The Meaning of the Giving of the Torah

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, why? From now on, when he no longer does it, maybe he’ll start to deteriorate, but regret itself—what happened, happened. Why should that change it retroactively? Even his personal wholeness, not the wholeness in the world, it could be that that remains. No, he doesn’t change it—that’s what he’s suggesting, as far as I’m concerned. What matters isn’t that point; it’s these two aspects. I’ll just finish the examples he brings here. He says, at the end of the first chapter of Bava Kamma, there’s a passage in the first chapter of Bava Kamma: Jeremiah said before the Holy One, blessed be He, “Even when the people of Anatot give charity”—because it’s talking about the people of Anatot—“cause them to stumble with unworthy people so that they will not receive reward for them.” Meaning: if they come to give charity, trip them up with people who are frauds, who aren’t really poor, so they gave charity not to a poor person and therefore won’t receive reward for it. What does that mean? But there’s also the dimension of obedience. He says here: the dimension of obedience is certainly present. I was commanded to give charity, I understood that the person standing before me was poor and entitled to charity, and I gave it to him—I did the will of God. So the obedience to the Holy One, blessed be He, is certainly here. True, the results of giving charity did not occur here, and here again you see the point he’s talking about: results not in the sense that now I become righteous, and by virtue of this act I become righteous. He’s talking about some sort of result in a broader metaphysical sense. And then he says: if you didn’t give charity to a poor person, then that didn’t happen, so the results didn’t happen, even though the will did. So that’s what he says. And there’s a difficulty, because it was taught in tractate Berakhot: if a person intended to perform a commandment and was prevented against his will and did not do it, Scripture considers it as if he did it. So how can it say here that they should be made to stumble with unworthy people and then lose the reward? Since they stumbled unknowingly over unworthy people, why shouldn’t they receive reward for their intention to perform a commandment? And on that he says: the answer here is that there are two dimensions. In short, what he says in the end is that these are two aspects. So from the perspective of fulfilling the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, I fulfilled the will of the Holy One. From the perspective of the result, in practice there was no result, because the poor person did not receive charity. Therefore there is reward for this dimension, and I will not receive reward for that dimension. That’s the sense in which Rabbi Soloveitchik resolves the contradiction between the two Talmudic passages.

[Speaker B] Who is this? Who is this? Rabbi Soloveitchik. What is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He? That you give charity to the poor. So he didn’t fulfill it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t fulfill it in practice—I didn’t actually do it. But in terms of responding to the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, I certainly did respond. I thought a poor person was standing before me, and that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded me to give charity, and I responded and gave charity.

[Speaker B] Wait, I take the four species with an invalid etrog. So you’re saying there too I did… same thing, I fulfilled the command? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly—the exact same thing. Like if you intended to eat pork and it turned out to be lamb, an example he brings later in Nazir, same thing. In the subjective dimension, you committed a transgression. In terms of the actual result, you didn’t eat pork, you ate lamb. But in the subjective dimension you committed a transgression. The Kedushat Levi writes there in Nazir that this is an actual transgression, a prohibition. There’s just a novelty here: when the result doesn’t occur, there is no punishment. But you fully violated a prohibition—that’s what the Kedushat Levi claims in Nazir. No, so you’re asking: did I fulfill the obligation of taking the four species or not?

[Speaker B] No! So the same thing with charity—you also didn’t fulfill the obligation of charity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You fulfilled the will of God. In one respect you fulfilled it, and in the other you didn’t. To fulfill the obligation, you need both aspects. The factual aspect you didn’t do, but the conscious, subjective aspect you did do.

[Speaker C] Where is this found? Where does he say this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In On Repentance, a collection of essays. And then he says: if one intended to blow the shofar and was prevented against his will and didn’t blow it, then in terms of the result, you didn’t blow it, but the intention—the intention belongs to the dimension of doing the will of God. He says an unintentional sin is the opposite of this. An unintentional sin means that in a sin done unintentionally, there is really no intention to violate the will of God, but in practice you did violate it. There are all sorts of examples here: sometimes there’s intention and no act, sometimes there’s an act and no intention. Sometimes it’s with a prohibition, sometimes with a positive commandment, and he brings various examples here that all basically illustrate this double plane. Okay, that’s what matters for my purposes. I don’t want to get into everything he writes here; there are of course more things. But the basic principle he establishes here is that every commandment and every transgression has two aspects—Ramchal really has two aspects. There is the subjective aspect of obedience or rebellion against the command, and there is the factual, result-oriented aspect. Now, I think I spoke about this at some point in the past already; I don’t remember what I spoke about and when. Right—what is the meaning of this matter, of this dimension of command? Let’s say there’s something we understand by reasoning to be good. The Talmud often says, “Why do I need a verse? It’s logical,” right? And I think we also discussed this once, about logical reasoning—I think we had a topic like that. So I said back then that people commonly think that “Why do I need a verse? It’s logical.” There is a Pnei Yehoshua in Berakhot, where he asks there about blessings over enjoyment. Before a person says a blessing over food, that is derived logically: that it is forbidden to enjoy this world without a blessing, and anyone who enjoys this world without a blessing is as though he committed sacrilege. So Pnei Yehoshua asks: if this is logic, then it’s Torah-level, so why are blessings rabbinic? Why in cases of doubt about blessings do we rule leniently? “Why do I need a verse?”—a verse and logic have the same status. And that simply isn’t true.

