Answer to Lesson 1
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Positive Commandment 73: Confession and Repentance in Maimonides
- The Four Types of Positive Commandments and the Conceptual Map
- The Commandment of Settling the Land of Israel, an Existential Commandment, and Fundamental Disputes
- Divorce in Sefer HaChinukh and Understanding “Neglecting a Positive Commandment” in the Context of Agunah
- “And you shall return to the Lord your God”: Promise or Command, and the Dispute Between Maimonides and Nachmanides
- Sefer HaMitzvot versus the Mishneh Torah: What Is Counted and What Is Binding
- The Contradiction in Maimonides’ Language About Repentance and the Explanation Through “An Obligation Based on Reason”
- Why the Torah Does Not Command Repentance: Unnecessary and Harmful, and Character Work
- The Unusual Character of the Laws of Repentance: Rhetoric, Persuasion, and Free Choice
- Yom Kippur and Repentance: Commandment, Spiritual Value, and Atonement
Summary
General Overview
Maimonides counts Positive Commandment 73 in Sefer HaMitzvot as the command to confess along with repentance, and from his wording it emerges that there is no independent commandment to repent; rather, when one repents one must confess. The text maps out four types of positive commandments and places confession as a more procedural / definitional commandment rather than a conditional obligation that creates “neglect of a positive commandment.” It then argues that according to Maimonides, the verse “And you shall return to the Lord your God” is a promise and not a command, while Nachmanides disagrees and sees it as a commandment. Finally, the gap between Sefer HaMitzvot and the Mishneh Torah is explained: Sefer HaMitzvot counts only explicit commandments from the Torah, whereas the Mishneh Torah also includes obligations that are not counted among the 613, and therefore the laws of repentance are written in a rhetorical style whose goal is to persuade a person to repent, not to present repentance as a formal command.
Positive Commandment 73: Confession and Repentance in Maimonides
In Sefer HaMitzvot, under Positive Commandment 73, Maimonides writes that we were commanded to say confession together with repentance, and from this it is argued that in his view there is no commandment to repent; rather, when one repents one must confess. The text asks what kind of commandment confession is and whether it is in fact an active positive commandment, and suggests that the wording “when one repents, then one must confess” initially sounds like a conditional positive commandment. The text rejects this understanding as absurd, because it would create a situation in which someone who repented without confession would be worse than someone who did not repent at all, and it concludes that confession is part of the procedure that defines repentance, so that without confession this is not repentance in its full sense, and there is no additional transgression of “neglecting a positive commandment.”
The Four Types of Positive Commandments and the Conceptual Map
The text distinguishes between an ordinary obligatory positive commandment, where fulfillment is a commandment and non-fulfillment is neglecting a positive commandment, and an existential commandment, where there is fulfillment but no possibility of neglect. The text argues that the commandment of tzitzit is not existential but rather a conditional obligatory commandment, because if one wears a four-cornered garment without tzitzit one neglects a positive commandment, and similarly Grace after Meals is conditionally obligatory upon eating and being satisfied. The text defines a third type as “a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment,” where there is no fulfillment of a commandment through the action, but there is neglect of a positive commandment through violation, and it gives examples such as “You shall work them forever,” “for eating and not for commerce,” and “to the foreigner you may lend with interest,” while noting that Maimonides sees “to the foreigner you may lend with interest” as a full positive commandment, but most halakhic decisors understand it as shaping a prohibition in positive language.
The text presents a fourth type of positive commandment that can neither be fulfilled nor neglected, and gives Maimonides’ Positive Commandments 95 and 96 as examples: the laws of annulment of vows and the laws of ritual impurity. The text explains that these are definitional / procedural commandments that formulate how a status takes effect from the standpoint of Jewish law, rather than obligations or prohibitions, and therefore no blessing is recited over them beginning “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us.” The text suggests that for Maimonides the concept of “commandment” functions as a substitute for the term “law,” so that Sefer HaMitzvot is understood as a law book that also includes definitional and procedural clauses, such as “how one divorces a woman,” how one “becomes impure,” and how one “annuls a vow.”
The Commandment of Settling the Land of Israel, an Existential Commandment, and Fundamental Disputes
The text presents the view of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein as an almost unique example of a commandment that is entirely existential: immigrating to the Land fulfills a positive commandment, while not immigrating is not considered neglect. The text notes that Rabbi Avraham Shapira disagrees and argues that there is no commandment that is entirely voluntary; at most there may be a threshold of obligation above which there is voluntariness, and it presents this as a fundamental rather than a local dispute about the commandment of settling the Land of Israel. The text also mentions the possibility that voluntary offerings are an example of an existential commandment, but qualifies that perhaps even there there is no “fulfillment of a commandment” but only “it is proper to bring,” and that this has not been fully checked through.
Divorce in Sefer HaChinukh and Understanding “Neglecting a Positive Commandment” in the Context of Agunah
The text explains that divorce does not make a person more righteous, because it is a procedure: if it is done according to law, the woman is divorced, and if not, she is not divorced. The text notes that in Sefer HaChinukh, on the commandment of divorce, there appears language saying that one who divorced not according to the rules “neglected this positive commandment and his punishment is great,” and it explains that this does not mean that someone living peacefully with his wife is obligated to divorce her; rather, when the marital unit has already broken down, it is forbidden to leave the woman “bound,” and therefore an invalid bill of divorce leaves her an agunah. The text concludes that according to Sefer HaChinukh, leaving a woman an agunah is a Torah-level prohibition described as neglect of the positive commandment of divorce.
“And you shall return to the Lord your God”: Promise or Command, and the Dispute Between Maimonides and Nachmanides
In the Laws of Repentance chapter 7, Maimonides explains that “And you shall return to the Lord your God” is a promise that Israel will in the future repent, not a verse commanding repentance. Nachmanides, in his commentary on this verse, argues that it is a command and a commandment to repent, and the text also mentions the discussion of “For this commandment is not too far from you” and what “this commandment” refers to. The text rejects the claim that Maimonides does not count foundational commandments because of their foundational nature, and notes that in Root 4 Maimonides defines a “general positive commandment” as a commandment that repeats and tells one to keep the whole Torah, such as “You shall be holy” or “You shall do all My commandments and keep them,” and not as a “foundational” commandment that for that reason is not counted.
Sefer HaMitzvot versus the Mishneh Torah: What Is Counted and What Is Binding
The text states that the purpose of Sefer HaMitzvot is to count only commandments that have an explicit command in the Torah, and that Maimonides’ approach in the second root is that commandments derived by rabbinic exposition are not counted, because such exposition expands beyond the plain sense of the text and does not “uncover” what was already in the verse. The Mishneh Torah, by contrast, is intended to be a halakhic code containing everything one must do or must not do, including rabbinic laws, derivations, and reason-based obligations, and the text calls it the only halakhic code written throughout history. The text explains that the Mishneh Torah also includes commandments not found among the 613, and gives as an example the laws of Hanukkah and Purim, where Maimonides writes “a positive commandment from the words of the Sages” even though they do not appear in Sefer HaMitzvot.
The Contradiction in Maimonides’ Language About Repentance and the Explanation Through “An Obligation Based on Reason”
At the opening of the Laws of Repentance, Maimonides writes, “There is one positive commandment, namely that the sinner return from his sin and confess,” and the text notes that the Minchat Chinukh comments that this contradicts the wording in Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 73, from which it seems there is no commandment to repent. The text suggests that the difference stems from the conceptual gap between Sefer HaMitzvot and the Mishneh Torah: in Sefer HaMitzvot there is no place for repentance as a Torah commandment because there is no explicit command, but in the Mishneh Torah there is a halakhic obligation to repent, and therefore it opens as a “positive commandment” in the sense of a normative obligation. The text concludes that the obligation to repent exists on the basis of reason, because once the Torah has revealed that there is such a mechanism of repair and atonement, it is obvious that anyone who has sinned must use it to correct his actions.
