The Receiver Chapter – Lesson 8

Table of Contents

• Introduction and connection to the previous lecture
• The approaches of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and shifting the passage to liability for the wall
• Maimonides in Laws of Monetary Damages, chapter 4, and the contradiction to the Mishnah
• The Raavad and the Mishnah's challenge to Maimonides
• The contradiction within Maimonides: law 1 versus law 2
• Maimonides' responsum to the sages of Lunel and the reasoning based on intent
• Explaining the law of a shaky wall according to Maimonides: the owner's liability and the breaker being liable in the Heavenly court
• Indirect causation versus direct-but-induced causation, and explaining the distinction between bandits and a breaker
• The Meiri: including the law under direct-but-induced causation and making it dependent on intent
• A conceptual difficulty: a person who causes damage versus damaging property, and intent in damaging property
• The similarity to a pit, fire, and his stone, knife, and load: creating the damager as tort ownership
• A parallel in Bava Kamma 56: one who places another person's animal onto another person's standing grain, Tosafot versus the Rashba
• Conclusion, summary, and reference to the written summaries

Summary

General overview

The text presents a lecture continuing the discussion of the law of someone who breaks a fence in front of another person's animal, and of the contradiction between the Talmudic passage and the Mishnah about one who pens sheep into a fold. It lays out three approaches among the medieval authorities (Rishonim): Rashi and Tosafot, who shift the discussion to liability for the wall; Tosafot in Sanhedrin and an approach brought in Maimonides, who impose liability for the loss of the animal even when the wall was sound; and Maimonides, who reads the passage straightforwardly as dealing with the animal's own damages and payment for them. After presenting the sharp contradiction between the Mishnah and Maimonides, the lecture brings Maimonides' responsum to the sages of Lunel, which distinguishes between bandits whose intention is to steal and a breaker whose intention is to cause damage. From there the discussion broadens to the question of indirect causation versus direct-but-induced causation, and to whether Maimonides' liability is based on a person who causes damage or on damaging property, with comparison to the dispute between Tosafot and the Rashba in the passage of one who places another person's animal onto another person's standing grain.

Introduction and connection to the previous lecture

The lecturer turns to the participants and asks them to turn on their cameras in order to create eye contact. He summarizes that in the previous lecture they studied the law of someone who breaks a fence in front of another person's animal, and discussed the approaches of Rashi and Tosafot versus Tosafot in Sanhedrin and an approach brought in Maimonides, with an introduction to the issue of indirect causation versus direct-but-induced causation. He says that in the straightforward reading of the Mishnah and the passage, we are dealing with damages caused by the animal, not with the loss of the animal, and he presents the contradiction: in the Mishnah, if bandits broke in they are exempt, whereas in the Talmud, if the wall was sound, the breaker is liable even in human court.

The approaches of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and shifting the passage to liability for the wall

Rashi and Tosafot explain that the loss of the animal has the same law as damages, and in both cases the breaker is exempt in human court even when the wall was sound. Therefore they interpret the Talmud as imposing liability for payment for the wall. Tosafot in Sanhedrin and an approach brought in Maimonides distinguish between the loss of the animal and the damages caused by the animal, and they impose liability for the loss of the animal in human court even when the wall was sound, unlike the animal's damages, where the Mishnah teaches exemption when bandits broke in. The lecturer emphasizes that these departures from the straightforward reading are meant to resolve the contradiction between the Talmud and the Mishnah.

Maimonides in Laws of Monetary Damages, chapter 4, and the contradiction to the Mishnah

Maimonides rules: one who breaks a fence in front of another person's animal, and it goes out and causes damage—if the fence was strong and sound, he is liable; but if it was a shaky wall, he is exempt in human court and liable in the Heavenly court. He compares this to someone who places poison before another person's animal, which is indirect causation. The lecturer concludes that Maimonides' wording indicates that in the case of a shaky wall, the breaker is exempt in human court and liable in the Heavenly court, and that it also sounds as though the owner is exempt. But he points to a difficulty from the continuation of the passage, from which it emerges that a shaky wall is not good guarding, and the owner becomes liable when the animal goes out through that wall. He says that Maimonides reads the passage straightforwardly, as dealing with the animal's damages, not its loss and not payment for the wall, and therefore the contradiction with the Mishnah returns in full force: in the Mishnah, bandits who broke a sound wall are exempt, while in Maimonides, one who breaks in through a sound wall is liable.

The Raavad and the Mishnah's challenge to Maimonides

The Raavad objects to Maimonides and argues that if the liability is for the wall, then there is no reason to say, "and it went out and caused damage"; and if the liability is for the damage, then the bandits are not liable unless they struck it and directed it toward the damage. The lecturer notes that the Raavad does not raise the possibility of the loss of the animal within his objection, and tries to clarify from his wording how he understands the statement. He emphasizes that in the Mishnah itself it is clear that the discussion is about damage caused by the animal, and therefore the problem lies in the gap between the statement and the Talmudic discussion, on the one hand, and the law of bandits in the Mishnah, on the other.

The contradiction within Maimonides: law 1 versus law 2

In law 1, Maimonides brings the law of the Mishnah: with a shaky partition, the owner of the flock is liable even if it dug through, or if it was breached at night, or if bandits broke in; and with a sound partition that was breached at night or that bandits breached, and the animal went out and caused damage, he is exempt; but if the bandits led it out and it caused damage, the bandits are liable. The lecturer says this creates an internal contradiction: in law 1, bandits who broke a sound wall are exempt, while in law 2, one who breaks a fence in a sound wall is liable. The Maggid Mishneh brings Maimonides' responsum, which says that there is a distinction between bandits who intend to steal and someone who intends to break the fence and not to steal.

Maimonides' responsum to the sages of Lunel and the reasoning based on intent

In Maimonides' responsum, quoted at length in Migdal Oz, he states that the law was said regarding the animal's damages and not regarding the wall, and he brings proofs: if it were about the wall, it would not say "in front of another person's animal"; and the Talmud brought it on the Mishnah of one who pens sheep into a fold; and in the case of a shaky wall there is no logic to exempt in human court for breaking the wall. Maimonides resolves the difficulty of the bandits by saying that the bandits' intent is to steal, and therefore as long as they did not remove it from the owner's domain, they did not become liable and it did not become part of their domain. If it went out on its own, they are exempt, because the damage they intended—namely the theft—did not occur. Maimonides distinguishes this from someone who breaks a fence in front of another person's animal: his intent is not to steal, but rather that it should go out and cause damage and the owners should become liable for its damages. Therefore he is liable for that very damage, like any damager.

Explaining the law of a shaky wall according to Maimonides: the owner's liability and the breaker being liable in the Heavenly court

Maimonides explains that in the case of a shaky wall, where the animal is not truly guarded, the owners are liable in human court for the damages caused by their animal. But the breaker is exempt in human court and liable in the Heavenly court, because he caused the owners to have to pay, since had he not broken it, it is possible the animal would not have gone out and would not have caused damage. The lecturer summarizes a functional distinction: with a sound wall, the breaker stands opposite the injured party and pays him; with a shaky wall, the owner stands opposite the injured party and pays him, while the breaker is liable toward the owner in the Heavenly court for having caused him to pay. He emphasizes that Maimonides focuses the Heavenly-court liability on the fact that the breaker caused the owner to pay, not on the fact that he directly caused the animal's damage.

Indirect causation versus direct-but-induced causation, and explaining the distinction between bandits and a breaker

The lecturer suggests that Maimonides' distinction rests on indirect causation versus direct-but-induced causation and depends on intent: the bandits' intention to steal makes the accompanying damage an indirect causation that is exempt in human court, whereas the breaker's intention to cause damage turns it into direct-but-induced causation, which is liable in human court. He stresses that intent here is not a measure of moral "guilt"—in fact, intent to steal is more serious than intent to create incidental damage. Rather, intent serves to define the act as an act of damage that creates liability. Participants ask how intent can be established, and the lecturer suggests circumstantial evidence, noting that in monetary law circumstantial evidence may be sufficient. He refers to Maimonides in Laws of the Sanhedrin, chapter 20 versus chapter 24, regarding the difference between punishments and monetary matters.

The Meiri: including the law under direct-but-induced causation and making it dependent on intent

The Meiri explains that everywhere the breaker is exempt in human court for the animal, because that is indirect causation, and he understands the human-court liability in the case of a sound wall as referring to the wall itself. He brings the answer of the sages of the preceding generations to explain the distinction between bandits and a breaker on the basis of intent and "his thought was fulfilled," and strengthens this by saying that this falls under the law of direct-but-induced causation and not under mere indirect causation in damages. He presents a rule: someone whose intent is to cause damage and through whom alone the damage is done falls under direct-but-induced causation; someone whose intent is not to cause damage, or where someone else assists in bringing about the damage, is merely indirect causation in damages and is exempt. He applies that here: the breaker's intention is to cause damage, and since the damage comes through him alone, he is liable; whereas with a shaky wall, the other party's negligence joins in, and therefore he is exempt in human court.

