This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- [0:02] Introduction and presentation of Rabbi Michael Abraham
- [1:51] The blog post “The Dispute”
- [3:23] Rabbi Abraham’s criticism of the reality perception of that world
- [5:57] The claim that Torah study protects against coronavirus
- [7:24] Lack of solidarity and ideological filters
- [12:39] Rabbi Kanievsky’s political background
- [15:07] The connection between Torah and science in the square potential well
- [26:05] The Mussar movement and human greatness
- [27:15] A sad melody in the Book of Esther
- [29:48] The difficulty of determining the right resolution of instructions
- [32:15] Decrees against the prayer quorum and the antagonism
- [36:16] Rabbi Kanievsky’s authority in decision-making
- [40:57] Science without an alternative and its limitations
- [43:31] Personal responsibility versus obedience to a leader
- [49:40] Reference to Leibowitz and philosophy
- [51:25] The question of reasons in commandments and in Jewish law
Summary
General overview
The text presents an interview about the conduct of parts of Haredi society during the coronavirus period, through the episode of Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky’s directives, and about Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham’s sharp criticism of the phenomenon. Rabbi Abraham argues that the disregard for the danger is not “lack of solidarity” but a combination of stupidity and malice, stemming from a lack of understanding of the modern world and of mechanisms of information filtering and ideology, alongside a concept of authority called “Torah opinion” that produces dangerous mass obedience. He sharpens the point that the problem is not only a factual mistake, but the taking of authority to decide matters with consequences for the general public. At the same time, he asks to distinguish between appreciating devotion to Torah and figures of persistence and diligence, and opposing the idea that such figures should lead the public on modern and medical issues.
The opening of the interview and background on Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham
The interviewer presents the channel as dealing with education, intelligence, and critical thinking, and hosts Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham as a physicist and author. The interviewer lists his books, including the quartet and especially Two Carts and a Hot-Air Balloon, God Plays Dice, The Science of Freedom, Truth and Not Stable, and the trilogy series that came out in February and is presented as intended to “annoy” both secular and religious people from both sides. The interviewer connects the interview to a post Rabbi Abraham published on his blog, written out of familiarity and love for the Torah world, yet one that struck some readers as harsh and problematic.
Rabbi Kanievsky’s instruction to refuse closure of educational institutions and the sharp response
The interviewer describes a recording from March 14 in which Rabbi Kanievsky is told that the state says yeshivot and cheders should be closed, and he replies, “You do not close the cheders,” and “Heaven forbid” to canceling the cheders. The interviewer defines Rabbi Kanievsky as a Torah, halakhic, and even ideological authority for a large part of the Haredi public, and reads from Rabbi Abraham’s words that the “picture that emerges in the world is horrific” and that it is “a desecration of God’s name unlike anything else,” including the statement that if this were in 19th-century Russia or Ukraine, “massacres and pogroms would break out here.” The interviewer quotes additional expressions from the post about “a herd of infantile fools by will and by choice,” lacking solidarity and self-criticism, and Rabbi Abraham confirms that he stands behind those words.
The Gulf War anecdote, “Torah study,” and the claim of protection
The interviewer brings an anecdote according to which during the Gulf War Rabbi Kanievsky said that missiles would not fall in Bnei Brak, while Rabbi Shach of blessed memory put on a mask, with the explanation that the one protecting was Rabbi Shach. Rabbi Abraham claims missiles did fall on the outskirts of Bnei Brak, and that one can always hairsplit about boundaries and the eruv, and he compares such predictions to “the Oracle of Delphi,” which gives prophecies that can be reconciled with any outcome. Rabbi Abraham says he is entirely in favor of Torah study, but one has to understand “what it does do and what it doesn’t do,” and he brings the rabbinic saying, “One whose head aches should engage in Torah,” not as meaning that Torah will cure a headache, but that even someone with a headache is not exempt from study. Rabbi Abraham agrees at most with the formulation that “if missiles are falling, one should study Torah,” but rejects the conclusion that Torah study will “prevent the missiles or the coronavirus.”
Conduct in Bnei Brak, solidarity, and the distinction between disregard and negligence
The interviewer presents a sequence of news events, such as Litzman being sick with coronavirus, prayer with a prayer quorum despite the prohibition, and a bus in Bnei Brak running despite the ban, and also mentions an article by Rabbi Farkash about disobedience to the instructions. The interviewer speaks about the claim of lack of solidarity, and about the idea that someone who behaves “disgracefully and carelessly” will take a hospital bed at the expense of someone who was careful. Rabbi Abraham replies that the problem is not lack of solidarity but “a combination of stupidity and malice.” He explains that if those people had really been convinced that the virus was dangerous, they would have closed the yeshivot, and he brings as proof that a few days later Rabbi Kanievsky did order them closed and even called anyone who did not comply a “pursuer.” Therefore, this was disregard for the danger, not a conscious decision to endanger others.
Lack of understanding of a pandemic, exponential processes, and information filtering
Rabbi Abraham argues that the public in question “doesn’t live inside a modern world” and does not understand a pandemic that spreads “exponentially,” the idea of “flattening the curve,” and the meaning of children gathering together. He gives as an example the claim that Rabbi Kanievsky relied on a Talmudic text that defines a “plague” according to the percentage of casualties, and explains that this is “a mathematical misunderstanding,” because a small number of deaths today can grow very quickly. Rabbi Abraham separates two almost independent aspects: familiarity with the world and with basic mathematics needed to understand an exponential process, and the attitude toward the state, which produces filtering and a tendentious presentation of reality. He describes narrow sources of information that are not professionals, alongside ideological filtering in which “the moment it’s the state, you automatically recoil.”
The language of the Haredi press, antagonism toward the state, and the concept of authority
Rabbi Abraham quotes, through Rabbi Farkash’s article, the change in language in the Haredi press from “decrees of the authorities” to “the instructions of the doctors and the Ministry of Health,” showing that this reflects a shift from antagonism to more neutral wording. The interviewer emphasizes Rabbi Kanievsky’s “extraordinary significance” in the Haredi public, including family ties, his status in Bnei Brak, and his authority even in the political decisions of United Torah Judaism, according to what Gafni says. Rabbi Abraham casts doubt on how much actual political subordination exists in practice, and argues that politicians use the claim “I consulted” as a technique of public presentation, alongside a mystical Lithuanian concept according to which someone who is secluded within the “four cubits of Jewish law” has a “more refined perspective” and is less biased.
“Everything is in the Torah,” Haredi doubleness, and the gap between slogans and behavior
The interviewer reads a passage by Rabbi Abraham about yeshiva fellows who asked why he went to the university, since “everything is in the Torah,” and about his reply that if so, then he is “studying Torah at the university,” and that they should bring him the solution to “Schrödinger’s equation for a rotating square potential well.” Rabbi Abraham argues that no one really expects to find such a solution in the Torah, and that “everything is in the Torah provided you don’t look for it,” and he speaks about a kind of “doubleness” in the Haredi world, in which sharp, sober people also tell jokes about the great sages of the generation, yet obey voting instructions. He describes a situation in which it is obvious that a cure will come from the Weizmann Institute, yet people attribute it to prayers, and he argues that in practical choice many would prefer that the Weizmann Institute keep working, even if the slogans declare otherwise.
“Lithuanian Hasidism,” Torah opinion, and reactions against the modern world
The interviewer quotes Yair Cherki: “Rabbi Kanievsky is a Lithuanian Haredi rabbi with the mannerisms of a Hasidic rebbe,” and asks how a Lithuanian public identified with critical thought reaches this kind of obedience. Rabbi Abraham says the public is not monolithic, but he identifies a phenomenon of “Lithuanian Hasidism” born as an antithesis to secular education and science, through the need to offer “an alternative to the outside world.” He explains that the concept of “Torah opinion” develops as a mechanism in which Lithuanian rabbis are considered “knowers of everything” by virtue of Torah wisdom, and that the difference from Hasidic charisma narrows in the final result. Rabbi Abraham compares this to the New Age phenomenon in the Western world as well, as a backlash in search of a transcendent anchor when science does not solve existential problems.
The Mussar movement, human greatness, and the internal tension between greatness and smallness
The interviewer raises a theory about Catholic Christianity, which presents a person as “stained by sin” and in need of mediation, as opposed to a Jewish moral outlook of “the greatness of man,” which places the person at the center, and claims that the result in the Lithuanian public resembles a need for a mediator in the form of the leading sage of the generation. Rabbi Abraham corrects the sociological characterization and argues that Rabbi Kanievsky comes from the circle of the Chazon Ish, who opposed the study of Mussar, and he presents a “twisted” chain of ideas. Rabbi Abraham describes an inherent tension in the Mussar movement: on the one hand, a belief in “the greatness of man” as an ideal; on the other hand, an “unceasing digging” into weaknesses, inclinations, and biases in order to preserve purity of decision-making. Therefore, a relatively skeptical and sad atmosphere emerges.