Why the Torah Does Not Command Repentance: Unnecessary and Harmful, and Character Work
The text argues that not only is there no need for a commandment about repentance because “why do I need a verse? It is reason itself,” but such a commandment would actually ruin repentance, because complete repentance must come from inner understanding and not from compliance with an order. The text compares this to character work and brings the yeshiva joke about someone who worked for a year on his character traits in order to “fulfill his obligation of humility,” to illustrate how inner work, when done as a formal clause, becomes distorted. The text notes that the Torah describes the virtue of humility in “And the man Moses was very humble, more than any person on the face of the earth,” without commanding one to be humble, and places repentance in that same framework: the Torah defines its value and expects it, but does not command it in a formal sense.
The Unusual Character of the Laws of Repentance: Rhetoric, Persuasion, and Free Choice
The text describes the Laws of Repentance as an unusual collection in which Maimonides “sings poems” about the greatness of repentance, such as “See how great is the virtue of repentance: yesterday he was hated, distant, rejected, and today he is beloved and close,” and combines this with discussions of the World to Come. The text explains that this unusual character comes from the fact that Maimonides is not presenting only halakhic instructions here but is persuading the person to repent, because repentance does not take place by force of command but by force of inner choice and decision. The text justifies the appearance of two chapters on free choice in the Laws of Repentance by saying that there “the commandment is to be a chooser,” unlike other commandments where choice is only the means to fulfill a concrete command, and concludes that one cannot command a person to be a chooser, because if he does not choose, he also will not choose even this command.
Yom Kippur and Repentance: Commandment, Spiritual Value, and Atonement
The text argues that in Maimonides there is no Torah commandment to repent on Yom Kippur, and that in Sefer HaMitzvot the commandments of the day are things like affliction and the service of the High Priest, not repentance. The text notes that Rabbeinu Yonah argues that there is a commandment to repent, and even a special commandment on Yom Kippur, and adds that Rabbi Soloveitchik speaks about a “special spiritual quality” on Yom Kippur. The text explains that once one understands that without repentance there is no atonement, reason itself obligates repentance even without an explicit command, and concludes that the continuation of the discussion will be postponed until “next time.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We have three—well, two meetings on this issue, so I’ll try to fit things into the two meetings. Maybe I’ll start with a technical remark, and then we’ll get a bit more into the substance. In Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 73, Maimonides writes there that we were commanded to say confession together with repentance. That’s Positive Commandment 73. And when you look at that wording, it’s pretty clear that Maimonides does not hold that there is a commandment to repent. That’s not how you formulate it if you want to say there’s a commandment to repent. Rather, what? We were commanded that when one repents, one must confess. Is there a commandment to confess? To repent, no. To confess? Meaning, if one repents, then one confesses. So repenting is not a commandment. And what about confession? On the face of it, it seems yes. That’s Positive Commandment 73. What is the nature of this commandment, to confess? You know, maybe I mentioned this once, I don’t remember anymore. There are four types of positive commandments in Jewish law. There’s a regular, simple positive commandment, what’s called an obligatory positive commandment. Putting on tefillin. That’s a positive commandment such that when you put on tefillin you fulfill a positive commandment, and if you didn’t put on tefillin then you neglected a positive commandment. That’s called an obligatory commandment. You are required to do it. Opposed to that, there is an existential commandment. An existential commandment means: if you did the commandment, then you have a commandment; and if you didn’t do it, nothing happened. For example, an example of an existential commandment—are there really many full examples of this? Sending away the mother bird. Even sending away the mother bird, in my opinion, isn’t an accurate definition of an existential commandment. In a moment I’ll explain why. Say the commandment of charity. In the commandment of charity there is a standard that one is obligated to pass—one-third of a shekel per year, Maimonides writes. One-third of a shekel per year is an obligation. What about beyond that? If you gave charity, you fulfilled a commandment; but if you didn’t give, it’s not that you neglected a positive commandment—no, nothing happened. Meaning, up to one-third of a shekel, if you didn’t give, that’s neglect of a positive commandment; beyond that, if it happened that you gave, then it’s a commandment. If not, then not. By the way, up to one-fifth of one’s assets, from one-third of a shekel up to one-fifth. The same with Torah study according to some opinions. The commandment of Torah study—we talked about this—according to some opinions it’s just one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, the recitation of Shema here, morning and evening. Everything beyond that is an existential commandment. Meaning, if you did it, you fulfilled the commandment of Torah study, and if not, then in the formal halakhic sense nothing happened. Nothing happened, and we talked about how precisely because it is so important and expected of us, therefore the formal command is minimal, in order to leave the…
[Speaker C] An example like divorcing a wife?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, that too isn’t completely precise. I’ll get to that in a moment. Because divorce too—even when you divorce her, you haven’t fulfilled a commandment.
[Speaker C] Even when you divorce, you haven’t fulfilled a commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The commandment of divorce—someone who divorced his wife did not fulfill an extra commandment compared to someone who didn’t divorce his wife. That’s another type; we’ll see in a moment. What about slaughtering? Slaughtering is like—sort of—slaughtering isn’t exactly like divorce, but also not, also not—
[Speaker B] Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain to you in a moment why all these examples aren’t good. I just want to sketch the map, although again this is only a parenthesis, I don’t want to go on too long about it. There are only six hundred and thirteen possibilities here. Right. We’ve already eliminated some. That’s two to the ninth, right? Fine, okay.
[Speaker C] In any case, so—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We said there is an existential commandment, which is a commandment such that if you fulfill it, there is fulfillment, and if you neglect it, there is no neglect of that commandment. Why did I say there’s no good example of this? Because I can hardly think of an example where the entire commandment is like that. There are commandments that have a threshold. One-third of a shekel a year, which is obligatory; beyond that it’s optional. Torah study… tzitzit?
[Speaker B] Tzitzit also isn’t a good example, in a moment…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me finish the map and then I’ll explain to you…
[Speaker B] According to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, settling the Land…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So according to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, that’s the one example—maybe one more—that is an example of a commandment that is entirely existential, according to his view. He claims that if someone immigrates to the Land, he fulfills a positive commandment, and if someone doesn’t immigrate, nothing happened. And Rabbi Avraham Shapira argues with him; he says there is no such thing, there is no such commandment in the Torah. This is a fundamental dispute, not a dispute about the commandment of settling the Land of Israel. He says there is no such thing as a commandment that is entirely voluntary. There can be a threshold beyond which it is voluntary, but there cannot be a commandment that is entirely voluntary—but that is Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s claim. Someone once commented to me about voluntary offerings. Voluntary offerings are not a bad example. Voluntary offerings may be a good example, although there too I’m a bit unsure, because say Rabbi Avraham Shapira certainly didn’t see it that way, since he argued that there is no such commandment. Meaning, it cannot be. Because with voluntary offerings it could be that even if you bring them, it’s not a commandment; rather, it’s proper to bring a voluntary offering, fine, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that one fulfills a commandment by doing so. That needs to be checked; I haven’t checked it through to the end. In any case, this is an existential commandment. Why are all the examples you brought here not good for this? So first I’ll show you—it’s a nuance—I’ll stand on a certain nuance. Let’s talk about the commandment of tzitzit, one of the examples mentioned earlier. Why is it not an existential commandment, as people usually think? There are later authorities who write that it is an existential commandment. That’s a mistake; it’s not true. The commandment of tzitzit is not an existential commandment. Why isn’t it an existential commandment? Because the commandment of tzitzit can be neglected. There is a situation in which I neglected the positive commandment of tzitzit, right? If I wore a four-cornered garment and didn’t put tzitzit on it, that’s neglect of a positive commandment. An existential commandment is a commandment that cannot be neglected; you can’t commit neglect of a positive commandment. It only has fulfillment; it has no neglect. Meaning, if you fulfilled it, you fulfilled a positive commandment, but you cannot neglect an existential commandment. Okay? That’s what is called an existential commandment. So what is the commandment of tzitzit? The commandment of tzitzit is a conditional commandment. A conditional commandment means it is a commandment imposed on you as an obligation—it’s an obligatory commandment—but it is conditional on certain circumstances being present, namely that you are wearing a four-cornered garment. Slaughtering, maybe the same thing—I’ll maybe comment on that in a moment, maybe not—but slaughtering, if you want to eat then you need to slaughter. If you ate without slaughtering, you neglected a positive commandment. So slaughtering can be neglected.