A conceptual difficulty: a person who causes damage versus damaging property, and intent in damaging property

The lecturer raises the difficulty of how the breaker can be seen as direct-but-induced causation when the animal is the one actually doing the damage, especially since with a sound wall Maimonides makes the breaker pay the injured party directly. He quotes Rabbi Soloveitchik in Reshimot Shiurim, who understands Maimonides to mean that removing the guarding from the damaging ox makes the one who removed it into the owner of the damaging force. He infers this from the fact that Maimonides places the law in Laws of Monetary Damages rather than in Laws of Injury and Damage. He then presents the difficulty: in the category of damaging property, intent is not usually a parameter, while Maimonides makes liability depend on intent. So it is unclear whether Maimonides imposes liability under the law of a person who causes damage, through direct-but-induced causation, or under the law of damaging property by turning the breaker into the "owner" of the animal for purposes of tort liability.

The similarity to a pit, fire, and his stone, knife, and load: creating the damager as tort ownership

The lecturer expands on Rabbi Soloveitchik's comparison of the breaker to one who uncovers a pit: just as one who opens a pit is liable because he removed the guarding and became the owner of the pit, so too one who removes guarding from the ox becomes the owner of the damaging ox. He compares this to the case of his stone, knife, and load that fell from the top of the roof, came to rest, and then caused damage, where the wind is involved in creating the damaging force. From this it follows that the way the damaging force comes into being affects how tort ownership is attributed. On that basis, he suggests that intent is relevant not from the angle of indirect versus direct-but-induced causation, but in order to confer on the breaker a kind of "tort ownership" over the animal as a damaging force when he intended that it go out and cause damage. By contrast, bandits who intended to steal, and whose plan did not materialize, do not become owners of the damaging force for purposes of being sued for its damages.

A parallel in Bava Kamma 56: one who places another person's animal onto another person's standing grain, Tosafot versus the Rashba

The lecturer brings the law: one who places another person's animal onto another person's standing grain is liable, and presents two ways the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand it. Tosafot impose liability on the basis of tooth and foot, because "it is considered as though it were his, since he did it," and they compare it to one who ignites another person's flax with another person's candle. In that way, the one who positioned the animal is considered the owner of the damaging force for purposes of liability under the law of damaging property, and according to them there is a practical implication that he would be exempt in the public domain. The Rashba imposes liability because placing it on the standing grain is as though he fed it by hand, and therefore this is a case of a person who causes damage, so the liability applies even in the public domain. He rejects Tosafot's logic, denying that there can be an artificial "tort ownership." The lecturer presents this dispute as a framework for understanding Maimonides and the Meiri: is the breaker liable because he becomes the owner of the animal for purposes of torts, or because he is treated as someone who damages directly by virtue of direct-but-induced causation?

Conclusion, summary, and reference to the written summaries

The lecturer says that if one accepts Maimonides' distinction between bandits and an ordinary breaker, there is no need to depart from the straightforward reading, and the contradiction with the Mishnah is resolved. He remains with the conceptual difficulty of how to classify the liability in the case of a sound wall as direct-but-induced causation when the connection to the damage is so indirect, and suggests that it depends on whether liability is imposed as a kind of tort ownership or as a person who causes damage when there is no avenue for liability under the law of damaging property. He concludes by saying that the written summaries are available on the institute's website and in Moodle or Dropbox, and takes leave of the participants.

In the previous lecture—hello to those who are here with us, those with us today, and those not with us today. With anyone who can, I’d be happy if you’d turn on even a camera. If there’s some constraint, I already said we’re not going to fight about it, but whoever can, I prefer that there be at least some eye contact. Okay, so in the previous lecture we talked about the law of someone who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal. We saw the position of Rashi and Tosafot, who say that the loss of the animal is like the damages [the animal causes]: in both cases he is exempt in human courts even when the wall is sound, and then they basically redirect the Talmudic discussion to payment for the wall. And that is in contrast to the position of Tosafot in tractate Sanhedrin and a view brought in Maimonides, according to which for the loss of the animal there is liability in human courts even if the wall is sound, unlike the damages caused by the animal, where we see in the Mishnah—like in the case where bandits breached it—that they are exempt. And I already mentioned there the issue of indirect causation versus a more direct legally actionable causation, and we’ll get back to that today as well. On the straightforward reading, as I already noted, both the plain sense of the Mishnah and our passage are dealing with damages caused by the animal, not with the loss of the animal itself. Except that there is some contradiction here between what we see in the Talmud and the Mishnah. In the Mishnah we see that if bandits breached it—unless they actually led it out—but in a case where they breached it, they are exempt and the owner is also exempt. So you see that the one who breaches is exempt. But here they say that if it’s a sound wall then he is liable even in human courts, and if it’s a shaky wall then not even in heavenly judgment—so that doesn’t fit. Therefore the medieval authorities (Rishonim) chose different options. Some distinguished between a case where the animal is lost and a case where the animal causes damage—that’s what we just saw. And according to the view of Rashi and Tosafot, who do not distinguish in that way—Tosafot in our passage—they have no choice but to talk about payment for the wall, so that our Talmudic discussion is really about liability for the damage to the wall. Now there is Maimonides’ view, and he seems to be following a third approach. He explains the passage in the straightforward way. Of course it is about the animal itself and not about the wall; when the discussion is about payment, it is payment regarding the animal and not the wall. And second, Maimonides says—and this is also the straightforward reading of the passage—that it is talking about an animal that caused damage and not about payment for the loss of the animal. Now that seems like a completely self-inflicted shot in the foot. Meaning, he closes off both options chosen by the first two camps we’ve seen until now. Those who distinguished between the loss of the animal and the damage it causes—Maimonides is not willing to accept that. And those who distinguished between the value of the wall and payment regarding the animal—Maimonides is not willing to talk that way either. As far as he is concerned, it is about the animal—not only about the animal, but about damage caused by the animal. And if the Talmud is talking about that, then the contradiction from the Mishnah comes back in full force, because in the Mishnah it says that if bandits breached it, then he is exempt and they are exempt, while in the Talmud it says that if it is a sound wall then the breacher is liable even in human courts. That directly flatly contradicts the Mishnah. So let’s look at Maimonides’ position. I’m sharing the file again so we can read it.

Okay, so Maimonides says as follows in Laws of Property Damage, chapter 4: “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal, and it goes out and causes damage—if the fence was strong and sound, he is liable; and if it was a shaky wall, he is exempt in human courts and liable in heavenly judgment. And likewise, one who places poison before another person’s animal is exempt in human courts and liable in heavenly judgment.” Yes, basically what we have here is that Maimonides clarifies that this is a case of indirect causation. So first of all, in Maimonides you see that if the wall was shaky, then the breacher is exempt in human courts and liable in heavenly judgment. On the face of it, it seems that the owner is exempt too. Right? The exemption of the breacher is because of indirect causation, as Maimonides says later when he compares it to one who places poison. If the owner were liable, then you could exempt the breacher only because the owner is already paying for the damage. So apparently it seems that the owner too is exempt in such a case, and that basically means that putting up a shaky wall—apparently what does that mean? It means that this is considered proper guarding. And in fact in the Talmud too, in the case “bandits breached it,” it says that the owner is exempt and the bandits are exempt. And again: why are the bandits exempt? Because of indirect causation. Which implies that the owner is not exempt because now the owner has to pay; the owner too is exempt.

Okay, we’ll see more about that later, but that is the first remark. It’s a problematic statement. Why? Because later in the passage we see that a shaky wall is not proper guarding. The passage later says: “It was breached at night, or bandits breached it.” Rava said: “And that is only if it tunneled under.” But if it did not tunnel, what then? He is liable. Because if it didn’t tunnel but rather went out through the wall itself, then its owner is liable. If it tunneled—dug under the wall—then he is exempt; that’s an unavoidable accident, he couldn’t have foreseen it. But if it went out through the wall, then the owner is liable. The Talmud asks: What are the circumstances? If you say it’s a sound wall—if it’s a sound wall, then if it didn’t tunnel, why is he liable? What else could he have done? Right? If it went out through the wall but the wall was sound, what can he do? That’s a complete accident; he is not supposed to anticipate such a thing. So rather, it’s a shaky wall. The Talmud asks: if it’s a shaky wall, then if it tunneled, why is he exempt? This is a case where it begins with negligence and ends with an accident. So what do we see? It is clear that if it goes out through the wall, then he is liable when it is a shaky wall. But even if it tunnels, he should still be liable, because it began with negligence and ended with an accident. We’ll still get to that passage later, but here we see very clearly that a shaky wall is not proper guarding—contrary to what seems to emerge from Maimonides’ wording above.

