Excisions

Table of Contents

• [0:00] A hint in the Torah and the giving of names
• [1:33] Conditional karet: a kind of contingent excision
• [2:48] Midrash Tanchuma on being released from karet
• [5:32] Sabbath desecration and the connection to lashes
• [13:23] Being cut off from the World to Come through severe transgressions
• [25:57] Death for Sabbath desecration – the views of Maimonides and the Behag
• [27:28] The Talmud on the commandment of court-imposed execution
• [29:39] Lashes as a solution to karet – is that really a punishment?
• [35:14] The renewal of semikhah in Safed in the 16th century
• [38:18] The dispute between the sages of Jerusalem and Safed over semikhah
• [44:54] Maharalbach against the renewal of semikhah – criticism
• [50:54] Repentance without lashes – the possibility of atonement

Summary

General overview

The text raises the question of the relationship between lashes and karet in transgressions that carry karet, and presents Maimonides’ view that when a person receives lashes, he is released from the punishment of karet and from death at the hands of Heaven, so there is no “double punishment” here in the sense of simultaneous punishment under two different laws. The text brings the wording of the Mishnah and Maimonides: “All those liable to karet who were lashed are exempted from their karet,” and also cites Midrash Tanchuma, from which it appears that lashes can serve as a kind of “remedy” that releases a person from karet. It even raises a reading implying that even in transgressions where there is technically no punishment of lashes according to the law, lashes might still release a person from karet. Later, the text presents the controversy over semikhah in Safed in the 16th century as being driven, among other things, by the need to make lashes possible so that “the gates of repentance would not be locked.” It also brings Maharalbach’s response, claiming that lashes that release from karet are specifically lashes imposed by a religious court with witnesses and prior warning, yet even so he maintains that repentance can atone even without lashes where that is not practically possible.

No person is liable under two laws, and the status of lashes versus karet

Maimonides rules that we do not apply here the principle of “a person is not liable under two laws” in the sense of “he does not receive lashes and pay” or “he does not die and pay,” because once he is lashed, he no longer has upon him either the punishment of karet or the punishment of death at the hands of Heaven. Maimonides defines karet and death at the hands of Heaven as punishments of Heaven, and rules that lashes exempt a person from both karet and death at the hands of Heaven. The text explains that this means there is no “double liability” in which the Torah imposes both karet and lashes for the same transgression; rather, karet stands as the consequence if the path to exemption was not carried out. The text suggests that repentance is needed alongside the lashes, and raises the possibility of a situation in which a person neither receives lashes nor repents, and therefore is not exempted from karet.

Midrash Tanchuma and an expansive reading of exemption from karet through lashes

Midrash Tanchuma is brought as the source for the question: “Those who violate the karet prohibitions in the Torah—how are they healed and how do they leave behind their karet?” Its answer is: “All those liable to karet who were lashed are exempted from their karet,” by virtue of the verse “then your brother shall be dishonored before your eyes.” The midrash describes a process in which Moses prays after the section of the wood-gatherer, and the Holy One, blessed be He, gives a “remedy”: “Let them receive forty lashes and they will be released from their karet.” The text wonders whether these words were said generally about karet or specifically also with respect to Sabbath desecration. The text presents a reading, attributed to Kli Chemdah, from which it emerges that even in a case where there is technically no punishment of lashes for Sabbath desecration according to the law, the lashes themselves might still exempt a person from karet. The text concludes that one practical implication would be the theoretical possibility that even nowadays a person might want to receive lashes in order to be released from his karet, and suggests that this depends on a dispute among halakhic decisors as to whether lashes not imposed by a religious court are effective.

The wording of the Mishnah and Maimonides, and the difficulty regarding transgressions that carry court-imposed execution

The text quotes the wording of the Mishnah and Maimonides that all those liable to karet who were lashed are exempted from their karet, along with Maimonides’ statement that “anyone who sinned and was lashed returns to his kosher standing,” based on “then your brother shall be dishonored.” The text notes that the general formulation does not distinguish between different kinds of karet, and therefore raises the question whether even a Sabbath desecrator, whose offense carries both execution and karet, would be released from his karet if he were lashed. The text presents the seemingly obvious narrowing assumption that exemption from karet applies only to lashes imposed for a transgression that is itself punishable by lashes according to Torah law, and not in every situation in which karet exists. The text raises a practical possibility that in a case where there was no warning or some critical detail was missing for carrying out court-imposed execution, karet might remain—and then the question arises whether one could lash him in order to exempt him from karet.