[Speaker D] What was the question?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That if blessings over enjoyment—say, “who creates the fruit of the tree” or “who brings forth bread from the earth”—are based on logic, then they should be Torah-level. Because logic has the same status as a verse. The Talmud says all the time, “Why do I need a verse? It’s logical,” which seems to mean that logic and a verse have the same status. So if that’s so, then why in cases of doubt about blessings do we rule leniently? We rule leniently in cases of doubt about blessings because they’re rabbinic. So if it’s Torah-level, why? So I think that assumption is imprecise. Why? Because logic is Torah-level in this sense: from the result-oriented perspective, from the factual perspective. Once that act is a positive act, then clearly if you do it there are positive results, whether or not the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it. The Holy One, blessed be He, can command you in order to tell you that it is positive—maybe you don’t know that. But if you arrived at the conclusion on your own that this thing is positive, then why do you need a command for it? In the result-oriented sense, it makes no difference whether there is or isn’t a command. So why do you need a command?

[Speaker C] People generally understand—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that you need a command in order to clarify for me something I wouldn’t know on my own: to clarify that this act is positive, or another act is negative and shouldn’t be done. And then it comes out that the command, the verse that commands me, is actually an informative statement about the act. It tells me a fact: know that this act is positive. And if I knew that by myself, it would be unnecessary. “Why do I need a verse?”—that’s what Pnei Yehoshua assumes, right? If I knew it by myself, then the verse is superfluous; there was no need to say it. Is that a religious command? What? That’s the religious command. Yes. The Holy One, blessed be He, commands me. Why?

[Speaker D] What does the Talmud say?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Why do I need a verse? It’s logical”—that’s it. The Talmud says that logic is enough; you don’t need a verse. No. You could say you’re foolish, you’re careless, you did the wrong thing—but you can’t prosecute me. Why? Because there’s no law. In other words, the purpose of law isn’t only to tell me things I don’t know. Even without the law I know that crossing on a red light is dangerous. And still we need a law. Why? To turn it into an obligation.

[Speaker E] In that example, the law exists so that they can punish me. The purpose of the law is so they can punish me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but why can’t they punish me if it’s irrational? By the way, today the first law in traffic law, when you study road regulations, is—

[Speaker E] The law of general caution.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The duty of general caution. There is such a law, you know. If you’re driving at a certain speed—say there’s a road where you’re allowed to drive up to 100. Okay? You drove 90. But under unsuitable conditions, you committed an offense.

[Speaker E] Right, the maximum speed is 100.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the maximum is 100, but really it all depends on the… I’m saying, take this to the end. Basically, you drove dangerously, and it doesn’t matter whether there is or isn’t a law forbidding it. Of course, for that you need to legislate a duty of general caution. So that’s a law. But if there were no law of general caution, then no. Then if you did it according to the law, you did it according to the law.

[Speaker E] You can’t impose a sanction if there is no law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the sanction is an expression of the fact that you are obligated. So I’m saying the sanction is an expression, but at the root of it there is first of all the creation of an obligation. Of course, if you violated something you’re obligated to do, then there’s a sanction. Okay? But the law creates the obligation. The law does not create the fact that it’s dangerous. The fact that it’s dangerous, or harmful to someone else, or that it’s something good to do—that the law does not create. We talked about “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” That law does not turn the act of helping my fellow man who is in distress into a good deed. We know it’s a good deed even without a law. The law turns it into a legal obligation. That’s not the same thing. Now why do we need that? Everyone already knows it’s a good deed. Why do we need it? So I say, some will say technically: we need it in order to make sure people do it. They know it’s good, but they won’t necessarily do it, so punishment will make sure they do. Conceptually, I think it’s more than that. The law turns it into something obligatory, and of course that also means there is punishment, and maybe that also motivates people—but first of all, on the conceptual plane, the law turns it into an obligation. The fact that it was dangerous didn’t make it an obligation; it made it rational.

[Speaker E] In those cases, why is it called “it’s logical”? Huh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it called “it’s logical”? We talked about that back then. “Why do I need a verse? It’s logical” applies only where there is no law. Meaning, in a place where, for example, there is “judge your fellow with righteousness,” right? It says “judge your fellow with righteousness”—that’s a commandment. Now what is justice? Sometimes the Torah tells me that such-and-such is justice, and sometimes I understand on my own what justice is. But once I understood on my own what justice is, I am under the obligation of “judge your fellow with righteousness”; there is already such a law.

[Speaker E] All the examples in the Talmud of “Why do I need a verse? It’s logical” are like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Many, many, yes, yes. All the examples. Examples that aren’t like that—that’s exactly blessings over enjoyment. And in fact there you really see that it’s rabbinic and not Torah-level, that it’s…

[Speaker D] I thought with blessings over enjoyment—I thought you can’t just eat, and it’s like sacrilege, so I’m saying only thank you—why do I need to say this particular formula?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I explained that there, didn’t I?

[Speaker D] No, and that’s why here I think it is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The difference—

[Speaker D] —that the rabbis specified exactly which, exactly which…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course, but even saying thank you was not an obligation. Because there wasn’t such an obligation. It’s logic; there is no such obligation.

[Speaker D] In contrast, let’s go back to the traffic light: once there’s a red light and no cars at all, two in the morning, no cars, then logic says you can cross. Right? Obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the law didn’t come to prevent that. What does the law care if I cross there? It doesn’t really care—it’s not making distinctions like that. In other words, why would it care if I cross when it’s not dangerous? The law came to make sure there won’t be accidents. The law wasn’t made because of two in the morning; the law was made because of noon. And only once there’s already a law do we stop making distinctions and say even at night, because we’re not going to start making subdivisions now. But the law wasn’t created for that.

[Speaker B] But at the beginning you said there are two dimensions to the command: one is obedience and the second is the result of the act. So the result, so the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The result—

[Speaker B] —of the act exists in any case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Exactly what I’m saying.