And that is the first remark. So we’ll still talk about how that can be. If in the case of a shaky wall the owner is liable, then why is it relevant that the breacher is considered only indirect causation? The owner is liable because he put up a shaky wall, period. What does that have to do with the breacher at all? The wall was effectively open even before he breached it; it was shaky. So that is the first point we’ll still need to examine. A second point that comes up here: in Maimonides it appears first of all that we are speaking of the animal—it doesn’t just appear, it says so: “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal and it goes out and causes damage.” That is, Maimonides explains it as referring to damage caused by the animal, not like Rashi, who writes that it is about the loss of the animal itself. Another point: Maimonides says—or at least that is how he records the law, so it seems that this is also how he understood the Talmud—that the issue here is liability for paying for the damage caused by the animal, not the wall. And that is what I said at the outset: Maimonides seems to follow neither of the two camps of medieval authorities we saw before. He does not distinguish between loss of the animal and damage caused by the animal; he says that what is written here—that one is liable when the wall is sound—is talking about damages caused by the animal, not loss of the animal. And second, Maimonides also says that what he pays for is not the wall but the animal itself. So if that’s so, we need to understand how this fits with the rule that if bandits breached it, they are exempt. In the case of bandits breaching it—the bandits are exempt, sorry—and in the case of bandits breaching it, the bandits ought to be liable according to Maimonides. They breached the wall, certainly a sound wall. And even, by the way, with a shaky wall, another comment that appears here: Maimonides implies that “if it was a shaky wall, he is exempt in human courts and liable in heavenly judgment.” In Maimonides it sounds like if it’s a shaky wall, the breacher is still liable in heavenly judgment. In Tosafot we saw that he writes not so: if it is a shaky wall, then there is exemption even in heavenly judgment. So we’ll come back to that too. There are several comments in Maimonides that we need to pay attention to. For us, the main point is that Maimonides is following neither of the two camps of medieval authorities. And what is the difficulty from the Mishnah? Again: according to Maimonides’ explanation, what is the contradiction from the Mishnah? That the bandits are exempt. After all, the bandits who breached the fence should have been liable according to Maimonides. Maybe it’s talking about a shaky wall? No—the Mishnah is talking about a sound wall. That is the whole distinction the Talmud makes: in the Talmud they say, what are we dealing with here—shaky wall or sound wall? In the Mishnah itself it’s clear that it is a sound wall. Okay. So we’ll see in a moment. Maimonides himself addresses this, but that is the contradiction that led all the medieval authorities we studied last time, each one according to his own approach, to explain it their way. Either he says this is talking about the loss of the animal, or that it is talking about payment for the wall and not at all about the damage caused by the animal. But those two distinctions are exactly intended to resolve this—that what is written in the Mishnah, that if bandits breached it, the bandits are exempt, means with respect to the damages caused by the animal; but regarding loss of the animal, the bandits would be liable, and regarding the wall itself the bandits would be liable. At least where it is a sound wall.

So that is exactly what led the medieval authorities to depart from the straightforward explanation of the Talmudic passage, because it is clear that Maimonides is the straightforward explanation. Meaning, the simple reading of the Talmud is clearly what Maimonides says: this is about damage caused by the animal’s goring, not about loss of the animal and not about the price of the wall—who even mentioned the wall here? What forced all the medieval authorities to move away from that is simply the contradiction from the Mishnah. But Maimonides is not bothered by the contradiction with the Mishnah and explains the Talmud straightforwardly. By the way, many times that is an important lesson when learning Maimonides: very often we learn Maimonides after we have already seen Rashi, Tosafot, the commentators on the page, and we are already somewhat captive to their way of reading the Talmud, their textual versions, and therefore it seems to us that Maimonides is difficult in light of the Talmud. Sometimes Maimonides simply had a different text of the Talmud, not the text we know, and then nothing is difficult. You need to remember that the Talmudic text before us is usually Rashi’s text. But here, in this case, it is probably not a different text but truly a different explanation. I’m just saying in general that when Maimonides seems to go against the Talmud, one has to pay close attention whether it is really against the Talmud, or against all sorts of assumptions the medieval authorities we learned made about the Talmud.

The Ra’avad, sorry, really does object to this point, and the Ra’avad says as follows: “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal and it goes out and causes damage—liable.” Said Abraham: “This ‘liable’ that he said—we don’t know what it means. If he means for the wall, why would he need to say ‘and it went out and caused damage’? If you want to tell me that he is liable for the wall, why do I care now that the animal went out and caused damage?” Right, clearly Maimonides is not talking about the wall. “And if he means the damage, that is not so—unless they struck it and drove it to the place of damage.” That is what we saw: the bandits are liable only if they struck it and drove it to the place of damage, but otherwise the bandits are exempt. So it can’t be either about the damage or about the wall. In short, how does Maimonides fit with the Mishnah, which says that if bandits breached it, the bandits are exempt? And Maimonides does not explain it as talking either about the wall or about the loss of the animal, but rather about damage caused by the animal. So if that’s the case, it is really not clear how Maimonides fits with the Mishnah.

By the way, how does the Ra’avad himself understand it? In the Ra’avad itself there is no mention of the possibility that this is talking about the loss of the animal. Right? He discusses here whether “it went out and caused damage” refers either to the wall or—sorry—whether it’s about the wall or the damage caused by the animal, but he doesn’t have the option of loss of the animal. It seems that the Ra’avad, who disagrees with Maimonides, probably really explains it the same way with respect to the wall—or at least that is how his language seems at first glance. I’m just saying: here I had written differently, that he rejects the wall and therefore it seems he is speaking of the loss of the animal, but that is of course not correct, because he does not reject the possibility that it is talking about damage to the wall. He rejects the possibility that Maimonides is talking about damage to the wall because he says that if Maimonides were talking about damage to the wall, why does Maimonides mention “and it went out and caused damage”? Okay? But wait—let’s look for a moment at the language of the Talmud, the language of the Mishnah, sorry. In the Mishnah itself it says: “One who brings sheep into a pen and locks it properly, and it goes out and causes damage—he is exempt.” So here too it already says “and it went out and caused damage.” Okay? And about that it says: “Or if bandits breached it and it went out and caused damage, he is exempt, and the bandits too are exempt.” Okay? But in the Mishnah itself it is clear that this is talking about the animal’s damages, not the wall’s damage—that is clear—therefore it says “and it went out and caused damage.” But in the Mishnah itself it truly says that the bandits are exempt. Our problem is in the Talmud, because the Talmud is talking about the saying, not about the Mishnah. In the saying: “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal”—about that the Talmud speaks. Here it says “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal,” and it doesn’t say “and it went out and caused damage.” “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal.” So here the Ra’avad might really explain that this is about payment for the wall, like Rashi and Tosafot, and that is not connected to what appears in the Mishnah. And still, even according to the Ra’avad, one could ask: if it says “one who breaches a fence,” then why do you need to say “in front of another person’s animal”? Just say “one who breaches another person’s fence is exempt”—and why say it at all? One who destroys a wall is certainly liable for a sound wall. So in the Ra’avad itself it is not entirely clear how he explains it here. In any case, regarding Maimonides himself there is room to discuss how he resolves this against the Mishnah.

Now when you look at Maimonides—this was in halakhah 2—when you look at Maimonides in halakhah 1, Maimonides in halakhah 1 brings the rule of the Mishnah itself. “One who brings sheep into a pen and locks it with a door that can withstand a normal wind, and even if it tunneled and got out, and even if the wall was breached at night or bandits breached it, the owner of the sheep is liable.” That’s in the case of a shaky partition. “If the partition was sound and it was breached at night or bandits breached it and it went out and caused damage, the owner is exempt”—the owner of the partition, that is. “If the bandits led it out and it caused damage, the bandits are liable.” So he presents here, he writes here, the Mishnah in its straightforward sense: if bandits breach a sound wall, then the owner is exempt and the bandits are also exempt. So then this is no longer a contradiction with the Mishnah; it is a contradiction between halakhah 1 and halakhah 2 in Maimonides. On the one hand Maimonides says that if bandits breach a sound wall, they are exempt; and in halakhah 2 he writes that if a person breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal, he is liable. The Maggid Mishneh addresses this contradiction and says as follows: “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal”—this is a baraita on page 55 and the Talmudic discussion there—“and our teacher of blessed memory explained ‘exempt’ and ‘liable’ as referring to the damage caused by the animal.” And they challenged him from the Mishnah. “Exempt” and “liable”—sorry—that refers to the damage caused by the animal. “And they challenged him from the Mishnah he brought above, which states specifically: ‘If the bandits led it out’—specifically led it out; but if they merely breached it in front of it, they are not liable for its damages. And he answered, and he mentions here an answer that Maimonides himself gave when they asked him about this contradiction, that there is a distinction between bandits who intend to steal and not to breach a fence, and one who intends to breach the fence and not to steal. And he gave supporting arguments for his words.” Maimonides made this distinction and also justified it, explained why it is correct.

In any case, you see that Maimonides himself sensed the contradiction, and it would be hard not to sense the contradiction between halakhah 1 and halakhah 2. And Maimonides says there is a difference between whether the breacher was a bandit or whether the breacher was just some person who wanted to breach the fence. What is the difference? The question is what he intended to do. That is what he says here. This citation is very brief, but he says: “There is a distinction between bandits who intend to steal and not to breach a fence, and one who intends to breach the fence and not to steal.” What is the difference? Why should it matter what they intended? What did they do? From here it seems that Maimonides probably understands that when bandits breach the fence, their goal is to take the animal and steal it. Now if in the end, for whatever reason, they do not steal it, and the animal goes out and causes damage—they did not intend to breach the fence so that the animal would go and cause damage. In that case the bandits are exempt; that’s what is written in the Mishnah. But if we are talking about a breacher who breaches it so that the animal will go out and cause damage, then the breacher is liable—liable, I mean, in human courts, not in heavenly judgment. Maimonides writes simply “liable.” What is the difference between these two things? On the face of it, it is definitely reasonable to explain this on the level of indirect causation versus more direct legally actionable causation. Right? And we already spoke about this—that for some of the medieval authorities, one of the parameters they use is intent. Did you intend to cause damage? Even if you did it by way of indirect causation, but from the outset you intended to cause damage, then that is a more direct legally actionable causation and you will be liable. If you did not intend to cause damage, then you are exempt. So it seems that Maimonides in the answer cited here means to say that if bandits breached it, they are exempt because this is only indirect causation. They did not intend to breach it so that the animal would cause damage; they intended only to steal it, and in the end they didn’t manage. But one who breaches the fence so that the animal will cause damage—that is a more direct legally actionable causation, and he intended that the animal be able to go out and cause damage; and if so, then he is liable.