The claim of a “double standard” between the supermarket, running, and prayer quorums, and the response
The interviewer mentions Yoav Sorek and the claim of a “double standard,” according to which one may go to the supermarket with children while a morning prayer service with a small prayer quorum is forbidden, and adds the claim that mood and resilience depend on the ability to study and pray in crowded families. Rabbi Abraham says that on the substantive level one cannot do without a supermarket, and the question is one of the resolution of the instructions, while a prayer quorum is not a life-saving necessity even if its absence harms one’s mood, similar to the demands made of secular people to stay home. He distinguishes between the corner-cutting of a private individual and a public directive that creates a macroscopic effect, and argues that in the Haredi sector many arguments are not detached from the consciousness of a “decree” and antagonism toward the state.
“Who put him in charge,” causing loss to others, and authority over the whole public
Rabbi Abraham sharpens the point that the problem is not whether Rabbi Kanievsky is wise enough, but by what right he makes decisions that have consequences for the entire State of Israel. He presents this as a moral problem of authority and brings a halakhic principle: “causing loss to others,” according to which a person cannot make a decision that binds other people. He describes how wrong decisions cause infection, occupation of hospital beds, and the investment of enormous resources in Bnei Brak, and argues that even if the rabbi did understand epidemiology, he still would have no formal authority to decide for those who never gave him such a mandate.
Science, critical thinking, personal responsibility, and the danger of mass obedience
The interviewer raises the limits of reason and the uncertainty in medicine, and Rabbi Abraham agrees that science can err and that “scientism” is an unhealthy phenomenon, but argues that there is no better alternative for decision-making in a pandemic. He tells about an encounter at ORT Ramla in which he called on students not to obey leaders blindly and to place responsibility on the citizen, because mass obedience is “a recipe for disaster” when a leader is wrong intentionally or unintentionally. He says he does not have great trust in human wisdom, but he does trust that dispersing responsibility offsets mistakes, and he prefers “the responsibility of the many” to “the wisdom of the many.”
Democracy as a value and the distinction between truth and the public’s will
Rabbi Abraham argues that he is a democrat not because the majority necessarily arrives at the truth, but because it is important that a person take responsibility for his fate and decide about his own life. He stresses that government is not meant to produce “the right thing” through majority polls in professional matters, but to allow legitimate decision-making according to the public’s will under the value of self-responsibility. The interviewer connects this as well to halakhic concepts such as “follow the majority,” and to meta-questions of normalizing majority versus quality, in the context of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.
Criticism of metaphysical claims that cannot be falsified
The interviewer reads Rabbi Abraham’s passage saying that “the Torah protects” only when you cannot see it, “prayer helps” only when you aren’t looking, “tithing makes one wealthy” only when you don’t check, and that “the blessing function collapses” when you examine it, alongside the saying “blessing rests only upon that which is hidden from the eye.” Rabbi Abraham explains that he has an objection to emphatic metaphysical statements that cannot be falsified and that become “pure truth” only because they have been emptied of factual content, and he is deeply skeptical of them.
Why observe commandments, Leibowitz, and a concept of non-physical utility
The interviewer asks how observance is justified if “the Torah does not protect and save,” and Rabbi Abraham mentions Leibowitz, who said “because I want to,” and formulates it as a form of worship in which “you serve God, and God is not working for you.” Rabbi Abraham adds that he believes the commandments also “do good” in some way, apparently metaphysically, even if he does not see that physically. Later the topic is raised of “what difference does it make to Him whether one slaughters from the neck or the back of the neck,” and Rabbi Abraham presents Maimonides’ position in the sixth chapter of the Eight Chapters, according to which every commandment has a reason, but the distinction between rational and non-rational commandments is on the psychological plane and the plane of identification, not in whether there is or is not a reason.
A positive ending: appreciating an exemplary figure while opposing his leadership role
The interviewer asks to end with something positive about Rabbi Kanievsky after such a “hard” column, and Rabbi Abraham says he greatly appreciates the devotion, self-sacrifice, intensive engagement with Torah, and mastery of the leadership and its flock, and argues that such figures are vital and serve as role models. He distinguishes between the importance of cultivating figures who live within the “four cubits of books” and the serious mistake of giving such figures a position of public leadership in making decisions in a modern world. He explains that lack of understanding in fields such as epidemiology is an unavoidable price of extreme Torah immersion, and therefore this is not criticism of the figure himself but of the use made of him. Rabbi Abraham adds that not everyone has to be like that, and that there is “another kind of greatness in Torah” that is engaged with reality and knows how to connect fields and ask the right questions. He mentions figures such as Rabbi Cherlow and Rabbi Firer as people capable of asking correctly even without formal expertise, and concludes that these marvelous figures deserve honor and cultivation, but not binding leadership over the entire public.
Full Transcript
[Speaker A] What’s going on with Haredi society, and why its conduct during the coronavirus has been very problematic for all of us. Hello everyone, greetings and blessings to everyone, welcome to my channel, a channel that talks about education, intelligence, and also how to make you more critical in your next living-room conversation. And this time it’s a huge opportunity and honor to host Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham. Now, there are people here on the channel who don’t know him, so I’ll just say who he is. Rabbi Abraham, besides being a physicist who was at the Weizmann Institute and at Bar-Ilan University, has written quite a few books. The most famous among them, for the older ones among us, are the quartet, and especially Two Carts and a Hot-Air Balloon. After that he wrote the book God Plays Dice, which really became something of a modern classic, right? I’d say it replaced In the Beginning Created, though I don’t know whether he’ll like that comparison. After that he wrote The Science of Freedom, which dealt with choice and free will. Then he wrote a book called Truth and Not Stable, about religious fundamentalism. It was written in a period of Muslim fundamentalism, but in my view today it’s already moving in the direction of Jewish fundamentalism. And in February of this year his book series called the Trilogy came out, which talks toward the creation of a lean Jewish thought. Meaning, the first book is supposed to annoy the secular people, and the second and third books are supposed to annoy the religious people among us. So the first book basically talks about why it makes sense to believe that there is a God, right? Because a lot of times people ask me how you can be both rational and religious. And the second book, and the second two books, talk about the problematic aspects that exist in Jewish law as it currently stands. So the reason I’m showing and talking about all this is that two days ago, or maybe yesterday, Rabbi Michael Abraham published a post on his blog, and if I didn’t know this was a person rooted both in the Torah world and with great love for its students, it would look like a very, very, very problematic post. So maybe I just want to read a small part from the post, right? This isn’t a post I wrote casually myself, and then we’ll begin, basically. Is that acceptable? Very good. Okay, fine. So we begin with this story. I think everything really starts with what we see here, the recording of Rabbi Kanievsky, or of his grandson if you like, who tells him the state is saying to close the yeshivot, and Rabbi Kanievsky on March 14 says, “You do not close the cheders.”
[Speaker C] The state now wants to say that all the cheders should stop studying, also the yeshivot but mainly the cheders, that they should stop studying now until they understand what’s happening with this plague, because children gather together in one place, children, and all the air from one to another can spread infection and increase the danger. The question is whether grandfather thinks the cheders should be canceled because of that. Heaven forbid. No.
[Speaker A] So grandfather says, Rabbi Kanievsky says, heaven forbid. For those who don’t know, Rabbi Kanievsky, the figure on the right, is basically the Torah authority, the halakhic authority, and in a moment we’ll also talk about the ideological authority as well, for a large part of the Haredi public. And about this Rabbi Michael Abraham writes the following, right? “The picture that emerges in the world is horrific. A desecration of God’s name unlike anything else. People in the Land of Israel and around the world are absolutely exploding at the sound and sight of these things. The rage is terrible. And if we were in 19th-century Russia or Ukraine, I think massacres and pogroms would break out here. Suddenly I’m beginning to understand how this happened.” Now, if you check, the word “pogroms” is said here once and in the comments twenty times. I’m not going to get into the word itself because that really is an extreme example, but he does say: “The world sees before its eyes a herd of infantile fools by will and by choice, lacking understanding and lacking solidarity, and together with that swollen with self-importance and devoid of any capacity for self-criticism. A collection of small, irresponsible children, throwing around slogans that they themselves don’t believe in and don’t even live by.” So before we begin, these are things you stand behind, right? Indeed. So maybe we’ll start with an anecdote. The anecdote says that during the Gulf War Rabbi Kanievsky said missiles wouldn’t fall in Bnei Brak, and everyone—and Rabbi Shach of blessed memory did put on a mask. So they came to Rabbi Kanievsky and said to him, how is it that Rabbi Shach put on a mask—doesn’t he know what you know? Rabbi Kanievsky said: the whole reason missiles aren’t falling in Bnei Brak is because of Rabbi Shach. The fact that he doesn’t regard himself as great is something else. So maybe the reason now is that Rabbi Shach has passed away and there’s no one left to protect Bnei Brak?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, that’s a fairly provocative way to present the question.
[Speaker A] I think that first of all not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Missiles did fall.
