the quality of the result of the betrothal, how excellent the betrothal is. It deals with the question: what is the quality of the fulfillment of the commandment? Okay? Did you fulfill the commandment in a more choice way or not? What? If he did it himself, from a legal perspective is it stronger? Why? So if he made a mistake, then it will be void, but if he didn’t make a mistake and it took effect, then it took effect—what’s the difference? So if he has complaints, let him complain, and in the end there won’t be betrothal if, say, the agent didn’t act according to his intent: “I sent you to rectify, not to distort.” And you’re suggesting something else, but again that also doesn’t really concern betrothal. Then it’s always better to do things yourself and not via an agent, because later there can be problems. So that is still a general principle. So Rashi says no—because singeing the head and salting the fish, it would be hard, I think, to fit your explanation into those examples. Okay? Therefore Rashi says no, the explanation is different. In any case, we are dealing here with an explanation that is general and not a special rule for betrothal.

More than that I’d say: not only is it not a special law in betrothal, it’s also not a law in agency. It’s not a law in agency; it’s a law in how commandments are fulfilled. When you do the commandment with your own hands, it’s more choice than if you do it through someone else. Suppose there is a commandment that can be fulfilled not through an agent. Someone else fulfills the commandment for me without being my agent. Know an example of that? Redemption of the firstborn, maybe? Right—all things that are called a “monkey act.” “Monkey act” means: placing an eruv, for example—there’s a distinction between boundary eruvin and courtyard eruvin—but placing an eruv, for example, the Talmud says, is a monkey act. You can send a minor, you can send a monkey to place the eruv in the right spot. Okay? What does that mean? It still has to place your eruv in the location so that the eruv takes effect. Okay? So what does that mean? That no agent is needed at all here. Now if I did it through someone else—a monkey, a minor, an adult, doesn’t matter, someone else—would we also say there that there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent? Certainly yes. It has nothing to do with the laws of agency at all; rather it is preferable that you do the commandment yourself. It has nothing to do with the laws of agency.

So I say this is not only not a law specific to betrothal, it’s also not a law specific to agency. This passage isn’t dealing with agency at all; it deals with how to fulfill divine service in the best way. Yes, another example is circumcision. According to the Or Zaru’a and Tosafot Rid, circumcision is not an obligation on the father; the father’s obligation is only to see to it that his son will be circumcised. He has no obligation to circumcise him personally. The practical difference, for example, is that he does not need to appoint the mohel as his agent, because it need not count as though I did it. What I need is only to see to it that there be a mohel—in other words, to see to it that my son is circumcised. That is the commandment. Therefore the mohel does not need to be my agent. Okay? The main thing is that I saw to it that the son is circumcised. And still, I assume, “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” would be said there too.

One of the proofs of this—we’ll see later—is: what are “salting the shibuta fish” and “singeing the head”? What commandment is he fulfilling with that? Preparing for Sabbath? Maybe he’ll have what to eat on Sabbath, so that’s delight of Sabbath, but the preparations for that are maybe only a preparatory act for a commandment; they aren’t the commandment. So why is this an example of “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent”? There is no commandment either in doing it oneself or through one’s agent; at most it is preparation for a commandment. Why is “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” said here? Because this doesn’t really have to do with—more than that I’ll say: simply speaking it’s also not agency. When I hired a cook or a housekeeper to salt the fish for me for Sabbath, I don’t need to appoint them as my agent. There isn’t some legal status that I need to effect, and then when my agent does it, there is a rule of “a person’s agent is like himself,” and it’s as though I effected the legal status. There is no legal status here at all; I need to have food for Sabbath. A monkey act, as I said before. Okay? So it’s not a commandment, and there’s no agency there. Later we’ll see that these two things are connected. So it’s not a commandment and there’s no agency there, but even there the Talmud says that the principle “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” still applies. Why? Because that principle is a principle in serving God—it’s not even a law about commandments. It’s not a law about agency, not a law about betrothal, not a law about anything. It’s a law in divine service. If you invest yourself and do the service of God yourself, that has greater value than if someone else does it for you. Not specifically because of the laws of agency or not agency—it has nothing to do with agency. There is simply value in doing it yourself. Right? “Abraham arose early in the morning and saddled his donkey.” He got up early, and on that the Torah praises him, that he hastened to do the will of his Creator himself—he saddled his donkey with his own hands. Why? Because there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent. Okay?

So the Talmud goes on: “Some say…” “Some say that in this there is even an element of prohibition, in accordance with Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav,” as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: “A man is forbidden to betroth a woman until he sees her, lest he see in her something objectionable and she become repulsive to him, and the Merciful One said: ‘Love your fellow as yourself.’” So this “some say” is the second version. What is it saying? What do you mean, it’s not merely that there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent. If you do it through an agent, there is a prohibition. Not only is there a preference for doing it yourself rather than through an agent, but if you do it through an agent there is an actual prohibition. Why? Because that’s what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: a man is forbidden to betroth a woman until he sees her, lest he see something objectionable in her and she become repulsive to him, and the Merciful One said: “Love your fellow as yourself.” So this second version apparently disagrees with the first, and says that really the first version says this is only preferable, there is no prohibition, and the first version does not accept the rule that a man is forbidden to betroth a woman without seeing her. A dispute—that’s what it seems at first glance from the Talmud. Okay? The second version says there is a prohibition here. What about the preference? Does the second version also disagree with the first, or only the first with the second? In the plain sense, it seems that the second version accepts the first. It is preferable to do it oneself rather than through an agent; he’s just saying: don’t tell me that—tell me something stronger. There’s even a prohibition here, not merely a preference. He doesn’t say there’s no preference. He says it’s not only a preference, but there’s even a prohibition. And the dispute is asymmetric. The first version apparently does not accept that there is a prohibition. The second version does accept that there is a preference. Okay? That’s what seems from the wording of the Talmud.

How does the Talmud know that the first version wasn’t talking about a prohibition but about something else? First of all, from the wording: “There is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent,” not that there is a prohibition against using an agent. Second, from the fact that this is not a rule specific to betrothal, because Rav Safra singeing the head and Rava salting the fish are examples of this idea of “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.” So therefore, as I said earlier, it’s clear that there we are talking about some general principle in commandment-fulfillment overall—not specifically betrothal, not specifically agency, all those things. Here, by contrast, it’s a specific law in betrothal. In salting the fish and so on, you can’t apply the second version, right? This is a specific law in betrothal, that in betrothal there is even a prohibition if you do not do it yourself. So the Talmud says: “And when Rav Yosef said this, he said it regarding the latter clause.” What’s Rav Yosef? Rav Yosef who said “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent”—here. Like Rav Yosef: “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent,” like Rav Safra and so on. So what Rav Yosef said was said regarding the latter clause.

Meaning, the first version—you have to understand the structure of the Talmud here—the first version is not Rav Yosef. The first version is what our neighbors would call the anonymous editors of the Talmud, the “stammaitic” layer, the editorial department of the Talmud, they’d call them. Meaning, the Talmud itself brings a first version, and in the first version they attach Rav Yosef to the first clause. Now comes the second version, which does not disagree with Rav Yosef. It’s not that Rav Yosef is the author of the first version, because after all the second version says: no, Rav Yosef is referring to the latter clause. Meaning both versions accept Rav Yosef; the whole question is what Rav Yosef was talking about. Okay? So the dispute between the first version and the second version is a dispute between editorial layers, not between Rav Yosef and another amora. The question is what Rav Yosef was referring to—that’s the dispute. Okay?