Again? Can the Rabbi repeat that? I’ll say it again. The difference lies in the question: who is the breacher? In halakhah 1, when Maimonides brings the rule of the Mishnah, it is a case where the breacher was a bandit. When a bandit breaches the fence, his intention is to steal the animal, not to breach it so that the animal will go and cause damage. Now in the end he doesn’t know—they chased him off, he didn’t manage to steal the animal. The fence remains breached and he runs away. Now the animal goes outside and causes damage. About that Maimonides says he is exempt. Why is he exempt? Because he did not intend for the animal to cause damage. When he breached the fence he did not intend to create an opening so that the animal would go out and cause damage; he intended to steal it, he just failed. So in that case, this is indirect causation. In contrast, in halakhah 2 Maimonides is talking about a breacher who from the outset wants to breach the fence—a kind of wicked person, not even someone who wants to steal, just someone who wants to cause damage. He breaches the fence so that the animal won’t be enclosed and it will go outside and do all sorts of things. One who intends such a thing is liable—liable even in human courts. Let’s talk about what exactly the point is. In other words, Maimonides is apparently making a distinction here between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation, and he makes the difference depend on intent. If you really intended that the animal should go out and cause damage, then this is a more direct legally actionable causation and therefore you are liable. And if you did not intend that, but in practice that is what resulted from your actions, then that is indirect causation and you are exempt, at least in human courts.

One has to pay close attention here; it’s an interesting point. Usually we are used to the idea that intent is a parameter that matters in relation to guilt, such as the rule of “unintentional” in various areas of Jewish law. Here, the pure intention of the bandits was to steal the animal. To say he is not blameworthy because he had pure intentions and it just came out wrong—that’s really not the case. He intended to steal the animal; that is much worse than causing it to go and damage things. Stealing the animal is certainly causing damage. The fact that maybe it will go out and maybe it will cause damage—not certain that will even happen. That is negligence, not okay, but not certain. Here, if he intended to steal the animal, then he intended to cause damage to the owner of the animal, certain damage. So it seems to me that if I had to rank those two intentions, the intention to steal is a more seriously criminal intent than the intention to breach the fence so that the animal will go out and cause damage. But from Maimonides’ perspective that does not matter, because we are not discussing intent on the level of how blameworthy you are, or how appropriate it is to impose punishments or monetary liabilities on you. Rather, it is a definition of this act as a human act. Meaning, if you intended it, then it is a more direct legally actionable causation, and then it is considered that you are effectively a person who caused damage. Even though you did it indirectly—you didn’t cause the damage directly, you only breached the fence and the animal went out and caused damage—but it is still treated as if you are a person who caused damage. Sorry, a more direct legally actionable causation. And if you breach it in order to steal, but in the end flee and leave the animal unsecured, with the fence open, and the animal goes out and causes damage, then it is indirect causation. And then you are indeed exempt.

How can you determine whether a thief is also a bandit or not? What? So how can you determine whether when he stole, he also intended to cause damage? I don’t know. It could be that you can see, for example, that they took other things with them before they were driven off. No, but theoretically a person can be both—both a bandit and a thief. So he enters the pen, takes one animal with him, and leaves the second one there in order that it cause damage. Not likely. If he broke in to take, he probably wanted to take everything and just didn’t have time. There may be ways to bring circumstantial evidence of one sort or another, at least circumstantial evidence if not actual witnesses that this man is a robber. It could be that he even has an impressive record as a highly accomplished bandit. The surrounding circumstances can show that. In monetary law, by the way, circumstantial evidence can be good evidence. You do not necessarily need formal testimony. This is Maimonides in Laws of the Sanhedrin—there’s chapter 20 versus chapter 24—where he says that for punishments, what is called criminal law, you need two witnesses. In monetary cases, circumstantial evidence is also enough. But in any case for our purposes, this is what Maimonides writes here, and it really does seem that he is making a distinction between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation.

Maimonides’ answer is actually brought more fully in Migdal Oz. Let’s see some of it inside. “Question: In the Book of Damages, chapter 4: ‘One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal and it goes out and causes damage—if the fence was strong and sound, he is liable.’ Let our teacher teach us: if he meant the wall, why say ‘it went out and caused damage’? And if he meant the damage, haven’t we said in the Talmud that the bandits are liable only if they struck it and drove it to the place of damage? Let our teacher instruct us; may his reward be doubled from heaven.” If this reminds you of the language of the Ra’avad, it is almost a word-for-word copy. Of course the language of the Ra’avad—it’s not surprising. This answer was written to the sages of Lunel. And the sages of Lunel were of course from his camp—Provence, Lunel. I’m not very expert in the geography there, but this is the same group; they were scholars apparently connected to the Ra’avad. Lunel is the name of a city in Provence. In Provence, yes, there is some sort of—this is the same group. In any event, for our purposes, this wording here is basically the Ra’avad’s question. So we have here a wonderful opportunity. Usually Maimonides did not answer the Ra’avad’s objections. But objections sent by the sages of Lunel—we sometimes have Maimonides’ answers, and here he answers this objection of the Ra’avad.

He says: “Answer: I was speaking about the damage and not about the wall,” as we already inferred from his language above. He says, I am speaking about the damages caused by the animal, not payment for the wall. “And thus the sages too spoke of the damage and not of the wall.” “Thus and thus”—that is of course a hint to the explanation of the Talmud. And anyone who explains the Talmud as if it is talking about the wall is also mistaken. The sages in the Talmud too spoke not about the wall but about the damages caused by the animal, and I merely copied what the Talmud says according to my understanding. And now he brings three proofs for this. I divided them here into sections; of course in the original they are not divided this way.

“For if the words of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi were about the wall, as has entered the mind of everyone whose explanation I have seen”—and Maimonides knew the explanations of Rashi and Tosafot, who explained it as referring to the wall—“that cannot be. Why? He would not have said: ‘One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal,’ but rather: ‘One who breaches another person’s fence.’ Why mention an animal?” Notice what a full 180-degree turn he makes. The Ra’avad asks Maimonides: it cannot be talking about the wall, because otherwise why does it say “one who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal and it went out and caused damage”? Why mention “and it went out and caused damage”? Maimonides answers the Ra’avad: according to your view that it is about the wall, then why does it say “one who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal”? Why are you jumping all the way to “and it went out and caused damage”? What about the earlier words, “in front of another person’s animal”? Those are also superfluous. If one breaches another person’s fence, he should pay for the fence, and that’s it. What does it have to do with “in front of another person’s animal”?

Now of course we already saw this in Tosafot, that the discussion is indeed about the animal and not the fence, even according to Tosafot. It is about the animal and not the fence. Except that they say it cannot be established with a shaky wall because with a sound wall—sorry—because with a sound wall there would be liability in human courts for the wall. So you cannot establish it with a sound wall and say that he is exempt in human courts with respect to the animal. It is true that he is exempt in human courts with respect to the animal, and that is what they wanted to say—damages caused by the animal and not the wall—but you could not just say “exempt,” because with respect to the wall he would indeed be liable. Therefore Maimonides’ question is not difficult. But he turns that question back against the Ra’avad.

“And furthermore, the Talmud brought these words on the Mishnah of ‘one who brings sheep into a pen.’” Right? This statement was brought—and we talked about this in the previous lecture—why is this statement here at all? Obviously it was brought on our Mishnah of “one who brings sheep into a pen,” where the Mishnah says that if bandits breached it, the bandits are exempt. And on that our statement is brought, that “one who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal is liable,” and they discuss here what the case is. In other words, the whole context of the discussion is the context of damages caused by the animal, not the wall. So what relevance would there be to bring Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement in the context of “one who brings sheep into a pen” if it were talking about the wall? Again, of course, the answer is the same answer: it is not talking about the wall; it is talking about the animal. What the Talmud asks is: how can you say that in the case of a sound wall he is exempt in human courts? With respect to the wall, he would be liable in human courts. But not that the novelty of the statement itself is about the wall. The novelty of the statement is about the animal even according to the Ra’avad and even according to Rashi and Tosafot. So that is also not difficult. But this is how Maimonides argues.

“And furthermore, the fact that the Talmud establishes the words of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said ‘One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal is exempt in human courts and liable in heavenly judgment,’ in the case of a shaky wall—if he was speaking about the wall, then according to your view, if he is speaking about the wall, why would one who breaches a shaky wall be exempt in human courts? Would it enter anyone’s mind in the world that one who breaks a whole vessel is liable and one who breaks a shaky vessel is exempt? Surely not. One who breaks a whole, strong vessel pays the value of a whole vessel; one who breaks a shaky vessel pays only for a shaky vessel. So too one who destroys another person’s wall—if the wall as such is at issue—pays the value of the wall he caused to be lost, whether whole or shaky. He is liable in human courts. So what heavenly judgment is there?” If it is a shaky wall, he is still liable in human courts; he simply pays the value of a shaky wall. “And if you say that this shaky wall is standing to be demolished and he performed a commandment”—as Rashi explains—“then why would he be liable in heavenly judgment?” So what sense is there in obligating him in heavenly judgment for the wall? If it is a shaky wall, it does not make sense to obligate him in heavenly judgment. Of course one could absolutely say—and that is what Tosafot says in our passage—that with respect to a shaky wall he really would not be liable even in heavenly judgment for the shaky wall. The Talmud only discusses: if it is a shaky wall, then he should not be liable even in heavenly judgment—indeed so. That is exactly what the Talmud asks. And if it is a sound wall, then he should be liable in human courts for the wall. Okay? Therefore all these questions are basically answered by Rashi and Tosafot. But one always has to remember that the simple explanation of the Talmud is the explanation of Maimonides. Meaning, Rashi and Tosafot certainly were forced into a strained reading, and so were Nachmanides and Tosafot ha-Rosh—they all were. The simple explanation of the Talmud is Maimonides. But Maimonides still owes us an explanation; he still has not explained how he resolves the contradiction with the Mishnah. He has only challenged them on the explanations they offer for the Talmudic statement, saying that it cannot be. And as I said, it is not true that it cannot be.

