Talmud Torah, Lesson 1

Table of Contents

• The purpose of study as study in order to do, and the difficulty posed by non-halakhic parts
• Rashi on Genesis, “The Book of the Upright,” and the justification for opening the Torah with Genesis
• The “aliba de-hilkhata” approach, Rabbi Ovadia, and Maimonides and the Mishneh Torah
• The intrinsic value of study, and the proof from Choshen Mishpat versus state law
• “Expound and receive reward,” the stubborn and rebellious son, and the principle that study does not depend on practical application
• Women, the blessing over Torah study, and the distinction between studying in order to know what to do and the commandment of Torah study
• Reciting the Shema as a minimal fulfillment of Torah study, and the connection to tractate Nedarim
• “Because they did not bless the Torah first,” preparatory acts of a commandment, and Torah scholars
• Method: clarifying meta-halakhic questions through Jewish law rather than through philosophical literature
• Aggadic literature, the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), and what “Torah” means in the speaker’s view
• Nefesh HaChayim, Gate 4: study for its own sake, cleaving to God, and the distinction between God’s will and God’s speech
• The concubine at Gibeah, “these and those,” and a proposed distinction between will and speech
• Torah in the object and Torah in the person, and evaluating philosophical study versus halakhic study
• Pulling the whole move together: the halakhic core, cleaving to God’s will, and Rashi on Bechukotai about laboring in Torah

Summary

General Overview

The text presents an inquiry in preparation for Shavuot about the purpose of study and the relationship between “Torah study” and “the commandment of Torah study,” with the central claim that Torah study is not defined primarily as study in order to know what to do, but rather as study that has intrinsic value as engagement with Torah and attachment to the word of God or to His will. It points to difficulties in the instrumental view of study in light of non-halakhic parts of Torah and laws that are not practically applicable today, and brings proofs from the Talmud and the halakhic decisors, alongside a methodological discussion that prefers drawing “meta-halakhic” conclusions from halakhic sources. Later it presents the view of Nefesh HaChayim on study for its own sake and the role of aggadic literature, and finally connects this to Rashi’s interpretation of “If you walk in My statutes” as laboring in Torah that is not dependent on practical outcome.

The purpose of study as study in order to do, and the difficulty posed by non-halakhic parts

The text presents a common view according to which the main point of Torah study is “to study in order to do,” so as to know the Jewish law, and it emphasizes the slogan “an ignoramus cannot be pious” as a basic assumption about the need to know what to do. It argues that if this is the only purpose of study, it becomes difficult to explain the parts of Torah that are not halakhic and have no direct practical aim. It suggests that even non-halakhic parts can be understood as having broad practical significance in terms of ethics, ways of life, and “how one ought to behave.”

Rashi on Genesis, “The Book of the Upright,” and the justification for opening the Torah with Genesis

The text cites Rashi at the beginning of Genesis in the name of Rabbi Yitzhak, who asks why the Torah did not begin with “This month shall be for you the first of the months,” and answers that the purpose is to respond to the nations of the world when they say, “You are robbers, for you conquered the inheritance of the seven nations,” and therefore the account of creation was written to teach that the Holy One, blessed be He, “made the earth and gave it to whomever was upright in His eyes.” It argues that Rashi is not explaining only the first two chapters, but also what follows, because what follows teaches why the land was given to those worthy of it, and therefore Genesis is called “The Book of the Upright” and “the book of the upright ones.” It concludes that the very question assumes that the Torah should begin where there is a commandment, while the answer shows that the non-halakhic contents are meant to teach uprightness with broad practical implications.

The “aliba de-hilkhata” approach, Rabbi Ovadia, and Maimonides and the Mishneh Torah

The text attributes a strong version of the view that the point of study is to know what to do to Rabbi Ovadia and his school, and links this to criticism of “pilpulim” and yeshiva-style study that does not “end in Jewish law.” It presents a discussion of Maimonides and the Mishneh Torah and argues that the purpose of the book is to summarize what needs to be done so that one will not “waste time on the Talmud,” and can then “begin engaging in the Account of Creation and the Account of the Chariot.” It stresses that from here a different direction emerges in Maimonides than the simplistic presentation of study as merely a means to action.

The intrinsic value of study, and the proof from Choshen Mishpat versus state law

The text brings the example of Choshen Mishpat as “the halakhic book of rights” and explains that a right means something one can waive, unlike prohibitions, where there is no such thing as “waiving” them. It argues that in practice, “what one should do today in the laws of bailees” is determined by state law and by the rule that “any stipulation in monetary matters is valid,” so someone who wants to know what to do should study “the law book of the State of Israel” and not necessarily Choshen Mishpat. It then asks why one recites the blessing over Torah study on Choshen Mishpat but not on law school studies, and concludes that Torah study is not defined primarily as study in order to know what to do, but has another kind of value.

“Expound and receive reward,” the stubborn and rebellious son, and the principle that study does not depend on practical application

The text cites the article “Law and Judgment” by Rabbi Yisrael Salanter on the question whether we study in order to know what to do, and centers the discussion around the statement, “There never was and never will be a stubborn and rebellious son, so why was it written? Expound it and receive reward.” It interprets this to mean that the stubborn and rebellious son was written in order to teach the idea of “expound and receive reward,” meaning that we study even when there is no possibility of carrying it out, and that this becomes a paradigm for all study. It argues that the statement “there never was and never will be” is not a historical claim, but a use of the passage to teach what Torah study is, and it applies the same principle to the “idolatrous city.”

Women, the blessing over Torah study, and the distinction between studying in order to know what to do and the commandment of Torah study

The text cites the ruling of the Shulchan Arukh that women recite the blessing over Torah study even though they are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, and it brings the explanation of the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah that they need to learn the commandments relevant to them in order to know what to do. It concludes from this that studying in order to know what to do is not defined as “Torah study” in the sense of the fundamental obligation, because otherwise women would have been obligated in the commandment itself. It argues that the blessing over Torah study is a blessing over one’s belonging to Torah and not necessarily a blessing over the commandment, and that women are exempt from study as a value in itself even though they are obligated in the study necessary for practice.

Reciting the Shema as a minimal fulfillment of Torah study, and the connection to tractate Nedarim

The text cites the Talmud in tractate Nedarim about “one who says, ‘I will review this chapter’ has made a great vow to the God of Israel,” and the question, “But is he not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai?” along with Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai’s answer that one fulfills the obligation with the chapter of Shema morning and evening. It argues that if the commandment of Torah study were mainly about learning practical laws, then one would expect “a daily Jewish law lesson” and not recitation of the Shema, and from here it follows that the purpose of the commandment is not the doing of Jewish law but some other lesson tied to study itself.

“Because they did not bless the Torah first,” preparatory acts of a commandment, and Torah scholars

The text cites Rabbi Yisrael Salanter’s comments on “because they did not bless the Torah first” and asks how Torah scholars, who are obligated in study, could treat the blessing lightly. It presents his claim that they ideologically held that Torah study is only a means to knowing what to do, and over “preparatory acts of a commandment” one does not recite a blessing, based on the Talmud in tractate Menachot that “for any commandment that is not the completion of the commandment, we do not recite a blessing over it.” It concludes that someone who sees study only as a means will tend not to bless over it, and therefore his children “will not become Torah scholars,” as the Talmud says.

Method: clarifying meta-halakhic questions through Jewish law rather than through philosophical literature

The text presents a methodological stance that prefers clarifying questions such as Torah study, tolerance, and pluralism from within Jewish law itself rather than from the “colorful wing” of philosophical literature, on the grounds that Jewish law demands much greater precision. It cites the Pnei Yehoshua, who vowed to engage in aggadic literature but in practice deals consistently with Jewish law, and explains that in aggadic literature “people are not precise” and offer clever homiletic lines, whereas in Jewish law one defines and sharpens things carefully. It cites the example of the Maharshal and the polemic against ruling on the basis of precedents, and argues that in introductory publicistic writing things are sharper and more extreme than in halakhic practice in responsa.

Aggadic literature, the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), and what “Torah” means in the speaker’s view

The text describes skepticism regarding aggadic literature and the level of precision found in it, and raises the question of why the editors of the Talmud left aggadot, medical remedies, and non-halakhic knowledge inside the Talmud. It argues that the Talmud was edited by people who included things in it according to their own understanding, and that “the Talmud is not the Oral Torah” but a book that contains parts of the Oral Torah. It notes that it is customary to recite the blessing over Torah study even when studying aggadic literature, but expresses a sense that many aggadic passages were said in order to “wake up the students” or as provocation, and it calls into question the search for deep essential links in every aggadic statement.