So the second version essentially says that Rav Yosef is speaking about the latter clause: “When Rav Yosef said this, he said it regarding the latter clause: ‘A woman becomes betrothed by herself and by her agent.’ Now if she becomes betrothed by her agent, is there any need to say by herself?” This whole version replays the entire move, but now on the latter clause. Okay? Rav Yosef said: “There is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent,” like Rav Safra singing the head and Rava salting the fish. “But in her case there is no prohibition,” in accordance with Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish said: “It is better to dwell as a pair than to dwell as a widow.” And how did you solve the problem by assigning Rav Yosef to the latter clause? After all, what bothered you in the first clause? In the first clause, what bothered you was: what are you talking to me about preference? There there is even a prohibition. Therefore you had to say that Rav Yosef is speaking about the latter clause. Well—and in the latter clause it’s not like that? In the latter clause it’s only a preference and not a prohibition? The Talmud says yes, it’s only a preference and not a prohibition. Why? Because from the woman’s point of view, even if she doesn’t see the man, there is no prohibition in becoming betrothed, because he has not become repulsive to her: “It is better to dwell as a pair than to dwell as a widow.” A woman is willing to settle for a relationship in general. Meaning, at this point even if she discovers he has some defects, still that means she is willing. In other words, there is no problem with that.

From the standpoint of preference for the woman, of course there still is. It is still preferable to do it herself rather than through an agent. Why? We said: in the second version, it accepts the preference; it just says there is also a prohibition and also a preference, right? So in the first clause the second version says there is a preference and also a prohibition. Therefore there is no point in assigning Rav Yosef’s words to the first clause, because in the first clause—what are you telling me preference for? There is even a prohibition. So you assign them to the latter clause. Why? Because in the latter clause there is only preference and no prohibition—sorry, there is preference and no prohibition. There is preference and no prohibition. Why is there no prohibition? Because “it is better to dwell as a pair.” Why is there preference? “There is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent,” right? Like any other commandment: there is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent.

I’ll already note here: what commandment? Is betrothal a commandment for the woman? Even if betrothal is a commandment, it’s a commandment on the husband, not on the woman. So here, what is “there is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent”? There is no commandment at all. On the husband? According to most opinions there is no commandment of betrothal at all. It’s commonly thought that this is a dispute between Maimonides and the Rosh—we’ll see later, I don’t think that’s correct. A preparatory act for a commandment? What? Preparation for what? Procreation? But procreation also isn’t commanded for the woman; a woman is not commanded in “be fruitful and multiply.” Maybe in “He created it to be inhabited,” but not in “be fruitful and multiply.” For the husband, it is commonly thought that betrothal is a permit or a preparatory act for the commandment of procreation, but for the woman there is no commandment of procreation and therefore no betrothal commandment either. For his sake? Fine, but what is “there is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent”? This is the strongest proof of what I said earlier: that “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” does not really speak in the category of commandments at all. There is obviously value in procreation for the woman too, right? “He created it to be inhabited” is the halakhic expression, but obviously the value of procreation exists for the woman too. There is divine service here. It is just not a positive commandment in the formal sense, like a time-bound positive commandment. Women are exempt from time-bound positive commandments, right? But according to almost all halakhic decisors, there is value in a woman doing them. There’s a dispute whether she may recite the blessing or not, but that a woman should perform them—almost all decisors say it is fitting for her to do so, and there is value there as divine service. It’s just not a positive commandment in the formal sense. So what will happen with time-bound positive commandments—is there a value that the woman do them herself and not through her agent? Certainly yes. Like with the fish, what? Like with the fish. Right, exactly, like what I said earlier with the fish, but here I’m giving internal proof. With the woman, even in betrothal—not only with the fish—there is no commandment. Not procreation, and not even preparation for a commandment; there’s no procreation, no betrothal, nothing. So what is “there is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent”? Why is there preference? I understand why there’s no prohibition, but why is there preference? Because the issue of preference has nothing to do with commandments at all. Not with agency and not with commandments. It has to do with divine service. It is a principle in divine service that in serving God it is preferable that you do it yourself rather than through someone else. It doesn’t matter whether he is an agent or not, it doesn’t matter whether this is a commandment or just something of value in divine service—there is an idea of “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.”

By the way, the term “mitzvah” in this context really is being used in a broader sense, not necessarily commandment in the formal sense of a positive commandment. “Mitzvah” here means divine service, and you see this in several places in—like on the street today, when you say “you did a mitzvah,” you don’t mean that you fulfilled positive commandment number 265. Okay? You mean that you did a good deed, right? So also in the Talmud it turns out in several places that when they speak of a mitzvah they mean a good deed; they do not mean commandment in the formal halakhic sense that one fulfilled a positive commandment. And “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.”

Practically, what comes out here? Let’s explain these duplications to ourselves. So according to the—according to the second version. According to the first version, Rav Yosef is talking about the first clause, about the husband’s betrothal. He apparently understands that there is no prohibition; there is only the preference of “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent,” but there is no prohibition on betrothing a woman through an agent. So why is there “by herself and by her agent” in the latter clause? There too it’s only preference. Well, but the preference was already learned in the first clause, so why—why does it say “by herself and by her agent” in the latter clause? I don’t know, maybe by the flow of the language, yes, since it said “by himself and by his agent” in the first law, it said the same thing in the second law and in the third law. For the father? No, not the father—I’m talking about the woman, the second law. What is called here the “latter clause” is the second law, the middle clause. Maybe because with the woman the novelty is greater: there is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent. What? With the woman the novelty is greater because it isn’t even a commandment, as you’re saying. It could be there’s a nuance here that says: for the husband one could still have thought this is really a commandment—betrothal, or at least preparation for the commandment of procreation. For the woman it isn’t even that, not even preparation for a commandment. It’s just something of value, so they taught you that even something of value—even there. Nice, maybe that’s a good idea. It could definitely be. And then “like Rav Yosef, Rav Safra singeing the head and Rava salting the fish,” emerges from the Mishnah. From where did Rava and Rav Yosef and Rav Safra learn it? From this duplication in the Mishnah, where one sees that even a thing that is not a commandment still has value if you do it yourself more than if you do it through someone else. So that is according to the first version.

According to the second version, the “by himself and by his agent” of the first clause comes to teach that there is a prohibition, and the “by herself and by her agent” of the latter clause comes to teach Rav Yosef’s preference. Right? But in the first clause too there is preference. The preference exists, just not only preference—there is also a prohibition. Right? In the first clause. In the latter clause there is only the preference; there is no prohibition, because “it is better to dwell as a pair.” Okay? But if in the first clause there are both, both the preference and the prohibition, then how can you learn from there the prohibition? Maybe it’s the preference. After all, there are both there—how do you know it means the prohibition? Maybe it really means only the preference? And then you’re omitting the main thing from the text: you came to teach the prohibition, but you can’t teach the prohibition because there is also preference there. It’s not reasonable to say there is only the prohibition—we’ve seen that that can’t be. There is no reason that in the husband’s case there should not also be preference in addition to the prohibition of “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent,” like with the woman—even more so.

Maybe because of the repetition. What I asked earlier about the first version: why do you need “by himself and by his agent” in both the first clause and the latter clause? Apparently because the latter clause comes to teach the preference and the first clause comes to teach the prohibition. Because of the repetition. And apparently they don’t accept your suggestion in the first version—which I also hadn’t thought of; I was captive to the second version—that the latter clause also teaches preference, but preference in the woman’s case is a greater novelty, and that’s why it’s there. The second version doesn’t accept that, and that works out excellently for the second version, because the second version really sharpens the point that this has nothing to do with whether this is a commandment or not. So really, what difference is there between “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” for the husband and for the woman? The only difference is that with the husband there is a commandment and with the woman there isn’t. But if the whole idea has nothing at all to do with commandments, only with divine service, then there really is no reason we should need a special novelty for something that is not a commandment as opposed to something that is. Because from the outset there is no difference. That is the whole idea of the second version, okay?