[Speaker A] Yes, Rabbi Kanievsky who said that also said they landed outside the eruv. But fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So that’s why I say you can always hairsplit. You know, the Oracle of Delphi always makes sure to give predictions that can be reconciled with any result that happens. Usually these predictions meet that criterion, and even if not, we find some other explanations for why it still works. Meaning, you can say that in my view even in Rabbi Shach’s time there was no one to protect Bnei Brak. So there’s no need to rely on the fact that he passed away. I’m completely in favor of Torah study, but you have to understand what it does do and what it doesn’t do. And I think, you know, just now I wrote some response on a site, and I was reminded of the rabbinic saying: “One whose head aches should engage in Torah.” They published now that Rabbi Kanievsky said that if people study Torah it will protect against the plague or something like that.
[Speaker A] My grandmother always used to say about that phrase—my grandmother always said it means he should engage in Torah, see that he doesn’t understand, see that he has no head, and then nothing will hurt him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But a similar explanation, though a bit different—actually a friend of mine said that the one whose head aches should also engage in Torah. Meaning, he is not exempt. It doesn’t mean the Torah will cure his headache. So let’s say this: I’m willing to accept Rabbi Kanievsky’s statement that if missiles are falling, one should study Torah. That does not mean that by studying Torah we will prevent the missiles, or the coronavirus, or whatever it may be. I’m not inclined to accept those statements.
[Speaker A] Now here there really is a whole story, because for example we’re seeing it again today in the news. Meaning, if you open Ynet today, then Litzman is sick with coronavirus, Rabbi Kanievsky is praying with a prayer quorum even though it’s forbidden, and now on Ynet a few minutes ago there’s a bus in Bnei Brak traveling even though it’s forbidden to travel. You also brought in your post an article by—I’ll tell you who this person is—Rabbi Farkash. Yes, by Rabbi Farkash, who basically says that the conduct was that they weren’t really listening to these instructions. And one of the problems is that if missiles fell in Bnei Brak, missiles fell in Bnei Brak, but since Bnei Brak today contains the largest number of coronavirus patients, a very large part of the discussion is about lack of solidarity, as in many articles. Meaning, the idea that because of your disgraceful and careless conduct, you’ll take a hospital bed from a person who really was careful. I’ll just say that in response to the issue of solidarity, you said it’s not lack of solidarity but rather a combination of stupidity and malice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. I mean, I think that if those people had really been convinced that this virus is dangerous, they would have closed the yeshivot. And the proof is that after a few days Rabbi Kanievsky also ordered the yeshivot to be closed, and even went so far as to define anyone who didn’t do so as a pursuer. He moved from one extreme to the other. And therefore I didn’t agree with this diagnosis that this was a matter of lack of solidarity. Lack of solidarity means that despite the danger, I don’t cooperate in defending against it. I think they simply ignored the danger. Meaning, if they had thought there was danger, they would have cooperated. But that disregard is negligent disregard.
[Speaker A] And a large part of that disregard comes from the fact that these people, as you said, don’t live in a modern world, don’t live in a world that can understand what a pandemic spreading exponentially is, don’t understand what flattening the curve means. And in the end, when Rabbi Kanievsky’s grandson comes to him, he filters the things for him in that way. There are even those who say “the state,” meaning the Zionists want to behave in a certain way. This whole idea that everything passes through this filter, and those same people who are secluded in their homes—the best example I know, and it’s one my religious friends don’t like very much, is the fact that the Vilna Gaon in the 18th century refused to meet Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the author of the Tanya. Now there are two reasons you can give for that. One reason is that he understood in higher worlds that if he refused to meet him, then Hasidism would spread as it ought to. And the second reason is that the community leaders of Vilna, who were very forceful, told him the story they wanted to tell him. Right? Meaning, and that’s basically the story. The filter you go through—there is some filter here, and those sages secluded in their homes, their ability to conduct themselves in the ways of the world is unreasonable. This is also something you talk about in your last book, about the definition of the leading sage of the generation in the 21st century, when I have the Responsa Project and Otzar HaChochma, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. What you’ve really combined here are two different aspects, almost independent. One is familiarity with the world, and mathematics for example. Meaning, understanding the significance of an exponential process. A good example is that today—I don’t know how verified it is—but today someone on a website claimed that Rabbi Kanievsky relied on some Talmudic text, where the Talmudic text defines what a plague is. A plague is a certain percentage of casualties, meaning per thousand people how many died, and according to that they define what a plague is. Now, that is of course a mathematical misunderstanding, because the fact that ten die today could mean that tomorrow twenty will already die in an exponential process. And that’s an example of the first aspect. Again, I’m not sure that really was Rabbi Kanievsky’s reasoning, but it certainly could have been the reasoning, even if it wasn’t. Because that is his conceptual world. And the second aspect you raised here is the attitude toward the state, and the filtering, and the incomplete or tendentious presentation of reality according to which decisions are made. Both of those things are true, both exist, and they are independent. Meaning, the filter itself also has two aspects. One aspect is that the sources of information from which Rabbi Kanievsky is nourished are very particular sources. Certainly not professionals, certainly not people presenting before him the full range of possibilities, or the full range of views and interpretations and facts. And beyond that there is also an ideological filter. There is a filter of lack of professionalism, but there is also an ideological filter. And the ideological filter says that the moment it’s the state, you automatically recoil. And you almost can’t allow yourself not to recoil. Rabbi Farkash talks about this in that article, and he really even points to the way the Haredi press expresses itself.
[Speaker A] Yes, that it moved from the Zionists to the doctors.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, heaven forbid we’re not against the authorities—no—even two expressions that are relatively neutral, but still the difference is very clear. Meaning, at first it’s “the decrees of the authorities,” and that’s the stage where we are antagonistic. And the second stage is “the instructions of the doctors and the Ministry of Health,” which is a more neutral expression. And that’s basically the stage where permission was granted to the doctor to heal.
[Speaker A] Now, I think people don’t understand—I mean, my secular audience doesn’t understand—the extraordinary significance of Rabbi Kanievsky in the Haredi public. By the way, there’s also an article by Yair Cherki, which we’ll link here, that was published a few days ago about Rabbi Kanievsky. This is the same rabbi who sits at 23 Rashbam Street in Bnei Brak, the son of Rabbi Yaakov Yisrael Kanievsky, the brother-in-law of the Chazon Ish, someone belonging to the old guard of Bnei Brak, the elitist-intellectual guard, let’s call it that. And in the end, this man, or this rabbi—the one who completes the Talmud every year on Passover eve because he is a firstborn—he is also the one who decides things for United Torah Judaism. Gafni says: I consult with him on matters. Now, you say listen carefully, this person is not integrated into the world, and then Gafni, who is very integrated into the world, tells you: I consult with him all the time. Meaning, I think this is part of the story. Your claim is that the United Torah Judaism party is a party that lives inside the modern world, votes in the Knesset, and receives its decisions and considerations through people who are less familiar with the world they live in, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. There are several aspects here as well. First of all, I don’t really believe Gafni. That’s first. Politicians are politicians, and they present what they want to present. Gafni seems to me a very sober person, firmly rooted in our world. I don’t know how great a mathematician he is, but that’s fine, not everyone has to be a great mathematician.
[Speaker A] Nobody’s perfect, you’re saying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And I think that when he goes to consult Rabbi Kanievsky, if it’s clear to him that Rabbi Kanievsky is talking nonsense, then he won’t do it. He’ll find a way to explain it to him, to convince him, to circumvent it, I don’t know what. He’ll find a way. It’s not true in a simple sense. There’s a difference between the outward discourse, how you present things, especially when you want to defend yourself against decisions that may not be popular in the eyes of the secular public or the Haredi public. And then you say, “I consulted Rabbi Kanievsky.” That’s a very common technique in other Haredi parties as well. That’s one thing. Second, there is a sort of mystical conception in the Haredi world that precisely someone who is secluded in the four cubits of Jewish law, inside the room with the books, has some more refined perspective. He isn’t biased by various interests and inclinations, he isn’t influenced by the media.
[Speaker A] He draws the greatest insights out of the Torah. Meaning, within the Torah, part of that idea is that all the insights can be in the Torah. In this context I want to read something beautiful that you wrote—even about the potential well. There was a time when you were both in a kollel in Bnei Brak and also studying at Bar-Ilan. So you write there: “I already mentioned that my friends in Yeshivat Netivot Olam in Bnei Brak used to ask me why I went to the university in the afternoon—after all, everything is in the Torah.” And that’s something anyone who grew up in the religious public really did grow up on, this ethos that truly everything is in the Torah. “To this I answered them that if so, there is no problem, because I am studying Torah at the university—and does the place make the difference? So what does it matter, go to the faculty and study the same thing. And besides, I told them, if by chance you find in the Torah the solution to Schrödinger’s equation for a rotating square potential well”—which is apparently hard, because even though I taught field theory, I have no idea what you’re talking about here—“I’d appreciate the update, since that would save me time in my research and I could sit and learn Bava Kamma. Needless to say, nobody found it. Now although they understood the statement literally—that everything is written, everything is in the Torah—nobody even really thought the solution to the potential well would be found. Meaning, everything is in the Torah as long as you don’t look for it.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And there’s a kind of doubleness here, which I also talked about in the last part of the column. To understand the Haredi world, you have to know that the Haredi world lives with doubleness. On the one hand, these are very clear-eyed people. I mean, I lived there for quite a few years, and some of my best friends, as they say, are sharp people, sober people, they know—I heard jokes about the great sages of the generation, cruel jokes. And at the same time, those same people telling the jokes, not others, will obey an instruction about whom to vote for. There is some doubleness there that is very hard to understand when you’re looking from the outside. They can recite these slogans with terribly deep conviction that everything is in the Torah. Even though in the back of their consciousness they understand that maybe it’s there, but nobody can get it out of there, and therefore on the one hand you recite the slogans, and on the other hand you live in a relatively sober way.