“Rather, anyone who explains it that way is mistaken. And these words refer only to the animal that went out through the breach and caused damage. If the fence was strong and sound, the breacher is liable for its damages in human courts. And if it was a shaky wall, which does not actually guard it, the breacher is exempt in human courts for that damage caused by the animal, and liable in heavenly judgment, because he caused the owner to have to pay—since the wall was shaky, as we explained, that even if it tunneled or if bandits breached it, the owner of the sheep is liable. And had he not breached it, it is possible that it would not have gone out and would not have caused damage, and for that reason he is liable in heavenly judgment.” What is Maimonides saying? He says that if this was a shaky wall, then he is liable for the damage—he is exempt for the damage caused by the animal in human courts but liable in heavenly judgment for the damage caused by the animal. And what about the wall itself? What do you say? Are you with me? What is the status of the wall itself according to Maimonides? Earlier he said that regarding the wall too he should be liable. In human courts. For the wall, liable in human courts—he just pays the value of a shaky wall, that’s all. In other words, a wall that is worth less, but he is fully liable for the wall. It’s just that there is no discussion about the wall. Maimonides doesn’t address the wall because that is obvious. Meaning, if you caused damage to something, obviously you have to pay. That is not the discussion. The discussion is the question of what your connection is to the damages caused by the animal. And that is all Maimonides is talking about.

So notice, I highlighted the line here: “because he caused the owner to have to pay.” Here there is already a hint that will be important for us later too. Why exactly is the breacher liable to pay in heavenly judgment? We would have said: because he caused the animal’s damages. Because he caused the animal’s damages, as if—he breached the fence. But Maimonides says: what does it mean he caused the animal’s damages? The shaky wall is not proper guarding for the animal anyway, even without him breaching it. So in what sense—why does he have to pay? Maimonides says: this is not causing the damages caused by the animal. It is causing the owner of the animal to have to pay. Meaning, what is the breacher liable to pay for? Not for the damage itself—not for the damages caused by the animal to the victim. He is liable to pay the owner for the amount the owner will have to pay for the damages caused by his animal. And they asked: why? After all, he put up a shaky wall, and so on and so on, he did not guard properly, so let him pay. What does that have to do with me? So he says: I could always argue—as in his final line, this is what he says—“even if bandits breached it, the owner of the sheep is liable; and had he not breached it, it is possible that it would not have gone out and would not have caused damage. And for that reason he is liable in heavenly judgment.” Maimonides is saying as follows: if the wall… What? Can one say that in heaven, indirect causation in damages is liable? In human courts, indirect causation in damages is exempt, but in heaven they are stricter and say that indirect causation in damages is liable. The Talmud says he is exempt in human courts and liable in heavenly judgment for indirect causation, but here we have to pay a little closer attention; we need to proceed more carefully.

Because Maimonides says as follows. Let’s summarize for a moment the rules that emerge from Maimonides. If we are dealing with a sound wall, then clearly if you destroy it, with respect to the wall you certainly have to pay, just as with a shaky wall—you have to pay the value of the wall you destroyed. The whole discussion is about the damages caused by the animal, not its loss but the damages. And if it is a sound wall, the owner is of course exempt. Right? The owner is exempt because he guarded it properly; what else could he have done? And the breacher? What about the breacher in the case of a sound wall? Maimonides writes: “And if the fence was strong and sound, the breacher is liable for its damages in human courts.” To whom does he pay this? Even though this is indirect causation? It’s indirect causation! Hold on, let’s see. To whom does he pay? To the injured party, right? He is liable for the damages caused by the animal. That means that when the animal caused damage to someone, that someone has to sue the breacher. Right? And if it was a shaky wall, what would we have said apparently? Then the owner is liable for its damages—he put up a shaky wall, he didn’t guard it. Maimonides says no. Since the owner can argue to the breacher: had you not breached it, it is possible that even this shaky wall would have kept it in and it would not have gone out. I cannot know. If it had gone out without you, and the wall I put up was a shaky wall, then certainly I would be held liable. But I do not know that it would have gone out; perhaps it went out only because you breached it. In that case this works as follows. I have to pay the injured party—this is explicit in Maimonides, right? “The owner of the sheep is liable.” I have to pay the injured party, and the breacher has to pay me in heavenly judgment. I have to pay the injured party in human courts, and the breacher has to pay me in heavenly judgment. Why? Why not in human courts? Because in human courts, at the end of the day I put up a shaky wall, so that is not strong enough to say: listen, without you this damage would not have happened. With a shaky wall you were negligent; you cannot make too many claims. But true, in heavenly judgment I can still argue: listen, maybe the animal would not have gone out if you had not breached it, and therefore in heavenly judgment you have to reimburse me for what you caused me. You do not pay the injured party. Notice the difference. When Maimonides spoke above about a sound wall, he spoke about the breacher paying the injured party. The breacher is the responsible one. With a shaky wall, Maimonides says the breacher pays the owner because he caused the owner to have to pay. So two things come out of this. First, with a shaky wall the owner is liable to pay. And that was in the Talmud at the beginning of the lecture: with a shaky wall he did not guard it; this is called beginning with negligence and ending with an accident. The owner is liable to pay if damage occurred. But because here the damage did not happen on its own—it’s not that the animal breached the shaky wall by itself, but rather someone came and breached the shaky wall—the owner has the right to argue to the breacher: I don’t know; perhaps even this shaky wall the animal would not have breached. So in human courts he cannot sue him for compensation, but in heavenly judgment he can. That is enough for you to be liable to pay me in heavenly judgment, to reimburse me for what I paid the injured party.

So notice: with a sound wall, the one standing opposite the injured party is the breacher; the breacher has to pay him. With a shaky wall, the one standing opposite the injured party is the owner; the owner pays the injured party in human courts, and afterward he sues the breacher, and in heavenly judgment the breacher must pay him, but not in human courts. Those are the rules according to Maimonides. Up to here, that is what Maimonides has done. First, he rejected the explanation of the other medieval authorities. Meaning, regarding the loss of the animal he did not mention it at all; but as for the wall, it cannot be at all—Nachmanides, Rashi, Tosafot, the Ra’avad, sorry—it cannot be about the wall at all. Therefore it is clear that this is talking about damages caused by the animal. And regarding damages caused by the animal, what is the difference between a sound wall and a shaky wall? He explains the whole Talmudic flow very well. The Talmud says it is not speaking at all about damage to the wall; it is speaking about damages caused by the animal. The Talmud says—and it is not speaking at all about damage to the wall, but damages caused by the animal, because if it is a sound wall, then the breacher stands as the damager—sorry, the breacher stands before the injured party, and he is the one who has to pay the damages caused by the animal to the injured party. With a shaky wall, the owner is the one who stands as the damager opposite the injured party, and he has to pay the injured party in human courts, because you put up a shaky wall and did not guard it. The breacher will have to compensate the owner in heavenly judgment in the case of a shaky wall. Okay? And of course for the wall one always pays according to the value of the wall; that is a separate matter entirely. Those are the rules.

What still remains for us? Maimonides still has not done one thing: he has not explained the contradiction with the Mishnah, or the contradiction in his own words between “bandits breached it” and “an ordinary breacher of a fence,” halakhah 1 and halakhah 2. After all, Maimonides says that with a sound wall, if bandits breached it they are exempt; but if someone breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal in the case of a sound wall, then he is liable. What is the difference? So this is the continuation of Maimonides. I’ll just read it and then we’ll go out for a short break. And I continue reading Maimonides’ responsum: “And that which you challenged from the case of bandits who breached the wall of the pen, where it was sound and they are not liable for its damages unless they led it out, but if it went out on its own they are exempt—this is indeed a valid difficulty, and perhaps this difficulty confused the commentator until he established this matter as referring to the wall itself.” Those are the medieval authorities we saw. Maimonides says: “But this is not difficult, and this is its explanation: there is a great difference between bandits who breached the pen and another person who breached it in front of his animal. For the bandits intend to steal the animal; therefore, as long as they have not taken it out of the owner’s possession, they have not become liable and it has not become under their control. And when they take it out, it becomes under their control and they become liable for its damages. But if they left it there, they did not do the damage they intended, namely the theft, and therefore they are exempt.” That is the bandits, that is the Mishnah; therefore the Mishnah says the bandits are exempt. “But one who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal does not intend to steal and intends only that the animal should go out and cause damage and that the owners should become liable for its damages. Therefore he is liable for that damage like any damager.” Okay? There is a difference between a mere breacher and bandits, what we saw in the Maggid Mishneh. “And this is the distinction between bandits and one who breaches in front of another person’s animal. And all these matters are correct and emerge from the principles of the laws, and all were given by one shepherd.”