The Talmud says there is no prohibition for the woman because “it is better to dwell as a pair.” Right? Therefore in the woman’s case there is no prohibition with the woman’s agent. So she doesn’t even prefer to see the husband? She is willing after the fact even if it turns out he has boils or whatever, full of defects. Well, all the more so. Let’s take it to the limit. No, but I’m saying: why are you telling me that in the woman’s case there is no prohibition because “it is better to dwell as a pair”? Also for the woman it would be preferable—he can become repulsive to her, right? So that she won’t want the marriage because of that. But he can become repulsive to her if she discovers he has defects, right? So why does “it is better to dwell as a pair” exempt that? Presumably the Talmud understands that because of “it is better to dwell as a pair,” there is no prohibition here. Certainly she would prefer, so from the standpoint of preference it could definitely still be that the preference is that he not become repulsive to her—we saw that earlier. After all, there is the preference of “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.” The prohibition is “lest he become repulsive to her.” Now with the woman too there is concern that the husband will become repulsive to her, but because of “it is better to dwell as a pair,” that does not rise to the level of prohibition. At most it adds to the preference. Meaning, there is a preference that the woman do it herself and not through an agent. From the woman’s side, that preference is not only because “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent,” but also because of the concern that he may become repulsive to her. But in her case, because of “it is better to dwell as a pair,” that concern does not rise to the level of prohibition. For the husband there is no presumption of “it is better to dwell as a pair”; there, he may find her repulsive, and there is a real prohibition here. Okay? For the woman it is only an additional factor to the preference.

More generally, I’ll perhaps note that there is a tendency among halakhic authorities to exaggerate a bit the idea of “it is better to dwell as a pair.” Quite a lot, I’d say—not just a bit. Meaning, there is some assumption that the woman doesn’t care about anything, as long as she has a spouse. So therefore even a man with severe afflictions—whatever you want. Ah? That’s an assumption of the Talmud, yes. Right, so I’m saying that people take it to an extreme and say this is the nature of women and it will never change. They don’t stop for a moment to look at what women actually prefer. Do a survey today and ask women if they are really willing to marry absolutely anyone. Obviously not. Meaning, this presumption today has been emptied almost entirely of content. There isn’t such a major difference between women and men—I think there is some slight difference on average from my impression—but certainly not some categorical difference that a woman is ready to accept any spouse, doesn’t care who. Better than remaining alone. Ah? Better than remaining alone. There are many women who prefer to remain alone and won’t agree to marry partners who don’t suit them, even if there are no major defects. They simply don’t suit them, there’s no chemistry. Today it is clearly different. I’m saying this as a continuation of not taking “it is better to dwell as a pair” too far. So it does not mean that the woman is totally indifferent as to who her partner will be. Clearly she has preferences; she would want to see him and express her view. The claim of “it is better to dwell as a pair” only means that it does not void the betrothal if she did not see him, because the presumption is that at least she wants a spouse to the degree that she will not nullify it. That does not mean she is agreeable to anyone at all and has no preference for one person over another. Okay? Therefore it could be that this simply adds to the preference. From the woman’s side, “it is better to dwell as a pair” only means there is no prohibition here; the concern lest he become repulsive to her simply adds to the preference.

What? If he finds her repulsive, he can divorce her? No, no—here we’re not talking about the legal effect at all, and that’s exactly what I’m saying. We’re talking about “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.” This is not about the application of the betrothal itself. It isn’t dealing with that plane at all. Even regarding the husband there is room to discuss this. So if she becomes repulsive to him, he can divorce her—what’s the issue? What is the concern “lest she become repulsive to him”? After all, the husband can divorce, the woman cannot. That’s easy—he can divorce, that’s a transgression. Or—he has to pay the ketubah. So you’re basically saying the concern is financial loss to the husband. But then it says, “Love your fellow as yourself,” and that doesn’t fit. So there are two possibilities. One possibility is that he may indeed divorce her, and the Torah also does not want that. It does not want a person to marry and divorce. Right? “Whoever divorces his first wife, even the altar sheds tears over him.” And second, of course, the plain meaning of the Talmud is “Love your fellow as yourself,” meaning not necessarily to the point that he will divorce her—especially since earlier we spoke of a case where he divorced and then could not marry another. So it doesn’t necessarily reach the point where he divorces her. But even if he doesn’t divorce her, he will live with her while she is repulsive to him, and then he is not fulfilling “Love your fellow as yourself.” That is the concern.

Look at Maimonides in Laws of Marriage, chapter 3: “It is a commandment for a man to betroth his wife himself rather than through his agent, and likewise it is a commandment for a woman to betroth herself personally rather than through her agent. And even though a father has permission to betroth his daughter, whether she is a minor or a young maiden, to whomever he wishes, it is not fitting to do so. Rather, it is the commandment of the sages that a man should not betroth his daughter when she is a minor until she grows up and says, ‘I want so-and-so.’ Likewise, it is not fitting for a man to betroth a minor, and he should not betroth a woman until he sees her and she is acceptable in his eyes, lest she not find favor in his eyes and it turns out he divorces her or lives with her while hating her.” Two possibilities: either the concern is that he will divorce her, or the concern is that he won’t divorce her—that is, it won’t get that far, or he doesn’t want to lose the ketubah, doesn’t matter; keeping her costs more than the ketubah, so I don’t know if that’s really the calculation—but he will continue to live with her while hating her.

Now the Talmud says: “A man betroths his daughter when she is a young maiden.” When she is a young maiden, yes; when she is a minor, no? This supports Rav, as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, and some say Rabbi Elazar: “A man is forbidden to betroth his daughter when she is a minor until she grows up and says, ‘I want so-and-so.’” Here the Talmud does not deal with the question why it says “by himself and by his agent.” “A man betroths his daughter when she is a young maiden, by himself and by his agent.” Here the Talmud does not ask why it says both “by himself” and “by his agent.” Why not? Then the Talmud says: yes, but why a young maiden? What about a minor? After all, with a minor too? No—with a minor there is even a prohibition. With a young maiden there is no prohibition; with a minor there is a prohibition. Why is there no prohibition with the young maiden? Because this is an agent for receipt, not for delivery. An agent in relation to “it is better to dwell as a pair.” We’re talking about the father, not the husband. The father betroths his daughter, meaning we are here on the woman’s side—either the woman sends an agent or the father sends an agent on her behalf. There there is no prohibition, only preference. Therefore with a young maiden there is no prohibition. But with a minor it turns out that even from the minor’s side there is a prohibition—not merely preference, but a prohibition. Why? Because “until she grows up and says, ‘I want so-and-so.’” A young maiden knows how to empower her father, and she is willing even not to see the man intended for her. But with a minor, the father does it against her will. It’s not that she empowered him. There no—it may be that there not only is it preferable, but there is an actual prohibition. Maybe because as she grows up he can better know her mind too. But in any case, she has no legal capacity yet to agree. The young maiden, even if she does not see, empowered her father and agrees. At least the preference may apply, but the prohibition that perhaps he’ll become repulsive to her does not apply, because she relies on her father. But a minor does not rely on her father; he does it against her will. She has expressed no will, and even if she did, it doesn’t matter because the will of a minor isn’t legally significant. So she has no legal capacity. There in fact there is a prohibition. It’s sort of upside down: precisely because she is a minor, where one might think the father can do whatever he wants—no. Precisely because of that, there is a real prohibition there, just like with the husband’s agent of delivery.