[Speaker A] Meaning everybody knows—sorry—everybody knows that the cure for coronavirus, if it comes from Israel, will come from the Weizmann Institute, but that’s because of the prayers of Bnei Brak, only you can’t prove it’s because of the prayers of Bnei Brak. But that’s perfectly clear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And let’s say that if you gave someone alone in a room the choice between the Weizmann Institute being shut down or Rabbi Kanievsky’s room being shut down—I’m talking in terms of treating coronavirus—a great many people would choose that Rabbi Kanievsky leave the room and that the Weizmann Institute keep working. I understand. There is a difference between the slogans you throw out publicly—and again, by publicly I even mean in your own consciousness. Many times you don’t even allow yourself to give an accounting of what you really think about these things. You recite them with terribly deep conviction, but inside you also don’t really identify with them. That’s the human soul—it is a complex soul. And when you are inside an atmosphere of enormously great truths whose foundation is in the Holy One, blessed be He, and it cannot be that they are mistaken, then you can’t allow yourself to say it’s mistaken, and you also can’t allow yourself to say to yourself that it’s mistaken, not only outwardly. Meaning, it’s unthinkable, and inwardly you know it’s not true.
[Speaker A] And by the way, that’s part of the last two books in the trilogy—let’s take the tradition, the “tradition” as you call it, and try to clean from it all the things that are not necessary, so that on the one hand we can still hold on to tradition—and in a moment we’ll get to holding on to tradition—and on the other hand we can still maintain some kind of rational approach. Nadav Shinar says in his book Oblique Ray, about this idea of people—lawyers who wouldn’t believe someone telling them he has a problem with the checks and will pay them next month, but then they’ll walk into the synagogue between the afternoon and evening prayers and believe stories that every kabbalist from a generation ago raised the dead. Meaning, this doubleness, where you create falsehood within your soul, is something completely crazy, right? And that’s what you’re trying—again—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those same people, if you tell them: are you taking the medicine developed at the Weizmann Institute, or are you turning to that kabbalist from the previous century, I assume many of them would in practice prefer the Weizmann Institute.
[Speaker A] By the way, that’s also very good for chickens and bats that they don’t use the medical methods of the Talmudic text, because otherwise, heaven have mercy, what would we do. Yair Cherki’s article said: Rabbi Kanievsky is a Lithuanian Haredi rabbi with the mannerisms of a rebbe. Now I want again—I’m not opening up the difference between a rebbe and a Lithuanian rabbi—but I do want to say, as they say, there’s that joke from Doryanov that Hasidim are fools because they believe the tales about the righteous, and the Lithuanians are wicked because they don’t believe the tales about the righteous, right? And suddenly you see a Lithuanian Haredi public, the leader or rabbi of the Lithuanian Haredi faction, whose whole thing really is to think and to object and to make the opposite plausible and always—and yes, whoever learned Talmudic text sees the greatest intellect, this whole thing of always casting doubt—and within the Lithuanian public some rabbi arises and says things and nobody takes—nobody asks a question. How can it be that the Lithuanian public gets to such a place? It’s like the Chazon Ish is there. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, first of all, it’s not that nobody asks questions. This isn’t a completely monolithic public. There are shades within it, and one has to know that, although I myself am no longer really inside it. But I know enough to understand that people do ask questions, meaning it’s not quite that monolithic. But it is true that some surprising phenomenon has developed here at first glance, namely a kind of Lithuanian Hasidism. I can attribute it—of course this is just a hypothesis—to antagonism toward the outside world. Because after all Hasidism too, like the Mussar movement, say, which was more common in the Lithuanian wing, arose as some kind of antithesis to the Enlightenment, to the development of the broader outside world. You needed some kind of answer. So if they have science, we have kabbalists, or we have those who know everything from the Torah. Now the Lithuanian world tried to preserve rationality and not get dragged into Hasidism, but in the end, in the end, it too has to offer some kind of alternative to the outside world. You’re saying in a postmodern world you have to have the—
[Speaker A] The rabbi, you have to have the soul, you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have to have the someone, the father who will protect you. Exactly. And then this whole thing of “Torah opinion” developed, which by now is also not new, but it keeps developing, and it’s become a sort of Lithuanian conception that developed. Benjamin Brown wrote a lot about it and so on—that these are also Lithuanian rabbis who know everything, but they don’t do it through magic; for them it’s only through the wisdom of Torah. But the difference becomes very small. Meaning, let’s say—I don’t know, I don’t know the phenomenon well enough—but I assume Rabbi Kanievsky’s followers don’t attribute it to magic; they attribute it to his Torah wisdom. Meaning, it’s not like the spiritual charisma found in the Hasidic rebbe. But in the end, both sides need something that will give them an alternative. If we have no science, and no understanding, and no recognition, no willingness to recognize the world, then what do we cope with? What are our tools? So somehow, in the end, you have to cling to something. And I think, by the way, that the New Age phenomenon is in some sense like that too. Meaning, within the rational, Western, modern world, some very strange and surprising phenomenon develops.
[Speaker A] A backlash, a backlash.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is a need for all kinds of transcendent sources of knowledge, or channeling, or all sorts of things of that kind. People whom in other contexts you can see are intelligent, sensible people, get swept into all kinds of bizarre things. And why? Because they are looking for some kind of anchor to hold on to. By the way, there too part of it is because of the loss of faith. So you need some other anchor to hold on to, because after all science does not solve our life problems in most cases. Meaning, we don’t know how to conduct ourselves better with spouses, or with friends, or I don’t know exactly, by means of science. There are theories, but it doesn’t really help. It doesn’t solve our life problems.
[Speaker A] Even a psychologist fights with his wife, and most people, as Kierkegaard would say, don’t commit suicide because they didn’t find a solution to Schrödinger’s potential well, but because of something more existential, right. Exactly. That’s the point. Now you’ve gotten to something that in ethical theory is called—one of the theories I really, really liked about this whole story was that Catholic Christianity mainly said that man is not—man is a pretty miserable creature, yes, and this world is pretty miserable too, and in order for a person to conduct himself properly he needs the mediation of the Church, of the priest, and of the pope. And against that came the Jewish ethical conception, which puts the human being at the center—what is the greatness of man, yes—a conception whose roots may be in the Renaissance, and the human being, unlike the way the Catholics see him, as having no path because he is stamped with sin, the ethical conception speaks about the greatness of man. And that same ethical conception, which really was supposed to put the emphasis on the person and on rationality, suddenly within half a generation gets to the point that because we really are, yes, no—yes, sometimes in sin, and yes our evil inclination works, we need to look at those great sages of the generation, who are pure, yes. And so suddenly we get certain manners or modes of conduct here that remind us very much of Catholic Christianity, yes. You need the mediator, you need the rabbi who will come because you are stamped with sin. Right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And it’s much more complicated than that. First of all, just on the level of sociological characterization, Rabbi Kanievsky is of course from the circle of the Chazon Ish. The Chazon Ish opposed mussar, the study of mussar. So that’s one thing. Second, the Slabodka yeshiva, for example, which was close to the Chazon Ish in its origins—the original Slabodka yeshiva really did have a conception of the greatness of man. So there’s a very twisted development of ideas here, a kind of entanglements, yes, an interweaving of ideas with one another. But the greatness of man is only one of the conceptions in the mussar movement. You have to pay close attention, though, because in the mussar movement there is something almost internally self-contradictory, inherently so. Because mussar is like the story they once asked, I think, the Kotzker Rebbe. Someone came to him and asked: I’m constantly fleeing from honor, and it doesn’t chase after me. Why? After all, it says that one who flees honor, honor will pursue him.
[Speaker A] He told him: you’re looking backward, you’re checking to see whether it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he said to him: you’re looking backward. Meaning, many times the mussar movement places its hopes in the greatness of man, but in the end it constantly preaches working on that dimension. That is, it is constantly dealing with his smallness. It tells him: deep inside you, you are tremendously great—but know that you are consumed by urges, and consumed by influences, and constantly examine yourself to make sure you are not personally biased, that you are making clean decisions. And this comes from mussar; it’s not something outside of mussar—this is the mussar movement. So on the one hand there is the greatness of man, and on the other hand there is an unceasing digging in order to preserve or expose that greatness, and to deal with all the aspects of smallness that constantly threaten to drown us. So it’s not as sharp as you described. There is something here that is also very skeptical with regard to man, even though you say “the greatness of man”—that’s a utopia. In other words, the greatness of man is a belief in what our potential can be, or where we can get to.