[Speaker B] Exactly. So it’s not that he didn’t fulfill the commandment; he fulfilled half a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Logic—logic is a substitute for a command only in the sense that it tells me whether something is right or wrong. But every commandment has another dimension as well, this dimension of obeying the commandment or rebelling against it. For that dimension, you need a command. Without a command, it won’t happen, even if these logical arguments continue forever, even if it’s absolutely obvious to everyone. That doesn’t help at all. It cannot become an obligation or a prohibition—you see, this is deontic logic, right? It cannot become an obligation or a prohibition without a command. The command first of all turns the thing into… brings it into the normative sphere. It brings it into the sphere of what one must do or is forbidden to do, yes—in prohibitions and positive commandments. Logic cannot bring things into the normative sphere; that’s a naturalistic fallacy. Logic says there is a fact: if you cross on a red light, you will endanger yourself—that’s a fact. From the fact, you cannot derive that it is forbidden to cross on a red light. “It is forbidden to cross on a red light” is a norm. A norm is not derived from facts. In order for there to be a norm, you need legislation. Okay? Legislation creates a norm.

[Speaker E] We’re now speaking on a fifth level—what you explained about facts, and if they are moral facts then they are indeed a command, because one could say that’s because there is a command.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, moral facts are a command. A moral command. We’ll get to that in a moment.

[Speaker B] Yes, but there is natural morality, so… natural morality also comes with a command. What? Natural morality also comes with a command. After all, God created us in the image of God, so there is an ethos, but it…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that in a moment, we’ll get to that in a moment.

[Speaker E] In the previous class, regarding the dispute of Pnei Yehoshua, you mentioned that… what I remember you saying was that in a case of doubt we rule stringently.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The case of doubt is exactly—here I got stuck on what Yehudit said earlier. Saying thank you. Exactly. And if you’re in doubt, then Pnei Yehoshua asks why don’t we say that in a case of doubt we rule stringently? After all, it’s Torah-level. So I say: yes, we do say that in a case of doubt we rule stringently—

[Speaker E] But not with a blessing containing God’s name and kingship; rather, to say thank you very much, because that is the Torah-level law. The name-and-kingship formulation, the specific formal text of the blessing, is certainly rabbinic. The obligation to say thank you is Torah-level. So if you’re in doubt whether you blessed or not, say thank you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim that is the law—

[Speaker E] In a Torah-level doubt, you must be stringent; you are obligated to say thank you. But Pnei Yehoshua himself—I looked there afterward—and he says you don’t need to be stringent, because he says since there is… it also didn’t seem to me that he says to say thank you, from what I saw. Did you see there that he said to say thank you? No, he doesn’t say to say it; I said you need to say thank you. No, so I’m saying: there, in the place where he says that a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently, he says: and why nonetheless is it not ruled stringently? Because there is a concern here of a blessing in vain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, and that’s what I said earlier.

[Speaker E] So why doesn’t he say to say thank you?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he doesn’t think that way, very simply. I claim that is not what Pnei Yehoshua is saying.

[Speaker E] No, he thinks that a Torah-level doubt—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —ruled stringently means to recite the blessing, with God’s name and kingship. And to that he says: not true, because there is… He doesn’t understand that there is another dimension here; he doesn’t grasp that there is another dimension here. Meaning, he doesn’t—it’s what I’m saying, this is what I agreed with Yehudit about earlier—that the Torah-level law of the obligation does not specifically require God’s name and kingship. Say thank you, ask the Holy One, blessed be He, before eating so that you won’t commit sacrilege. And the Sages instituted doing that in this formal version, with name and kingship according to the rules: specifically over fruit of the tree you bless this way, over fruit of the ground you bless that way. But all of that is certainly rabbinic—there’s no question about that. Right. So for rabbinic law, in cases of doubt we rule leniently, and certainly where it involves not taking God’s name in vain. And of course one could analyze here Tosafot in Sukkah, that if someone does not fulfill a Torah-level commandment according to the way the Sages established it, then he has not even fulfilled the Torah-level commandment. Like someone who sat in a sukkah while his table was inside the house, lest he be drawn after it. Right, so there is a concern: one must not sit in the sukkah in such a way lest he be drawn after his table and eat during the meal inside the house. And there Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel entered and found Rabbi Yohanan ben Ha-Horanit sitting with his table inside the house, and they said to him: you have never fulfilled the commandment of sukkah in your life. Tosafot there asks: why didn’t he fulfill it? After all, it’s only rabbinically forbidden to sit there lest he be drawn after his table. He is sitting in the sukkah; it’s a valid sukkah. Tosafot says there that one who fulfills a Torah-level commandment not according to the rabbinic rules established by the Sages has not fulfilled even the Torah-level commandment. He doesn’t have even a Torah-level commandment. The Ran disagrees with that, but there is such an approach in Tosafot. And according to that one could sharpen things a bit here. But even saying thank you… what? Even saying thank you… there is a Torah-level obligation to say thank you; in a Torah-level doubt we are stringent.