Nefesh HaChayim, Gate 4: study for its own sake, cleaving to God, and the distinction between God’s will and God’s speech

The text quotes Nefesh HaChayim by Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, in Gate 4, as the basis for understanding Torah study, and presents it as a response to the Hasidic view that study is meant to create an experience of cleaving to God. It cites his words that study for its own sake means “for the sake of Torah,” and that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok distinguishes between commandments, which one performs “for the sake of their Performer,” and Torah, regarding which “speak of them for their own sake,” meaning for the sake of Torah itself. It quotes that study is cleaving because “He, may He be blessed, and His will are one,” and every law and halakhah is “His blessed will.” It adds that even when one engages in aggadic literature that has no practical legal consequence, “he is attached to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He,” because “the entire Torah… all of it came forth from His mouth, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai.”

The concubine at Gibeah, “these and those,” and a proposed distinction between will and speech

The text cites the Talmud in tractate Gittin about the dispute of “a hair or a fly” in the story of the concubine at Gibeah, and how Elijah says that the Holy One, blessed be He, “is occupied with the concubine at Gibeah” and says, “My son Evyatar says this, My son Yonatan says that.” It suggests that this illustrates the idea of “the words of the living God” in the sense of divine speech that carries both formulations within it, rather than “will,” where there is one binding conclusion. It emphasizes that the continuation of the discussion about “these and those” in the halakhic context will be dealt with separately.

Torah in the object and Torah in the person, and evaluating philosophical study versus halakhic study

The text proposes a distinction between “Torah in the object,” where the halakhic source is objective Torah and anyone who engages in it fulfills Torah study, and “Torah in the person” in the subjective sense of philosophical study that builds a worldview. It argues that in the halakhic world the consciousness is a hermeneutic one of receiving data and proposing interpretation while working against sources, whereas in thought there is no “interpretation” in the same way, but rather the creation of a language and a thesis. Therefore, someone who studies philosophy without it building him or challenging him may be in a state of “neglect of Torah study.” It notes that philosophical study can also build a person in a negative way, through disagreement and challenge, but still its status is different in his eyes from halakhic study.

Pulling the whole move together: the halakhic core, cleaving to God’s will, and Rashi on Bechukotai about laboring in Torah

The text presents halakhic study as the core of Torah not because its goal is action, but because its goal is “to cleave to His will” and to adopt a halakhic mode of looking at reality. It gives a literary example from Halakhic Man about seeing a mikveh through halakhic categories. It concludes by connecting this to Rashi on “If you walk in My statutes,” which he interprets as “that you should labor in Torah” and not merely the observance of commandments. It also interprets “and keep My commandments” as “be laboring in Torah in order to keep and fulfill,” so that the first two parts of the verse are described as stages within the world of study, and only “and do them” refers to actual performance of the commandments. It emphasizes that laboring in Torah means study for the sake of study itself, the “lishmah” of Nefesh HaChayim, from which true guarding and action draw nourishment, but which is not defined as merely a means.

We’re starting to deal a bit with Torah study, the commandment of Torah study, in anticipation of Shavuot, the festival of the giving of the Torah, so this is a good opportunity to clarify the issue a little. What I’m really going to deal with today is the question of the purpose of study. Meaning: is study meant in order to act, in order to know the Jewish law, or does study have some intrinsic value, or maybe some other purpose? That’s the first part. Afterward I’ll talk a bit about the commandment of Torah study. Today I’m talking about Torah study; after that I’ll talk about the commandment of Torah study. As I’ll try to show, that’s not exactly the same thing. And at the end I’ll connect these two parts.

Okay, so people often think—and after all this is grounded in the words of the sages—that the main point of the commandment of Torah study is to learn in order to act, in order to observe. And apparently it would seem that the purpose of study is basically that study is some kind of means in that sense, so that in the end you know the Jewish law. “An ignoramus cannot be pious,” meaning that you have to know what to do. Right now I’m speaking mainly about the halakhic branches of study, but already here I can’t avoid remarking that according to this conception it’s a little hard to understand the non-halakhic branches. Meaning, if the goal really is only to know what to do, then it’s harder to understand the parts—both in the Written Torah and in the Talmud or anywhere else—the non-halakhic parts that apparently have no direct practical goal.

So one could say: fine, the intention is to know what to do in the broader sense. Meaning, ultimately if you learn—and indeed the book of Genesis is called the book of the upright. If there’s the first Rashi at the beginning of the section of Bereshit, then Rashi says there—yes, Rabbi Yitzhak says there: why didn’t the Torah begin with “This month shall be for you the first of the months”? And he answers that the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted that if the nations of the world would say, “You are bandits, for you conquered the inheritance of seven nations,” therefore He wrote the Torah to tell us that He made the earth and gave it to whomever was upright in His eyes.

And on the face of it, that Rashi is strange, because he explains the first two chapters of Genesis. The first two chapters of Genesis describe creation. But what about the rest of the book, and the first portions of the book of Exodus? After all, the question was why it didn’t begin from the section of Bo. So how did we get all the way to Bo? Creation, I understand: the Holy One, blessed be He, wants to show us that He is the owner, He made the world, He distributes it to whoever He wants. But what about the rest?

So it seems to me that these things are written into Rashi’s intention, really to answer that too. Rashi says: “and gave it to whomever was upright in His eyes.” All the rest really comes to teach us why the Holy One, blessed be He, decided to give the land to those to whom He decided to give it. Meaning, he says that because they were upright in His eyes, and therefore it’s called the book of the upright, as the sages say, “the book of the upright ones.” Meaning, the beginning of the book is meant to say that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the owner, He created the earth and therefore He can distribute it to whom He sees fit, and the continuation comes to say that the Holy One, blessed be He, gave it to whom He gave it not for nothing, meaning not as an arbitrary decision, but because he was worthy of it—that is uprightness, the upright.

So this comes to teach us, basically, uprightness, and that’s why it was written. So if I take this into our context, then this basically means that there are parts of the Torah that are not halakhic in the usual sense. Notice: the assumption behind the question was that the Torah really should have focused only on its halakhic dimensions. What is Rabbi Yitzhak asking? Why didn’t the Torah begin with “This month shall be for you the first of the months”? Why should it begin there? What kind of question is that? Why is “This month…” preferable to Genesis? Simply because it contains a commandment, right? Meaning the assumption is that the Torah is supposed to contain only its halakhic dimensions. And the question was: why do we need anything more? What are the rest for? That’s the questioner’s assumption.

And the answer was that the other parts are really meant to show what it means to be upright. So according to this view, there definitely is some practical significance even to the non-halakhic parts. It’s not significance in the sense of “obligated” and “exempt” in the simple halakhic sense, but yes, it teaches us in some sense how it is proper to behave, to think, and so on. So it has some practical implications, and therefore it’s not so bad—meaning, you can still use broader circles: morality, ways of life, and so on.

So on the face of it, as I said before, I think Rabbi Ovadia and his household, or his students, express this conception very strongly. The conception that says that the whole point of study is to know what to do. Therefore one should study according to the practical Jewish law and without the pilpulim, yes, like he always shouts about the Ashkenazic yeshiva style of learning, where they deal with all kinds of things that in the end don’t conclude in Jewish law or aren’t studied for Jewish law. Maybe in this you’re hinting at Maimonides in his Mishneh Torah, that he said one has to learn… I don’t think that was the complaint. The complaint was why he didn’t bring his sources. Why is he writing things without sources—what is this, Sinai revelation? But Maimonides’ answer in practice was that this is what a Jew needs in order to observe commandments. No, but Maimonides says the opposite. Maimonides says that he writes the Mishneh Torah so that you’ll learn it, know what you need to do, and then you can begin to learn. Meaning: don’t waste your time on the Talmud, because the Talmud is only for knowing what to do, so I’ll summarize it for you in the Mishneh Torah, and now you can begin to deal with the work of creation and the work of the chariot. So Maimonides’ conception actually seems different.

Okay, but in any case, this means that according to this conception, the purpose of study is to guide us how to behave, or that its purpose is practical. Maybe the opposite conception—which is a conception more accepted in the yeshivot, meaning Lithuanian yeshivot and their continuations—is the conception that says that study has some value in and of itself. Not only as a means to know what to do, but it is something that has value in itself. When I say Lithuanian yeshivot that’s not completely precise; Hasidic yeshivot too, it seems to me, to a large extent already follow this line as well, though there are nuances—maybe I’ll comment on that a little later. Yes.