[Speaker A] But you should know that in day-to-day life you’re not actually great, and therefore the mussar outlook, unlike Hasidism, is sadder, yes. Why do Lithuanians chant the verses of the Book of Esther in a sad melody, when they’re supposed to be happy too? In other words, sadness is Lithuanian joy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, because this is the Purim of the Lithuanians.
[Speaker A] Yes, very nice. By the way, there’s another joke: then why not do the whole Megillah to the melody of Lamentations? They say no, that would already be wild revelry, that would be too much, we’re not in that territory. Obviously. Now, you wrote really very harsh things about Rabbi Kanievsky, who really is considered the great sage of the generation, even though once again your definition of “great sage of the generation” says it should be different. Among other things, on this issue that if there were some integrity here, people should have gotten up and left, yes, and not issued Jewish law rulings or instructions on matters outside that world. And maybe at this point I want to offer the opposite argument, yes. In some way, Yoav Sorek—yes, I’ll read what Yoav Sorek says. Yoav Sorek says the following. He says, listen, I go to the supermarket and inside the supermarket there are—you know, people come with their children, some grandmother in the supermarket says people come with their children to the supermarket, I requested—I’m already old, this business of children is dangerous for me, I’m not allowed to see my grandchildren, but the supermarket is allowed. And Yoav Sorek says that if I participate in the morning prayer in a reduced quorum, two meters apart, that’s forbidden. After all, if we go—and by the way this was also part of what some of the people wrote to you in the forums, yes—someone who wrote to you said that in the end there’s this issue of what’s called morale, yes, ultimately. So if, for example—yes, let’s read what they wrote. They say this: in the end, look, a substantial part of the body’s immunity depends on one’s mood. What kind of mood does a family of ten have, shut up in a cramped apartment with impatient and idle children, with no peace of mind to study and pray? In the end, the Haredi public brought itself—or part of this story is that it lives in crowding, in poverty, with many children, and among other things you answer these things by saying: I’m not saying what’s right and what’s wrong, I just have criticism of how the decisions are made inside this story. But it creates the impression that running is allowed, yes, and now there’s even a WhatsApp group saying let’s go run between five and seven in the morning because it’s really important to run—but prayer quorums are forbidden. Granted, the virus doesn’t distinguish, as they say, between righteous and wicked—but what about people who say, just a second, there’s a double standard here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So look, I’ll answer you on two planes. On the substantive plane, that is, regarding the claim itself, it’s very hard to determine. You can’t do without going to the supermarket—that’s a given. Now the question is what exactly is permitted in the supermarket and… whom to bring and whom not to bring. Here the question is how fine-grained the instructions can be. It may be that they missed something here; nobody is perfect. My trust in the government is quite limited—you could also read that in other posts, it’s not that I’m their greatest defender—but still, there is some kind of instruction here that is unavoidable, namely that you may go to the supermarket. Now the question is what to do, what to buy and what not to buy, whom to bring and whom not to bring—those are levels of resolution that so far at least they apparently haven’t managed to define well. It may be that within the framework of tighter restrictions that will come too, I don’t know. By contrast, a prayer quorum—it’s not a matter of saving life. True, it affects people’s mood, but being isolated at home also affects people’s mood. Just as religious people need a prayer quorum, secular people need company, and they’re being told to stay home. So I think there is a certain logic to drawing some line, even though it is of course a rough line because you’re giving instructions to millions of people, but these are the lines that are drawn. You can’t give every person his own Torah in his own hand. And you have to understand that when a private person cuts corners and brings his children to the supermarket, he is really in the wrong, but if someone were to give an instruction—folks, take your children to the supermarket—about that I would write the same thing. Those are two different things. And when you give instructions to the public—and this was also in an earlier column I wrote on the coronavirus—there is a very big difference between the question of how a private individual behaves, which is ultimately almost meaningless on the broad scale. What difference does it make if I bring my child to the supermarket? Maybe one more person gets infected, or two more get infected—it’s not a big deal. In the end, it won’t change the overall picture. But when an entire public of tens, hundreds of thousands—I don’t know how many—receive guidance that goes against the accepted rules, that will have a macroscopic effect. It’s not some corner-cutting by an individual person. So it’s an entirely different argument, even if at the specific level I think there’s no difference between running and praying. By the way, today even running is already forbidden, but that’s another discussion. That’s on the substantive plane. And on the plane—and by the way, in Bnei Brak this of course gets amplified because it of course becomes some scheme of the wicked Zionists against us. So you understand that these arguments are not detached from that. It’s not that you can’t survive without a prayer quorum, but the moment there is a decree against the prayer quorum, then it’s die rather than transgress—that’s the life of my soul, what do you mean, you’re allowed to run and I’m not allowed to pray?
[Speaker A] By the way, I think Rabbi Tikochinsky here—or Shlomo Tikochinsky, I assume he’s the son of Rabbi Tikochinsky—says that one of the most significant things in this whole story
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is antagonism,
[Speaker A] maybe let’s put it differently, yes, that he sees himself within the—where is it, here, this needs analysis, wait, where is it, I don’t know how to get into it, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You uploaded the…
[Speaker A] Here, here—“to stand for our lives,” yes. That is, the collective Haredi consciousness is—or sorry, the Jewish consciousness is—we versus them, yes, culture against opposing culture. That was part of this story, yes. Antagonism. In other words, we always—how do you say it—they wanted to kill us, now they’re coming against us to destroy us, and we will not surrender to them, yes, we will not surrender to them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So what I want to claim is—he’s completely right. What I want to claim is that these arguments too, about the morale provided by the prayer quorum and so on—at least in the Haredi context, it’s not entirely that, but there is an element of that—they also come from there. You’ll manage without a prayer quorum too, or many people will manage without one. There are people who would be happy to have permission not to go to a prayer quorum. I’m not saying everyone, but there are such people. But once it’s a decree—what do you mean? So they’re allowed to run and I’m not allowed to pray with a quorum? Then the arguments awaken. So this is not independent of the antagonism and the hostility to the authorities that we talked about earlier, vis-à-vis the Health Ministry.
[Speaker A] And there’s the shoelace, yes—now there’s a decree of religious persecution here, and under a decree of religious persecution, according to the tradition, even if they tell you to change something completely meaningless like your shoelace—change it to green—you have to die and give your life over it. That’s part of the ethos we preserve.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s why, in my view, these arguments are a little disingenuous, beyond the fact that there are differences, as I said before, but all that is with regard to the substance of the argument. The question that troubles me no less is actually twofold. First, to what extent did you really make that calculation when you made this decision? Rabbi Kanievsky said to continue going to the yeshivot. I think about people’s morale when they go to a prayer quorum—let’s say okay. But what about continuing the yeshivot and the kollel? You can manage without kollel too. I sat in kollel in Bnei Brak; people will manage just fine without going to kollel, their morale will be fine. So the permission there did not come from that. The permission there came from the claim that Torah protects and saves, not from the need to care for people’s morale. Those are after-the-fact excuses. Beyond that, the… it’s the form of decision-making. That is: how do you make the calculations, how much time do you devote, how do you examine the data, how much do you really think about what yes and what no. But beyond that—who put him in charge? In the end, the decision he made there—and I wrote this in my first coronavirus column—the decision he made there is a decision that doesn’t concern only his own flock, such that those who follow his instructions will bear the consequences. In the end it affects the entire surroundings. Today the State of Israel is carrying Bnei Brak in its arms because of the distress there, including the army of the wicked Zionists who came to destroy everyone, including the government that is investing enormous budgets there and deploying professionals there—all of which Bnei Brak itself does not have.
[Speaker A] Wait, but I want to go back to one of your recent columns—“who put him in charge” is something I heard in your column about Rabbi Rafi Peretz and Rabbi Druckman, where that phrase “who put him in charge” ran through the blog many times. I think there is an extraordinary difference between “who put him in charge” in the case of Rabbi Rafi Peretz and Rabbi Druckman—where it was said in the column that they’re a madrich and a youth counselor in Bnei Akiva playing in the big leagues—as opposed to Rabbi Kanievsky, whom the public really did put in charge. Wait, but the claim is that Rabbi Kanievsky is now making decisions that concern all citizens because of the nature of the epidemic, and in that he doesn’t understand, if I understand correctly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not claiming that. I’m making another claim. In the sense of “who put him in charge” that I said about Rabbi Peretz and Rabbi Druckman, that’s different from Rabbi Kanievsky’s “who put him in charge.” Rabbi Kanievsky was put in charge. I’m speaking on a different plane. I’m speaking on the plane of “who put him in charge” in the sense of by what authority does he come to make decisions for the entire State of Israel. If he makes decisions for his own public and his public obeys him and is willing to bear the consequences, I may not agree with them, I may think it’s foolish, but fine—a public can make decisions regarding itself. But here they are making decisions that have implications for the entire public on several planes. First, they infect additional people.