What about “by himself and by his agent”? Why does it say “by himself and by his agent”? By the flow of the language from the first clause—just by the flow. Then why not also say in the second case too that it’s just by the flow? Here in the Mishnah you already have an unnecessary “by himself and by his agent”; so say, fine, in the second case too it’s like that. What’s the great difficulty with it repeating twice? After all, you could think: the father is her agent, and now he appoints another agent. So you might say that maybe he can’t appoint another agent, that he has to do it himself. Himself? Yes. Then you’d need to say “by his agent”—that he can do it himself and also through an agent. So say only “by his agent”; “by himself” is obvious. Why? If his agent can, why can’t he? If not, then neither can. But if the agent can, then he certainly can. I think here it’s not so difficult, because the novelty is that it’s specifically a young maiden and not a minor. They tell you “by himself and by his agent” with a young maiden, but with a minor: by himself yes, by his agent no. So you need to say “by himself and by his agent.” Again, “by his agent no” doesn’t mean it won’t take effect. “By his agent no” means there is a prohibition. All right? Not that it won’t take effect. It’s not talking about legal effect; it’s talking about prohibition. Okay? So here it isn’t difficult why it says “by himself and by his agent.” “A man betroths his daughter when she is a young maiden by himself and by his agent” comes to tell you: when she is a young maiden, it is by himself and by his agent; when she is a minor, only by himself. Okay? You could have said: “A man betroths his daughter when she is a young maiden by his agent,” and then with a minor you would understand that not. But to sharpen it, it’s no longer difficult why “by himself and by his agent” is used. The fact that it is both by himself and by his agent is because she is a young maiden; with a minor it is only by himself, not by his agent. All right?

Why is it permitted if she is a minor and he does it himself? After all, he too is in some sense acting for her. She still doesn’t see her intended husband, because the father is really only her agent. It could be that “by himself” means together with her—they’re in the same place. So if he betroths, presumably she is there too, I assume. But when you send an agent, it’s as though it’s being done elsewhere, not where she is and not where he is, so she does not see. And there is a prohibition because she is a minor, seemingly. In Tosafot: “A man should not betroth his daughter when she is a minor.” We said that with a minor, perhaps even by himself he can’t? “Until she grows up and says…” You’re saying that even if she says she wants, if she says it as a minor, that still isn’t enough. It could be that it is enough—maybe not ideally, but then there wouldn’t be a prohibition. No prohibition, so it could be that ideally one should not do it, as I said in the second law. All right, all these are remarks that the Talmud doesn’t address, but there is room to wonder about them.

Tosafot says: why, in the case of a minor, is the presumption of “it is better to dwell as a pair” not enough? So he says: “A man is forbidden to betroth his daughter when she is a minor. And even though above it said that there is no prohibition because ‘it is better to dwell as a pair’—that applies only to an adult woman who becomes betrothed by herself, because once she consented there is no concern that she will retract. But a minor who becomes betrothed by her father—there is concern that if she were an adult she would not have consented. As for the fact that nowadays we practice betrothing our daughters even while they are minors, that is because day by day the exile presses upon us,” and so on. And when you do it for the good of the minor, then it is indeed permitted. Therefore this is not a problem in the legal effect of the betrothal. If it were a problem in the legal effect of the betrothal, it would not help that the exile is pressing upon us. Rather, this is like an enactment of the sages for orphans. The sages told the father: take care of the minor; don’t do this without her knowing. If the mother saw to the minor and that is what compels me to betroth her while she is a minor, then it is all right. So that is not what was being discussed. Okay? But from Tosafot, what did I understand from the Talmud? “When she is a young maiden, yes; when she is a minor, no.” As though he can’t betroth her. No—he can betroth her, it’s just prohibited. A father can betroth his daughter when she is a minor; he can, it’s just prohibited. The betrothal still takes effect. The legal effect of the betrothal does apply. It’s a prohibition because of the concern lest she become repelled; it’s some sort of concern. It’s not something that prevents the legal effect of the betrothal itself.

There’s another Tosafot that I didn’t show you. What happens with the woman’s agent? If the woman’s agent comes and the husband betroths her through her agent, then there’s no prohibition, right? Only preference. It’s only preference and not prohibition. Why no prohibition? Because “it is better to dwell as a pair.” But when the husband betroths through his own agent, there is also a prohibition—why? Because he didn’t see her. And if he betroths through an agent of receipt, then he did see her? It’s true that the agent is the woman’s agent, but the husband still hasn’t seen the woman. So true, from the woman’s side there’s no prohibition, but from the husband’s side there is. So Tosafot says—and by the way, this is not forced; what he says appears in many places. Maybe here because the woman initiated it? You’re saying maybe because she initiated it? Yes—the opposite: if she initiated, it’s even easier. But if she didn’t really initiate, it’s even worse; he probably isn’t exactly buying premium merchandise. “It is better to dwell as a pair,” says Tosafot in two ways: “And if you ask: here too, with regard to her, there is also a prohibition, because when he gives the betrothal to her agent, he has not seen her?” Right, he didn’t see her. Even if it’s her agent, he hasn’t seen her. He says: “In any case, the Mishnah speaks from her side—that she becomes betrothed by herself and by her agent. Therefore, what the tanna taught with ‘by herself’ was to inform us of the preference. But a prohibition with regard to her there is not. However, in the first clause, which speaks from his side, it taught ‘by himself’ because of the prohibition.”

In other words, in the end, everything applies both in the first clause and in the latter clause. And even in the latter clause, when the woman sent an agent for receipt, it is not only preference—there is also a prohibition. The prohibition is from the husband’s side. From the woman’s side there is no prohibition because of “it is better to dwell as a pair.” From the husband’s side there is a prohibition. What the Mishnah says, however, refers only to the woman, because it already stated the prohibition in the first clause, so there is no need to repeat it. What is said in the latter clause is only the matter of preference. Okay? Practically, there is both preference and prohibition in both the first clause and the latter clause.

Halakhic summary. What does Maimonides say? “It is a commandment for a man to betroth his wife himself rather than through his agent.” By the way, often—just in connection with the previous Tosafot—people infer that when Maimonides says some prohibition is, say, “because of extinguishing”—wait, but what about cooking? Never mind, just some example. Okay, he was discussing the laws of extinguishing, so he says that it is prohibited because of extinguishing. Don’t infer from here that it is not also prohibited because of cooking. Meaning, sometimes one speaks of one particular aspect because that’s the aspect under discussion. Here too, they are discussing the aspect of the woman, so they say there is no prohibition. That doesn’t mean from the husband’s side there isn’t a prohibition in such a case. That simply wasn’t the issue here. Here they dealt with the woman’s side.

Maimonides. What? Yes, that’s obvious and also very logical. I’m saying, this is simple common sense. No, I’m saying there is no point in making those inferences. Again, it depends on context. But if the context clearly is dealing with that aspect, then the fact that they said that aspect does not mean there is no other aspect. If in the context it’s not clear that they are dealing specifically with that aspect, and they say there is a prohibition of extinguishing, then you can infer that apparently there is no prohibition of cooking. But if the whole sugya deals with prohibitions of extinguishing, then you can’t infer anything from there. Yes, but if some simple person reads it plainly he says: if there isn’t a prohibition, it’s permitted. Then let the simple person go to a rabbi and learn how not to read like a simple person. He reads it straight without interpretation, and if someone did this—what, is it forbidden for him to do it if she married a husband…? She doesn’t violate a prohibition, but that doesn’t mean the husband may. The husband violates a prohibition; she does not, even if the husband is virtual. That’s how Maimonides writes it, to calm the husband? If the husband reads it he says: if not, it’s permitted. But read the first clause! In the first clause it says you need to see her. What, did you forget the first clause when you moved to the second, actually the middle clause? The Mishnah and Talmud must be read not with the reading of simpletons; they must be read by someone who knows how to read. In the Mishnah of Sabbath, the laws of carrying on Sabbath—taking out and bringing in—there too it’s a matter of “do not place a stumbling block,” right. Same idea: they’re not dealing with the laws of “do not place a stumbling block”; they’re dealing with the laws of carrying in and out.