Maimonides says: I explain the Talmud in its straightforward sense; it is about damages caused by the animal, and this is the plain sense of the Talmud as we saw. What forced all the medieval authorities into strained readings—and Maimonides explains why it is a very strained reading; and we too know that it is a very strained reading; that’s not something he had to discover for them—but they do not understand how one can reconcile this with the contradiction from the case “bandits breached it.” That is what troubles them. Maimonides says: let me solve that for you, and then you can go my way, which is the straightforward interpretation that this is talking about damages caused by the animal. How do I solve it? There is a difference between when the breacher is a bandit and when the breacher is a regular person. In the case of bandits, he did not intend damage and therefore he is exempt—it is indirect causation. If he intended to cause damage, the regular person, then it is a more direct legally actionable causation and he is liable. That is Maimonides’ claim.

Okay, let’s stop here for three or four minutes, go wash your face, and we’ll come back. Okay, welcome back. We want to continue. I want to continue. Okay, so we saw Maimonides. Maimonides’ view basically is that if we accept Maimonides’ distinction between bandits and an ordinary breacher, then in practice that resolves the contradiction with the Mishnah and there is no need at all to depart from the simple straightforward reading. Meaning, assuming we accept this point, Maimonides’ explanation is the most natural and straightforward explanation of the Talmud. By the way, many times it is like that—another lesson from what I said last time—that when you uncover Maimonides’ assumptions or his different textual versions, suddenly you discover that very often he is actually the simple and natural explanation of the passage.

Anyway, in our matter, the Meiri here writes as follows: “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal—if it is a shaky wall, even though it is standing to be demolished, he is liable in heavenly judgment, and in every case exempt in human courts, for that is what it stands for. And if it is a sound wall, he is liable for the wall even in human courts. But in any case, regarding the animal: if it went out and was lost, or it went out and caused damage, and the owners became liable for its damages, he is exempt, for this is only mere indirect causation. And when they asked here, ‘If it is a sound wall, then in human courts too he should be liable,’ the explanation is that this refers to the wall.” Now I’m skipping a bit. “And the sages of previous generations challenged this from what was said in the Mishnah: ‘If bandits led it out, then the bandits are liable’—which implies that if they merely breached it and did not lead it out, the bandits are exempt. But they answered that the bandits intend to steal, and as long as their plan is not realized they do not become liable for its damages. But one who breaches a fence intends only to cause damage, and his intent was realized, and therefore he is liable.” Also interesting, by the way, the wording: “his intent was realized.” That is exactly the wording later in the chapter on page 60. That is exactly the wording that distinguishes the laws of the Sabbath from the laws of damages. In the laws of the Sabbath you are liable because your intention was realized, whereas in the laws of damages that is indirect causation, and even if your intention was realized you are exempt. Here he emphasizes that because his intention was realized, therefore he is liable. And what is the idea? The idea is apparently that this is a more direct legally actionable causation and not mere indirect causation.

And now he says: “And their words can be strengthened, for this matter falls under the category of more direct legally actionable causation and not under the category of indirect causation in damages. For you already know that many commentators labored to explain what distinguishes more direct legally actionable causation, for which one is liable, from indirect causation in damages, for which one is exempt, until they explained that any case in which one intends to cause damage and the damage occurs solely through him is a more direct legally actionable causation—such as one who burns another person’s documents, or one who waives a debt after selling the promissory note. And any case in which one does not intend to cause damage, or even if he does intend to cause damage but another factor assists in bringing about the damage, is indirect causation in damages and one is exempt—such as what they said in chapter ‘One may not dig’: one keeps a ladder away from a dovecote, and so on; and also one who sets another person’s dog upon someone else, even though he intends no damage, or another element is involved. And similarly you explain all of them according to this principle. And here too we say, according to the view of the great codifiers, that this causation, since he intended to damage and the damage came solely through him, falls under the category of more direct legally actionable causation, and he is liable for the damage. And in the case of a shaky wall, the other man was negligent, and causation together with another’s negligence is exempt”—exempt in human courts, of course, because with a shaky wall Maimonides says he is liable in heavenly judgment. But exempt in human courts. So he says that is the difference: the difference is between more direct legally actionable causation and indirect causation. The bandit, who does not intend to cause damage, is indirect causation. One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal is more direct legally actionable causation.

There is a point here that needs clarification, because what does it mean that the damage is considered as though the entire damage came solely through him? The one who caused the damage is the animal. What does it mean—how can that be more than indirect causation? The animal caused the damage, not he. What is the difference between that and, say, where the wind takes the fire or something like that? The animal went and caused damage. And the owner guarded it properly. What? The owner guarded it properly, there is no claim of negligence against the owner here. So the damage belongs to the one who breached it. Fine—then treat it, at most, as the damage caused by the animal of the one who breached it; we’ll get to that in a moment. But how can you say this is a more direct legally actionable causation? That category belongs to a person who causes damage. Maybe I’ll sharpen it. Look, Rabbi Soloveitchik here, in his lecture notes on this passage, writes as follows. “Maimonides ruled in Laws of Property Damage: one who breaches a fence,” and so on. “According to Maimonides”—I’m reading again, third line—“according to Maimonides, removing the guarding from a damaging ox makes the one who removed it liable as the owner of the damager. Support for this comes from the fact that this law was brought in Laws of Property Damage and not in Laws of Personal Injury and Damage. And it is proven that he makes the one who removed the guarding liable under the law of property damage.” What is he saying? That they impose monetary responsibility on the breacher because he becomes, as it were, the owner of the damaging animal. Exactly. He understands Maimonides’ position to be that what obligates the breacher is that he is obligated as though his property caused the damage. The animal that went out because you breached it—not bandits, but an ordinary breacher—the animal that went out because you breached it is considered like your animal, and now your property caused damage. This is not a person causing damage; it is property causing damage. But why is it his property? It doesn’t belong to him. With bandits, if they take it—we’ll discuss that later—they acquired it. But here we are talking about a breacher who is not a bandit. He did not intend to acquire it at all; he intended that it go out and cause damage. Rabbi Soloveitchik says: in that case we view him as the owner, and now this animal is considered his animal. It is property causing damage.

But if the injured party is the owner of the cow—the owner of the cow that caused the damage—as we wanted to say before, if the injured party is the owner of the cow that caused the damage because he had to pay? Yes. Then I can understand why he is called a person causing damage. That is fairly natural. Exactly. And Rabbi Soloveitchik takes these things to a plane that we’ll see in a moment—the plane of the question of who counts here as the owner. And he claims that Maimonides innovated here an innovation: if a person breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal, he is considered its owner for purposes of damages. And he is the one sued. But then who sues him? The injured party. The injured party. Not really the owner of the animal; the injured party sues him. But if we are talking about the law of indirect causation versus more direct legally actionable causation, then on the simple level we are talking about a person causing damage. What property causing damage? The question is whether I caused damage indirectly or by a more direct legally actionable act with intention and so on. When my animal causes damage, what relevance does it have whether I intended or did not intend? In property damage that is not relevant; on the contrary, in property damage every damage is indirect. It is always that in property damage—I left the door open and my animal went out. Why am I liable? After all, that is only indirect causation. I only left a door open. Right—that is the whole innovation in property damage: that even though my connection to the damage is only one of causation, I am liable. In person-caused damage there is a difference between indirect causation and non-indirect causation, or more direct legally actionable causation as opposed to indirect causation. So if Maimonides makes a distinction between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation, that means he is not going in the direction of property damage; we are dealing with person-caused damage. So seemingly Rabbi Soloveitchik is not correct here.

And in fact, look at the Meiri. He spoke—we read him earlier—he speaks of the difference between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation. The difference between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation applies to a person causing damage, not to property causing damage. There is no such thing as indirect causation versus more direct legally actionable causation in property causing damage. But I’ll remind you again of what I said earlier: Maimonides writes two things. With a shaky wall the breacher pays the owner of the animal, because the owner of the animal himself has to pay the injured party. Okay? In contrast, with a sound wall the breacher himself pays the injured party. Now here the issue is not simple, because on the face of it the Meiri is speaking about a sound wall; he is not talking about a shaky wall. He is speaking about a sound wall, because in the end he comes and says that a shaky wall is something else, right? But until that point he was discussing the sound wall. And with a sound wall, Maimonides says the breacher pays the injured party. The breacher is the damager who stands in court opposite the injured party. That really does look like property causing damage, not person-caused damage. With a shaky wall one can say more easily: I am a person causing damage because I turned the owner’s animal into a damaging animal. And I did that directly when I breached the fence. So in that case one can say maybe this is more direct legally actionable causation and not indirect causation, and I have to pay the owner of the animal in heavenly judgment. I have to pay. But then why only in heavenly judgment? More direct legally actionable causation is paid even in human courts. And if you are talking about a sound wall, then with a sound wall I pay the injured party altogether, not the owner of the animal. And with regard to the injured party, how can I be considered a person causing damage? At most you can innovate and say that I am considered the owner whose property caused damage, even though I am not really the owner—but the innovation is that I am nevertheless considered the owner for this purpose. But to jump from there to saying that I am a person causing damage because of that—how do you get that?