Difficulties with the whole mechanism of karet versus lashes and repentance

The text asks why the Torah establishes the punishment of karet if it can be “solved” through lashes, and why severe transgressions whose karet is more stringent end up, in practice, with a mechanism that looks similar to lashes. The text brings in the known framework of “the gradations of atonement,” according to which for karet punishments, repentance and Yom Kippur are not enough and suffering is also required, and asks how lashes can exempt from karet if atonement for it is supposed to be more severe. The text suggests that the midrash itself portrays the lashes as an act of grace, beyond the strict letter of the law, so that people would not despair over losing the World to Come. The text raises two possible explanations: one is that karet comes to express severity, similar to “an eye for an eye,” while in practice the result is softened through grace; the second is that karet may be “temporary” or exist in degrees, and it notes that Nachmanides in Sha’ar HaGemul raises such a possibility, whereas in Maimonides it sounds as though karet means, in a sharp and absolute sense, “you have no World to Come.”

“What business is it of ours?” and the Maggid Mishneh on the practical implication of karet

The text asks why there should be room to discuss the details of karet in Jewish law at all, since a religious court does not rule on karet, and suggests that the practical implication is to inform a person in advance what is expected for him from Heaven and to define situations in which he can free himself through lashes. The text cites the Maggid Mishneh (quoted in the name of the Kesef Mishneh) that in a dispute with no practical implication regarding lashes, there is no point in going deeply into explaining the Talmudic passage as it relates to karet. The text presents the tension between an approach that treats discussion of karet as merely theoretical and an approach that sees it as part of defining a person’s halakhic status even “with respect to Heaven.”

Root 14 in Maimonides and the Behag’s dispute over whether punishments are commandments

In Root 14, Maimonides attacks the Behag for counting those liable to karet and those liable to death at the hands of Heaven as prohibitions, and describes this as loading commandments onto the Holy One, blessed be He—“that He should deal with them and not us.” The text suggests an explanation that the underlying dispute is whether punishments are “a law on the person” as part of the details of the prohibition itself, as Maimonides holds, or “a law on the court,” as a separate obligation to punish, as seems implied by the Behag. The text connects this to a fundamental discussion attributed to Rabbi Akiva Eiger in tractate Makkot, according to which in penal law the court “creates the verdict” rather than merely uncovering an already existing liability, unlike monetary law. The text suggests the possibility that the Behag’s understanding also includes a prohibition on us to punish in a case where the Holy One, blessed be He, has “taken responsibility for them,” and raises the idea that lashes which exempt from karet might be understood not as a punishment at all, but as a mechanism that the Holy One, blessed be He, gave beyond the strict letter of the law in order to save a person from karet.

Lashes as punishment versus lashes as a tool of exemption, and the example of the Temple Mount

The text notes situations in which there is karet but no lashes because of the absence of warning, and on the other hand situations of lashes without karet, such as partial entry onto the Temple Mount, which according to some views carries lashes but not karet. The text points out that the same prohibition may lead to lashes in two different roles: sometimes as punitive lashes, and sometimes as lashes that exempt from karet. The text proposes an approach according to which when karet exists, the lashes are not really a “punishment” at all, but rather a regulation for exemption from karet—and from this it follows that perhaps nowadays such lashes could also exist.

The controversy over semikhah in Safed in the 16th century as a response to the problem of karet nowadays

The text describes the renewal of semikhah in Safed based on Maimonides’ novel ruling that the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel can renew semikhah, and the ordination of Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, together with the fact that Rabbi Yosef Karo was ordained and ordained others. The text describes the opposition of Maharalbach and the sages of Jerusalem, and the dispute over whether the agreement of “all” the sages is required or whether a majority is sufficient, as well as the involvement of sages outside the Land of Israel such as the Radbaz. The text states that one of the central motivations for the move was to make lashes possible in order to exempt those liable to karet from their karet, and describes how the semikhah continued for several generations but “nobody recognizes it,” and the matter faded away.

The letter of the sages of Safed: the gates of repentance being locked because of the absence of lashes

Maharalbach quotes from a letter of the sages of Safed a description of a spiritual state in which “we have no one among us who judges penalty cases,” and a person seeking to repent says, “Why toil in vain,” since there is no power to exempt him from his karet through “forty lashes.” The letter describes this as “a stumbling block and a snare,” leading to “the locking of the gates of repentance” and to a lack of motivation to return. The letter describes their choice of “the greatest among us in wisdom and number,” Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, for semikhah so that he could seat ordained judges and adjudicate “and if the wicked man deserves to be beaten,” and lash him “according to the Torah” so that “he will be exempted from his karet.”

Maharalbach’s response: lashes exempt only with witnesses and warning and in a religious court

Maharalbach praises the goal of the sages of Safed but rules that their agreement will not help them achieve their objective. He interprets the Mishnah, “All those liable to karet who were lashed are exempted from their karet,” as limited to a case in which “they were warned at the time of the transgression regarding lashes, and afterward they were lashed in court,” and he brings proofs for this from Rashi in tractate Megillah and from the Nimukei Yosef on the Rif. Maharalbach concludes that the project does not solve the problem for the public of penitents who sinned in private and have no witnesses or warning against them, because precisely they are not candidates for court-imposed lashes, and therefore the lashes available to them are not a tool for exemption from karet. Maharalbach adds that lashes which are not court-imposed lashes not only do not exempt; they may even be forbidden because of bodily injury and danger.