[Speaker E] Therefore, if a poor person stood before you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If a poor person stood before you and you didn’t give him charity, did you neglect the commandment of charity? No, no, no—you did not neglect the commandment of charity. If you gave one-third of a shekel a year, you did not neglect it. Not in the formal definition of the positive commandment of charity—you did not neglect a positive commandment.
[Speaker B] It’s true that there is an issue, a mode of conduct, “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”—you can approach it from other directions, but in the category of the commandment of charity, up to one-third of a shekel per year is the obligation. Certainly if there’s no one before you, let’s say that’s certainly true. Therefore there are positive commandments that look like existential commandments, but they’re not. They are conditional obligatory positive commandments. For example, would anyone imagine that the commandment of Grace after Meals is existential? Only if I ate and was satisfied do I need to recite Grace after Meals, right? Am I obligated to eat and be satisfied? No. I could go my whole life without eating and being satisfied, and I would never recite Grace after Meals. Nobody says that this is an existential commandment. Why? Because it’s obvious to everyone that it’s a fully obligatory commandment; the obligation is simply imposed on you only if certain circumstances are met—if you ate and were satisfied. Right? Therefore things like these are obligatory commandments, not existential commandments. They are conditional obligatory commandments. An existential commandment is distinguished by the fact that it cannot be neglected; it can only be fulfilled. So for now we’ve collected two types: an obligatory commandment, conditional or unconditional—that is a commandment such that if I fulfill it I have a positive commandment, and if I violate it I have the transgression of neglecting a positive commandment. That is a commandment that can be fulfilled and can be neglected. An existential positive commandment is a commandment that can be fulfilled and cannot be neglected. Tzitzit is conditional-obligatory, right? Good. So of course, now that we’ve shown our cards, there are two other combinations still missing, right? Two by two. Fulfillment and neglect, yes and no fulfillment, yes and no neglect. What still remains? A commandment that can be neglected and cannot be fulfilled, right? That’s the third type. What is that? That’s what is called a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment. There is a dispute in the Talmud whether a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment or a prohibition. Okay? A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment such that if I fulfill it, I didn’t fulfill a commandment, but if I didn’t fulfill it, then I neglected the positive commandment. For example: “You shall work them forever.” That’s a positive commandment to work a Canaanite slave. Is there a positive commandment to work a Canaanite slave? No. Someone who works a Canaanite slave did not fulfill a positive commandment. Someone who frees a Canaanite slave neglected the positive commandment of “forever”—“you shall work them forever.” Meaning, this is a commandment that is actually formulating a prohibition in positive language. It’s not telling you to work the slave; it’s telling you not to free him. Another example: “And the produce of the land shall be for you for eating and not for commerce,” in the Sabbatical year, right? So is there a commandment to eat Sabbatical-year produce? There are interpretations like that according to Maimonides; even about that I’m not sure. But according to most halakhic decisors there is no commandment to eat Sabbatical-year produce. One does not fulfill a commandment by doing so. But if someone trades in Sabbatical-year produce—“for eating and not for commerce”—if someone trades in Sabbatical-year produce, he has committed a transgression. Which transgression did he commit? Not a prohibition. Neglect of the positive commandment of “for eating.” He didn’t eat; he traded. But eating is not a commandment. When it tells you to eat, the meaning is not to trade. “To the foreigner you may lend with interest.” There is a prohibition of interest. “To the foreigner you may lend with interest”—but is there a positive commandment? Maimonides indeed says that this is a full positive commandment. But the common understanding among most halakhic decisors, so they say, is that there is no commandment to lend to a foreigner with interest; rather, if you lend with interest, do so only to a foreigner, not to someone else. And if you lend with interest to a Jew, not to a foreigner, then not only have you violated the prohibition of interest, you have also neglected the positive commandment of “to the foreigner you may lend with interest.” But there is no commandment to lend with interest to a foreigner; one does not fulfill a positive commandment by doing so. So many times the Torah uses positive language to tell me indirectly about the existence of a prohibition. When does it do that? When the prohibition it wants to tell me about is on the level of neglecting a positive commandment and not on the level of a prohibition. If the Torah wants to tell me that this is not a prohibition but neglect of a positive commandment—it’s a lighter prohibition—then sometimes it says it in the language of a positive commandment, but really the point is not that I should fulfill the positive commandment, only that I should not neglect it. So that’s the third type: a positive commandment that can be neglected and cannot be fulfilled. What remains, of course, is a positive commandment that can neither be neglected nor fulfilled. Fine, so what do you do with that? What is a positive commandment that can neither be neglected nor fulfilled? There are two examples of this in Maimonides—in fact more than two, actually two where he says it explicitly, in Positive Commandments 95 and 96, one right after the other, although there is no connection between them. Positive Commandment 95 is the commandment by which we were commanded to adjudicate the annulment of vows. Annulment of vows—the father regarding his daughter or the husband regarding his wife, on the day he hears, if he hears that they vowed a vow, on that same day he has the right to annul the vow for them. When he annuls the vow, did he fulfill a positive commandment? No. He may annul it, or he may not annul it. If he doesn’t annul it, did he neglect a positive commandment? No. He may annul it or not annul it—do whatever you want. So what is this commandment? It’s a commandment that imposes no obligation on me and forbids me nothing; it’s neither a positive commandment nor a prohibition. So what is this thing? It can neither be fulfilled nor neglected.
[Speaker F] Unless the vow is something against the Torah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if the vow is against the Torah then it doesn’t take effect—and an oath as well does not take effect concerning a commandment. Wait, sorry: a vow does take effect regarding a commandment; an oath does not take effect regarding a commandment. Yiftach? Yiftach is a more complicated topic.
[Speaker G] Does the Torah tell him, listen, you as a father or as a husband have the option to annul, or does it say that he is obligated?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that he has the option—that’s exactly the point. But this is still one of the positive commandments, even though it is only an option. Why? Right, so what is this thing? A positive commandment that can neither be fulfilled nor neglected?
[Speaker G] It seems to me very strange to count that among the commandments. The commandment is to keep the vow if it wasn’t annulled. No, that’s a different commandment, that’s—
[Speaker E] a commandment—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that is counted separately, certainly. “He shall not violate his word”—you have to keep the vow. This is just a condition for the vow to take effect, that’s all. Okay, but this in itself is not a commandment, right? So that’s what we’re talking about. But Maimonides is aware of this; he didn’t miss it. He writes—he says: if you hear this thing from me, know that you are under no obligation to annul the vow, and there is also no prohibition against not annulling the vow. So then what is it? The commandment is to adjudicate the laws of annulment of vows, meaning: this is how one annuls a vow; this is a procedure.