So on the one hand, the Meiri seems not to go like Rabbi Soloveitchik, because the Meiri makes a distinction here between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation, which is apparently a distinction within person-caused damage. Rabbi Soloveitchik is speaking here of liability under the law of property causing damage—that he is considered as the owner of the animal. Look also at Maimonides: when Maimonides says that he intended to cause damage, in Maimonides’ own responsum—earlier I spoke about the Meiri; what about Maimonides himself? Maimonides himself says that they did not realize the intended damage and therefore they are exempt, “but one who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal”—this is a sound wall—“does not intend to steal but intends only that the animal go out and cause damage and that the owners become liable for its damages. Therefore he is liable for that damage like any damager.” What is this? This is a person causing damage. So what is the relevance of his intention? If we are talking about a person causing damage—or if we are talking about property causing damage—then why does it matter what the breacher intended? One could say with difficulty: maybe if he intended that the damage occur, then when the damage occurred we treat it as if the animal were his animal and he pays under the law of property causing damage. But he does not spell out anything like that. It looks as though he is appealing to the familiar distinction between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation. In the simple sense, it seems the Meiri is right: Maimonides’ distinction is between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation, even though it is quite hard to understand on what that is based. Because after all, with a sound wall the breacher pays the injured party, not the owner of the animal. Then how is it possible to view him as a person causing damage? He is apparently considered, if anything, the owner of the animal—the animal of his went and caused damage—and that I can understand. But how can you turn him into a person causing damage? And if it is property causing damage, then what does indirect causation versus more direct legally actionable causation have to do with it?

This whole story is very strange. I’m looking further up now; I’m just reminded of a formulation of the Maggid Mishneh that might give us a clue here. No, not the Maggid Mishneh. There was someone who compared this to fire; I don’t remember. Ah, no, to a pit—this is Rabbi Soloveitchik himself. Look: “It comes out that according to Maimonides, an ox is similar to a pit. Just as one who opens a pit is liable because he removed the guarding of the pit, so too one who removes the guarding from the ox is liable, because in so doing he becomes the owner of the damaging ox.” Like one who opened a pit—he did not dig the pit, but he acquired the pit for purposes of liability for its damages; then he becomes the owner of the damaging property, and the pit is his property that caused damage. Rabbi Soloveitchik says: the same thing happens with the ox. When I open the door in front of the ox, the ox itself becomes my ox that causes damage. And here again the big question is how this fits with Maimonides’ distinction between intentional and unintentional. According to this, it seems that one of two things must be true. Either Maimonides really does make a distinction between intentional and unintentional even regarding property causing damage—but again, of course not where my property causes damage and I opened the door before it. There it has no significance whether I opened it so that it would cause damage or for some other reason. Clearly the dependence on intent is only in order to turn him into the owner of the damaging property. That is, if he intended it, we will view him as the owner of the damaging property, and now this will be a case of property causing damage. And if he did not intend it, then this property is not considered his property, and therefore in fact he will not be liable, because it is not his property causing damage. And then it turns out that intention versus lack of intention is a relevant distinction even in the category of property causing damage—but not for an ordinary owner whose property caused damage. There it doesn’t matter what he intended. Here, in order to turn him into the owner whose property caused damage, that happens only if he intended that the damage occur. Because basically the Torah or Jewish law somehow transferred this ox to him for this purpose—namely that he become liable for its damages if he truly intended that this happen.

And this is indeed the analogy here, a very interesting analogy to the pit. For example, you know, the Talmud in tractate Bava Kamma on page 6 discusses what we learn from the common denominator in the first Mishnah at the beginning of Bava Kamma. There the Talmud talks about one’s stone, knife, and burden that he placed on top of the roof and they fell—and after they came to rest they caused damage as a pit. And the Talmud says that we learn that from the common denominator between fire and pit. Why is it similar to fire? Because the wind took these stone, knife, and burden from the roof to the ground, to the street level. But in the actual damage itself the wind was not involved; the damage itself is a classic pit. But because the creation of the damager was done with the help of the wind, I also need the category of fire in order to learn it, and otherwise I would not be able to obligate the owner of that stone, knife, and burden. In other words, you see that the manner in which the damager came into being plays a role similar to the manner in which the damage happened. As with fire, where the wind takes the fire and participates in the damaging act, so with one’s stone, knife, and burden that fell from the roof and caused damage after they came to rest: the wind participated in the creation of the damager, not in the occurrence of the damage. Meaning, how did a pit come into being here in the public domain? I did not dig it. Rather, I together with the wind—I placed it on the roof and the wind knocked it down. So we see that the manner in which the damager comes into being is treated as the action that determines who owns it. Therefore in principle, if the wind were involved in the creation of the pit, I could not hold the person liable who owns that stone, knife, and burden unless I learned it from fire, where we see that even if the wind is involved that does not exempt me. But without that, I could not obligate him. Why not? At the end of the day, after all, my stone, knife, and burden are sitting in the public domain, at rest in the public domain like a pit, and causing damage. Why should I care that they got there with the help of the wind? There is property of mine sitting in the public domain and causing damage. No—because this pit was created with the help of the wind, there was room to exempt me, because the creation of the damager takes part in the question of who owns the damager. It is not just ownership in the ordinary legal sense—if it is my property then I own it. No. Sometimes the one who creates the damager is considered its owner. And that we learn from uncovering a pit, and also from wind and one’s stone, knife, and burden.

Rabbi Soloveitchik says: something similar happens here too in Maimonides. When I open the door in front of the animal, I am in effect making this animal my animal. And now it is my property causing damage. Why? Because who created the damager here? I did, when I opened the door before the animal. That is like creating a pit. I basically created a potential damager here, and now the animal goes out and causes damage. The moment I created the potential damager, I own the damager. And now they can sue me as the one whose property caused damage. That is Rabbi Soloveitchik’s claim. And the discussion of whether he intended or did not intend has nothing at all to do with indirect causation versus more direct legally actionable causation, as the Rif writes. It has nothing to do with that at all. Rather, the claim is that only if I created the damager with the intention that it cause damage do I become the owner of this property, and then one can sue me because my property caused damage. But if I intended to steal it, then yes, I caused the damage, but causing the damage is only indirect causation. I did not become the owner of the ox for purposes of people coming to me with claims when it causes damage, and therefore I am exempt. That is what Rabbi Soloveitchik says. And again, in a certain sense maybe this is a borrowed expression—the difference between indirect causation and more direct legally actionable causation—and maybe the Meiri too means to discuss this under the law of property causing damage. Because otherwise it is very hard. Understand: with a shaky wall, as someone pointed out earlier—I don’t remember who it was—with a shaky wall one can understand it more. Because with a shaky wall the breacher pays the owner of the animal, not the injured party. That one can say I caused by a more direct legally actionable causation and not by mere indirect causation. I did it directly. I turned his animal into a damaging animal, and in doing so I caused him to have to pay. So about that one can say I am more direct legally actionable causation—but that is in the case of a shaky wall. The Meiri says this in the case of a sound wall. And with a sound wall Maimonides writes that I pay the injured party, not the owner. And with regard to the injured party, how can I be more direct than the owner of the damaging animal who was negligent about it? That is completely unreasonable; you cannot understand such a thing.

Maybe the Meiri means to say that since it is not my property, but it is no less than my property, it is obvious that I should be liable. Because after all, from Rabbi Soloveitchik’s logic, I am the one who basically created the damager here. He just is not willing to accept Rabbi Soloveitchik’s reasoning that says that if I created this damager I become its owner, and then one can sue me because my property caused damage. So he says: no, if I created the damager and therefore they want to obligate me, they will obligate me under the law of a person causing damage. It is simply the remaining category through which they can sue me. Not that the formal definitions of person-caused damage are really fulfilled here; rather, I am considered the person who caused the damage and I am the one who can be sued. Right, the animal is not mine, so they cannot come at me through the category of property causing damage. But after all, clearly this is a fortiori. It cannot be that I am treated less severely than the owner of the property who was negligent and did not lock it properly. Therefore it is obvious that one can come to me with claims. But what can you do? The category of property causing damage allows claims only about things that are my property. So he says: fine, then there is no choice but to say that they come to me through the category of person causing damage. And that is indeed very strange.

I’ll bring you perhaps a similar source where there is a similar dispute. Basically the discussion of what rationale makes the breacher liable for breaching the wall—the question whether Maimonides makes him liable as a person causing damage or under the law of his property causing damage. In other words, do we see the animal as though it were the property of the breacher—despite the fact that he did not intend to acquire it at all? On the contrary, the bandits who did intend to acquire it are entirely exempt because they ran off, while the breacher did not intend to acquire it, but precisely because of that we obligate him. And in order to obligate him, we basically turn him into the owner of this animal. So the dilemma of the Meiri versus Rabbi Soloveitchik is over which legal category we sue him under: the category of person causing damage or the category of property causing damage.

Something like this we find in the Talmud on page 56b. The Talmud there brings—I’m getting to that passage—but the Talmud there brings a saying: “As Rava said in the name of Rav Mattana in the name of Rava: one who places another person’s animal upon another person’s standing grain is liable.” I take someone else’s animal and place it on the standing grain of a third person, so I am liable. I, the one who placed it there, am liable. The question is why. After all, the animal is not mine, and the animal ate that standing grain, so this is property causing damage. But property causing damage applies only to property that is mine, and here it is not mine. So the medieval authorities there discuss this. Tosafot on page 56b says as follows: “One who places another person’s animal upon another person’s standing grain is liable. And even though the animal is not his, he is liable under the category of tooth and foot. For even though it is written ‘his beast,’ it is considered as his, since he did it. Like one who lights another person’s flax with another person’s lamp”—ah, that’s what I remembered, this is Tosafot—meaning the analogy to fire. If I take fire belonging to one person and use it to ignite the standing grain of a third person, fire is one of the primary categories of damage caused by one’s property. But the fire is not mine—it is someone else’s fire—and I also had no intention of acquiring it; I intended only to use it to ignite the grain of the third person. Tosafot says: but it is obvious that I am liable. Why am I liable? Because we see me as if I am the owner of the fire. And the fire belongs to someone else; I also did not intend to acquire it; I intended only to ignite the grain of the third person with it. But because I am at fault, we see me as the owner of the fire, and now people can come to me with the claim that my property caused the damage.