At the beginning of the section of Bechukotai, Rashi is explicit: “If you walk in My statutes” speaks about study as study with an intrinsic value, separate from practical need. The first Rashi on the section of Bechukotai—that really is this week’s Torah portion, you’re reminding me—there’s there… okay, maybe I’ll talk about it later, because one can talk a lot about that Rashi too. And it’s exactly in this context. For some reason it slipped my mind—it really is this week’s portion, right. Okay, maybe later.

In any case, the other side is basically that study has intrinsic value and is not only a means to know what to do. I’ll bring an example from our previous topic. I spoke about the sections of the Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat—how to define these different sections in relation to one another—and when I defined Choshen Mishpat, I said that Choshen Mishpat is the halakhic book of rights. Yes? What rights a person has—that’s basically the collection of paragraphs in Choshen Mishpat, or most of it at least. And what does it mean that a person has a right? When a person has a right, that means he can also waive it. I can’t waive the prohibition on eating pork. But I can waive a right that gives me money. I can say: okay, I forgive you, I waive it for you. Or a watchman, or the depositor—it doesn’t matter—they can waive things for one another; in contract law they can waive things owed to them, and that isn’t an act against the Torah—it’s permitted from the outset. Meaning: it’s your right, it’s your money, do what you want with it.

But then, what are we learning there in the laws of bailees when we study? What I’m owed. After I know what I’m owed, I can also waive it. Fine. But I’m learning what I’m owed. Now, to sharpen that, I said that in practice, what will actually be followed today in the laws of bailees? What will be followed in practice is the law of the state. Every monetary stipulation. Yes, right, the law of the state is what determines it, or if two people make a stipulation between themselves then of course that’s also fine, but not Choshen Mishpat. Choshen Mishpat is at most the default where there is no other explicit stipulation, whether by the two parties to the contract or by the state, society, or community in which they operate.

And if so, then this basically means that if I want to know what to do, I need to study the law book of the State of Israel and not Choshen Mishpat. Because that is, in the end, the practical halakhic instruction. So what is Choshen Mishpat? After all, we don’t usually recite the blessing over Torah on law school studies, and we do recite the blessing over learning Choshen Mishpat—even though in practice, what to do is learned from civil law, and Choshen Mishpat for the most part doesn’t pertain to practical Jewish law today from the outset. I’m not lamenting that state of affairs—that’s not the point.

So what is the meaning of the fact that Choshen Mishpat is Torah and civil law is not? Studying civil law is not? Yes, yes, of course. I’m bringing this example to show that you see: Torah study does not mean studying in order to know what to do. Because in order to know what to do, I can study law. So why do I need to study Choshen Mishpat?

But one could say the same thing about an Israeli who studies the laws of sacrifices and the laws of the Temple. Okay. Okay, that doesn’t mean it isn’t Torah. Right, that’s another proof, true—although you could say, “may the Temple be rebuilt speedily,” and then we’ll need to know in order to preserve it for later. Yes, when the Temple is rebuilt speedily, then yes, we’ll need to do that in practice. But here in Choshen Mishpat even that isn’t true. What’s the problem? When the Messiah comes there will still also be laws of the state, and that is what will determine things, and it won’t overlap with Choshen Mishpat—I hope at least. By the way, if you live in England then you need to study English law. Right, obviously—that’s to know what to do. But obviously I’m not going to recite the blessing over Torah on that; that’s not Torah, even though that’s the practical instruction of what to do. So what does that mean?

I think there is here a mode of conduct that has value on the side of gathering the theoretical right of the other. Yes, but what difference does that make? It isn’t practical. Why isn’t it practical? I’ll give you an example: competition laws—not opening a store opposite another store. Okay. So even if the local zoning committee would allow me to open stores opposite stores—say, one kiosk opposite another—it could be that as a Jew attached to a certain mode of conduct, I won’t do that. No, that’s not right, I think that’s not right. Not right. If the law determines—if society has set different competition laws, then different competition laws. That’s not a prohibition; that’s Choshen Mishpat. Competition laws are Choshen Mishpat, not prohibitions. And in Choshen Mishpat society can determine whatever it wants in that domain. Every monetary stipulation—the first mishnah in Bava Batra—there’s no obstacle to that in my opinion.

And therefore I say: but never mind, let’s talk about the laws of bailees, okay? Not competition law. Study it and receive the blessing over Torah for it—and what about the laws of bailees? Rather, when we study Torah, it isn’t really in order to know what to do. That’s not true. That’s not the right definition. Not only. That is not the fundamental purpose of study. In a moment I’ll sharpen this more. Rather, there is something else: study has some value in itself.

And still, of course, that isn’t an excuse or explanation of why we study something that we don’t even observe, even if you say study has independent value. Because one could say: fine, true, the purpose of study is that study has intrinsic value, not to know what to do. But what is the Torah that must be studied? It’s that same Torah which, when one wants to know what to do, that’s what one does. The stubborn and rebellious son. We’ll get to the stubborn and rebellious son in a moment—that’s also a good example. Sorry, if someone comes to a religious court, the religious court ruling will be according to Choshen Mishpat and not according to civil law. No, what? In monetary law—of course not. If there were a religious court and they had a dispute about competition, they would judge me according to… Certainly. What do you think—if there’s a question of ownership or neighbors, that isn’t affected by labor law? Everything. What do you mean? In Choshen Mishpat, the state determines it.

And besides, a religious court is always… I’m saying there are those who have an ideology according to which they don’t recognize themselves as part of the existing society, and then maybe they don’t… But even there, in the world of Haredi religious courts, they definitely take account of what the law says, and rule in accordance with what the law says; they’re not detached from it. Maybe except for Rabbi Lau—I don’t know who’s there now—but in most places… The main thing is that I didn’t get the names wrong.

Anyway, the significance of the matter is that we’re really studying not in order to know what to do. So what then? Why do we study after all? There’s an article by Rabbi Yisrael Salanter called “Law and Justice,” and there he talks about this very question: do we study in order to know what to do? Rabbi Yisrael Salanter is basically one of the fathers of Lithuanian thought, so there you can really see this conception. There he discusses the question why we study: whether we study in order to know what to do, or whether study has intrinsic value.

And he says there—he brings the saying of the sages, not a midrash, the Talmudic passage that says that the stubborn and rebellious son never was and never will be, and why was it written? “Expound and receive reward.” So he asks: what does “expound and receive reward” mean? As if with all the rest of the Torah we’re done, and now we need these three extra verses so that we have something to do? Meaning, if the purpose is so that we know, so we’ll have… what exactly is the meaning of this idea that it was written in order to expound and receive reward?

So he says that it’s being read incorrectly. What the Talmud is saying is that the law of the stubborn and rebellious son was written in order to teach the idea of “expound and receive reward.” After all, the stubborn and rebellious son never was and never will be, so if he never was and never will be, then why do we study it? To teach you that study is not in order to observe. Now that becomes a paradigm for all study. Even in study that does proceed to actual observance—before the act—there too, the purpose is not in order to observe but in order to learn, to learn for the sake of learning. And the stubborn and rebellious son is only the paradigm.

By the way, that’s an interesting comment on the Talmud, because in the Talmud itself there appears there the claim that says, “I sat on his grave,” yes, a famous Talmudic passage. One says it never was and never existed, and the other says, “It was, and I sat on his grave.” And somehow no one is bothered by what he says there. Meaning, we go on quoting that the stubborn and rebellious son never was and never existed, while the other guy sat on his grave. “Never was and never existed,” and we go on quoting and discussing and analyzing the matter and everything. And I think the point is that in my opinion that wasn’t really a historical claim at all.

How does he know that this stubborn and rebellious son won’t exist in the future? Maybe there will be one in the future—how do you know? He means to teach this idea. He doesn’t mean to say that it couldn’t be that a stubborn and rebellious son will exist—that’s not the point. He uses the section of the stubborn and rebellious son in order to teach me the principle of “expound and receive reward.” That’s the point. So what difference does it make to me whether it existed or not? You’re saying: so what is this, and what is it also? What? You keep saying what Torah study is—is it this, or is it also this? Meaning, is it either/or, or is it… No, it’s both, but the question is what is more fundamental, that’s all. It is not for the sake of knowing what to do. Not at all. No, not at all. I’ll prove it to you now, okay? A simple proof.

A simple proof. The Shulchan Arukh rules that women recite the blessing over Torah, right? At the same time we know it is ruled that women are not commanded in the commandment of Torah study. So why do they recite the blessing over Torah? So the Magen Avraham says there, and the Mishnah Berurah explains there, because they need to learn the commandments that apply to them. Right? They need to learn in order to know what to do. So why do you say they are not commanded in the commandment of Torah study? Then they are commanded—in the commandments that apply to them. Time-bound positive commandments they don’t need to learn, okay. But the commandments that apply to them, they do. There are also commandments that don’t apply to me—I’m not a priest. So women have a few more commandments that don’t apply to them; what’s the problem? Why is that called not being obligated in Torah study? Because someone who learns what applies to him in practice—that is not Torah study. It’s not Torah study.