Fine. Maimonides says: “It is a commandment for a man to betroth his wife himself rather than through his agent, and likewise it is a commandment for a woman to betroth herself personally rather than through her agent.” Up to here—wait a second—how is Maimonides ruling? Seemingly like the first version, no? There is no prohibition when the husband sends an agent, whereas the second version says there is a prohibition. Only when the woman sends an agent is it preference; when the husband sends, there is a prohibition. Maimonides seems at first glance to rule like the first version. Like the first version, which says that “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” applies both to the husband and to the woman. Maimonides is also precise in his language. By the way, this is a general rule in Maimonides, unlike the other medieval authorities where one has to be careful with inferences from language. Usually, making fine inferences from wording in the medieval authorities is often just casuistry. They don’t really write with that kind of precision; they say roughly what they mean. But with Maimonides, one of the rules is that he is precise in his wording. So if the Talmud says “commandment” versus “prohibition” and he says “commandment,” then it is probably commandment and not prohibition. That only sharpens further what I said when we read the Talmud, that the first version and second version are two versions that disagree with one another. And seemingly Maimonides rules like the first version, whereas usually we rule like the latter version. Also in the Talmud itself, if I read it plainly, I’d understand that the Talmud concludes according to the second version, simply because it remains at the end as the apparent conclusion, even though it doesn’t say explicitly “refuted” or “the law is” or anything like that, but by the flow it seems more likely that the second version is the practical law.

But look at the continuation: “And even though a father has permission to betroth his daughter, whether she is a minor or a young maiden, to whomever he wishes, it is not fitting to do so. Rather, it is the commandment of the sages that a man should not betroth his daughter when she is a minor until she grows up and says, ‘I want so-and-so.’” So the phrase “it is not fitting” refers only to a minor, not to a young maiden, right? He says: “Even though a father has permission to betroth his daughter, whether she is a minor or a young maiden, to whomever he wishes, it is not fitting to do so.” That “it is not fitting” refers only to a minor, not to a young maiden, although he mentioned both. How do I know? Because he says: “Rather, it is the commandment of the sages that a man should not betroth his daughter when she is a minor until she grows up and says, ‘I want so-and-so.’” What about a young maiden? No problem—there is no prohibition, but there is preference. He already said that earlier, right? Just no prohibition. Okay.

Further: “Likewise, it is not fitting for a man to betroth a minor, and he should not betroth a woman until he sees her and she is acceptable in his eyes, lest she not find favor in his eyes and it turns out he divorces her or lives with her while hating her.” What is this? Why is he repeating himself? He is explaining “it is not fitting.” It is not fitting for him to betroth a minor—and also not to betroth a woman. But the woman you already mentioned above. That too is a prohibition. Right. So he rules like the second version, not like the first version. But what is he saying? And notice, all this is precise. A prohibition? No—“it is not fitting” is the prohibition. The prohibition here is not a negative commandment. What? Fitting to betroth a woman and not to betroth? Right. No, “it is not fitting” and “he should not betroth” also a woman. A minor whom her father betroths is like a woman from the husband’s side. As in the Talmud—it’s in the Talmud. The Talmud says this. From the husband’s side. Right? We said “not fitting.” No—prohibited. There is a prohibition. “Not fitting” is the prohibition. The commandment not to do it is preference. “Not fitting,” or “prohibited”—here “prohibited” doesn’t mean a formal negative commandment; it means “not fitting.”

What is Maimonides really saying? He rules like the second version, and he precisely sharpens the point we discussed when we read the Talmud. Through divine inspiration he saw what I’m going to tell you. Namely: the second version does not disagree with the first version. The second version agrees that when the husband sends an agent there is preference; it just says that in addition there is also a prohibition. But there is also preference. And that is exactly what Maimonides writes here. First he brings the law of preference, and says that the law of preference exists both with the husband’s agent and with the woman’s agent. All right? Besides that, with the husband’s agent there is also a prohibition, and with a minor there is also a prohibition. He is simply summarizing the Talmud, that’s all. Nothing beyond that. It’s just that—you have to read the Talmud with determination and sensitivity, yes? The second version doesn’t talk only about prohibition. The second version talks about the prohibition in addition to the preference, and the preference still remains. And that’s what Maimonides says there: that there is both preference and prohibition. Okay?

The Shulchan Arukh, for example, is very careful with the wording and the distinction. It says: “A man may appoint an agent to betroth a woman for him, whether an unspecified woman or a particular woman, and the agent says to her: ‘Behold, you are betrothed to so-and-so.’ But if it is possible for him to betroth her himself, it is forbidden to betroth her through an agent, unless he knows her, lest afterward he find in her something objectionable and she become repulsive to him. In any case, even if he knows her, it is a commandment that he betroth her himself, if possible.” What is this? First of all, he is speaking about the halakhic principle that one can appoint an agent for betrothal. Right? That’s not our issue. That agency exists in betrothal. Okay? Whether an unspecified woman or a particular woman, and so on. “But if it is possible for him to betroth her himself, it is forbidden to betroth her through an agent.” If you can’t, then send an agent. But if you can, betroth her yourself—and here the language is already “forbidden.” Like the Talmud, right? With the husband’s agent it really is forbidden. “Lest afterward he find in her something objectionable and she become repulsive to him.” “In any case, even if he knows her, it is a commandment that he betroth her himself, if possible.” Why? Because there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent. Exactly. He understands that both things are present. He rules like the second version, that there is a prohibition with the husband’s agent. But the existence of a prohibition doesn’t mean there is no preference—there is also preference. Both things. Therefore if you know her, then you’ve solved the issue of prohibition because she won’t become repulsive to you; you know her. So send an agent, no problem. But you still lose the matter of preference—that there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent. So in fact the Shulchan Arukh too is like Maimonides, although here he is more careful about the distinction between prohibition and commandment.

What about the woman, the woman’s agent? At the beginning of section 36—this was in section 35—at the beginning of section 36 he writes: “A woman may appoint an agent to receive her betrothal, and it is a commandment that she become betrothed by herself if she can, but there is no prohibition, unlike in the case of the man.” All right? So completely like Maimonides. The wording is a bit different, the division of the laws is a bit different, but they both summarize—they rule like the second version and say that the second version also recognizes that there is a preference; it simply adds a prohibition in addition. Okay?

Notice regarding a father who betroths his minor daughter: in section 37, “It is a commandment not to betroth one’s daughter while she is a minor until she grows up and says, ‘I want so-and-so.’” Strange phrasing, a bit. “It is a commandment not to betroth”? It should say it is prohibited to betroth. “It is a commandment not to betroth” sounds like preference. But with a minor we saw in the Talmud that it’s prohibited, right? Gloss: “And some say that nowadays our custom is to betroth our minor daughters because we are in exile,” and so on. Yes, that’s the Tosafot we saw. So the Chelkat Mechokek there says: “‘It is a commandment not to betroth his daughter while she is a minor’—that is, even though in the Talmud they said it is forbidden to betroth his daughter, still if he says to her, ‘Go and receive your betrothal,’ there is no prohibition. In any case, it is a commandment to wait until she grows up.” If she goes herself and receives the betrothal—meaning if she sees the husband—then there is no prohibition. Not like what we saw in the Talmud. And he wants to argue that only if she sees the intended husband, even though she is a minor and has no legal capacity, then there is no prohibition. Betrothing a minor is prohibited only through an agent.

I remind you what I said: why does it say “by himself and by his agent” in the latter clause of the Mishnah? I said because the prohibition with a minor is only through his agent, not by himself. And the novelty isn’t that it says “by himself and by his agent”; the novelty is that “by himself and by his agent” applies only to a young maiden, but with a minor it is only “by himself” and not “by his agent.” You said: but with a minor, even if the father betroths, what difference does it make? She still doesn’t see the husband. No—she does see the husband. And you told me yes, but if she sees the husband then what’s the issue? She still doesn’t have legal capacity, so why do I care that she agrees? She’s a minor. Here, he says that I do care. Meaning that if the minor agrees, then it’s all right, and in any case there remains a commandment to wait until she grows up. Exactly what I told you. Meaning, if the minor agrees, then true, she has no legal capacity, but there is already no prohibition. Right, she can regret it later when she grows up, but it’s not complete—still, the basic rationale remains somewhat similar. There is just concern that perhaps she isn’t yet fully formed, so it doesn’t rise to prohibition, but still ideally there is a preference. This thus adds to the preference in the case of a minor, although there is no prohibition. So it adds to the preference. Okay? That’s the Chelkat Mechokek.