So what is he saying? Also in “one who places another person’s animal upon another person’s standing grain,” we basically view that animal as though it were the animal of the one who placed it there, even though he did not rob it and did not intend to acquire it. The animal belongs to someone else. But if you are directly at fault—you brought it and placed it on another’s grain—then we view that animal as though it were your animal. Now you become liable under the law of property causing damage. It is your property, even though it is not really yours. But legally, for the purpose of this damages claim, it is considered your property. He does say, however, that it cannot be that he is liable under the category of fire, because then he should also be liable in the public domain, and that does not make sense. We do not find anywhere that one who places another person’s animal on another person’s grain is liable in the public domain. Okay? So that is Tosafot’s position.

On the straightforward reading, Tosafot seems to learn like Rabbi Soloveitchik. Why? Because Tosafot says that the moment you created the damaging act, you created the damager by placing the animal on another person’s grain, then even though the animal is not yours in the property sense, in damages law we see you as the owner of the animal. And now they sue you under the category of property causing damage. Your property caused damage, even though it isn’t really your property. That is what Rabbi Soloveitchik said about Maimonides. Because you broke the sound wall, you basically turned the ox that was inside into a damager. Now we see you as the owner of the ox, and we sue you through the category of property causing damage—your property caused damage. Okay? That is exactly parallel to Rabbi Soloveitchik. By the way, according to this Maimonides has a greater innovation than Tosafot. Why? Because when I broke the wall in front of another person’s animal, that is not the same thing as taking the animal and placing it on the grain. Placing it on the grain is really directly causing damage. But here I broke the door and went home. Afterwards the animal went out. It could be that it walked three kilometers before it even decided whether or not to cause damage. To see that as really “placing it” in a direct sense is highly problematic. And therefore one can certainly see here what I said before: the moment you created the property that caused damage, the damager—you created it like digging a pit or lighting a fire, or the wind created the pit by throwing that knife or burden into the public domain—once you created the damager as a damager, even if you are not its owner, you are considered the owner. And in that sense, like “one who places another person’s animal on another person’s grain,” I created the animal’s status as a damager. What did I do? I took the animal that was in a guarded place and brought it to another’s grain and put it there so that it would eat. In that sense it is completely parallel to one who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal. He turned this animal, which had been behind the fence, into a damager. Once you turned it into a damager, then in the law of damages this animal is yours. We sue you as the owner of the animal.

Now, the Rashba there on page 56b also writes as follows: “One who places another person’s animal on another person’s grain is liable. And even though the animal is not his”—the same question Tosafot answers—“since he placed it on the grain, it is as if he fed it by hand. And therefore the Talmud asks, ‘Isn’t this obvious?’ And from this we learn that if one places his own animal—and even another person’s animal—on another person’s produce, even in the public domain, he is liable.” This is a hint against Tosafot. Right? Tosafot said we have never heard of a case where someone places another person’s animal on another person’s grain in the public domain and is liable under the category of tooth, because that is the public domain; tooth is exempt in the public domain. The Rashba says: yes we have, absolutely. In such a case he really is liable. Why? But this is tooth! The Rashba clearly does not learn that the animal is considered my animal and they come to me through the category of property causing damage. Because if that were so, then yes, my property caused damage, but it caused damage by tooth in the public domain, and tooth in the public domain is exempt. Clearly the Rashba learns that this is a person causing damage, not property causing damage. When I place the animal on another person’s grain, it is not as Tosafot said—that now the animal is considered my property for the purpose of the damages claim. Rather, if I placed the animal on another person’s grain, then I damaged the grain directly. This animal is like an axe in the hand of the woodchopper. Basically I damaged the grain directly; I did it through the animal. I placed the animal on the grain, and in doing so damage occurred. That is considered direct personal damage. And that is person-caused damage. Therefore the practical difference will be that even if this happened in the public domain, I will be liable, because for person-caused damage we do not find an exemption in the public domain. Tosafot understands this as damage by tooth. The only innovation is that we turned the one who placed it there into the owner of the animal, and now his animal caused damage by tooth; so in the public domain he will be exempt, and only in the injured party’s courtyard will he be liable. But the Rashba disagrees with Tosafot and says that we see the person as though he himself caused the damage, not as the owner of the animal. He is not the owner of the animal. It is not his, so there are no such innovations that the animal becomes his only for damage purposes. There is no such thing. If you are making the person liable, that means this is person-caused damage, not property-caused damage. Therefore he will be liable even in the public domain.

That of course very much recalls the Meiri we saw above. What did I say about the Meiri above, and Maimonides? He said that if you breached a fence in front of another person’s animal, even though the animal is not yours and the damage is indirect, you are liable under the category of more direct legally actionable causation. Now more direct legally actionable causation, as I said, is not property causing damage; it is person-caused damage. It is just person-caused damage in a somewhat indirect way, but not indirect enough to exempt him. It is a kind of indirectness for which he is still liable as a person causing damage. Why? I asked why. After all, with a sound wall, with a sound wall you pay—as we saw in Maimonides—to the injured party, not to the owner of the cow for the fact that he had to pay the injured party. You yourself go and pay the injured party. So apparently this is property causing damage, where you stand opposite the injured party. How can one say that I personally caused damage to the injured party? How can one say that I personally caused damage to the injured party? Even according to the Rashba, by the way. Even according to the Rashba—if I placed another person’s animal on another person’s grain, they see me as a person who caused damage with his own hands. That one can still understand. If I take a hammer and break something of another person’s. So I took someone else’s hammer. Would anyone in the world think for a moment that I am not considered a person causing damage? Of course I am considered a person causing damage. The fact that I used a hammer and the hammer did the damage does not matter. It is like a hammer, an axe in the hand of the woodchopper. I used the hammer, but I caused the damage. I used a hammer—so what do I care whose hammer it is.

With an animal, it is an intermediate case. Because I placed the animal on the grain, but in the end the damage that happened did not happen by my force. In the end it happened by the chewing of the animal; it ate the grain. The Rashba says that even this is considered the act of a person causing damage. It is direct enough for us to view you, maybe even under the category of more direct legally actionable causation, as a person causing damage. What would the Rashba say in our case? I broke a sound wall. Then the animal went out. It might have gone out even a day later. It went out after a day, walked five kilometers, saw something and decided to damage it. The Rashba says—the Meiri says—this is more direct legally actionable causation. How is that more direct legally actionable causation? That is much more indirect than ordinary indirect causation. And if you do not accept that I am considered the owner of the animal so that they can come to me through the category of my property causing damage, and you claim that this is more direct legally actionable causation and come to me through the category of person-caused damage, how can one view such a thing as more direct legally actionable causation? It is the most indirect thing in the world.

It seems to me that what we need to say here is the logic of the Rashba. It seems to me the Rashba would say this too, and according to the Rashba’s logic there is a basis for it. What is the Rashba really saying? It seems to me that the Rashba is really saying as follows: when someone created a damager, he is the one whom we will sue. The only problem is that once the damager that caused the damage does not belong to me, then under the category of property causing damage they cannot sue me. Under property causing damage they sue me only when that property is mine. So there is no choice but to see me as the one who caused the damage and come to me through the category of person-caused damage. Even though it is clear that my connection to the damage is very indirect. It may not meet the criteria even of indirect causation, certainly not of more direct legally actionable causation. But as I said regarding the Meiri, perhaps where we have decided to make the person liable, and we have no route, no outlet—because after all the property is not his, so they cannot come to him through the category of property causing damage—there is no choice. We put this into the category of more direct legally actionable causation and come to him as if he were a person causing damage here. The practical difference will be that if the animal eats something in the public domain, then according to the Meiri apparently he will be liable. According to Rabbi Soloveitchik he is exempt. According to Rabbi Soloveitchik the breacher is considered its owner, and now his animal caused damage by tooth in the public domain, so he is exempt.

Again, the Rashba does not say what the Meiri says, but the Meiri certainly starts from the Rashba’s point of departure. He says: once you are liable, you need to make a person liable. And it is not direct enough to make him liable under the law of person-caused damage, but it is also not his property to make him liable under the law of property causing damage. So we put it into the category of more direct legally actionable causation, and under that category he will be liable. Not that we simply place it into that category; the Meiri also says that it has to satisfy the criteria of more direct legally actionable causation. That is, he has to intend to cause damage. Only then does it really meet that criterion. And that is apparently what one has to say; there is no choice.

Okay, I’ll stop here at this stage. Anyone who wants to comment or ask something? Rabbi, can you show the summary again? Again—the A, B, C, the end of section A, B, C. I’ll send it—I’ll put the summary in the file. You’ll be able to read the summary. The summaries are all on the website. On the institute’s website and also on Moodle. Whoever is a student, it’s on Moodle; whoever isn’t can go into the institute’s Dropbox. So all the summaries are there; you can read them there at your leisure. Okay, thank you very much. Okay, so goodbye.