[Speaker B] And if you didn’t adjudicate?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no such thing as “you didn’t adjudicate”; that’s not relevant. Meaning, to adjudicate the laws of annulment of vows means that the procedure for annulling a vow is this. If you did it in this way, then the vow is annulled; if you didn’t do it in this way, then the vow is not annulled. It’s a procedure. It only defines a status: is there a vow or is there no vow? It’s a definition, a definitional commandment. That’s 95. 96 is the commandment regarding ritual impurity. Again, someone who touches a creeping thing becomes impure. And there too Maimonides once again spells it out and says: when you hear from me this command, know that it is in this manner for all the laws of impurity—there is no commandment here to become impure, and of course no prohibition against not becoming impure, certainly not for Israelites. Priests have a certain prohibition against becoming impure, but not ordinary Israelites. You may be impure, you may be pure. You can neither fulfill this commandment nor neglect this positive commandment. It’s a definition, a defining commandment. What is the idea behind this? The fourth type of commandment in Maimonides. What is the idea behind this? The idea behind this, it seems to me, is that for Maimonides the concept of commandment replaces what we in our language call law. So in our law book, of course, there are obligations that must be done, there are things you are forbidden to do, and there are also definitions. A definition: a minor, for the purposes of this law, is anyone who reached such-and-such an age, or produced two hairs, or whatever you want. That’s a clause in the law book, but it’s not a clause commanding me to do something or forbidding me something else; it’s a definitional clause. You have to define things for the sake of other points. That is a clause in the law book. If the meaning of the word commandment is simply law—not command in the sense we are used to, but law—then Sefer HaMitzvot is a law book. Okay, so if it’s a law book, then of course it will also contain definitional laws. There are laws for how to divorce a woman, how one becomes impure, how one becomes pure, how one annuls a vow, and so on.
[Speaker C] So of course you also don’t recite a blessing before performing it. What? You also don’t recite a blessing before performing it. Obviously not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you annul a vow, you don’t recite any blessing.
[Speaker C] Nothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no commandment—“Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to annul vows”? No. He did not command us. And that is exactly the point. The “and commanded us” in “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us” is in the meaning of our Hebrew—an actual command. But “commandment” is merely a synonym for “law.” That’s all. Sefer HaMitzvot is the law book.
[Speaker E] But why does he count this as a commandment, as opposed to many other definitions that he doesn’t count?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I think if there is a definition that the Torah defined, then it will be counted as a commandment—why not? Now divorce—that’s exactly why I said it wasn’t a good example. Every example wasn’t good because it belongs to a different branch of the map. Now this is the complete map. Divorce—what is it? A procedure. A procedure, right. It’s obvious that someone who divorces his wife is not a greater righteous person than someone who doesn’t divorce his wife, right? He didn’t do an extra commandment. Rather, what? It’s a procedure. If you did it according to law, then the woman is divorced. If you didn’t do it according to law, then she isn’t divorced. That’s how you do it. But it’s not a matter of a commandment that you must or must not do; rather, it’s a definition. One of the interesting things is—actually this is the weekly Torah portion, now I suddenly remember, the portion of Ki Tetze. Look in Sefer HaChinukh on the commandment of divorce: on the last line he writes, “And one who transgressed and divorced his wife not according to the rules”—I don’t remember his exact wording—“that we counted here, neglected this positive commandment, and his punishment is great.” One who transgressed and did not divorce his wife, yes, neglected this positive commandment and his punishment is great. So it seems that this really is a positive commandment, a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment—as if this is a positive commandment that can be neglected, not as I said earlier that it is only a procedure. It’s pretty clear that that is not his intention. What he means to say is that if it has already been decided to dissolve the marital unit, then do not leave the woman bound, but rather give her a bill of divorce. And if you give her a bill of divorce not according to law, then in effect you did not give her a bill of divorce; you left her bound to you. In my humble opinion this is a Torah-level prohibition; meaning, leaving a woman an agunah is a Torah-level prohibition according to Sefer HaChinukh. It is neglect of the positive commandment of divorce. But he does not mean to say that some ordinary person living peacefully with his wife should divorce her because there’s such a commandment, and if he didn’t do it, then he neglected a positive commandment. Okay, but that’s a remark about divorce. Slaughtering, all the examples thrown out here—it seems to me they all now find their place, each in its place. So now let’s return to Maimonides’ Positive Commandment 73.
[Speaker H] So maybe Sefer HaMitzvot is forced? Because there are 613, it’s some kind of symmetry, and because he wants to get to 613 he pushes in every law and every law and every law—but really it’s forced?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can call it forced, yes. Several people have already noted that this number, 613, is meant to force us, because it helps us understand what is a commandment and what is not a commandment. If they give us the framework, then we know—we have another guiding principle when we check what is a commandment and what is not a commandment. In any case.
[Speaker B] Maybe another example of an existential commandment is according to the Vilna Gaon, eating matzah on Passover night.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, could be, yes. People say the same thing about sitting in the sukkah. Guarded matzah? Guarded matzah is something else. Guarded matzah is some kind of stringency—that you don’t need to eat guarded matzah all the festival, and there’s no reason for it. You don’t need to eat guarded matzah on the festival; there’s no commandment there and nothing at all. Only on the first night does it need to be guarded for the sake of the commandment. The rest of the festival it’s only a matter of not eating leavened food. Okay, so after we sketch this map, let’s return for a moment to Positive Commandment 73. The commandment to confess together with repentance. Now let’s try to place it on the map. So like this: repentance is not a commandment at all. There is no commandment to repent. If you repent, you need to confess. Meaning, this is the way to repent. You could have seen this as a conditional obligatory positive commandment, right? If you repent, how do you do it? You confess. If you ate the required measure, you need to recite Grace after Meals. If you wore a four-cornered garment, put tzitzit on it. You’re not obligated to wear a four-cornered garment, and you’re not obligated to repent. If you did, this is how you do it.
[Speaker G] You really can say—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that it’s the opposite.
[Speaker G] Wait, wait, wait. Maybe somebody here wanted to speak.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, we’ll get to that. Maybe someone wanted to look at it… exactly. Now, not only “maybe,” but it’s even likely. Why? Because Maimonides’ wording shows that this is a conditional obligatory positive commandment. But listen, it’s pretty absurd to think that this is a conditional obligatory positive commandment. Let’s try to compare two people: one of them repented and did not confess, and the other did not repent at all. Who is in a better state?
[Speaker G] The second one. Depends what he did. No, if it’s conditional—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s a conditional commandment, then the second.
[Speaker G] Because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The first one repented and did not confess—he neglected a positive commandment. The second one didn’t repent, so what? There is no need to repent. It’s like the difference between someone who ate and was satisfied and didn’t recite Grace after Meals, versus someone who didn’t eat and wasn’t satisfied and of course didn’t recite Grace after Meals, because he didn’t have to.
[Speaker G] What does it mean that he repented and it begins with confession? He didn’t repent. If he repented and didn’t confess, then he didn’t repent. After all, if the term repentance is not anchored in procedure, then it doesn’t exist. Like the one who divorced his wife and didn’t give her a bill of divorce—then he didn’t divorce her? So say the same thing about repentance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, now you’re offering an alternative—that’s exactly where I’m heading. First of all, if this is a conditional obligatory positive commandment, then it’s not what you’re saying now. Then an absurdity comes out, because then it comes out that… one second. Because then it comes out that someone who didn’t repent is in a better state than someone who did repent but didn’t confess.
[Speaker E] What does it mean, “repented”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He regretted what happened, accepted upon himself… not verbally, in his heart.
[Speaker E] Maimonides explains that confessing is verbal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—verbally, yes. Repentance has four parts: abandoning the sin, regret, resolving for the future, and confession. I did three of those things without confession. So what then? Am I in a worse state than someone who didn’t repent at all?
[Speaker B] It sounds strange. Yes, in Breslov there’s such a thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, even in Breslov, no. If it’s not too crooked even for Breslov, then no.