But in Beit Shmuel there he says: “It is a commandment not to betroth”—yes—and there are minors who do have understanding. He too says that if a minor has understanding, then there may be no prohibition. “And as for the fact that he wrote ‘it is a commandment,’ while in the Talmud it says ‘forbidden,’ the Chelkat Mechokek wrote that this is where he says to her, ‘Go and receive your betrothal,’ and then there is no prohibition. But that is forced, because he did not mention that he is speaking where he tells her ‘go’—why are you making such an interpretive narrowing in the Shulchan Arukh? Is the Shulchan Arukh speaking about a case where he tells the minor, ‘Go and receive your betrothal’? He speaks generally about when a father betroths his daughter; he does not limit it specifically to where he says to her, ‘Go and receive your betrothal.’ Rather it seems that the law is not in accordance with Rav who says there is a prohibition with a minor. No—we don’t rule like Rav who says there is a prohibition in the case of a minor. That was not ruled as practical law. For we find many cases in the Talmud where they would betroth minors.”

I’m not one hundred percent sure that all their inferences and all these disputes are really well founded. Meaning, it may be that when the Shulchan Arukh writes “it is a commandment not to betroth his minor daughter,” he means a prohibition. Unlike Maimonides, the Shulchan Arukh is not so precise in his wording. Wait, but the Beit Shmuel, when he brings the Shulchan Arukh, says that now in exile we do this—implying that he understands the Shulchan Arukh to think there is a prohibition, no? No, he says there is a preference. Nowadays we don’t pay attention even to the preference, according to his reading. He is speaking only about preference, and as for preference, today we don’t pay attention to it. And what about Tosafot? It depends how you read it. He brings it to explain the prohibition. I understand, but I’m saying it depends how you read this statement. I’m saying, all these inferences are somewhat problematic. In Maimonides there really is a rule that he is precise in his wording; in the Shulchan Arukh, absolutely not. But to change the wording of the Talmud? If the Talmud says it is forbidden, then why turn it into “it is a commandment not to betroth”? That means prohibited—a negative commandment is also a mitzvah, a commandment not to betroth. Not from the language—from the Mishnah? A negative commandment is also a mitzvah. No, because in the Mishnah there is nothing to infer, there’s no issue there. No, the Mishnah says nothing; the Talmud does. It says “he betroths by himself and by his agent.” Sure, but the Talmud talks about the prohibition and the preference and all those things; there is no hint of that in the Mishnah. No, they didn’t add anything; they interpreted the Mishnah. Here he reads only the Mishnah. But he doesn’t read only the Mishnah. We don’t read the Mishnah without the Talmud. Certainly not for practical law. Fine, therefore I’m not entirely sure about this matter.

Now, as I said earlier, the rule “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” plainly is not said specifically about commandments. As I said, singeing the head and salting the fish, and so on, plainly are not commandments. What about betrothal? With betrothal, for most medieval authorities it is not a commandment; it is a preparatory act for the commandment of procreation. “When a man takes a woman” is not language of a positive commandment. “When a man takes a woman.” And “when he finds” regarding divorce—what, only divorce is a commandment? Betrothal is just a preparatory step so that you’ll later be able to divorce her? The common approach among halakhic authorities and medieval authorities is that there is no commandment; it is a preparatory act for a commandment. However, it is commonly thought that Maimonides does disagree with this. Maimonides and the Rosh, brought by the Beit Yosef at the beginning of Even Ha-Ezer, says that Maimonides holds that this is indeed a commandment. How do we know? Because he counts betrothal among the positive commandments. And that is, of course, no proof at all. Because in Maimonides’ list of positive commandments he also counts positive commandments that are definitional. There, positive commandments 95 and 96—positive commandment 95 is annulment of vows, that the husband annuls his wife’s vows. Maimonides says, when you read this, don’t think it means there is some commandment to annul, or that one who did not annul transgressed anything. Nothing. It is just a rule that if he annuls, the vow is annulled on the day he hears it, and according to the rules, then it is annulled, and if not, not. That is a definition. So why is it a positive commandment? Because for Maimonides, in the Book of Commandments there also appear “commandments” that are definitions. Where if you didn’t do them you did not fulfill a commandment nor neglect a positive commandment. Rather it is simply a definition: if he annulled the vow, the vow is annulled. What? No, he says it in the commandment itself. In commandment 95 he writes it. He includes it in the list of commandments. Never mind what—what does he call it? How does he classify it? He classifies it… what does that mean, classify? There are commandments of this sort that are laws. So why is it called a law? Let’s look. I’ll open it for you.

Positive commandment… let’s see. There are two principal commandments where he explains this: 95 and 96. Positive commandment… wait. Maybe it’s 95. Yes, 95 and 96. Commandment 95: “He commanded us to adjudicate the annulment of vows.” Meaning: the Torah instructed us to adjudicate these laws. “The point is not that we are obligated under all circumstances to annul”—not that there is an obligation to annul. “And understand this point from me whenever you hear me counting one of the legal rules among the commandments.” That’s the point you made. “For there is no command in one of the actions necessarily; rather the commandment is that we are commanded to adjudicate this legal rule regarding this matter.” Okay? “As for the fact that husband and father annul, Scripture already explained and adjudicated it, and tradition teaches that a sage too may release,” and so on. That is 95. Look at 96: “The 96th commandment is that anyone who touches a carcass of a dead animal becomes impure.” And this commandment includes impurity of carcasses and all its laws. “And I will mention a premise that you should remember in everything we mention among the kinds of impurities. Namely, that our counting each kind of impurity as a positive commandment does not mean that we are obligated to become impure with that impurity, nor that we are warned not to become impure by it so that it would be a negative commandment. Rather, the Torah’s saying that one who touches this type becomes impure, or that this thing imparts impurity in such and such a manner to one who touches it, is a positive commandment.” Meaning, this legal rule that we were commanded is the positive commandment. “Namely, that one who touches such and such in such and such a way becomes impure, and one who is in such a condition does not become impure. Becoming impure itself is optional: if he wants, he becomes impure; if he doesn’t want, he doesn’t become impure.” What? If I touch something impure, is there then a commandment to declare me impure? No, I don’t think I’d infer that. Rav Panitch claims that in Maimonides, but I don’t agree. There’s no necessity to read it that way.

In any case, we see that Maimonides includes in his list of commandments also definitional commandments. Okay? What is the idea behind this? It seems to me that for Maimonides, the Book of Commandments is simply the law book. “Mitzvah” means law. The Jewish law book is the Book of Commandments. There are details, but this is the framework, these are the foundational laws. Okay? Now, in the law book there are also definitional laws. A minor for this purpose is someone who has passed such and such age and has such and such characteristics—this appears in the law book. What is that? It doesn’t obligate us in anything; it merely defines who is a minor. Or what is impure, or what is a vow annulled or not annulled. Definitions. But definitions appear in the law book. So in halakhah, “mitzvah” means law. In the Book of Commandments all the laws appear. So there are also definitional laws, and therefore they too appear in the Book of Commandments. It should be remembered: everyone who is impure, say, who may not enter the Temple or who may not eat terumah—those appear as separate commandments. You do not need the commandment of impurity as some umbrella under which all the details that are themselves commandments or prohibitions fall. No, those appear as separate commandments in the Book of Commandments. The definition itself counts for Maimonides as a positive commandment. So that means there is no obligation here. Therefore also with betrothal, not necessarily that when Maimonides counts the commandment of betrothal in his list of commandments he means there is a commandment to betroth a woman. No. It could be a definition: if you do such and such, then the woman is betrothed; if not, not. And from there, if he has relations with her, then the law is such and such. It’s a status, a definition. Therefore, the fact that Maimonides counts betrothal among the commandments is not in itself proof that he disagrees with the Rosh. Not necessarily. The wording there leaves room for discussion; it is not formulated exactly like here. But it is not entirely clear. It is definitely possible, I think, to explain even in Maimonides that betrothal is not a commandment. But that’s regarding the husband. Regarding the woman, certainly there is no commandment. It isn’t even a preparatory act for procreation, because she isn’t obligated in procreation either, only in “He created it to be inhabited.” In that, she is obligated. So there there is no commandment. And the examples in the Talmud also are not commandments—singeing the head and salting the fish. So that really means that this whole story is really about good deeds, divine service—I don’t know exactly—a kind of general principle in divine service.