[Speaker A] But you only know that if you understand the epidemic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The point is that this is part of the story. You allow yourself to make decisions that concern a much broader public, and perhaps you don’t understand that—and that is part of my accusation: this negligence, this irresponsibility. So by “who put him in charge” I don’t mean in the sense that he isn’t smart enough—that was my earlier claim, not mathematically smart enough, I’m not talking in Torah. My present claim is that he is taking for himself an authority that does not exist, that is not in his hands. Suppose I believe something is right for all of us. Can I make the decision for you? Suppose I’m even right. But it is your right to make your own decisions. By what right do I make decisions that affect you? By the way, Jewish law recognizes this—it’s a halakhic principle: this imposes liability on others. Jewish law says that you cannot make decisions in a place where you obligate others—not because you are not right. You’re convinced you’re right? Fine. But it is their right to make decisions for themselves. Now Rabbi Kanievsky here is making decisions—as you said earlier—that occupy hospital beds for all of us. Decisions under which this public infects other people. These decisions now require enormous resources. Yesterday’s regular, daily press conference of Netanyahu and Bar Siman-Tov was devoted to Bnei Brak; almost half of it, or I don’t know how much, most of it was devoted to Bnei Brak. Bnei Brak is today the issue the State of Israel is dealing with. And why? Because one Jew decided to make some decision. So if you want to destroy your entire flock and they also agree—health to you. But this is a decision that concerns the entire public.
[Speaker A] So I’ll define this as a “whichever way you look at it” argument that you really like, yes? Either Rabbi Kanievsky understands epidemics and understands exponential spread, and then indeed what he’s doing is deciding for his community but in fact he understands that it affects all the residents of the State of Israel, and that’s very problematic. Or, whichever way you look at it, he doesn’t understand it, so don’t decide on it at all. One of the two.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, although—correct. But I think this “whichever way you look at it” really says the following: even if you did understand mathematics and epidemiology, you still do not have the formal authority to make decisions for me.
[Speaker A] Not for your community.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can make them for yourself, for your students, for whoever wants to take your instructions upon himself—fine. But even if you are the greatest expert, it doesn’t matter. I’m not willing for you to make decisions on my behalf. That’s why I say: he also doesn’t understand—that’s what I said before—but even if he did understand, here the problem is one of authority, it’s a moral problem. It’s not a medical question of whether he is right in his decision. First of all, even if you’re right, I’m not willing for you to make decisions for me. I’ll give you the mandate—then make a decision. I didn’t give it to you. Yes, and here now I
[Speaker A] maybe come to this issue that in your writings, in everything you write, one of the things you put the strongest emphasis on is this issue of reason: come decide for yourself, come understand. First of all, even if you’re right, I’m not willing for you to make decisions for me. I’ll give you the mandate, then make a decision—I didn’t give it to you. Yes. And now maybe I come to this thing that in your writings, in everything you write, one of the things you put the greatest emphasis on is this issue of reason—come decide for yourself, come understand, consult rabbis the way you consult wise people, but understand that every person is liable to err. There are people—and certainly if a person was mistaken once, put a question mark around the story. One of the things that definitely runs through your trilogy and also the recent columns is the power of reason, yes, that same reason which on the one hand the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century said would liberate man—about which Isaiah Berlin said that Kant was intoxicated with the concept of human freedom and with reason. And on the other hand maybe we—maybe that reason has some limitations. I had an interview with someone who dealt with evolution two days ago and I said, look, medicine doesn’t really know. Medicine now says yes to masks, now no to masks. Medicine is not physics in the end. It’s not physics, it’s not mathematics. If I want to sharpen this, because it’s very important to me since people asked, our claim is: we have no alternative. We have no alternative besides science. It may be that right now science says you need masks, and it may be that coronavirus can infect even someone who was already sick and so on. And I don’t know that right now, but I have no alternative except scientific tools for making decisions.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. It’s clear that science can make mistakes, and scientism is a terrible disease. And of course—I completely accept this—you need to be critical; all that is true. Whoever has better tools should propose them, we’ll discuss it, and fine, we’ll accept them. This is the best way I know of dealing with this kind of problem. I said that science does not deal with many other difficult problems, but with this type of problem science deals excellently, or as well as anything does—I don’t know about excellently. And certainly with a new virus that people are only now beginning to know, of course they’re going to miss things, and there are interests here and politicians and Bibi and Litzman and everyone pulling in his own direction. I am far from having blind trust in governmental decision-making. And still, this is what we have. If everyone starts doing what—if people make decisions in another way, in my view, especially when the decisions are for me, that is very problematic. But I want to say something else about reason. I’m not all that optimistic that the whole world is wise. On the contrary: in my view, if most of the world thinks something, it’s probably not true until proven otherwise. But I do think that a person bears responsibility for his decisions. I was—some time ago there was some conference here at an Arab school, at ORT, ORT Ramla. And they asked several religious figures from all the religions—you know, Druze, Muslims, Christians, rabbis—to come and speak a little.
[Speaker A] So apparently they don’t know you well enough here in Lod.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Well, they asked us to speak there about all sorts of things, relations between religions and so on. I said something there that somewhat upset the other religious leaders, something a bit radical. I told them: look, usually Jews are very worried about Arab extremism. And I think the solution to that is not to restrain the Arab leaders. The solution is to impose responsibility on the citizen. In other words, I call on you not to obey your leaders. Not because they are not moderate—those who were there with me were very moderate. It was actually delightful to hear them speak.
[Speaker A] It’s always the people who come to these conversations, yes. Rabbi Soloveitchik also talked about who comes to these conversations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So the point is, that’s also why I usually don’t come, but this was an opportunity to speak with students, not to meet with the forum, with the leaders, yes. And I told them: look, if everyone obeys the leader, that’s a recipe for disaster. Not because the leader gives wrong instructions, but because he can give wrong instructions. Meaning, if the leader gives wrong instructions—whether deliberately or inadvertently, whether wicked or mistaken or whatever—everyone will do what he says and then there will be catastrophe. If everyone takes responsibility, some will err, some won’t err, we’ll somehow offset things. A bit of capitalism versus communism, yes. I have faith in the invisible hand—not in the sense that the invisible hand is right, but in the sense that it offsets mistakes. And therefore I’m very afraid of mass phenomena. That is, if everyone obeys the same authority—granted, he may be very wise—but the moment he gives one wrong directive, we all go to destruction. And if everyone does what he understands and bears responsibility, and doesn’t say “he told me, so therefore I’m exempt from responsibility”—if you make a mistake, the responsibility is yours, and know that the responsibility is always yours. Even if—as I told them there—even if so-and-so, the great wise man, the rabbi, the qadi, whoever, told you. I told them: that’s what I tell my students and that’s what I suggest to you too. I’m not Muslim and I don’t know Muslim thought, but I suggest this to you: in my view a person is always responsible for what he does. Even the greatest ignoramus imaginable, standing opposite the greatest rabbi imaginable—in the final analysis, you have to make the decision whether to obey him or not. And I think that if we all are responsible, it’s not because we are wise—I don’t have great trust in human wisdom—but because in the end it will lead to better outcomes than herd phenomena. Herds can be led to positive places too—it depends. By the way, the leader is usually also more moderate, even in the Muslim world.
[Speaker A] So you oppose the idea of the wisdom of crowds; you support the idea of the responsibility of crowds. Exactly. By the way, I want to tell our viewers: there’s one lecture by Rabbi Michael Abraham—I don’t remember, I’ll link it—in which he really talks about this idea of halakhic ruling, I think, whether a halakhic ruling reflects the truth, a lecture where you basically talk about the idea that the question is when do we follow the majority, yes? In the end, why don’t we go with a fascist state like Plato’s—who according to Leibowitz is the father of all fascism? The idea is that you say okay, maybe the leader—how do we choose the leader? But the claim you raise is that the goal of government is not to do the right thing—which certainly is not to ask the majority—but to do what the majority wants. And here democracy plays the most important role. If you want to know what the right thing is, you don’t run a poll in Israel Hayom about quantum theory. That’s not right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning democracy is a value, not a form of government that will lead to the most correct decisions—or not necessarily.
[Speaker A] It’s a value. Yes. Although historically it has…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I mean, it may be that factually that does happen. But that’s not why I’m a democrat. I’m a democrat because I place value on a person taking responsibility for his fate, making decisions about his fate himself.
[Speaker A] Or as you say—and I’ve quoted this many times—“For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed; these said the Jewish law is like us, and those said the Jewish law is like us, until a heavenly voice went forth.” The question is why did a heavenly voice have to go forth? The Torah already says “incline after the majority.” Rather, the question, as you say, was at the meta-level, in the sphere itself: do I normalize Beit Shammai because they are wiser, or Beit Hillel because they are more numerous? Or in your words, am I counting heads or fingers or hands?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or feet.