[Speaker C] I just thought that this means that logic does not create a law. What? If logic cannot create a law…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So why… there is an obligation—no, it’s not an obligation in the halakhic sense; it’s an obligation in the moral sense because of the result. Even the Torah’s rule that in cases of doubt we rule stringently—that applies in commandments not because of the command… I spoke about this once. It’s not because of the command; it’s because of the result. These two dimensions—the reason one must be stringent in cases of doubt is not because of the dimension of command; it’s because of the result. Why? Because perhaps the problematic result is really here. How can you take the risk? Maybe this is pork. Maybe you are eating pork here. From the perspective of the command, a doubtful command is not a command—that’s what Rav Shimon writes; several later authorities write this. From the perspective of the command, one could be lenient. Regarding command there is also rabbinic law, “do not deviate.” Nachmanides asks Maimonides why we are not stringent in cases of doubt. And to that Rav Shimon, Rabbi Shimon Shkop, Rabbi Elchanan, and other later authorities say that rabbinic commandments have only the command, not the substantive content; therefore they are rabbinic. A doubtful command, a doubtful rebellion, is not rebellion; therefore you can be lenient. So if that’s the case, then even in Torah law, when we are stringent—from the perspective of the command, since a doubtful rebellion is not rebellion—what’s the problem? So why in Torah law must one be stringent? Because of the result-oriented dimension that is there: the result. The entire obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt is only because of the result-oriented dimension, not because of the command. And therefore it really is not an obligation—you will not find among the commandments listed by Maimonides any halakhic obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt. It is an obligation based on reasoning; it is not a halakhic obligation, and therefore it cannot be counted in the list of commandments. There is no such obligation. That’s what is meant by the result-oriented aspect that there is in a commandment—there is also… What about a doubtful commandment? Think about it—after all, maybe you are eating pork, so be careful.

[Speaker E] There’s a nice novelty here: that the prohibition comes by way of doubt, and that the potential comes by way of the prohibition on the side that it’s not prohibited. But that too becomes a problematic result.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. Let’s say if a person—

[Speaker E] —can eat permitted pork and it still spiritually dulls him. It may be that it depends only on the prohibition, but it depends on the prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the possibility that he’s eating it permissibly—there’s a dispute whether something milked permissibly still dulls the soul or not. There are various debates about that. A nursing infant—it says there in Ketubot page 60, the Maharam and the Maharach, and in many places—I think he writes—

[Speaker E] If—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —if I’m not mistaken, there’s a responsum in the Talmud here, and also in the Shulchan Arukh, about whether to let an infant nurse from a non-Jewish woman—does that spiritually dull the heart? Is it the transgression that dulls, or the… what?

[Speaker E] According to that, the result depends on the prohibition, on the command.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Spiritual dulling? No, of the food—the direct result. Spiritual dulling of the heart is a result of the prohibition. Even there I’m not sure it’s because of… Anyway. So the upshot of all this is that the command, contrary to how we usually understand it and apparently how Pnei Yehoshua understood it, is not meant to tell us what we don’t know. In the introduction of Ramchal—after all, “I have not come in Mesillat Yesharim to teach you novel ideas; I have come to remind you of old things, what is familiar to everyone, to internalize them, not to teach you innovations.” And in that sense too, the command of the Holy One, blessed be He—that is the meaning of the giving of the Torah. The meaning of the giving of the Torah is not to tell us what is permitted and what is forbidden. Telling us what is permitted and forbidden, and telling us what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants and doesn’t want—that’s just information. The giving of the Torah is a command; it is not information. The giving of the Torah is what turns, what pours the content of obligation, the normative content, into Jewish law. When the Patriarchs observed the Torah, as the Sages say in the midrashim, that Abraham our Patriarch even observed rabbinic festival cooking arrangements—I don’t know if that happened or not, but as a metaphor—when Abraham our Patriarch observed rabbinic festival cooking arrangements, he did not fulfill a commandment. At most he did a good deed. There was no commandment. As long as you are not commanded, there is no commandment here. Mount Sinai was not superfluous. Mount Sinai was not because we’re stupid and don’t understand the way Abraham our Patriarch understood—that his two kidneys became like two rabbis and so he understood everything on his own, while we, not on that level, need commands because we don’t understand by ourselves. That’s a mistake. The command does not come to tell us what we don’t understand. The command comes to turn what we do understand into an obligation. Or, if we don’t understand it, then it also tells us—but that doesn’t matter. Its main role is not to tell us what we don’t understand, but to add the normative dimension to the objective dimension, to the fact that it helps or doesn’t help on the objective level. That is the meaning of a command. And that doesn’t fit—

[Speaker F] It sort of makes sense if actions really had some kind of results in the world. But how can a person in this world understand these kinds of metaphysical processes in upper worlds? Abraham our Patriarch knows that rabbinic festival cooking arrangements will now make something happen? No—it’s a midrash. I’m trying to go through them in my head: aside from “do not steal” and “do not murder,” none of them would you ever arrive at on your own.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the commandments also make that distinction, of the results—from what—

[Speaker D] There are things that are logical. Maybe, maybe the Sabbath?

[Speaker F] No matter how many—there are lots of things that aren’t.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But no matter how many, there are some things we do understand and some things we don’t. So in those places we do understand, the command comes only to add the dimension of obligation. And in places we don’t understand, the command does two things: it also tells us that this thing is positive or negative, and also… Therefore in that sense, for example, when people always ask why “do not murder” is written—after all, it’s logical. Why do we need “do not steal”? Obviously we need it. Because without “do not murder” and “do not steal,” it would not have been a transgression—a transgression in the halakhic sense. It would have been a moral wrongdoing, an ugly act, a bad act.

[Speaker F] Could you unload?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you couldn’t unload. Morally, you still should not murder because you understand what it does, but it is not halakhically forbidden. Until there is a command, until there is a verse, it is not forbidden. The rest, etc.—we talked about that.

[Speaker E] The halakhic prohibition is really only in order to punish you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s another question. First of all, you can say that, though I’m not sure it’s true. But even if you say it is true, it still comes to add the prohibition—perhaps also in order to punish.

[Speaker E] In interpersonal matters. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Cain murdered Abel and there was no prohibition. Right. Who said there was a prohibition? What? There was a moral prohibition—

[Speaker B] There was no prohibition. Right, obviously that’s so. The seven Noahide commandments—they were commanded.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They were also commanded “do not murder.”