So why the blessing? The blessing over Torah really is not the blessing over the commandment. It’s the blessing over belonging to Torah, not over the commandment of Torah study. Women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. That is stated explicitly by all the legal authorities: women are exempt from Torah study. But learning in order to know what to do—even women are obligated in that. So what does it mean to be exempt? They are exempt from study as a value in itself. That is what Torah study is.

But it’s a bit strange to say that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over learning what one needs to do and not… No, no, no. The commandment is Torah study. The Talmud says women also recite the blessing because they too belong to Torah. In what sense? They learn the commandments that apply to them. It’s some kind of appendix after the main obligation. But the fundamental obligation is not that. And it’s funny to call learning the commandments that apply to her—of which she is exempt… So I’m saying: how are they not fulfilling a commandment? “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us…” No, so that’s fine. The question whether this is a blessing over a commandment—that’s next time’s topic. I’ll talk about that. On the face of it, it is not a blessing over a commandment; the blessing over Torah is Torah-level according to Nachmanides’ view, whereas a blessing over a commandment is rabbinic. So we’ll still talk about the question what the blessing over Torah is.

But it’s clear that women are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study. They say “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us”—we say that also over rabbinic obligations. That wording doesn’t prove much. What? What isn’t logically clear here? Why do you think it has to be either/or—why not both? No, it should be, but I’m showing that this is how it is. Here’s the proof. Explain it to me—tell me. Women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, right? But learning in order to know what to do—they too are obligated. Conclusion: Torah study is not learning in order to know what to do, which is what I came to prove. No, that isn’t a proof. The meaning is that it’s part of it, but only part. No, they are commanded in part of the commandment of Torah study. Fine, so they have part of the Torah—but what does it mean that they are exempt from the commandment of Torah study? Every person is only commanded in part. Yes, but what does it mean to be exempt from the commandment of Torah study? Look in all the legal authorities: women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. If the commandment of Torah study is to learn in order to know what to do, then women are obligated. But if you say “in order to act,” then yes, it is fulfillment… No, I didn’t say they don’t fulfill the commandment. If they study in order to know, they have fulfillment of the commandment in the sense of voluntary fulfillment, like all time-bound positive commandments. If they do it, they fulfill a commandment, one hundred percent, but they are not obligated. There is no obligation on them.

Again, I’m not now dealing with the question what women are permitted to do; that’s a different discussion. I think women should study like men. But you’re asking me what they are obligated in. For me this is an indication about the question of what Torah study is. I think there is a conclusive proof here.

I just want to give an example: if I have some practical question of how to behave, and I open the Mishnah Berurah in order to know how I should behave, that is not Torah study. Right. So that is Torah study in the mode of incidental involvement. And all in all you also studied Torah—you also did something that has value in itself—but you did it… You didn’t fulfill the commandment of Torah study? No, that’s what I said—you fulfilled it incidentally. Now the question is whether the commandment of Torah study requires intention or not. Because after all, you studied Torah, so you are doing that commandment. But that is not the commandment in which you are obligated. Meaning, if it’s only in order to know what to do, then fine, then you did it. Maybe commandments don’t require intention—you did it, all in all you studied. Study has value, so what difference does it make that your intention was to do it in order to know what to do?

And did you refer to reciting Shema twice a day? Yes, yes, yes, I’ll get to that. Another practical implication is the blessing over Torah, say for mourners or on the Ninth of Av, on days when it is forbidden to study Torah—do we recite the blessing over Torah? Do we? We do recite the blessing over Torah. That’s already something else. But there we are all like women—we recite the blessing over the fact that we belong to Torah. Yes, that proves it. Okay. That proves it, yes, that this is not a blessing over the commandment.

Okay. Although there too there is some Torah study one may do even on the Ninth of Av—the laws in the chapter “Those Damages” and other things; damages they study there. In any case, the claim is that the commandment of Torah study is study for the sake of study, and not studying in order to act. As I said earlier, someone who studies in order to act certainly fulfills, incidentally, the commandment of Torah study, because after all he is studying. But that is not really the fundamental commandment.

Maybe I’ll already mention—and I’ll still get to this in more detail—the issue of reciting Shema morning and evening, okay? They say there is a commandment—the Talmud in Nedarim 8, the Talmud says there: Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav, one who says “I will study this chapter” has made a great vow to the God of Israel. So the Talmud asks there: but is he not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai? It’s talking there about an oath, not a vow, never mind—the Talmud there is not careful with the terms vow and oath. The Talmud says: but is he not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai? Is one not commanded regarding Torah study? The Talmud answers in the name of the famous Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai that by the chapter of reciting Shema morning and evening, one fulfills his obligation. So if he says an additional chapter, then he vowed or swore about something concerning which he is not already sworn from Mount Sinai, and therefore it takes effect. Therefore the oath takes effect, because otherwise an oath cannot take effect upon an oath.

So I ask: how can it be that the commandment of Torah study is to say Shema in the morning and evening? That’s the most absurd thing imaginable; it’s exactly the thing that doesn’t bear on practice at all. On the contrary—do a daily Jewish law. Every morning do one law, in the evening another law, or a halakhic verse—not Shema. Something that bears on practice. What practical thing is there in “Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one”? Tzitzit and remembering the Exodus. In “Hear O Israel…” you don’t need to get to the section of tzitzit for that. Acceptance of the yoke of Heaven. So what is this? There’s some lesson here. That lesson—that is the learning here, not knowing what to do. So this means that even the fundamental halakhic definition of the commandment of Torah study is not learning laws in order to know what to do.

Now, Rabbi Yisrael Salanter writes in that same article—he brings the statement: why is it not common for Torah scholars to have sons who also become Torah scholars? So he says: because they did not recite the blessing over Torah first—the Talmud says that. He says this is something very strange. What does it mean they didn’t recite the blessing over Torah first? Torah scholars, who devote all their time and energy to Torah study, so they cut corners specifically on the blessing over Torah? Why? What is it about the blessing over Torah that specifically there they had a special inclination not to say it, or not to say the blessing before learning? That’s somewhat odd behavior for people who devote their lives to study. And what he claims is that there was an ideological deficiency.

He claims—the Talmud in Menachot says… Rabbi Yisrael Salanter in that same article I mentioned before. The Talmud in Menachot says that on any commandment that is not the completion of a commandment, one does not recite a blessing. For example, on making a sukkah. Never mind whether from the Babylonian Talmud, not important right now—on making a sukkah one does not recite a blessing; one does not recite blessings on preparatory acts for commandments. Meaning, things that are means and not ends. Commandments are ends. Means and not ends—one does not recite blessings over them. So Rabbi Yisrael Salanter says: those Torah scholars who did not recite the blessing over Torah first—and this is connected to what I said earlier—they claimed that Torah study is in order to know what to do. But if it is a means in order to know what to do, one does not recite a blessing over that. The Talmud says that one does not recite blessings over means—it’s like building a sukkah so that I can sit in it on Sukkot. So learning Torah is in order to know what to do, but one does not recite blessings over means, over preparatory acts for a commandment.

So those Torah scholars had an ideological error; this wasn’t an evil inclination. They thought that study is study in order to act, so they did not recite the blessing over Torah first. Someone who thinks that way—his sons will not become Torah scholars. Is that based on the assumption that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over a commandment? I don’t want to say whether that worked or didn’t work for Rabbi Ovadia. In any case, yes, it’s based on the assumption that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over the commandment. Right—I said this relates to what I said earlier, whether the blessing over Torah is a blessing over the commandment, but I’m leaving that aside for now. “Take counsel and it will be thwarted”—what does he say? In that same article. “Take counsel and it will be thwarted, speak a word and it will not stand.” Yes, the opposite seems more reasonable.

In any case, all these places basically show that Torah study—and again, let’s sit with this, maybe we’ll talk more later as well about how we reconcile, how we formulate a worldview on matters of thought, meta-halakhic issues, and so on. What is Torah study? So often our way is to go to books of halakhic or Torah-oriented publicistic writing. I don’t know—Maharal, Kuzari, Rabbi Kook, Guide for the Perplexed, things like that. And I don’t have much confidence in this method of clarifying questions of thought, because in the area of thought I don’t have confidence in it in general—we’ll maybe talk about that later. I think the way to clarify matters in what to me is a more reliable way is to do it through the laws. Let’s see how Jewish law itself conceives of the commandment of Torah study. Not what various writers of intellectual Torah literature write about it, because in my opinion intellectual literature isn’t really committed to the precision that Jewish law is committed to.