[Speaker A] Or feet. And basically we arrive at the point where in the end we believe Beit Hillel, even though in the end—and not stably—you bring some method according to which it may be that in their mode of decision-making they really do get there, because they present the other side first. I really do want to—first, thank you very much—but maybe one last thing, with your permission. This is the last thing you wrote in the WhatsApp exchange that started this whole story, and you begin it by saying “this already completely blew my shaky fuse,” and it was about the idea of whether Torah protects and saves. In the end the whole thing begins from whether Torah protects and saves, and therefore the kollels and the yeshivot and the children’s schools must remain open, because the world exists only by virtue of the breath of schoolchildren. And then you write the following: Torah protects whenever one does not see and cannot see it. Prayer helps only when one doesn’t look. Tithing makes one rich only when one doesn’t check. All the other commandments too—one must not check them. The involvement of the Holy One, blessed be He, is everywhere and always, only as long as one doesn’t look. The great sages of the generation don’t err, except when they do. The Jewish people are not under the stars, except when one checks. The Torah contains everything except what it does not contain, and even what it does contain no one has ever seen. And then in the end, blessing rests only on that which is hidden from the eye, and if you check, the blessing function collapses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, that’s not mine anymore, that’s Yitzhak Ruina’s.
[Speaker A] Yes, but it is still…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is something here that rebels a bit, something that rebels a bit against certain very emphatic metaphysical declarations which of course you’ll never disprove, because they are not open to disproof, and therefore everyone is convinced they are pure truth. They are pure truth because they have been emptied of all factual content. And I cast great doubt on them.
[Speaker A] Meaning, “He who blessed” helps memory for the dead the same way “He who blessed” helps the living.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly.
[Speaker A] So actually someone who reads this, and reads it again—if I gave someone your text to read, he would say this is just another leftist traitor to Israel from Haaretz. And I look at you—or my viewers, some of whom don’t know you. By the way, in your argument with Moshe Ratt, yes, about personal providence, I think the fact that in the Israeli public sphere you are not as well known as Leibowitz is the hardest blow to your theory that the world follows its natural course. Because if the world follows its natural course, you should have been like Leibowitz in his day, so yes, that’s the best proof for Moshe Ratt. But people look at you and say: how can it be? So if Torah does not protect and save, then what’s the point?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since you mentioned Leibowitz—in this regard I’m not entirely like Leibowitz, but somewhat.
[Speaker A] Leibowitz said, because I want to—that was Leibowitz’s claim, because I want to.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only that. You also don’t use Torah in order to heal yourself; for that you go to the health fund. You serve God, not God serving you. And in that sense—I agree with that, only I add one more thing. One of Leibowitz’s problems is that he always said correct things but took them too far. A bit simplistic and maybe a bit childish. He took the right ideas but always one step too far—that was really a disease. Part of it was a philosophical disease, by the way, not a Jewish one. He was a positivist, and that imprisoned him in an impossible straitjacket, it seems to me. I think that in the end I observe these things also because it is an obligation—because the Holy One, blessed be He, who created the world and me, imposed it on me—but I also believe that these things probably in some way also do good, that is, they make the world into something more complete.
[Speaker A] In a metaphysical way or in a physical way?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume it’s metaphysical, because physically I don’t see it. I don’t know. But I think—again, I have no idea—but I assume it isn’t just an arbitrary matter that the Holy One, blessed be He, tells us to do things; rather it is probably something meant to be beneficial in some way. Even though what difference does it make to Him whether one slaughters from the neck or from the nape? What, I didn’t hear?
[Speaker A] Even though what difference does it make to Him whether one slaughters from the neck or from the nape?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What difference does it make to Him whether one slaughters from the neck or from the nape—but in that sense I interpret it differently. I interpret it…
[Speaker A] Wait a second, I’ll just explain this for everyone. There is a topic in the laws of slaughtering that one must slaughter from the neck and not, as it were, from here or from there. Don’t do this at home, yes? And then the question is: why slaughter from here and not from there? Is there some reason why you say commandments have to be done specifically this way and not that way? And one of the schools among the Sages is: God told you this way, period. It doesn’t really matter to God whether you slaughter from here or from there, but that’s what you were told, and that’s what you do. And that leads us to: wait a second, but that’s meaningless. You can say that slaughtering from the neck is more humane for animals. On the other hand, if you assign reasons to commandments—then circumcision is done on the eighth day because it’s healthy. So now science will say it isn’t healthy—what then? In a very simplistic way, that’s part of the issue of “what difference does it make to Him.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides, in the sixth chapter of his Eight Chapters, really discusses this Talmudic passage, and Maimonides says that there is a difference between moral or rational commandments and revelational commandments, commandments that do not seem logical. But the difference is on the psychological plane, not on the metaphysical plane. He does not claim that these have a reason and those do not. All of them have a reason. We may presume of the Holy One, blessed be He, that He does not do things for no reason. He says there are those who think they magnify the Holy One, blessed be He, by saying that the commandments are without reason, in Guide for the Perplexed, and he says that actually diminishes Him. Rational people do not do things without reasons, so would the Holy One, blessed be He, just do arbitrary things? But he says: so where does the Talmudic statement you mentioned fit in? He explains that the question is where my observance should come from. Should my observance come from identification—am I supposed to identify with what I do? On the moral plane, yes. A good person is someone who does things also because he identifies with them, and not only because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. But that applies to moral, rational commandments. The revelational commandments—you are supposed to do them as if compelled by a demon, as if to say: what can I do? My Father in heaven has decreed it upon me. Yes, because what difference does it make to Him whether one slaughters from the neck or from the nape? But that is not because there is no reason. Rather because the reason is not a social or moral one, but some metaphysical reason—I don’t know what kind. And since that is so, don’t attach it to morality and start doing it out of moral identification, as is very common. Rabbi Kook, for example, does this—he identifies everything with moral reasons. I completely disagree with him on this point.
[Speaker A] In plain Hebrew, what he’s saying is that someone who doesn’t steal shouldn’t feel a need to steal and then refrain from it; he should understand that stealing is bad. But when you do commandments like, I don’t know what… like slaughtering, yes… giving a reason and giving a reason, as you like to say—then I have no interest in making a moral, value-based identification with it. I’ll just say that against this view of Maimonides, Gersonides for example—and Shner also brings him—says that actually this is greatness for people who want to do something bad and don’t do it. He gives the example of Joseph. Now, we’ve talked so much about against—forgive me for saying it—but against Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky. I… in the end it’s hard for me, you know, I came from the religious public. He definitely—I am not part of his flock, but he is perceived even among the Religious Zionists, heaven help us, as the great sage of the generation. Can we finish with something optimistic, positive, about Rabbi Kanievsky? Because really the column you wrote is very, very—first of all you can see it was written in heartache—but it is very harsh. You can also see that in the comments afterward.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They told me a lot of hatred is reflected there, and I corrected quite a few commenters and said: that’s anger, not hatred.
[Speaker A] Right, I also didn’t speak—I told you, there are twenty mentions of the word “pogrom,” twenty-one mentions of the word “pogrom,” one yours and twenty of theirs, and you said you don’t like it when people get hung up on examples, so I’m trying not to get hung up on examples. But again, the column is harsh. It’s a harsh column. I wanted to interview you about something else entirely, but this column is a harsh one. Can we end with something positive about Rabbi Kanievsky?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely. I want to say what I also wrote in one of my responses to the comments not long ago. It is completely clear, and I very much appreciate, the dedication—not only of Rabbi Kanievsky but of all these figures, not only the leadership but also their flock—the dedication and willingness to sacrifice, and the intensive engagement in Torah, and seeing Torah as the essence of their lives. This has no competition in other publics. I have explanations for why it happens there, and of course in a place where you do not allow engagement in other fields it is easier to produce figures of this kind. But the fact is that such figures are needed. I very much think they are needed. I have often written about the problem in the Religious Zionist public that we do not have figures of this kind. These self-contained figures who don’t understand the world, who remain within the four cubits of books. On the contrary, I think these figures are essential. I have written articles about this.