[Speaker B] If they were commanded, then it was there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. If they were commanded—what do you mean it wasn’t there? It exists morally, but not as Jewish law. But what’s the difference between it existing morally and existing as Jewish law? What’s the difference? Is one punished for morality or not? One is punished in the heavenly court for not being moral. What? In the heavenly court you’re also punished for not being religious, not only for not being moral.

[Speaker E] What is the heavenly court?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s actually what I’m getting to now. In this regard, this thing—I said this is basically the meaning of the giving of the Torah. The meaning of the giving of the Torah—the giving of the Torah is the point where there was a kind of big bang in which the normative sphere of Jewish law was created. Before the giving of the Torah, there was no Jewish law. Nothing—there was no Jewish law at all, nothing. Everything they did until then had no halakhic value whatsoever. It had moral value, but not halakhic value. So there was no—at the giving of the Torah, Jewish law was created. Before that, there was no Jewish law. Now, what about the seven commandments?

[Speaker C] No, they were commanded before—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the giving of the Torah. For them, the Noahides, no? And also at Marah there were commandments. When I say “the giving of the Torah,” I mean the command from heaven, not specifically at Mount Sinai. There were commandments given at Marah. The seven commandments given to the whole world. Yes. And that’s from the creation of the world. Right. And that’s before the Jews. Right. For all human beings. Right. Of course. When I say “the giving of the Torah,” I mean the command from heaven.

[Speaker C] The giving of the Torah is the commandments given at Mount Sinai, but obviously the command from heaven—that is what constitutes Jewish law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not just telling me that this is forbidden or that is permitted. That’s a mistaken conception of command, and it begins with a mistaken conception of “Why do I need a verse? It’s logical.” And all of this is because of these two dimensions Rabbi Elchanan speaks about in a straightforward way—it’s not some fancy pilpul, it’s just the obvious thing.

[Speaker B] So what was at Marah? What? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There was a command. Three things. Fine, right, so they were commanded there. So what?

[Speaker B] A command from heaven. Yes, from heaven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s first of all as a question, because until they were in Egypt and everything was in that format, it depends where each thing was first introduced. The Passover in Egypt was a command for that time; the Passover for future generations is something else. In a moment we’ll see that in the end everything goes back to Mount Sinai, according to Maimonides at least. And here we really come to the Maimonides you mentioned. Look, I marked a bit here, so let’s take a look.

[Speaker E] Doesn’t this somewhat reduce the drama of Mount Sinai? Why? Because it sounds much more like they were being told new things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The divine command makes a much bigger impression on me than the giving of the Torah as I’m describing it, but each person according to his own soul.

[Speaker D] But there are lots of new things there anyway.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but this is the big bang in which this category of obligation and prohibition was created. Until then, they tell you something you didn’t know—they inform you that this is how it is, okay, so big deal, what… Here an entirely new category was created, one that hadn’t existed before. This is creation ex nihilo. Brisk was created at Mount Sinai; before that there was no Brisk at all. Ah, does that seem trivial to you?

[Speaker B] Wait, but what happened at Mount Sinai? I don’t understand. What do you mean what happened? You’re saying Jewish law was not given at Mount Sinai?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? What was given at Mount Sinai?

[Speaker B] A few things had already been given at Marah… after all, Moses broke the tablets. So what is that? God said the Ten Commandments, that’s all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and Moses brought down the Torah. Doesn’t matter. What?

[Speaker B] But that wasn’t at Mount Sinai; that was much later. At Mount Sinai it was given to Moses, and afterward Moses told the people what he heard from the Holy One, blessed be He. We only heard two commandments—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of the Ten Commandments, we heard two directly from the Holy One, blessed be He, and the rest Moses our teacher transmitted to the people. But it is still a command from the Holy One, blessed be He, through Moses. It still counts as a command from the Holy One, blessed be He. It doesn’t matter whether we heard it with our own ears from Him. No, no, fine, I’m just saying it like that. What do you mean fine?

[Speaker D] Maybe “This month shall be for you” was before that, and also only at Mount Sinai.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now come, let’s see.

[Speaker B] But even when Moses did that, it wasn’t at Mount Sinai. We know what happened at Mount Sinai.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At Mount Sinai the Holy One, blessed be He, gave it to Moses, or Moses gave it to the people. Yes.

[Speaker B] Moses at Mount Sinai, that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It—

[Speaker B] —was given—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —to Moses, and afterward teaching them is another matter. Yes. Maimonides writes in the Laws of Kings—this is what you mentioned earlier, at the end of chapter 8: “Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to observe them is among the pious of the nations of the world and has the status of a resident alien.” And a resident alien is a non-Jew who accepts upon himself observance of the seven commandments before three people. “Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to observe them is among the pious of the nations of the world and has a share in the World to Come, provided that he accepts them and performs them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses our teacher that the descendants of Noah had previously been commanded regarding them. But if he performed them because of rational conviction, he is not a resident alien and is not among the pious of the nations of the world, but among their wise.” And in older versions of Maimonides it says “and not,” but the accurate version is apparently “but among their wise.” What is written in this Maimonides? That essentially a resident alien—he’s speaking about a resident alien because the context is that the commandments of a resident alien are rational commandments, things reason inclines toward. Maimonides himself writes there in the Laws of Kings what the seven commandments are. So these are basically commandments one can understand on one’s own, except for eating a limb from a living animal. But aside from that, at least most of them are things reason tends toward. And about that he says: if there is a resident alien who does it because of rational necessity—he thinks this is the right thing to do, sensible, rational, whatever—then he says he is not a resident alien and not among the pious of the nations of the world, but among their wise. In other words, “their wise” means wise in the sense of being intelligent and moral and all those good things. So he says that such a person is doing the right thing, but he is not performing a commandment—in my language. He did not perform a commandment. Why didn’t he perform a commandment? Because a commandment means doing something as a response to a command. If you don’t do it as a response to a command, then even if you did the right thing, and you’re doing it because you think it’s right and not because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, then you did not perform a commandment—you simply did a good thing. You are a good person; you are not fulfilling commandments. It has no religious value; it has no halakhic value. Maybe it has moral value. Not halakhic value. Even for a non-Jew?