This is the Pnei Yehoshua—I think I mentioned him once. What? Enough already, don’t add to it. Where? “Beware lest there be a matter…” It’s an intellectual book. It’s an intellectual book, but the proofs he brings are… Yes, exactly. The proofs he brings are from the legal sources. Exactly. And he too changes. I didn’t just bring Rabbi Yisrael Salanter; I brought his proofs from the Talmud. The proof is from the Talmud. Yes. Where does the pit at the inn that they brought in come in? I’m getting to that.

Anyway, I’m only making the methodological comment that often when we approach issues like this—issues like tolerance, pluralism, the attitude to Torah study, all kinds of intellectual questions—we’re used to checking them in the colorful “yes” wing of the Jewish bookshelf. And I think that’s a mistake. I think everything should be checked through the halakhic genre; it’s much more reliable.

Take the Pnei Yehoshua, for example. I mentioned him. In his introduction he says that a great earthquake happened and he was trapped under the ruins—this is a story I told here once. There was a great earthquake and he was trapped under the rubble, and while inside there he prayed to the Holy One, blessed be He, to save him, and he vowed to engage in aggadah. Now if you look at the Pnei Yehoshua on the Talmud, one of the most consistent later authorities, you’ll see he doesn’t let go. There isn’t a page, there isn’t a Tosafot that he doesn’t deal with. Page after page. He’s not one of those later authorities who gets to page 8 and moves to the next tractate. Those are yeshiva heads. Yeshiva heads are the ones who get to page 8 and move to the next tractate. I’m like that too, what can I do—we’re in yeshivot. But the Pnei Yehoshua was a Jew who didn’t… he didn’t give up. Page after page. Any place there’s aggadah—there’s no Pnei Yehoshua. None. Why? Because aggadah is… in aggadah, he says, people are not precise. That’s not really aiming at the truth of Torah; you say little homiletic ideas. In Jewish law you think very carefully about how you define things, what you’re saying.

So there I think that if one can derive meta-halakhic conclusions, intellectual conclusions, from the halakhic medium, from the halakhic part of Torah, in my eyes that is much more reliable than reading Torah publicism and deriving conclusions from it. You can see this in many contexts. There is, for example, Yam Shel Shlomo, by the Maharshal. In several places he writes extremely sharp things against precedent-based halakhic ruling, meaning relying on medieval authorities, and so on. Analyze the topic and decide on your own. Yes, that’s part of his dispute with the Shulchan Arukh; he had a major polemic with the Rema and the Shulchan Arukh. He came out against them very sharply, he and the Maharal and… the Maharal wrote about it in Be’er HaMayim Chayim, there’s a debate there. What does it mean that the Shulchan Arukh writes that he makes a majority count among the Rosh, the Rif, and Maimonides? What is this—lotteries? Study the Talmudic topic, reach a conclusion, and that’s how you should rule. What is this whole idea of relying on precedents? Binding precedents? Maybe they have weight, but just because he said it—so what.

Now, the Yam Shel Shlomo writes very sharply that he would decide disputes between tannaim and amoraim based on proofs. Meaning, when tannaim and amoraim remain in dispute, the Talmud remains unresolved, none of the medieval authorities decides it—he will bring proof against Abaye and rule like Rava; he will bring proof against Rabbi Shimon and rule like Rabbi Yehuda. Meaning, to enter into the Talmud itself. There, when one looks at his responsa, I think Yam Shel Shlomo is, by the way, a more daring work than the responsa. In the responsa he is completely conventional. His responsa are conducted like ordinary responsa, okay, maybe with slightly broader shoulders, but nothing dramatically different from standard responsa that we know.

Because in the introduction he lays out his doctrine—and that is publicistic writing. As publicism he says very sharp, very pointed, very blunt things. Again, not because he’s trying to deceive anyone, but because he’s trying to explain his agenda. In practice it doesn’t work that way. In practice he discusses the positions of Maimonides and the Halakhot Gedolot and all the great medieval authorities, the Rif and Rabbenu Tam. It seems to me he even discusses somewhere—if I remember correctly—who is greater, Maimonides or Rabbenu Tam and the Rif. And he concludes that the Tosafists are greater than Maimonides, and therefore he rules like them. Now for someone who supposedly doesn’t care at all about the medieval authorities, why does he care who is greater? Why is this ad hominem consideration relevant? Why this appeal to the person instead of to what he says and his proofs?

So that’s why I say one has to be very careful when learning from Torah statements that are not halakhic. And therefore I don’t have much confidence in that non-halakhic, intellectual genre, or something like that. Fine, you can roughly see and understand directions, but the precision there is problematic.

Okay, so for our purposes we basically see that… But excuse me, Rabbi, aren’t you engaged in that right now? In what? In a non-halakhic discussion? Certainly. I said one needs to engage in non-halakhic discussion, but to reach conclusions from halakhic sources. My topic is a meta-halakhic topic. And that’s exactly what I’m saying. Although the topic is meta-halakhic and it would have been expected that we would study the Maharal together—no. Not that we shouldn’t study the Maharal; I’m studying the Shulchan Arukh regarding women who recite the blessing over Torah. Meaning, again, one can study the Maharal too, one can study everyone. I hope I’ll get to it; we’ll also study things that are not halakhic. But regarding drawing conclusions one has to be careful. Precision characterizes Jewish law more. In Jewish law people are precise. People can make mistakes—we’re all human—but you try very carefully to aim accurately and reconcile with all the sources. You work carefully. And therefore I think that there one really sees what a person wants to say, and not in the intellectual fields, the less practical ones—yes, not practical but intellectual.

There are also commandments that are intellectual. Okay, that’s called almost non-practical, and there, Duties of the Heart—that’s Jewish law. To believe such-and-such, x, y, and z. Duties of the Heart is Jewish law, that’s obvious, I agree. Yes, “And you shall love the Lord your God” is Jewish law. “The Lord your God shall you fear.” But “precision” there is not really true? If you look at the halakhic discussion of those commandments—not the intellectual discussion of them—you’ll see: they ask questions, answer them, check things, make distinctions, meaning they build it like they build Jewish law. So what? It’s obvious. Jewish law has parts that one does not perform with hands and feet. I’m not claiming that Jewish law is fulfilled only with hands and feet. Maimonides at the beginning of the ninth principle—I think—writes that there are four kinds of laws. One of them of course is thought, speech, action, and he has another category there too, I don’t remember now. Do not covet. What? Yes, right, there are many things of this kind—duties of the heart—and the discussion that the later and medieval authorities and the Talmud conduct regarding “do not covet” is exactly what they do regarding Sabbath candles.

Ah, so at least that’s in the practical direction. There are matters of faith, and some are more inclined toward precision there and some less. So I’m saying that someone who deals with the commandment of love of God, but his genre is the genre of thought, I would be cautious about his conclusions. And someone who deals with it by halakhic methods and in the halakhic genre—there is more a priori confidence in the conclusions he reaches. Again, I’m not saying one shouldn’t study the other things—it’s a matter of taste—but I’m saying one has to be careful when deriving conclusions from them.

But don’t you think that Yam Shel Shlomo contradicts himself and does something here that is not… No, I think—I’ll tell you what I think happened there. He was in a major polemic with the Rema and the Shulchan Arukh, and he argued that one should not rule by precedent. When you write a publicistic article, you always sharpen things. You always say: what do you mean, nothing is binding. Now in practice… he too understands, okay, practice works in its own way. So there too you do see what he really thought. It’s not that there isn’t something in the extreme way he presents things there, because he’s trying to present the antithesis against the Rema and the Shulchan Arukh, but in practice it doesn’t quite work that way.

You can see this—okay, maybe we’ll discuss it one of the next times—people who take up the question of halakhic pluralism. What is the status of differing halakhic opinions? Were they all right? Is only one right? Questions of that type. There too there are various books of thought that go this way and that way, and introductions to books—introductions are also part of publicism, including introductions to halakhic books. And people say little ideas here and there, and the feeling is that they’re not really precise with the concepts. I think—we’ll see this—they’re not really precise with the concepts. And if I can reach a conclusion through a halakhic topic, to my mind that is much more reliable, much stronger. And therefore I think it’s important to invest effort in trying to clarify even questions that are meta-halakhic through analysis of halakhic topics.