[Speaker B] Who said repentance isn’t a commandment? Does Maimonides say you don’t need to repent? Of course you need to repent. We’ll see in a moment. Why is it not a commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get to that in a little while, but I’m not there yet. Slowly, step by step. So in fact it seems that seeing confession as a conditional positive commandment is problematic. If it’s a conditional positive commandment, that means that someone who repented and didn’t confess has accumulated an additional sin for himself and is in a worse state than someone who didn’t repent at all. That’s not plausible. So what is it, then? As you rightly presented, I think Maimonides’ intention is to say that this is a procedure. This is the procedure for doing repentance. And if you repent, you need to do it also with spoken confession—with words from the mouth. To say out loud what you think in your heart. If you didn’t do that, then there is no repentance here, or at least not repentance in its full sense. Not that you have committed a transgression, but rather that the repentance process didn’t succeed, or didn’t completely succeed. All right? Maybe it even has some value, but it didn’t fully succeed. That’s all. A procedural definition, in the earlier terminology, and not a conditional positive commandment. But all this is about the commandment of confession. Now what I clarified is the halakhic status of the commandment of confession. What I’m claiming is that this is a commandment of the fourth type. It is a procedural commandment. But what about repentance itself—that thing which, when one does it, one must confess? Repentance, not confession—what about that? That is none of the four types of positive commandments. Someone asked here earlier: wait, but there is the verse “And you shall return to the Lord your God.”
[Speaker B] It’s written in the Torah. The Torah commands us to return. Maimonides too, in his own writing, speaks about it as part of all his commandments.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Maimonides there says precisely his answer. In chapter 7, in the Laws of Repentance, Maimonides says that the Torah has already promised that Israel will in the future repent, as it says: “And it shall be when all these things come upon you… and you shall return to the Lord your God.” A prophecy. Exactly. Maimonides says that “and you shall return to the Lord your God” is not a verse commanding us to repent, but rather “and you shall return to the Lord your God” is a promise that in the future Israel will repent. Look how the whole context there is like that. It’s all descriptions of what will happen in the future. Yes? And among other things, we too will repent. It’s a promise, not a command. And indeed Nachmanides, by contrast, in his commentary on that verse argues that this is a commandment to repent. And that’s in the portion of Ha’azinu, yes? “For this commandment is not too far from you,” yes? “It is not in heaven and not beyond the sea.” What is “this commandment”? There too there are disputes. Some say this is the commandment of repentance. According to Maimonides it cannot be the commandment of repentance, because there is no such commandment. Okay.
[Speaker G] On the level of the… what? Maimonides counts several general commandments that aren’t counted—they’re inclusive—like the commandment of settling the Land of Israel, he doesn’t count it at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but Maimonides doesn’t… he doesn’t say that in his own words. He doesn’t say that a commandment… he doesn’t bring a list of general commandments that weren’t counted. Those are folk tales that developed from the difficulty over the commandment of settling the Land of Israel, Nachmanides’ Positive Commandment 4. People ask why Maimonides didn’t bring it. So they say, “Well, it’s a commandment that includes the entire Torah, and that’s why Maimonides didn’t bring it.” That’s nonsense. Why is it nonsense? Because where does this whole issue of a general positive commandment in Maimonides come from? From Root 4, Maimonides’ fourth root. And what is a general commandment there that is not counted? “You shall be holy,” or “You shall do all My commandments and keep them.” And Maimonides says explicitly: what is a general positive commandment? It is a commandment that tells you once again to keep all the commandments—not a foundational positive commandment, as people usually say. Look at all the examples there—it’s obvious. Maimonides doesn’t fail to count a general positive commandment because it’s foundational, but because it is simply unnecessary, since it has already been counted that one must do all the commandments. There’s no need to tell me again, “do all the commandments,” and therefore that is not counted. For Maimonides, inclusive positive commandments—and this is the example people always bring up again, especially lately—it simply… there is no basis for it. For Maimonides, a general positive commandment means repeating the command to keep the whole Torah. That’s what is written in Root 4, and that is not counted because the Torah already commands me—why do I need to count once more that I need to do everything written in the Torah? There is nowhere in Maimonides any trace of the idea that a foundational positive commandment is not counted because it is terribly foundational. Besides, I haven’t seen in Maimonides that the commandment of settling the Land of Israel is so foundational. That’s an ideological invention of various people in our time who decided that this is the most foundational positive commandment, and therefore it is not counted. So first, it is not the most foundational; and second, that is not why it is not counted. There are other reasons. It may be that it is not counted because… this is a conjecture, I don’t know… because it is an instrument for a commandment. From Maimonides’ standpoint, settling the Land of Israel is an instrument for the commandments dependent on the Land. Meaning, if you live in the Land, then you become obligated in the commandments dependent on the Land, and if not, then not. So therefore it is not counted, because it is a detail within the commandments dependent on the Land. You can propose explanations for this that are actually grounded in principles that appear in Maimonides. This one is not.
[Speaker I] But repentance is a commandment that comes through a transgression. Why? Because I need to commit transgressions.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—you don’t need to. If you committed a transgression, then you repent. You don’t need to commit a transgression.
[Speaker I] But how can I repent if I didn’t commit a transgression?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you don’t need to. Why would it be possible? How can you put on tzitzit if you’re not wearing a four-cornered garment? You don’t need to. If there’s no four-cornered garment, you don’t need to put on tzitzit. Right. But the question is whether this is conditional at all. There is no command about it. After we reach the conclusion that it is a command, we’ll think about which of the four types of command it is. But repentance, unlike confession, has no command. “And you shall return to the Lord your God” — according to Maimonides, that is a promise, not a command. So in essence, according to Maimonides there is no commandment at all to repent. About confession we argued earlier — is it a positive commandment, a conditional one, or a procedure? I think it’s a procedure, but fine. It falls into one of Maimonides’ four categories of positive commandments. But repentance does not fall into any of them. There is no command in the Torah. Something for which there is no command in the Torah is not a positive commandment, period.
[Speaker G] And yet there are ten chapters about it…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, there are ten chapters about it in the Mishneh Torah, and it’s not a commandment. In the laws of Hanukkah and Purim too there are several… four chapters, admittedly, not ten — and there too there is no Torah-level commandment. Those are rabbinic commandments. So what exactly is this whole matter of repentance according to Maimonides? That’s a big question. Nachmanides does understand it as a commandment to repent — “And you shall return to the Lord your God” — he understands it as a command. But up to this point I’ve described Maimonides’ words in the Mishneh Torah. Maimonides, in Sefer HaMitzvot, at the beginning of this collection of laws, the ten chapters of the laws of repentance, writes there: “One positive commandment, and it is that the sinner should return from his sin and confess.” Meaning, there is a commandment here to return and to confess. The Minchat Chinukh already notes that this wording contradicts Maimonides’ words in Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 73, where it says there is no commandment to repent. Here we see there is one positive commandment — not two, but one — and it has two elements: to repent and to confess. There are positive commandments that contain several elements; that’s not a question. Why is it only one positive commandment? Just as with the four species — we take the four species, and that has four elements, but it’s one positive commandment. Fine. Or the procedure of offering a sacrifice — it contains the four sacrificial acts, and after that removal of the ashes and all the other things. Fine, but it’s all one commandment. There are commandments that are a multi-stage process or that contain several elements. So I have no problem with the fact that this is one positive commandment and not two, repentance and confession. But why is it a positive commandment at all? After all, in Sefer HaMitzvot it seemingly says that repentance is not a positive commandment. That is the Minchat Chinukh’s question. I don’t know a good answer to this question; everyone gives clever answers except for the following one. What, what, what is the role of the Mishneh Torah? We said earlier, it’s a law book, right? We said, in Sefer HaMitzvot — sorry, in the law book. Maimonides consistently, throughout his principles, explains that Sefer HaMitzvot will not include a commandment for which there is no command in the Torah. Of course rabbinic commandments won’t enter there; that’s not part of the 613 commandments. You have to do them — it’s not that you don’t — but they won’t appear in Sefer HaMitzvot. What appears there are the commandments that we were commanded in the Torah.