[Speaker B] No, also for a Jew. I see here an unnecessary phrase. It says “and performs them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them.” Why continue? “In the Torah and informed us through Moses our teacher.” They’re not Jews—why should they believe that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides really is saying something more here. Because if someone thinks that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects him to do this, that also is not a commandment. Why not? Only if he understands that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded him to do it.

[Speaker B] He writes “in the Torah,” but they’re not Jews, so why would they believe in the Torah? What? They’re Buddhists, whatever, they never heard of the Torah at all. They were born in Africa—what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then they cannot fulfill a commandment.

[Speaker B] So why wouldn’t they have a share in the World to Come?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t say they don’t have one.

[Speaker B] But why give only these people a share in the World to Come? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short: anyone who does not do it out of command has no commandment. He has no commandment. All the pioneers who settled in kibbutzim did not fulfill the commandment of settling the Land of Israel just because they settled there.

[Speaker B] Yes, but why not call them the pious of the nations? Why not call them—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are doing good.

[Speaker B] But why not call them the pious of the nations of the world? That’s what I don’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “The pious of the nations of the world” means people whose actions have religious value. Let’s put it that way. “The pious of the nations of the world” does not mean righteous people. They can be righteous in the moral sense, no problem. “The pious of the nations of the world” means people who fulfill commandments.

[Speaker B] Yes, they believe—yes, they believe that God commanded it. But not in the Torah and not through Moses; they never heard of the Torah or of Moses. Where did He command it? What? Where did He command it? Where, where did He command it? Yes. According to their belief, they believe God commanded it—what difference does it make? In some jungle, what difference does it make? No, I’m talking about those who never heard of the Torah, those who lived in Africa, in China, and in the Caucasus Mountains. What? They never heard—until today they don’t know what—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They think the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them through Confucius. But He didn’t command them through Confucius, so what can you do? They’re mistaken.

[Speaker B] Not through— they said God commanded them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But where did He command them? In Israel? What? Where did He meet them? Where did He command them? The only encounter of the Holy One, blessed be He, with humanity was at Mount Sinai—that’s the accepted belief, at least.

[Speaker B] No, that’s the belief of the Jews—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is simply mistaken.

[Speaker B] That’s not true. Every nation has a myth of its encounter with God. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking whether it really happened or whether these are myths.

[Speaker E] If you do it as a response to a command—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They do good things—

[Speaker B] Good things!

[Speaker E] Yes, good things!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in the halakhic sense there is no commandment here. They do good things; they are not among the pious of the nations of the world, but among their wise. “Their wise” means good people, people who behave properly, fittingly—but they have no commandments. It is not a commandment. A commandment, by definition of the word, means responding to a command. If there is no command, there is no commandment.

[Speaker C] What if he mistakenly thinks he has a command?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it’s a mistake. It’s not a response.

[Speaker C] It’s unintentional involvement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I think that’s not a commandment. That’s what he adds here: “in the Torah and informed us through Moses our teacher.”

[Speaker C] Because he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —thinks there is a command, but there is no command, and he is simply mistaken.

[Speaker C] He is doing the seven commandments and he thought there was one. So what? He is just mistaken.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is mistaken because according to his own view there is no command, so it is not true that he responded to a command. It’s like Sabbath desecration in the eyes of Maimonides—returning on a weekday. Right? If I give charity to someone who in fact is not poor—

[Speaker C] There the problem is with the result, not with the command. What? There the problem is with the result, not with the command.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course, because there really is a command to give to the poor. I’m bringing it only as an analogous example. There is a command to give to the poor; I wasn’t mistaken about the command. I’m just giving an example of error. Once there is an error, then it’s an error—what can you do? Even if I’m not at fault. But in practice it didn’t happen. Here you are not really responding to a command because what you are relating to as a command is not a command. True, there was another command, so by chance you hit the mark—but that’s still unintentional involvement.

[Speaker B] But we see that God was revealed to non-Jews too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where was He revealed to non-Jews?

[Speaker B] For example, Balaam.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Did He command him commandments? What? He didn’t command him commandments.

[Speaker B] The fact is He reveals Himself to him. I don’t know, maybe Balaam came to his people and said, “You should do this and that.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do you know?

[Speaker B] You’re only reading the story of Balak there, but you don’t know. Balaam—you say he was one of the greatest prophets there were, no? Maimonides writes that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he writes. People ask how he knows that—I don’t know. He says there was no command except through Moses our teacher. If someone else says commandments came through him, he’s a liar. Why? Either a liar or mistaken. Fine, that’s what Maimonides says, I don’t know. But anyway, it doesn’t matter. This is the commandment—this is a mistake. Maybe he is mistaken about the commandment; maybe there are other commands, fine, maybe there are other commandments. But that’s what Maimonides says—it’s not the point. I’m trying to say: this is the meaning of a commandment. It could be that only the Christians are right and their commandments are the commandments. Still, what I’m saying would remain true: only someone who fulfills a command, only someone who fulfills an instruction—that is a commandment. Whether the commands are the commands of Jesus or of Moses our teacher.