So why did the editors of the Talmud leave all the aggadot in there? Good question. I don’t know what to tell you; I usually skip them. No, really. It’s not that I’m telling everyone to do that. I really don’t know what to do with aggadah. Like the Haredim with the Hebrew Bible? Like the Haredim with the Hebrew Bible? What interest do they have in the Bible? They know nothing. What is the Bible? Where does the Bible appear? I don’t know. Who is interested in the Bible? If they thought that was Torah? Fine, maybe. And again, there were all kinds of such homiletic passages that entered into the Talmud—I agree. More than that: medical advice and all kinds of kinds of knowledge entered the Talmud.

I think that in that period—if we’ll be a bit academic for a moment—I think that in that period the sharpness of the definitions of what is Torah and what is not Torah was simply not like it is today. Today we’re sharper with concepts, so then they thought about it in a more intuitive kind of way. So all words of wisdom and reflection and ways of looking at things were called Torah. But the Talmud is the Torah, it’s the Oral Torah. No, the Talmud is not the Oral Torah. The Talmud is a book that contains part of the Oral Torah. What—the Talmud descended from Sinai? The Talmud was edited by people who decided to put things into it according to the best of their understanding, and that’s what is there. And that’s all.

I’m telling you again: regarding the medical remedies there, “one seized by…” whatever the case may be—am I going to tell you that on that I would recite the blessing over Torah? I don’t know. Aggadot? It’s accepted that yes. Who am I to go against the tradition of Israel? But I don’t know. If you’re learning… If legal rulings? Yes, you have to see from within Jewish law. So you assume one thing, but Jewish law proves the opposite of what the world defines. What is accepted? I agree. Indeed I said: I do recite the blessing over Torah even if on that day I happen to study aggadah, and I have a reason—if I don’t feel well or something like that. So I recite the blessing over Torah because that’s the custom. Who am I to change accepted practice? And also because it’s publicistic and not practical. Okay, okay. So draw your conclusions. I said: don’t draw conclusions from what I say. Take the proofs I bring and decide for yourselves what they mean. What I say is also publicism, I agree.

What about that case where they taught in one town—one taught Jewish law and the other aggadah, and everyone came to hear the aggadah? Maybe that was to draw the people into learning. Yes, maybe; there are all kinds of explanations of that sort. If it’s to draw the people in, then we all understand that if so, then it isn’t Torah. Rabbi Akiva there—why did Esther merit to rule over one hundred and twenty-seven provinces? Because she was the descendant of Sarah, who lived one hundred and twenty-seven years. Now mountains upon mountains of analysis were said trying to explain the connection between these two things. Am I going to tell you that I’m convinced Rabbi Akiva had some profound idea behind it? The Talmud itself says he said it in order to awaken the students. So what does “in order to awaken the students” mean? It means he provoked them. He made a provocation so they’d wake up—that’s all. To remember the things. To remember the things, I don’t care—but who here has to search for some essential connection between the two things? I don’t know. Maybe yes, maybe no. That’s the aggadah that a rabbi needs to provoke. Okay, so here I am fulfilling it in the best way. Good, so that’s probably Jewish law, not aggadah.

We’re back to the matter of Torah study, the definition of Torah. And it seems to me we’re circling around this issue: is aggadah Torah or not Torah? Is the Hebrew Bible Torah? Are Prophets and Writings Torah? So I’ll tell you what I think. Maybe here I really will resort to a non-halakhic text for this, because, you know, a halakhic text that deals with aggadah—I don’t know if there is such a thing. In any case, I’ll explain. Publicistic writing isn’t invalid; one just has to be careful when using it. Again, I want to be precise: no, I’m not disqualifying all books that aren’t Jewish law. If they rely on Jewish law, that’s fine, no problem. I’m saying: someone who derives a ruling from a topic, someone who derives a conclusion from halakhic topics—I don’t care if the cover is colorful on the outside.

You too are kind of looking at Jewish law as something Platonic, but it’s also something that developed over time and was influenced by external circumstances. Platonic and developed over time, including external circumstances—I’ll talk about that. Maybe since you asked, I’ll say it here. Look. Wait, wait—first of all we want to hear the rabbi’s view on the Hebrew Bible and Writings. No, I didn’t start that; I was only answering someone. I said… But come on, let me tell you: what do I have to say about the Bible? The Bible is Torah, yes? I simplify. But do you know why the Torah began with Genesis and not with “This month shall be for you the first of the months”? So that when the nations of the world come, you’ll have something to answer them. Now decide: do you want to engage in answers to non-Jews, or do you want to engage in things one really needs to study? And why does one need to study? You can engage, if not… if your Torah study for the sake of… not to change the ways… maybe, I don’t know. I didn’t understand. I’m speaking again. If indeed Torah study for the sake of action is not the Torah study we’re talking about, it is not the commandment of Torah study, then there are other things too that one doesn’t need to study, one needs to study them when they’re not for practical Jewish law. So why is Bible study… okay, okay, fine, I’ll talk about everything. I’ll say what I think. You can accept it or not accept it—I’ll say it.

But first I do want to return for a moment to the comment made here about aggadah. In Nefesh HaChayim, Gate 4, Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin—yes, the father of the Lithuanian yeshivot, one could say, the founder of the Volozhin yeshiva—devotes the fourth gate of Nefesh HaChayim to explain what Torah is and what Torah study is. The subtext is basically that this is a work written against the Hasidic conception that says the purpose of study is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. And he says: it is true that the purpose of study is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, but not in the Hasidic sense. Not that study is done in order to cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, but that study itself is the cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. Not that study is done in order to generate some experience of cleaving, some kind of religious orgasms or whatever, but that the study itself is that. When you deal with miscarriage and placenta, with an ox that gored a cow—you are now cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He; you don’t need to think about Him at all.

And therefore that whole gate is devoted to precisely this question: what is this study? What is it meant to achieve? Now within his discussion—first of all, since we’ve already opened him—in chapter 3 he writes there as follows: “But the truth is that the meaning of ‘for its own sake,’ to study Torah for its own sake”—yes?—“means for the sake of Torah.” So to study Torah for its own sake means to study Torah for the Torah, not for purposes outside the Torah. And he is of course speaking not yet about purposes of action—not that is what he’s coming to reject here—but about purposes of cleaving, that is, religious experience. So he says one shouldn’t make it into a means for something else.

And the matter is as the Rosh explained on the statement of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok: “Do things for the sake of their Maker,” for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, who made everything for His sake, “and speak of them for their own sake.” All your speech and involvement in words of Torah should be for the sake of Torah, such as to know and understand and add insight and analysis, and not to provoke or become arrogant. Notice—up to here this is the language of the Rosh. He was precise in explaining the difference in Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok’s wording: regarding action he said, “for the sake of their Maker,” and regarding speech he said, “for their own sake.” The commandments are for the sake of their Maker, the One who made the commandments, the Holy One, blessed be He. The commandments must be done for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He. And study is “for their own sake.” Meaning, “speak of them”—of these things—for their own sake, for the sake of the things themselves. Meaning, Torah study for its own sake means for the sake of Torah. Therefore regarding action he explained “for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, who made everything for His sake,” and regarding study he explained “for the sake of Torah.” And this is basically the underlying thesis of Gate 4.

Now in chapter 6 there is a very interesting point. He himself addresses this question: why study aggadot? And he says as follows: “Therefore the truth is that this is the true way, which He, blessed be His Name, chose: that whenever a person prepares himself to study, it is fitting for him to settle himself before he begins, at least for a short time, in pure fear of Heaven with purity of heart.” Meaning, fear of Heaven is a preparatory act for the commandment of Torah study, not the other way around. Not that Torah study is a preparatory act for fear of Heaven. And regarding this he says this is the preserving measure—yes, this famous passage in Nefesh HaChayim—that one needs… he even calculates how much. Out of the time, how much one should invest in fear of Heaven, like the preserving ingredient that protects the grain. So he brings proof from the Talmud what percentage of preserving agent one needs to put into grain—meaning a calculation in minutes. Meaning: how many minutes per hour one should devote to fear of Heaven.

In any case, then he says: “And he should intend to cleave in his study to Him through the Torah,” to Him, to the Holy One, blessed be He, “meaning to cleave with all his powers to the word of God, this Jewish law. And in this he is actually cleaving to Him, blessed be He, as it were, for He, blessed be He, and His will are one, and every law and ruling from the holy Torah is His will, blessed be He, for so His will decreed that the law be this way: fit or unfit, impure or pure, forbidden or permitted, liable or exempt.” So he makes the claim that He and His will are one—the Holy One, blessed be He. That’s a philosophical topic I won’t go into here, but that’s his assumption. Once the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is Himself, then cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, means cleaving to His will, because to Him Himself I cannot cleave. In other words, the purpose of study is the study itself; when I engage in study I am cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, because the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is the thing with which I am engaged.