What happens with commandments learned from derashot? I think we spoke about this, right? A commandment learned from a derashah — Maimonides’ position is that that too does not enter Sefer HaMitzvot. Because Maimonides understands that a commandment learned from a derashah — the derashah does not reveal what is inside the verse, but expands the content of the verse beyond what is there. And since that is so, it is a product of the derashah; it is not something written in the verse, but something beyond the verse, and therefore it is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments. Because in the enumeration of the commandments there enters only what appears in the Torah, or in interpretation that reveals what is within the verse. Maimonides sees derashot as an expansive tool, not a revealing tool. And therefore in the second principle he rules that commandments derived from derashot are not counted in the enumeration of the commandments. Meaning, the enumeration of the commandments contains only obligations that the Torah explicitly commanded us.
What happens in the Mishneh Torah? In the Mishneh Torah, of course, rabbinic commandments also appear, right? In the Mishneh Torah, commandments learned from derashot also appear. In the Mishneh Torah, things that come from reasoning also appear. In the Mishneh Torah, everything appears — everything that has to be done. It’s a halakhic code. We already talked once about the fact that this is the halakhic codex — not only the first, but the only one written throughout history: the Mishneh Torah. Not the Mishnah, not the Talmud, not the Shulchan Arukh, and no other book. The Mishneh Torah is the only halakhic codex ever written in history. Arukh HaShulchan also tried to do something, but it’s not exactly the same thing, and he too uses Maimonides in constructing his work. And the purpose of this codex is to contain everything incumbent on a Jew to do or forbidden for him to do. All the laws — it doesn’t matter whether there is a command in the Torah, no command in the Torah, rabbinic law, derashot, reasoning — everything has to appear there. It is supposed to contain everything.
That means there is a conceptual difference between Sefer HaMitzvot and the Mishneh Torah. Sefer HaMitzvot sets itself the goal of collecting the 613 commandments that we were commanded in the Torah. Is the commandment of repentance one of them? According to Maimonides, no — because “And you shall return to the Lord your God” is a promise, not a command. So we have no Torah command to repent, and therefore in Sefer HaMitzvot it will not appear. But now the question is what you described earlier: is there an obligation to repent? Of course there is an obligation to repent. So clearly it will appear in the Mishneh Torah, because the Mishneh Torah contains everything that needs to be done, whether it was written in the Torah or not. So in the enumeration of commandments that appears in the Mishneh Torah, the commandment is to repent and confess. Why? Not because the Torah commanded repentance — it didn’t, and the proof is that in Sefer HaMitzvot the commandment to repent does not appear — but because there is such an obligation. One has to repent; that is halakhically obvious. So why does he begin the laws of repentance not with “there is a commandment to repent,” but rather “when a person repents, he should act in such-and-such a way”?
[Speaker G] That’s in Sefer HaMitzvot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, within the halakhah, within—
[Speaker G] In the first law, the first law in these ten chapters, he doesn’t begin by saying there is a commandment of repentance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re right. That wording fits Sefer HaMitzvot better. I’ll explain that in just a moment.
[Speaker C] No, I don’t understand. Could there be something in Sefer HaMitzvot that isn’t in the Mishneh Torah? No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — the opposite.
[Speaker G] So that’s what I’m saying.
[Speaker C] The opposite — there is in the Mishneh Torah. Right. There can’t be a case where there is something in Sefer—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] HaMitzvot that isn’t in the Mishneh Torah. If there is such a thing, that’s a contradiction. In principle that cannot be; the opposite can, yes. The opposite can. So therefore, here too it’s the same thing. Here too it’s the same thing. There is a commandment to repent in the Mishneh Torah, but it does not appear in Sefer HaMitzvot.
[Speaker G] This commandment — these commandments that are renewed, like repentance in the Mishneh Torah — is that Torah-level?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a very good question, and not a clear one.
[Speaker B] Maimonides writes in the second principle that this is from the words of the sages.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, what exactly he means there is a subject for discussion that maybe we’ll talk about — we haven’t talked about it—
[Speaker B] yet, so if so we’ll really talk about that sometime. Returning to our matter: in Sefer HaMitzvot, where he counts precisely before every section of laws—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so. I’ll give you one example that proves otherwise. In the laws of Hanukkah and Purim, what does he write? One positive commandment from the words of the sages, two positive commandments from the words of the sages: to light Hanukkah candles and to read the Megillah on Purim. And that does not appear in Sefer HaMitzvot. Because there is such a commandment and one must do it. It’s not a commandment in the sense of Sefer HaMitzvot — it is not a commandment for which there is a command in the Torah — but it is a halakhic obligation. Repentance is exactly the same thing. Repentance is the second example, like the laws of Hanukkah and Purim. Repentance? Not exactly the same thing, but is repentance rabbinic? Right. Not exactly the same thing, but logically it’s similar. Since repentance too has no Torah commandment to repent, but clearly there is an obligation, a halakhic commandment to repent. So in just a second we’ll get to it: at the beginning of the section of laws there will appear a commandment to repent and confess; there is such an obligation to repent. In Sefer HaMitzvot it will not appear, because there they count only what the Torah commands, and the Torah, according to Maimonides, does not command repentance.
Just one note on what Shmuel asked earlier: at the beginning of the laws of repentance Maimonides uses language that parallels Sefer HaMitzvot. Maimonides says that when the sinner returns from his sin, he should confess. “When he returns” — not “that the sinner should return from his sin and confess,” but “that when he returns, he should confess.” That’s the whole difference. “When he returns, he should confess” means there is no commandment to repent, but if you repent, then confess. So that seemingly fits what is written in the Mishneh Torah and in Sefer HaMitzvot. But understand: Maimonides’ structure is usually like this. Maimonides usually, when he details in the Mishneh Torah all the obligations, begins with the core, with what is written in the Torah. What is written in the Torah? In the Torah it says that when the sinner returns from his sin, he should confess, as we see in Sefer HaMitzvot. Then, if you keep reading Maimonides, you’ll see — of course there is also an obligation to repent and one must also confess; everything is there. But he builds it from the primary sources and then to the broader circles. And therefore he begins with the Torah’s formulation, just as in every section of laws he begins with “the Torah commanded to do such-and-such,” and afterward the sages added this, and expounded that, and another detail and another detail. That’s how he methodically constructs his legal sections. On the contrary, I think it only further shows what I said earlier — that he begins with the Torah’s command and then expands it onward.
Okay. Up to now we are left only with asking from where… yes, why is there an obligation to repent? If the Torah does not command repentance, is there some reasoning — it seems obvious. Yes. If the Torah does not command repentance, then either there is no obligation, or if there is an obligation then the Torah commands it. How can it be that the Torah does not command it but there is still an obligation? So this is what we see in Maimonides: the Torah does not command it, because it does not appear in Sefer HaMitzvot.
[Speaker G] If there had been some method of derivation…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, if there had been some derashah. I don’t know of such a derashah. So what do we see in Maimonides? That there is no such commandment in the Torah, but there is such a halakhic obligation. And of course the answer is that this is an obligation from reasoning. Why is it an obligation from reasoning? Because once the Torah tells you that there is such a thing as repentance, then anyone who understands what sin means, what closeness to the Holy One, blessed be He, means, and that the Torah opened this option for us — to repent — then by simple reasoning it is obvious that this is what one should do. So much so that Meshekh Chokhmah explicitly asks on the Torah, on this verse “And you shall return to the Lord your God” — he asks why there is any need at all… He assumes there is a commandment to repent. He asks: why is there any need at all for a commandment to repent? What do you mean? The moment the Torah said it forbids sin, in that it also said that we need to repent if we sinned. After all, the whole idea is that the Torah wants us not to have sins. So either we shouldn’t commit the sin — but if we already did, then we should erase it.