Regarding singeing the head and salting the fish, as I said earlier, this is a “monkey act.” In a “monkey act,” seemingly—though we’ll soon see maybe not—one not only does not need an agent, but plainly it seems that agency is not even defined there. Meaning, in an action that does not need to be done by you, there is no need to appoint the one doing it as your agent, as in circumcision according to the Or Zaru’a. The father has no direct commandment; he only needs to see to it that the son be circumcised. Okay? So he doesn’t need to appoint an agent. The question is whether agency is even defined at all in such situations. The later authorities plainly claim that in a “monkey act” agency isn’t defined at all. Not only that one need not appoint an agent. Because agency is defined where it is necessary that someone act on your behalf. If it isn’t necessary, then why would the Torah innovate the concept of agency? The Torah innovates agency where it is needed, not in a “monkey act.” If a monkey can do it, then what is an agent? He’s a monkey. As in the Talmud in Eruvin: “The daughters of Israel did not refrain from sending their eruvin in the hands of their sons and daughters who were minors in order to train them in commandments,” and later: “If he gave it to a monkey and it brought it, or he placed it on an animal and it carried it, it is a valid eruv.” From here comes the phrase in the later authorities, yes, that this is called a “monkey act,” this sort of thing.

So singeing the head and salting the fish is apparently a “monkey act.” So not only is there no need to appoint him as an agent; agency doesn’t really apply there at all. So I already said that in those examples themselves we see two things: that this is not a law in commandments, and not a law in agency. Now I’m saying that those are two sides of the same coin. Because this is not a commandment, agency is not defined here either. Therefore, because this is not a commandment, it is not a law in commandments and not a law in agency. It is simply a principle in divine service, that you should do it yourself and not through someone else.

But there are several halakhic authorities—I’m skipping a bit because we don’t have much time and I want to finish this today—the Ran on the Rif here writes as follows: “Some say that it was also said regarding prohibition, but when Rav Yosef said this, he said it regarding the latter clause. For from the first clause we would not learn that there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent, because perhaps there it is due to prohibition, as he explains, that anyone who can betroth personally and betrothed through an agent acts improperly, lest she become repulsive to him. But where he saw her first, and there is no concern for that, one could say that even ideally it is fine through an agent. But from the latter clause one can learn that in all cases there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent, for in her case there is no concern that she will see something objectionable in him, for Reish Lakish said: ‘It is better to dwell as a pair than to dwell as a widow.’ And this is a saying women use concerning any husband whatsoever: it is better to sit as two bodies than to sit as a widow, ‘tanu gufo udu shenayim.’ And even so, our Mishnah teaches us that there is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent, for even though a woman is not commanded in procreation, and thus has no commandment, nevertheless she still has a commandment because she assists the husband in fulfilling his commandment.”

What commandment is “assisting the husband in fulfilling his commandment”? There is no such commandment. It’s a good deed; it’s divine service. That’s what he means. He does not mean commandment in the sense of a formal positive commandment. He means divine service. Anything that is—like singeing the fish, okay? But in the Mikneh it sounds otherwise. The Mikneh here writes: “‘There is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent’—the Ran and the Maharshal strained to explain why there is ‘more commandment-value in her doing it herself,’ despite the fact that we hold a woman is not commanded in procreation.” By the way, she does have “He created it to be inhabited”; I don’t know why he needs to get to the point that she assists the husband. She has the commandment from the Prophets, “He created it to be inhabited.” In any case, he says, they were forced, because the woman isn’t commanded—so what does it mean, “there is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent”? Why is that forced? There is nothing forced here. “There is more commandment-value in her doing it herself than through her agent” means that in all divine service it is preferable that you do it yourself rather than through someone else. He apparently understands from the outset that “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” is talking about commandments in the formal sense. Therefore he says: but then what about the woman? So he says: “It seems more likely that from here there is proof for the view of Tosafot in Gittin, that although we hold a woman is not commanded in procreation, she is nevertheless commanded in ‘He created it to be inhabited.’” In other words, he has to find some formal commandment category, because otherwise the rule “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” is irrelevant. That means he really does understand it as a rule in the laws of commandments. Okay? Therefore—he cites plain readings from Bava Batra and so on.

“And furthermore, it seems that even though she is not commanded in procreation, nevertheless since she wants to marry a man, she is forbidden to have relations with him without betrothal because of ‘There shall not be a harlot,’ as Maimonides wrote in chapter one of the Laws of Marriage. If so, the betrothal is a commandment, just like the commandment of slaughter, separating terumah, and sending away the mother bird. For one is not commanded to slaughter or to separate terumah; rather, if he wants to eat, he is forbidden to do so without slaughter and without separation.” That’s a permit. It’s not a commandment—it’s a permit. Meaning, without it you can’t do something else. And a permit apparently also has some sort of formal status of commandment, even though it’s only a permit. That’s what he argues. In that sense too, for the woman betrothal is a permit for procreation—or for relations, not for procreation, for relations—because otherwise there would be “There shall not be a harlot.” That too is the subject of major disputes; according to Maimonides, every time he has relations without betrothal, even if she’s a concubine, there is neglect of a positive commandment, “that there not be a harlot.” Fine. In any event, we see throughout that for him this is a rule in the laws of commandments. That means there must be some status of commandment in order for “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” to apply. Not as I said earlier.

So what about singeing the head and salting the fish? Is that too a commandment? Look at this: the Mishnah Berurah in section 250, paragraph 3, writes that preparing for Sabbath is a commandment. Not merely a preparatory act for a commandment—it is itself a commandment. “He should prepare by himself, for the commandment of honoring the Sabbath rests upon every person, as it is written: ‘And call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord honorable,’ and there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent. And so too with all commandments, there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.” What does he write? That the preparations for Sabbath—preparing by oneself, and there he brings the law that one should prepare by oneself—that is a commandment. Why does he need to say that? Because it says there “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.” He too understands, like the Mikneh, that this principle applies to commandments in the formal sense. So what is this commandment of preparing by oneself? Delight of Sabbath has nothing to do with this. Delight of Sabbath is a commandment fulfilled on Sabbath itself, by enjoying good food. Preparing the good things is a preparatory act, not the commandment. This is honor of Sabbath, not delight of Sabbath. Delight of Sabbath is eating well on Sabbath. Honor of Sabbath is preparing things with your own hands in honor of Sabbath—not necessarily with your own hands, but preparing things for Sabbath—and that itself is a commandment, not a preparatory act. That is how you honor Sabbath, by preparing for it. And the practical difference is significant. Because if so, then singeing the head on Friday itself is a commandment, not a preparatory act. And therefore “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” applies to it. That means the Mishnah Berurah too learns like the Mikneh, that this principle applies to commandments in the formal sense.

That is also what the Sha’ar HaTziyun says: “And a person should make effort,” and so on. “In Maimonides, this law appears in the language of obligation: even if he is a very important person and it is not his way to buy things in the market or engage in household work, he is obligated to do with his own body things needed for Sabbath, for that is his honor.” Not delight of Sabbath, but honor of Sabbath, and honor of Sabbath is the person’s own honor. All right? “And so among the early authorities there were those who split wood to cook with, those who cooked or salted meat or twisted wicks or lit candles, and the like.” Okay? That is the claim.