[Speaker D] Fine, it doesn’t matter for the idea. What are you trying to say? That this is the meaning of command—that it’s something from outside. That’s maybe also a matter of definition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, I want to make that claim. In a moment, if I get there, I’ll formulate it that way. Yes. Good. So that’s Maimonides in the Laws of Kings. After that there’s another Maimonides that is supposedly parallel, but not exactly. Because the Mishnah in Chullin writes as follows, speaking about the sciatic nerve. At the end of the chapter on the sciatic nerve: “It applies to a kosher animal, and does not apply to a non-kosher one.” In a kosher animal, eating the sciatic nerve is forbidden. In a non-kosher animal there is no prohibition, no prohibition of the sciatic nerve. Those are the words of the first tanna. Rabbi Yehuda says: even in a non-kosher one. Rabbi Yehuda says that the sciatic nerve of a non-kosher animal is also forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda said: but wasn’t the sciatic nerve prohibited from the time of the sons of Jacob? After all, “Therefore the children of Israel shall not eat the sciatic nerve,” after the struggle with the angel. And at that point non-kosher animals were still permitted to them. After all, at that time the Torah had not yet been given, and non-kosher animals had not yet been prohibited. So if the sciatic nerve was prohibited, and at that point there still was no distinction between a kosher and a non-kosher animal, that means the sciatic nerve is in fact forbidden even in a non-kosher animal. A good proof. They said to him—the first tanna and the Sages said to him—“It was said at Sinai, but written in its place.” The prohibition of the sciatic nerve was said at Sinai, but it was written as if it had been at the time of Jacob. “Therefore the children of Israel shall not eat the sciatic nerve” is a verse that was said at Mount Sinai. The children of Israel do not eat the sciatic nerve from Sinai onward, as a remembrance of Jacob’s struggle with the angel. But it was said at Mount Sinai; it was not said in Jacob’s time. There is no chronological order in the Torah; the Torah is arranged in some way.

Maimonides says this differently—not like that. Maimonides interprets it differently in his Commentary on the Mishnah there. Maimonides writes as follows: according to Rabbi Yehuda, one who eats an olive-bulk of the sciatic nerve of a non-kosher animal is liable for two floggings: because of the non-kosher animal and because of the sciatic nerve. And the law does not follow Rabbi Yehuda. And note this great principle brought in this Mishnah, namely their statement: “It was prohibited from Sinai.” And this means that you must know that everything from which we refrain, or that we do today, we do only because of God’s command through Moses. You can really see his language from the Laws. And not because God commanded it to the prophets who preceded him. Even if there were earlier commands, today we are not obligated because of those earlier commands, but because of the command at Mount Sinai. For example, we do not eat a limb from a living animal not because God prohibited a limb from a living animal to the descendants of Noah, but because Moses prohibited a limb from a living animal to us, through what we were commanded at Sinai, that a limb from a living animal should remain forbidden. Yes, that’s a commandment that was said and repeated at Sinai, the passage in Sanhedrin there. And likewise, we do not circumcise because Abraham circumcised himself and the members of his household, but because God commanded us through Moses to be circumcised, just as Abraham, peace be upon him, was circumcised. And similarly with the sciatic nerve: we do not follow the prohibition of our forefather Jacob in this, but rather the command of Moses our teacher. Don’t you see that they said six hundred and thirteen commandments were said to Moses at Sinai? After all, all six hundred and thirteen commandments were said at Sinai. Why? But the sciatic nerve was said earlier, wasn’t it? Circumcision was said earlier? But no—we observe it because of Sinai.

Maimonides is introducing a novelty here. Even though things were indeed commanded earlier, that earlier command still does not obligate us; only the command of Sinai obligates us. Meaning, the claim is not a historical claim that the Sages are making against Rabbi Yehuda—whether the verse was said at Sinai or not said at Sinai. The verse was said with our forefather Jacob. They too agree that the verse was said with our forefather Jacob, and there was a prohibition even before. The children of Israel began not to eat the sciatic nerve from the very moment of Jacob’s struggle with the angel. It did not begin at Sinai. This is not a historical claim. The claim is that today, after the revelation at Mount Sinai, the source of authority that obligates us is the command at Sinai, not the command or custom or whatever it may have been that existed before. What?

[Speaker E] Was the sciatic nerve of a non-kosher animal permitted at Sinai? The sciatic nerve of a non-kosher animal was permitted,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is permitted; only in a kosher animal—animals that we eat.

[Speaker E] But it had been forbidden earlier.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It had not been forbidden. It may have been forbidden only in a customary or moral sense, let’s say. A halakhic prohibition was created at Sinai.

[Speaker C] There was no prohibition before. Fine—the question is whether the moral element continued even in a non-kosher animal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is there any value today in not eating the sciatic nerve of a non-kosher animal because it commemorates Jacob and the angel? Maybe yes, maybe there could be such a value. Today, as part of Jacob’s custom? Could be, could be there is such a thing. But in Jewish law, no. In Jewish law it is permitted. But the sciatic nerve—what?

[Speaker D] The sciatic nerve is always forbidden to eat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Do you eat the sciatic nerve? Just kidding. Is he violating two prohibitions or one? Now, what is the relation between these two passages in Maimonides—his Commentary on the Mishnah and the Laws of Kings? It’s not the same thing. In the Laws of Kings, Maimonides is talking about the person’s motivation. When a person performs a commandment, he has to do it with the awareness that he is doing it as someone responding to a command. Okay? Say, in Israeli law. In Israeli law too—why are you obligated to obey the law? Because the Knesset legislated it, and that is the law. But does a person who stops at a red light need to intend, “I am stopping at the red light only because I am responding to the law of the Knesset”—meaning, otherwise he has not fulfilled the law? Do commandments require intention? No. Why not? Because the law doesn’t care why you do something; the law cares what you do and what you don’t do. Okay. Jewish law does care why you do it. Commandments require intention, and that moves between desire and rightness and so on. In fact these two aspects that exist in a commandment—not only are there two aspects in a commandment, but when you do it, you are actually doing two things: you are obeying the Holy One, blessed be He, and you are also performing an action that has positive consequences. Okay. Now both require intention. When you obey—when you do the commandment because you understand that you are obligated to the Holy One, blessed be He—then you have done both things. If you do it without intention, you did only the second thing without the first.