[Speaker C] Because repentance is such a huge novelty that it had to be commanded. What do you mean? Where in the world is there repentance?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not to command it — to reveal to us that there is such a procedure. There is a question, though, why there is an obligation to repent — not where we know that such a mechanism exists. That the Torah reveals; that is the Torah’s novelty, obviously. It says, “And you shall return to the Lord your God.” Maimonides too agrees that the concept of repentance appears in the Torah. He only claims that it is not a command. Meaning, the Torah says that there is such a procedure of cleansing, atonement, purification. That is written in the Torah. It’s just that once that is written, why do you need a command? After all, by simple reasoning it is obvious that anyone who knows that there is such a procedure, and has sinned, obviously by reason should
[Speaker G] repent, to fix what he did. Is that why Maimonides really doesn’t count it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s from reasoning — maybe that’s one of the explanations. I said I don’t know what the explanation is; I know that that explanation isn’t correct. What the explanation is — that can be debated.
[Speaker G] So why didn’t the Torah write it? If it’s reasoning, why didn’t the Torah command it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the next question. In another second I’ll get to that too. You keep getting one step ahead of me every time.
[Speaker F] What is it — doesn’t the Talmud sometimes ask the reverse: “Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning”? Meaning, the Torah is telling us there is a commandment to reverse what you did.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the question, like a prohibition linked to a positive commandment. Why didn’t the Torah command here the repair of the prohibition?
[Speaker F] It’s obvious that this is—
[Speaker G] the case, but it didn’t command it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A prohibition linked to a positive commandment is a commandment that they do count; the Torah commands it. Here there is none. There isn’t even a prohibition linked to a positive commandment. The question is why not? Why doesn’t the Torah command it?
[Speaker G] But many times they ask, “Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning.” The reverse — if there is reasoning, you don’t need a verse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. But on the other hand, isn’t returning stolen property simple reasoning too? If it is forbidden to steal, then obviously you need to return the stolen item. Fine, so in just a second. So the claim is basically that once someone understands that there is such a mechanism of repentance, then he should understand by reasoning that if he sinned, he needs to repent for it. Therefore no command is needed. All that is needed is to reveal the existence of this mechanism. But why really — that explains why no command is needed, but there is still a question why the Torah did not command it, as with theft, with the prohibition linked to a positive commandment in theft, or in various other contexts. It seems to me that here there is not just the claim that there is no need to command, but that if the Torah were to command it, that would ruin it. And therefore it does not command it. Exactly. Meaning, the Torah expects us to repent not because there is a commandment to repent, but because we understand on our own that this is our situation, and we have a way out, and from that we will repent. Repentance will be more complete if it is done in that way, and not as a response to a command.
[Speaker G] But in theft, returning the stolen item is the same thing, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, apparently not. Why? Returning stolen property — the Torah has no problem with your returning the stolen property because of the command; on the contrary. Usually we say that one who is commanded and does is greater than one who is not commanded and does. But there are certain things — this is in Rabbi Kook’s language — there are certain things in which the old principle remains in place, that greater is one who is not commanded and does. For example, character work — I think I also once commented on this — and repentance. When I spoke about this once, I always tell the well-known yeshivah joke about the young man who reached the chapter of “a man betroths” — he reached marriageable age and started meeting girls, and rejected them all; none of them seemed right to him. So the mashgiach came to him and said, tell me, are you some supreme authority? Nobody is suitable for you? Sit down, work on your character traits, study ethics with passion for a year, and then come back. Fine. He studies ethics with passion, works on his traits day and night, sweating from the effort. After a year he comes back, starts meeting girls again. Again he rejects them all. So the mashgiach calls him and says, tell me, what did you do all year? So he says, I don’t understand the problem. A year ago, when I was arrogant, no one was good enough for me; now that I’m humble, certainly they’re not good enough for me. It’s simple logic.
What does this story show? Beyond the joke in it, the story shows what someone looks like when he does inner spiritual work because the Torah says you have to do inner spiritual work. Someone who becomes humble because there’s a clause saying you have to be humble. He doesn’t understand on his own that this is really an obligation — that one really has to improve one’s character — so I actually become humble. I am discharging my duty of humility. Do you understand? Meaning, this is not canceling the prohibition of arrogance and fulfilling the positive commandment of humility. That’s what he looks like. So in these matters the Torah does not command us to be humble or not to be arrogant. It says about Moses our teacher that “the man Moses was very humble, more than any man on the face of the earth.” The Torah tells us, without leaving room for doubt, that humility is a good trait. But it does not command us to be humble. It leaves that to us. The same is true of repentance. The Torah tells us, “And you shall return to the Lord your God.” It tells us that repentance is something important, something expected of us, but it does not command us to repent. Because if someone repents because he was commanded to, then that still isn’t it. The command does not… not only is it unnecessary, that’s the point. No — what I said earlier is that the command is unnecessary; there is reasoning; I can understand on my own that I need to repent, so why do I need a command? Now I’m saying more than that: the command is harmful. Not just unnecessary. Meaning, if there had been a command, it would have ruined it — not only would it not have helped.
[Speaker G] There are counterexamples to this argument: “Love your neighbor as yourself,” “Do not hate your brother in your heart,” “Be wholehearted with the Lord your God.” All these — “Be wholehearted with the Lord your God”—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something completely different; that means not to go after magic and occult practices. But “Love the Lord your God,” “Love your neighbor as yourself,” or “Love the Lord your God” — in order to answer that I’d have to get into the definition of the commandment.
[Speaker G] I’m not talking about definitions but about the very destruction caused by the command.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the question is what the commandment says.
[Speaker G] The question—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the commandment says exactly that inner psychological dimension, then you can ask why, indeed. The question is whether that’s what the commandment says.
[Speaker G] That’s a separate discussion. What? Do you want to say the causative form now?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. “And you shall love” means: do actions that express love. Not necessarily that there is an obligation of the inner feeling. Yes, after all Rabbi Akiva says, “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow.” Meaning, that somewhat tones down this command and basically turns it into something practical. What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow. They’re not talking to you about the heart. Fine, but that’s a separate topic.
[Speaker F] “Do not ignore them”—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “You may not ignore” a lost object.
[Speaker F] “You may not” is something else, but “do not ignore” means don’t do that, don’t do something that… fine, so the Torah says that one is obligated.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But “Do not covet”—
[Speaker C] “Do not covet.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There too, in “Do not covet,” it’s action, by the way. That too is a problematic discussion in the Talmud, but in the plain sense it is also action. In “Do not covet,” it means taking and paying for it — unlike stealing, which is taking without paying — but it is still on the plane of action, not about the coveting in the heart. There is room to discuss it. What?
[Speaker G] With the woman. Same thing — taking and paying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes — what does paying mean there?
[Speaker B] I don’t remember—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] really what they do there with the woman. In any case, what?
[Speaker B] With a married woman… ah—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe that really is a good example — David. He arranged it so that it wouldn’t be a transgression. He took her by “paying,” so to speak; meaning, he made sure she would be a widow, and then everything would be fine. Yes. In any case — so that is why I say that the fact that no command was written to do repentance is not only because it is unnecessary, but because such a command would also be harmful.
Now look at something interesting. I see that I’m already not even starting to get to repentance itself, so we’ll probably do that next time. But this section of laws called the laws of repentance has a special character, very unusual compared to Maimonides’ other sections of laws. Maimonides says there — I didn’t bring the book with me — but Maimonides says there: “See how great is the level of repentance. Yesterday he was hated, distant, ostracized, and now he is beloved and close,” and so on. Meaning, he’s singing hymns there in honor of repentance. Maimonides is a halakhic decisor. Tell me what has to be done and what doesn’t have to be done; don’t confuse me with songs. Write a poetry collection and I’ll decide whether to buy it from some literary publisher. Why are you putting this into the Mishneh Torah? What is this doing there? This whole section of laws is very unusual — not halakhic. Yes, “The Torah has already promised that Israel will in the future repent,” and then he moves on to the world to come and all that. What does all that have to do with repentance? Why are you putting all this… this whole section of laws is bizarre. What does that have to do with a section of laws at all?