One last point I still want to get to. No, but he does not accept—it’s precisely because he needs all sorts of elaborate arguments to show that something is a commandment that it’s not enough for it merely to be something of value. He says even a permit is a kind of commandment, everything is some kind of commandment. Fine. But there are things that won’t fit that. If, say, this were delight of Sabbath and not honor of Sabbath, then “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” would not apply here. Okay? Meaning, you need to get into some formal definition of commandment, even if you then broaden that formal definition. I once heard this from Rabbi Lichtenstein—I think it was Rabbi Lichtenstein—who said, with regard to the Chazon Ish, that he has extreme leniencies in the laws of the Sabbatical year. Because he is so stringent about the sale permit, you end up with extreme leniencies in the Sabbatical-year prohibitions. Because you can’t really live with the Sabbatical-year prohibitions today. So they solve it through the sale permit. But if you don’t have that solution, then you need to find tricks; you become lenient in Torah-level law or non-Torah-level law—rabbinic according to most opinions—but you become lenient in the core law of Sabbatical observance so as not to resort to the sale permit. Here too, if you are strict about “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent,” and limit it only to commandments, then you have to enlarge the definition of what counts as a commandment so that all the examples will fit inside. That often happens: someone who comes to narrow something ends up at the end forced to broaden something. And vice versa. Because in the end you have to get along with the facts, and that’s that.

All right, there is a major novelty of the Ra’avad. I’ll do this briefly. It appears in a responsum of the Rivash in at least two places, in the name of the Ra’avad, that one who betrothed a woman through an agent should go back and betroth her again. Because there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent. He doesn’t even necessarily speak about the prohibition; he speaks about “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent.” Now how is that relevant at all? He even discusses, by the way, whether one should bless again. To recite the blessing again, even on a second betrothal. But the first betrothal certainly takes effect—there is no dispute that betrothal through an agent takes effect. “A man betroths by himself and by his agent”—that’s clear, right? It’s only that there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent. But obviously through his agent she is also betrothed. So she is already betrothed—what exactly are you supposed to betroth her again for?

So at first glance, it seems that according to the Ra’avad—and this is how I opened the class—according to the Ra’avad, “there is more commandment-value in doing it oneself than through one’s agent” also speaks about the result, not only about the manner of fulfillment. Not only that the fulfillment is more choice when it’s by oneself rather than by an agent, but the result—the betrothal itself that is created—if you did it through an agent, something is a little defective. And if you do it yourself, the betrothal is of higher quality. Therefore there is room to betroth again after you have already betrothed, because you want to effect the betrothal in a complete manner. They really took effect, but in a partial or defective way or however we want to call it, therefore betroth again. To the point that he argues one should perhaps even bless over this. The Rivash does not accept it, but he brings it in the name of the Ra’avad. A very major innovation.

But the truth is there are discussions about this in the Sha’agat Aryeh and in Beit HaLevi. The Beit HaLevi is well known, who brings it in the name of Rabbi Chaim, but it really appears already in his father’s responsa, Beit HaLevi. He discusses there someone who has two etrogim: one kosher but not beautiful, and one beautiful but doubtful whether it is kosher. What should he do? So he says: first take the beautiful one that is doubtful whether it is kosher, and afterward take the kosher one that is not beautiful. Because if you take the kosher one first, then you have already fulfilled your obligation; what is the point of taking the second, more beautiful one? In any event you did not beautify the commandment, because you already fulfilled the obligation. Right? And Beit HaLevi expands this further. He brings a source for it from a Talmudic discussion in Menachot: if you have two sin-offerings, one fat and one lean, and you brought the lean one, he says bring the fat one too. Why isn’t that non-sacred slaughter in the Temple courtyard? You already brought the sin-offering. He says no, you bring again, you offer the blood again. In short, it’s quite a complicated discussion. Rabbi Chaim, of course, argues that this is irrelevant, and that is the common assumption: once you fulfilled your obligation, you fulfilled it. But there in Menachot, and the Sha’agat Aryeh also discusses this, you do indeed see something a bit like the Ra’avad. If you did something in a non-beautified way, there is room to do it again and it is not non-sacred slaughter in the Temple courtyard. You do it again in order that it be beautified. And here too, you do the betrothal again in a beautified manner, even though ostensibly it already took effect. But of course that is only if there really is a difference in the quality of the betrothal that was created. It’s not only that you performed the action better, as I explained.

At the beginning I said exactly the opposite. I said that the difference between doing it oneself and doing it through one’s agent is not that the quality of the betrothal created is better, but that the action you performed is more an act of divine service. Now I said that here we saw in the Mikneh and in the Mishnah Berurah that no—it speaks only about commandments. This is not just some non-formal principle of divine service. No, this is a halakhic rule in the laws of commandments: how commandments are fulfilled. The Ra’avad goes one step further. Not only is this a rule in the laws of commandments, but the commandment itself is somewhat defective if you do it through an agent. Therefore there is reason to do it again so that it be complete.

There would be room to connect this to the possibility that maybe he only intends mentally that he does not want to fulfill it if there is a way to do it in the complete manner, so he intended from the outset not to fulfill his obligation in the defective manner, and therefore he will do it again—because then she really isn’t betrothed. But that’s already an interpretive narrowing, because if he did it, then apparently he didn’t stipulate that; he did it. What—he didn’t know he could betroth without an agent? I don’t know. Or maybe he is showing seriousness to her—he sent the agent while he was overseas, sent an agent, “wait for me, I’m serious,” and so on, but then he betroths her personally. He betroths her so that she won’t have the option at all—not only that she’ll wait for him, but that she’ll have no other options—and then he comes and closes the matter. Okay, but still it really is a question: what is he closing? It was already closed. The foundation has already been laid. You have to say that betrothal through an agent must somehow not be complete; there is something lacking in it, and then he applies complete betrothal, and that is why one does it again—to the point that there is even discussion whether one recites a blessing again. Because now you are really performing the commandment—the earlier act was not the full commandment; the commandment is now. Even though you already did it. That is a major novelty.

In section 1 of Netivot Shalom… if the betrothal took effect, what changes if you have two women? No, but there indeed the situation is such—what do you mean?—that you have two women and really only one of them is betrothed, without your specifying which. That’s not the same thing. Here I betrothed one woman, the betrothal took effect, it is halakhically valid, everything is fine—what remains to be done? The betrothal is valid, that’s it. The betrothal didn’t really take effect because it was between them? But there you don’t really see that it is “between them”; rather because of the ambiguity of the situation it comes out that way. That’s due to the circumstances, not due to the concept of betrothal. The same would be true in any legal area, not just betrothal. Also if you consecrate one of two coins you have in your pocket, as Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings there, then too—it’s a kind of quantum superposition between the two coins. Yes, possible. But I’m saying that is because of the situation, not because of the concept of betrothal. The situation dictates that there is no defined woman to whom the betrothal applies. Maybe there is a Torah-level doubt? But why? That’s exactly the point—there is nothing here that causes these betrothals to be partial. I betrothed the woman, it took effect, the betrothal is valid, everything is fine. That’s the novelty. That is what we saw in the Ra’avad, and it is not connected to “betrothal not capable of leading to relations.” The Ra’avad innovates that even in a case like this there really is a situation of defective, partial, something-like-that betrothal, which is a very great novelty. There it isn’t such a great novelty; there it’s the result of the circumstances—what can you do?

And is there any issue if a person betrothed a woman without an agent and then wants to betroth her again two weeks later? No, that the Ra’avad does not say. Of course if he wants to, it’s just words in the air. What do you mean he wants to? You can give her a ring and say “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” but you haven’t done anything; you muttered words, it has no significance. Same thing here? No, because here he says not that—but here he even discusses whether to bless. Not just doing it again for no reason. One might have said maybe do it again for educational effect or something like that, since in any event it doesn’t matter. But when you discuss whether to bless—well, enough.

So we’re done with this topic. So send me WhatsApp messages, because I want to send you materials for the upcoming classes, and also a summary and the recording and so on.