Now, Maimonides in the Commentary on the Mishnah is not dealing with that at all; he is dealing with a completely different issue. What Maimonides says in the Commentary on the Mishnah is true even with regard to secular law. In the Laws of Kings this is not connected to law; it applies only in Jewish law. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, it’s true with law too. Maimonides in the Commentary on the Mishnah is dealing with the theory of Jewish law. Not the question of what should accompany the person who carries out Jewish law or violates a prohibition, but rather: by what authority do I bring a claim against a person? This is a question addressed to the judge, or to Jewish law: by what authority do I make a demand of the person? By the authority of Mount Sinai. That’s what in legal philosophy is called the “Grundnorm,” the basic norm. There is a positivist conception, at least, that at the foundation of every legal system—maybe every normative system—there is some foundational norm from which all the other norms are derived. For example, the norm that says one must obey whatever the Knesset legislates. That is the basic norm. Now, from that it follows that one must obey whatever the Knesset legislates. So there are norms derived from the basic norm—a pyramid of norms, like that—with a basic norm standing at the top, and from it more norms are derived, and from them still more norms are derived. Now the Knesset can delegate authority to a ministry or to a minister to establish laws, and that too will be valid. So there is a hierarchy of norms. But at the top stands a basic norm. That norm does not mean that when I obey this law I have to intend that I’m doing it for the sake of the basic norm. The basic norm is the justification for the judge—by what authority does he come to me, or the police officer, by what authority does he come to me with a demand? Because the basic norm is binding. That’s theory of law; it’s not practice of law.

Maimonides in the Commentary on the Mishnah is speaking about the theory of Jewish law. The theory of Jewish law: why am I obligated? Because of Mount Sinai. And Maimonides in the Laws of Kings, chapter 8, is speaking about the practice of Jewish law. When I observe commandments, I’m not supposed to do it like just anyone who observes commandments in order to preserve folklore, national culture, and so on. That is not a commandment. Maybe those are nice things, useful things, but a commandment it is not. A commandment exists only when one responds to a command.

[Speaker F] So do you need intention at the barber in Bnei Brak? Huh? Only in a prohibition. Only in a prohibition. Fine, I agree, but also sitting there idly, which is just a law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if it’s the Knesset, you have to do that prohibition as a response. Now there—now there it becomes problematic, because it has no meaning, as though you didn’t discharge an obligation if you violated the prohibition.

[Speaker F] No, because you didn’t obey the command.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But obeying the command—you don’t receive reward unless you obeyed the command. Maybe yes? No, from the halakhic standpoint, a commandment was not fulfilled. At the barber it’s moral, again—it’s moral.

[Speaker F] The reward as opposed to—again, let me try to sharpen it. Fulfilling a commandment, no. And you can sharpen it again,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not because it has no meaning. What does it mean that commandments require intention?

[Speaker F] Look how I’m sitting, look how I’m sitting at the barber and responding to the king’s command. On the contrary, where it’s more absurd, it stands out more, no? Meaning, when you’re sitting—if you perform a positive commandment and intend in order to fulfill it, that’s still somewhat understandable. But if I respond to a command where it’s

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely. Morally you’ll get a bonus for that, but fulfillment of a commandment—no. I have no problem with bonuses, but fulfillment of a commandment—no. This is a halakhic matter. Halakhically there is no fulfillment of a commandment here. If you don’t do it as a response, that is a halakhic statement. It’s not talking about the World to Come. I’m using language like reward and so on—no, I’m now talking about a halakhic statement. Do you have a commandment? The answer is no. You can keep all the laws of the Sabbath, major and minor alike, and if you don’t believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, you have done nothing. That I accept. And I will make a claim—which, by the way, is also argued in an article—that the transgressions you committed are not transgressions either. Transgressions also require intention. Transgressions require intention. Meaning, if you do not believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, every transgression you commit is not a transgression. Among secular people, atheists. So I’m saying that in both aspects, in this duality of meanings that exists within a commandment and within a transgression—there is the dimension of command, the dimension of obligation and prohibition, and the dimension of utility, the factual dimension—this additional dimension of command actually has two meanings: in the theory of Jewish law and in the practice of Jewish law.

[Speaker B] Wait, what you just said is far too important to pass over in silence. If I believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, but I don’t believe that He commanded this, then it’s not a transgression? What? It’s not a transgression?

[Speaker D] What you’re saying now is awful. What do you mean?

[Speaker B] Why is it not a transgression?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because no—a transgression has to be a transgression of a command. If you do not recognize that there is a command here—not that you are not bound by it, but that you do not believe there is any command at all—then you have not transgressed the command.

[Speaker B] So what is it then?

[Speaker E] So what is it then if it’s not a transgression? A transgression has to be rebellion. Yes. So what is it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he is simply a sinner? Yes, that’s what I’m saying. It’s “among their wise men,” but not “among the pious of the nations of the world.”

[Speaker E] But he’ll receive a general punishment for not believing at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That’s, for example, why a captive infant does bring one sin-offering. I discussed this in the article; there’s a discussion there about the division into sin-offerings, and there is evidence from the division into sin-offerings. One sin-offering he does bring for the very fact that he did not—but not for every single detail, no matter how many transgressions he commits. Fine.