It seems to me that the idea behind this is that it really is not a section of laws. Maimonides is coming to persuade us to repent, not to command us to repent. He is coming to say to us: see how important repentance is; see how far one can go if one repents. In the laws of Grace after Meals, Maimonides doesn’t tell us how wonderful it is to recite Grace after Meals, and what it repairs up above when we recite it, or what gets damaged when we don’t recite it. If you don’t recite it, you get forty lashes and go home. Don’t confuse me — this is what has to be done. Finished. That’s how a halakhic decisor speaks. Leave the songs to someone else. In the laws of repentance, the songs are the laws. In the laws of repentance there are no laws of repentance. In the laws of repentance, Maimonides persuades us to repent. He does not tell us that we are obligated to repent, since repentance is something we have to do on our own — not because of a command, but because we understand that it is important, that it is what has to be done. Therefore this whole “section of laws,” in quotation marks, is actually not so much a section of laws as it is a rhetorical means of persuasion, at least in part. Because the whole character of the commandment of repentance is not a commandment in the sense of a command, but some kind of halakhic category, a halakhic mechanism that I do not do because of… because I won’t receive any punishment if I don’t do it. Why would I receive punishment? I didn’t violate any prohibition.
[Speaker B] But he does spell out exactly what has to be done.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He spells out what to do; the procedure exists. I said: the concept of repentance exists in the Torah. We did not invent the concept of repentance; it is written in the Torah. The obligation to repent is not written in the Torah. That is exactly like humility. The Torah says there is such a virtue as being a humble person; it does not say one must be humble. That is exactly the point.
[Speaker B] Why does he get into free choice?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That — that is a continuation of the same idea. After all, maybe I’ll say it now; I thought I’d say it after the next part. Why does he get into free choice? After all, there is free choice regarding reciting Grace after Meals too, right? So why does the discussion of free choice appear in the laws of repentance and not in the laws of Grace after Meals? Or in the laws of honoring father and mother, or Sabbath — it doesn’t matter. Everywhere I have a choice whether to do or not to do.
[Speaker G] Because there is no command.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in repentance, all that we are commanded — is to be choosers. To do the right things because we understand that they are right, not because of the command. Therefore, true, there is choice with respect to every commandment, but here the commandment is to be a chooser. In Grace after Meals, the commandment is to recite Grace after Meals; one just has to choose the good, choose to recite it and not not recite it. Here the commandment is not to choose some particular thing; the commandment is to choose, period. Simply to return to being a chooser. That is the commandment. The moment you understand that this is the right thing, what is expected of you is simply to do what is right. Therefore this is the whole idea here. That is why two chapters in Maimonides here are devoted to the issue of choice — which again is philosophy and not halakhah. Because here this is the whole commandment. The commandment in the laws of repentance is to be a chooser. That is the commandment. A “commandment,” in quotation marks, of course — because a command for me to be a chooser, now you understand, is impossible; logically impossible. Because if I don’t choose, then I won’t carry out this command either. It’s irrelevant. This thing cannot be done in the form of a command, right? So that sheds even more light on the impossibility of a commandment to repent. One cannot command me to repent. The Holy One, blessed be He, only tells me: listen, I expect you to be a chooser — “and choose life; behold, I set before you the good and the evil, and you shall choose life.” You must choose, “and you shall choose life.” Does any of those who count the commandments count that as a positive commandment? No one. At least no one I know. Just a second — why? Because a commandment to choose is incoherent. If you are not choosing, then you also won’t choose to carry out that commandment, and you won’t do it. Being a chooser comes from you; it is not compliance with a command. If you are a choosing person, then you choose, and if not, then they enlighten you about it, they tell you: listen, you need to be a chooser. They cannot command you to be a chooser — it is simply self-contradictory. That is another aspect of why there cannot be a commandment to repent.
[Speaker B] But then afterward you can’t say that, okay, initially maybe you can say that if he didn’t do it nothing happened, but now it’s much more severe. If he didn’t do it, a huge amount happened. It happened, but not halakhically.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously — but not halakhically. When I say “in a commandment”—
[Speaker B] No, you can’t say from a halakhic perspective it’s much more severe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? I’m not talking about severity or non-severity.
[Speaker B] Are halakhic definitions so negligible, minor, and insignificant? So there — you’re answering your own question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the Torah had commanded it, then if I didn’t do it there would be neglect of a positive commandment here, a transgression of failing to fulfill a positive commandment. But now the Torah did not command it, so when I do it, it is not fulfillment of a positive commandment; it is something much more fundamental than fulfillment of a positive commandment. And if I don’t do it, it is much more severe — but it is not neglect of a positive commandment. It is something like: you don’t understand your role in the world.
[Speaker B] You preferred the secondary over the essential. Meaning, from a positive point of view.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite. The positive commandments are the secondary thing. I’m looking now… why? Because there are things that are incredibly fundamental, and they won’t enter the category of positive commandments. And these are not Maimonides’ “inclusive commandments,” as I’ve heard and so on, and it’s not the commandment of settling the Land of Israel — but yes, there are such things.
[Speaker E] How does Yom Kippur enter this whole story? What do you mean? On Yom Kippur I’m commanded to do a whole procedure of what is called—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — who said? Who said that is the commandment? On Yom Kippur you have to fast.
[Speaker C] Look in Sefer HaMitzvot and see what you’re commanded on Yom Kippur: the service of the High Priest, no repentance at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no commandment to repent on Yom Kippur. Search Maimonides — you won’t find it.
[Speaker C] Didn’t they do it in the past either? Wouldn’t everyone come to watch the High Priest?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. They repented then too; they repented then too from the standpoint of—
[Speaker C] It was public. Wouldn’t everyone go to synagogue?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not synagogue. You don’t have to go to synagogue. Repent at home.
[Speaker B] The priest would confess—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The priest would confess on behalf of the whole community. But that’s a different topic; it’s not a commandment. There is no commandment to repent on Yom Kippur. In Rabbeinu Yonah there is a claim that there is a commandment to repent, and a special commandment to repent on Yom Kippur, an additional commandment — but that’s Rabbeinu Yonah. In Maimonides you won’t find it.
[Speaker E] Rabbi Soloveitchik also explains that on Yom Kippur there is an elevated quality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An elevated quality. Again. I’m speaking about a halakhic definition: is there a positive commandment there? Certainly there is elevated value — no doubt about that.
[Speaker E] So what about all the repentance — the repentance you do, and it depends on Yom Kippur to atone?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? You are not atoned for if you did not repent. What does that have to do with anything? Who said there is a commandment to repent? Same thing. If you did not repent, then you are not atoned for. Fine? That is exactly the point. Once you understand that without repentance your act is not atoned for, then understand on your own that you need to repent.
[Speaker G] So where does repentance on Yom Kippur appear? Where does this repentance come from?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — it is written in the Torah, but not as a command. Maimonides does not bring it as a command. It is written in the passage of Acharei Mot: “And so shall he do before Me once a year,” “and you shall afflict your souls,” and so on. Within that, the word repentance does not appear there, but the fasting is apparently understood as an expression that also has to be accompanied by repentance.
[Speaker G] “And he shall atone for himself”—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And for all Israel.” It is quite clear from the spirit of the passage that one has to repent there, but there is no commandment. Nobody writes that there is a Torah commandment to repent on Yom Kippur. There is Rabbeinu Yonah — I said that there, yes, there are those who infer it. In Maimonides there isn’t. Fine. Okay, next time we’ll continue.