The passage you read actually says the opposite: he specifically cleaves to those parts that are practical—in the ending that you read. What do you mean? The last sentence speaks only about the commandments, only about actual observance. Study for the sake of observance. Meaning it’s not the Torah as… Wait, wait, I’m still in the middle. One second.

Then he says: since He and His will are one, when you study Torah, you are basically cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. It’s not a means after which you’ll be cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He; the engagement itself is the cleaving. That can also be true of commandments—matzah, any commandment. Every commandment is the same thing. In practical commandments, here it’s like the other commandments. Of course, of course—studying, studying the commandment. Not performing it. Studying the laws of matzah in order to eat matzah, like I study Torah in order to study… No, here there’s a third level; that’s not the point. Gate 4 deals with learning how to eat matzah.

Friends, listen—but what is the difference between observing other practical commandments, “Everything the Lord made for His own sake,” what He made—the commandments you should do for the sake of their Maker, for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, and study is for the sake of study itself. Meaning, he does create a distinction here; yes, his categorical distinction is exactly between Torah study and commandments. But the content of Torah study is all the commandments. I study matzah, I study the Passover offering, yes, I study all the commandments.

Now look at the next sentence: “And even if he is engaged in words of aggadah in which there is no practical legal implication…” So now he’s going to explain that. But notice this opening. Meaning, if we’re talking about the fact that He and the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, are one—what is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He? The will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is the commands, what He wants me to do. So what does that have to do with aggadah? What does that have to do with the Bible? What does that have to do with all the parts of Torah that don’t express the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, or His command—the non-halakhic parts? So that requires an answer: why is that too Torah? Since in a basic sense Torah means cleaving to the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. That is Torah. And now the question is: what about all the rest, all the things you asked before in different shades.

Then he says: “He is also cleaving to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He. For the entire Torah, in its general principles and particulars and details, and even what a young student asks his teacher, all came forth from His mouth, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai,” as the sages said at the end of chapter 2 of Megillah, etc. What is he basically saying? Interesting point: cleaving to His speech. Exactly. And that’s a point many people don’t notice. Meaning, the claim is that these two parts of Torah operate differently. Meaning, Jewish law is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He; aggadah is His speech. Now there’s a great novelty here: even when I engage in the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, I am cleaving to Him. And the claim that He spoke it all already at Sinai—again, I don’t think this is a historical claim—but the intention is that this has the status of the word of God, and since that is so, that too is a means of cleaving to Him.

Now whoever reads the rest—which we won’t have time to do—can notice that this hierarchy remains. There is a hierarchy here. When you engage in Jewish law, you engage in His will, but also in His speech. After all, the Holy One, blessed be He, also spoke the Jewish law, not only the aggadah. So when you engage in Jewish law you’re cleaving to Him completely—it is His will in His speech. When you engage in aggadah, that too is Torah, because you are engaging in His speech.

Then afterward he brings just one midrash—I’ll bring one from King David. Therefore King David said… how does it go there? He brings here… first he writes—well, maybe also… okay, King David said—I think in one of the earlier chapters—that King David asked the Holy One, blessed be He, that engagement in Psalms should be like engagement in the laws of ritual impurity. If the purpose of Torah is cleaving, then the opposite: one should ask that the laws of ritual impurity be like Psalms. Rather, he says that when you engage in Psalms, which is the height of cleaving, may it be God’s will that this too be considered Torah study like the laws of ritual impurity, miscarriage and placenta, and all the technical halakhic matters. So I think that too expresses the same idea.

But here afterward he brings a very interesting Talmudic passage, the one in Gittin regarding “these and those are the words of the living God,” Rabbi Evyatar and Rabbi Yonatan concerning the concubine in Gibeah. The question is what that man found in the concubine—a hair or a fly? Then they argue there, and then Rabbi Yonatan meets the Holy One, blessed be He, and asks Him: what is He engaged in? Rabbi Evyatar, sorry, encounters Elijah. He says to him: what is the Holy One, blessed be He, doing? He says to him: He is engaged in the concubine in Gibeah. Yes? The word of God, yes? The topic of the concubine in Gibeah, which is from the Bible—they studied the Bible. Meaning, what did he find in her? Fine? And this is aggadah in the Talmud, by the way. Engagement in the topic of the concubine in Gibeah is the aggadic part of the Talmud. So here we have the Bible and Talmudic aggadah together.

So the Holy One, blessed be He, is also engaged in the concubine in Gibeah. And what does He say? It’s interesting that He arbitrates. “My son Evyatar says thus; My son Yonatan says thus.” Yes? “You’re right, and you’re right too.” That is, because Rabbi Evyatar and Rabbi Yonatan were engaged with one another in the matter of the concubine in Gibeah, at that very time He, blessed be He, was also repeating their words exactly. And He, blessed be His Name, and His speech are one. Okay? Meaning, His speech too is one with Him, just like His will.

Now notice: the question of “these and those are the words of the living God” of course includes the famous question of the Ritva in Eruvin, where he asks: how can both of them be right? Yes? Both this one and that one are right when they disagree—how can that be? Like what he asked about the grave of the stubborn and rebellious son. Exactly. And it’s the same idea; that really is exactly the same idea. And basically what I think the interpretation he is implicitly offering here—at least it seems to me, but remember this is a non-halakhic text so I can only guess—is this:

Notice the phrase: “These and those are the words of the living God.” Not the will of the living God. The will of the living God is one. The Holy One, blessed be He, wants this. So if Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute, one of them is right and the other is wrong. But in the case of the concubine in Gibeah, where it’s the word of God, not the will of God—what did the Holy One, blessed be He, say? Not what does He want. He said this, and He said this, when He was engaged in the topic of the concubine in Gibeah. So he says “My son Evyatar says this, My son Yonatan says that.” And the Talmud—this is an explanation of the Talmud—the Talmud tells us that whole introduction exactly for this reason, that “My son Evyatar says this and My son Yonatan says that.” Why? To tell me that the Holy One, blessed be He, said both this and that.

Now you’ll ask me: how can both be right? It’s not true that both are right. Either he found a hair or he found a fly. After all, the Talmud later says he found a hair and didn’t object, he found a fly and did object, or something like that. Meaning there was some combination of both, or really both of them were wrong. So what does “these and those are the words of the living God” mean? It means that both sides are words of the living God—not His will. But isn’t the same said about Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai? That’s it—we’ll talk about Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai later. That’s the topic I’m going to deal with, because there it is said in halakhic contexts; I’ll talk about it there. Yes.

So in the words of God, on the page it seems like there’s a lesson there, like a message that this is the goal of Torah, right? And in the will of God, halakhically, if it isn’t to learn in order to act… I’m now going to close the circle, at least so that I remain with some closed-off unit. So what is he saying basically? I want to make a first distinction here between—and again, one can elaborate on this because lately it seems to me the conception around this is changing—between Torah in the object and Torah in the person. Meaning: when we study a halakhic source—well, we always mention the Ketzot in this context—when we study a halakhic source, that is Torah in the object. Torah in the object means that anyone who studies it fulfills the commandment of Torah study. It is objective Torah. The thing itself is Torah.

This doesn’t mean—and I’m not in favor of that historicist method—that everything the Ketzot said was really already revealed to Moses at Sinai. Of course that’s not true. Rather, the Ketzot is the interpretation he gave to the tradition that reached him from Sinai. But his consciousness is an interpretive consciousness. Meaning, when he approaches—and this is true, it’s clear that this is so—when one approaches halakhic engagement with something, the consciousness with which one comes is interpretive. Meaning, you receive data, you think about their meaning, and you offer an interpretation. Now one person offers one interpretation and another offers another interpretation—obviously, because we’re built differently, our interpretations differ. But fundamentally, our experience is an interpretive experience.

By contrast, when one engages in thought, in my humble opinion the claim I want to make here is: that is not interpretation. Let someone tell me what exactly the Kuzari is interpreting. He isn’t interpreting anything. He writes what seems right to him. It is obvious that he recruits sources and bends them so that they will say what they need to say. Just look and read—these are clearly his interpretations, many of them interpretations that don’t really make good sense in those midrashim. Rather, it’s obvious that he isn’t coming at all from an interpretive consciousness. He wants—I’m saying this is not criticism—it’s the nature of the field. You generate a doctrine. Therefore every intellectual doctrine looks entirely different from the next one. It’s not just disagreements like in the halakhic world. They speak a different language. They can’t even really speak to one another because each one created his own language.