[Speaker A] But I see you in your third book saying: in the modern world, yes, as Rabbi Uri Sherki says, a community rabbi needs to know five things about a Sabbath hotplate and a hot water urn, that’s all. In the modern world—and you write in your book—this is not a figure I would want leading a community in a world of responsa and text messages, where you…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh, there you go—so be precise. True or not? I say we very much need such figures, they are very important. Under no circumstances should they be given positions of leadership. Those are two different things. That is, these figures are very important. They give you a model to emulate; you see dedication to Torah, you see mastery and knowledge that have no competition. But you also see the price, and that is the other side of the same coin. So I say it’s not even criticism. That he understands nothing about exponential growth—I have no criticism at all. If he understood that, he would not know the amount of Torah that he knows. A person is limited in his abilities. And therefore I have no problem with that. Only one thing: speak about what you understand. Do not put such a person in charge of leading a public. It’s simply not… it’s simply a mistake. That’s all. Aside from that, I think they are wonderful figures, figures that I… I’d love for there to be such people in various publics. I really love talking with these people. I think these people are… a real asset. They should be cultivated, carried on our shoulders. But they go outside the bounds of their relevant domain, and that is a big mistake. I started talking about this already with Rabbi Elyashiv. Rabbi Elyashiv of blessed memory—the father-in-law… the in-law of Rabbi Kanievsky. Same thing. They dragged him, against his will as far as I can tell—I didn’t know him—into public leadership. He couldn’t have cared less. He wanted to learn Torah, that was all he cared about; twenty-four seven he studied. This is a figure whose degree of perseverance and intensity in Torah study is simply beyond comprehension.
[Speaker A] By the way, he sat on a bench made from a crate he got from the Jewish Agency in the 1950s, and that was his bench for seventy years.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are truly exemplary figures. To be educated in light of such figures is simply wonderful; I’m entirely in favor. I just think two things. First, not everyone should be like that. Second…
[Speaker A] Or as they say among us: you, the Religious Zionist public, say against the Haredi public, you’re good at producing one in a thousand—but where are the thousand? That is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s first and second: even the one in a thousand should also be different. That is, there is another kind of greatness in Torah—this is one kind, and there is another kind of greatness in Torah that is no less important. Greatness in Torah that is engaged with what happens around it, that knows how to make connections, that knows how to look at things. And if you ask me which of these types of great figures should assume public leadership, then of course I’ll tell you: the second type. But under no circumstances do I think… I have no criticism of the figure as such—on the contrary. I think it is an exemplary figure. It is an exemplary figure by whose light I would educate people. Completely. And I’ve written about this too. I say it, I talk all the time with people about how in our camp we are not managing to reach these levels of dedication, these levels of mastery. All of that is true.
[Speaker A] But when you say “our camp,” what do you mean? Who is your “our camp”? Yes, God help us.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not… in terms of my philosophical worldview, it’s not all that clearly defined. But sociologically I’m in the Religious Zionist world. That is, I… that’s the milieu in which I move, those are the people with whom I interact. When I say “our camp” I mean that. But I’m saying that first, I… but with two reservations, and both are important. That is, first, this is not the only model of greatness in Torah. It is important that there be such people; it is also important that not everyone be like that. Because in my opinion, greatness of originality, greatness of interdisciplinary connections—this is greatness that is no less important, and perhaps more important in our generation. But we also need those people; we need all of them to be “masters of wheat,” as the Talmud says.
[Speaker A] And of course you write that it may be that that researcher in the university is a rabbi in the more relevant sense today than someone sitting over the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A researcher at a university isn’t disqualified because of that, but I wouldn’t define a university researcher as the alternative figure. As far as I’m concerned, there can be people who are immersed in other fields even without being university researchers, but they’re immersed enough to make informed decisions. After all, nobody can understand every field. But you do need to be immersed enough to know, for example, how to ask the right questions. Say, Rabbi Kanievsky doesn’t need to be a mathematician in order to ask the question: what does exponential growth mean? Meaning, first of all, that’s not advanced mathematics, okay, but beyond that, I’m not even demanding that he know mathematics. I’m only demanding some awareness that there are such aspects, that it’s worth checking them, and the ability to understand the answer he’s being given and how reliable it is, or whether that too is biased. And you don’t need to be an expert in these fields, but you do need to understand the principles a little, to understand how things work there. Otherwise it really isn’t relevant. If you understand and you’re immersed, I’ll give you a personal example, which I don’t like doing. Say, Rabbi Cherlow. Rabbi Cherlow, yes, he’s a friend of mine, full disclosure, but Rabbi Cherlow is a figure who is immersed in a great many fields of knowledge. He has no professional training in any of those fields as far as I know, unless I’m missing something, but I know that when someone speaks with him, Rabbi Cherlow will know how to ask the right questions.
[Speaker A] The same thing with Rabbi Firer, whose medical knowledge is very extensive. Is that connected to what you call ruling from the outside and ruling from the inside? Because it seems not, right? Meaning, when you talk about ruling from the outside, when you talk about ruling from the inside, that means I understand the spiritual world of the person asking me. The example you give, the example you give is that if a person doesn’t understand what art, literature, or music mean for me, then to the question whether it is permissible to listen to the art, literature, and music of the gentiles, may their names be blotted out, the answer one gets is irrelevant, because you don’t understand what that does to my soul. Someone whose entire spiritual world is the Talmudic text won’t understand me, and therefore he won’t be able to issue a halakhic ruling. The example you gave was about epidurals for women, right? That suddenly through your daughter you understand what an epidural means for women, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then the ruling changes.
[Speaker A] Right, for everyone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I’m saying, here there actually is a connection if you broaden the scope. Because what I was really talking about is understanding the world, not my world, the world in general. And in that sense Rabbi Kanievsky is ruling from the outside on all questions. Not on a particular question from a particular questioner. Even the person from Bnei Brak who is his neighbor and goes to ask him a question, and he knows his world, he still doesn’t understand the world, and therefore he can’t issue a halakhic ruling even for that person.
[Speaker A] By the way, could it be that this is part of the problem with Brisk? Meaning, with the abstraction of everything, right, what might be called a homeowner’s common sense, where at a certain point you abstract things to the level where the world turns into relations between X and Y until you no longer understand anything?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, you’d have to think about it, there may be a connection.
[Speaker A] Schneur Rav says, for example, right, how do we know it’s forbidden to sort on the Sabbath? Right? That it was forbidden to do, well, what the daughters of Israel did when they went out dressed in white, right? How do we know it’s forbidden to do that? That it’s forbidden to sort on the Sabbath, right? This concept of the prohibition of sorting, where basically you strip it of all its context, right? And then you say that Brisk — and Schneur Rav also talks about this a lot — strips Jewish law down to relationships between symbols; it no longer sees the things themselves. Right, there are those who say that Rabbi Chaim never saw what a frying pan looks like. Something like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He took the frying pan out of the kitchen.
[Speaker A] Exactly. And maybe that too is part of the problem, right? Meaning, we turn it into an extraordinary intellectual exercise in the yeshiva, and suddenly we say, wait a second, but what we talked about has consequences.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. Meaning, if you don’t understand — and this is the example of Mary’s room, right? You know, there’s an article about it on Wikipedia.
[Speaker A] Bless Mary’s room.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the physicist who knows all the laws of optics but has never seen the color red.
[Speaker A] By the way, today you can solve the whole story of Mary’s room in a simple way, because there are those glasses they give color-blind people, and you just see their faces when they see color for the first time, and the crying and all that. Mary’s room.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a solved issue, because the fundamental question still stands. Yes, yes, I understand. Before you gave him the glasses, before you gave him the glasses, he doesn’t understand what colors are. Now if you ask him a question that touches on colors, he’s completely irrelevant — he can do all the calculations in the world. You know what, I studied engineering, and when I got to my first degree, when I got to Tadiran, it became clear to me that I understood nothing. I know how to diagonalize matrices with orthogonal polynomials and everything, but I don’t know what a transistor is, what you do with it, or a capacitor or a resistor or I don’t know exactly what, I have no idea what these things even mean. But all the theory — in theory I was pretty good. Meaning, it’s not — there’s something in grasping the world, not in understanding it intellectually but in the immediate perception of the world, that is very necessary for issuing halakhic rulings. Even though you can be very smart and connect things and build very impressive logical constructions, you still have to understand what you’re dealing with in order to issue a ruling.
[Speaker A] I really liked this sharpening of yours, that in the end Rabbi Kanievsky is, if we take your distinction between ruling from the outside and ruling from the inside, Rabbi Kanievsky is ruling from the outside on the world. And this has, it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He can’t really issue rulings at all, because he is outside the whole world, not outside the world of one particular questioner or another. Of course I’m exaggerating — there are certain questions for questioners from his own milieu and so on that of course he answered, or there are completely technical questions that don’t depend on understanding the world. But on the fundamental level, I’m not talking here about a particular questioner — that’s only what I wanted to sharpen — rather there’s something here, some kind of reality that is actual reality. It’s not that he doesn’t understand my world; he doesn’t understand the world itself. Mathematics is not my world — mathematics is how the whole business actually works. So this is not some distance between worlds; that’s not the problem. It’s an objective distance.
[Speaker A] Okay, so that was a good thing to say. First of all, this is a good opportunity to say thank you very much to Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, and to tell all of you: everything we talked about is in the video link, both the books, the trilogy, and his excellent blog. So anyone interested in these things is invited to follow. Thank you very much for the time you gave me and all of us, and for this presentation. It’s also worth reading both the latest post we talked about and the other things we’ll include. Thank you so, so much.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re welcome, gladly. Happy holiday.
[Speaker A] Happy holiday.