Now in that respect, this is my personal view: that is Torah in the person. Torah in the person in the subjective sense. Meaning, if someone studies that and it builds a worldview for him and so on, then he studied Torah; it’s something very important. But if someone studies it only because it’s bound in a nice holy book from, I don’t know, Mossad Harav Kook, but it doesn’t really build a worldview for him, then in my opinion that is neglect of Torah study. You see the same thing if there’s some ideological issue very close to one’s own opinions—for example, are women permitted to study Torah or not, okay? You see the exact same thing: everyone has his own opinion and recruits the sources in order to explain his opinion.

So the question is obviously a question of degree. We’re all human; none of us functions in a vacuum. Every decisor, every interpreter, everyone comes with all the baggage he brings with him. And that’s obvious—that’s how we are. It’s not criticism; that’s how the Holy One, blessed be He, created us. The question is degree. Meaning, at the foundation there is still the fact that you are trying to explain the various sources, and if there is a source that contradicts you, you’ll explain why you’re not following it. You’ll say there’s a dispute and Maimonides says such-and-such. You will work with a halakhic method.

Now, I’m not claiming this is unaffected by worldview. Of course it is affected by worldview. But fundamentally you live in an interpretive consciousness, where interpretation includes “me”—what can you do? My glasses to a large extent determine what the interpretive product will be. But in thought, it’s not glasses looking at something else—the glasses are the thing itself. Do you understand? It’s not that there is something there and everyone comes with his glasses; the glasses are the thing. Just glasses. You have to eat in order to be full, if not you eat just bread. Okay. So you eat this seasoning. There’s no way around it—the conclusion is exactly what you’re saying. Everyone likes a different kind of food. One hundred percent. Exactly what I said. But if you really like the Maharal—like in the sense that it builds something in you—excellent. Then that is Torah, no less important than halakhic Torah. I have to leave, not because I disagree. No problem; everyone leaves whenever he wants. I’m going to run—you’re not. They run, we run.

So I want to say: I’m not claiming one shouldn’t study these things. I’m only claiming that they have a different status than Jewish law. In Jewish law, even if you don’t agree with the Ketzot, if you studied him then you studied Torah. You don’t agree with him. But in thought, if the Maharal doesn’t speak to you, doesn’t build anything in you, then there is a certain measure of neglect of Torah study. So this is exactly the dispute—say if Avi Yitzhak were here today, he would say that all this aggadah, yes, and all of this intention of Maharal, Rabbi Kook, and Kuzari—that is exactly the will of God, and what the rabbi is saying today is a slippery slope to other things. Whether it’s a slippery slope or not is a technical question. The question is whether it’s true. If it isn’t true… if it is true, then now let’s discuss whether because it’s a slippery slope one should refrain from saying it. Fine. But a slippery slope isn’t an argument.

But that’s a very interesting point, because the second side says that the intellectual part is exactly the will of God—and what is the will of God? When we tell about the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, watches over us this way, or that we are a chosen people, or this or that—what will of God is here? These are facts. What does the Holy One, blessed be He, want? What will is revealed when I study this? I’m speaking categorically; this is not an ideological question. What is the nature of the content we are engaged in?

It builds and it challenges. It could be that I read the Maharal and really don’t agree and it doesn’t build me, but it challenges me to think. Good too. Good too. Good too. So when you open the book, you don’t know which direction it will go. Sometimes maybe it will build me, maybe… neglect of Torah under compulsion. Fine, you’re under compulsion. Okay, you’re under compulsion, fine. If in the end it didn’t challenge you and didn’t build you, then you neglected Torah, but you were under compulsion—I agree. Again, I’m saying I have no problem—the building can happen positively or negatively. That’s perfectly fine. Of course you should also study views you don’t agree with. But if it’s a language that just isn’t your language, you’re not even arguing with him—it’s absurd.

I’ll tell you that regarding many things. Is this class neglect of Torah? I don’t know, we’d have to check. But studying a story in the Talmud and in Jewish law—if it doesn’t give you something in practice and it doesn’t give you thought and understanding, then really, really… What is the status of analytical halakhic study? Up to now I’ve described almost the antithesis of what I said at the beginning. What I said at the beginning was that study is not for the purpose of knowing what to do. And suddenly my own teaching attacks me. Suddenly I decide that only studies of what to do are Torah, and all the other studies are not Torah. There is some contradiction in my words. You can say that my words are thought, and therefore, fine, one isn’t careful, there are contradictions, one must be careful—but I still want to claim that there is an intention in my words.

What I want to claim—and I’ll say it in one sentence and we’ll do it next time—is that in the halakhic world it is learning the will of God. But the goal is not to do, rather the goal is to cleave to His will. To cleave to His will means to adopt the mode of relation, the mode of perception. Whoever read Halakhic Man—I assume there are some very beautiful passages there on this topic—that when you see a mikveh, yes, you don’t think “how beautiful, water,” but immediately you think of immersion during the day and all kinds of things like that. Now that is of course a literary description of what I’m saying here: that even when I say the halakhic part is really the core of Torah study, I do not mean to say that the purpose of study is practical observance. There is no contradiction between the two things I’ve said. This is the Torah, this is the core of Torah—Torah in the object, as distinct from Torah in the person. But what does it mean to study this Torah? That’s another discussion.

And in Nefesh HaChayim we already saw a first hint. He basically says the goal is to cleave to His will. And that has nothing to do with later performance; on the contrary, later performance, the commandments, should be “for the sake of their Maker.” That’s entirely different. It’s not connected. He’s talking about studying what one needs to do. Studying what one needs to do is a value that stands on its own; this is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. But I’ll want to give this more content than just “cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He,” and that already…

Did someone want to say something about Rashi on Bechukotai? Ah, yes, okay—so that Rashi, one moment, let’s remember it. Where’s the Pentateuch? It’s over there on the right. “If you walk in My statutes and keep My commandments and do them.” This is still this week’s Torah portion—we won’t get out of it soon. Rashi says as follows: “If you walk in My statutes”—could this mean observance of the commandments? Apparently “walk in My statutes” means: do what I want, yes? Could this mean observance of the commandments? When it says, “and keep My commandments,” observance of the commandments is already stated. So how do I fulfill “if you walk in My statutes”? That you should labor in Torah.

“And keep My commandments”—that’s the next Rashi—be laboring in Torah in order to keep and fulfill, as it is said: “and you shall learn them and keep to do them.” Notice: on “and keep My commandments,” he doesn’t say to observe the commandments. What is “and keep My commandments”? Be laboring in Torah in order to keep and fulfill. The whole thing is the commandment of Torah study. The whole thing consists of three parts of the commandment of Torah study. All three parts of the commandment of Torah study, none of them dealing with actual observance. Not “if you walk in My statutes,” not “and keep My commandments.” “And do them,” which appears at the end of the verse—“If you walk in My statutes and keep My commandments and do them”—okay? So “and do them” is observance of the commandments. So what are the previous parts? “If you walk in My statutes,” “and keep My commandments.” “And keep My commandments” is also observance of the commandments. “Walk in My statutes”—walking means doing; that too is observance. He says: no. The first two parts are three parts of Torah study.

So he says “and keep My commandments”—yes—so he says: that you should labor in Torah, and then that you should labor in Torah in order to keep and fulfill. Meaning, there is labor in Torah in and of itself, and there is labor in Torah in order to keep and fulfill—practical commandments, what is called religious routine—and after that there is actually doing the commandments themselves. Actually doing the commandments—that is the third section. Okay? And this is exactly the distinction we are speaking about here.

And therefore when people always say “that you should labor in Torah,” I think there is a quite common mistake here. He doesn’t mean sweating in the sense we know—meaning that one should study but also exert oneself while studying, run in place while learning. Rather, the meaning is the study itself, the labor of Torah itself—not because of its results, not learning even in order to know, but learning in order to learn. Not even in order to know. Okay? In fact, I would say there are even three parts. The first two are really three. There is learning, there is learning in order to know, and there is learning in order to observe. Three things. And all of them are within the world of study. And after that there is also observance.

And the commandment of Torah study being discussed here is the labor itself. The labor itself means study for the sake of study, the “for its own sake” of Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin—“for its own sake” meaning for the sake of the object. Okay? Now, Rashi says: “If you walk in My statutes”—that you should labor in Torah. What is this labor? This labor is the study “for its own sake” of Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin. Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin says in Nefesh HaChayim that the meaning of “for its own sake” is for the sake of Torah. Meaning, not for anything else, but in order to understand and know the words of Torah. And that is the labor. And that is what Rashi says: that if you labor in Torah, then you are walking within the statutes of the Holy One, blessed be He. And that naturally leads to “and keep My commandments and do them.” Because without the labor, one cannot arrive at genuine keeping and doing. The keeping is study in order to act, and the doing is practical observance. But everything draws from the root of the labor of Torah.