Maharalbach: repentance atones even without lashes when there is no practical possibility

Maharalbach rules that a penitent must not despair, because “even without lashes by a religious court his sin will be atoned for” through complete repentance. Maharalbach cites the verse “Return, O Israel, to the Lord your God,” and brings from Rabbeinu Yonah in Sha’arei Teshuvah the interpretation of “Through kindness and truth sin is atoned for,” expanding the possibility of atonement even without suffering when no other option exists. The text concludes from his words that Maharalbach presents karet as a punishment that does not completely block the path when the technical mechanism of lashes is unattainable. In this way the text presents an alternative to the stringency of the sages of Safed, according to whom without lashes there is no exemption from karet.

Orchot Chaim: lashes are effective even without warning if the person requests them, and Maharalbach replies

Maharalbach quotes Orchot Chaim, which rules that lashes atone together with repentance and confession, just as death atones together with confession, and adds that even if lashes do not atone without repentance and confession, “it is impossible that they should not at least lighten the punishment of the sin” because of the suffering involved. Orchot Chaim writes, “There is no distinction in this matter between one who was lashed in court and one who was not in court,” except that when a person was liable in court, they lash him against his will, whereas when there was no warning and he “wanted on his own to receive lashes” in order to lighten his punishment, “a blessing should come upon him.” The text points out that this statement supports the view that lashes can be given even when there is no formal liability to lashes, though it still requires a court framework. Maharalbach sharpens the point that the verse “the judge shall cast him down and strike him” indicates a specific kind of lashes, and distinguishes between humiliation a person takes upon himself and humiliation that comes from others, citing the Talmud in tractate Ta’anit: “One who is embarrassed by himself is not like one embarrassed by others.”

Tensions in reasoning and the presentation of additional approaches

The text emphasizes a conceptual difficulty in Maharalbach’s position, according to which specifically the person who was warned and nevertheless sinned intentionally in front of witnesses, and was duly lashed, is exempted from karet, whereas someone who sinned outside that framework may remain with karet—which seems like an intuitive reversal between a “greater wicked person” and a “lesser wicked person.” The text admits that it has no good answer to the question of what happened with those liable to karet before the attempts to renew semikhah, and expresses discomfort with the possibility that many would remain “lost.” The text adds that in Mishneh LaMelekh on Maimonides (chapter 16 of Sanhedrin) an opposite view is brought, according to which lashes exempt from karet דווקא where there is no liability to lashes, but notes that this opinion is rejected there because it contradicts Talmudic passages.

And a hint from the Torah from which this is alluded to them, and they have all already been called by these terms, both fathers and sons, with the laver until the end. So when we read Maimonides here, then really let’s discuss whether this is a double punishment. What does that mean—both lashes and karet? Or how exactly do these two punishments relate to each other, where for the same transgression you receive two punishments? So in fact Maimonides himself goes on. He says: and in a case like this we do not say that a person is liable for two judgments unless one comes because of the other—that a person is not punished with two punishments at once; you do not get lashes and pay, or die and pay. So Maimonides says: in a case like this we do not say that a person is liable for two judgments, because when they lash him he will no longer have upon him the punishment of karet, nor the punishment of death at the hands of Heaven. All punishments that are in the hands of Heaven—that means either karet or death at the hands of Heaven—those two punishments are heavenly punishments. If a person was lashed or was put to death—if he was liable to death—then he is in fact exempt from karet, or from the punishment of death at the hands of Heaven. Of course, if he dies on the Sabbath he’s probably also exempt from karet; death is parallel to lashes. In any case, lashes—when they lash a person—exempt him from both karet and death at the hands of Heaven. That’s what Maimonides says. Meaning that there really is no double liability here, where the Torah obligates both karet and lashes. It’s not a double liability such that for the same transgression you owe both things. If you were lashed, you don’t have the punishment of karet. So then what does it mean that there is both karet and lashes? It’s some kind of conditional karet. Meaning, if you were lashed, then fine—you’re exempt from karet. And repentance is written there, and repentance too—yes, meaning you have to repent. And if he didn’t repent? What? If he didn’t repent? If he didn’t repent, then he is not exempt from karet, and that’s also so. Meaning, not necessarily. Is there a situation where you get both? Yes—if he is not lashed and does not repent. Right: if he is lashed and does not repent, he gets both, and still Maimonides says this is not called being punished with two judgments, because he can exempt himself from it. He needs two things: lashes and repentance. And if he doesn’t receive lashes but does repent? What? If he doesn’t receive lashes but does repent? That’s a big question. Apparently it doesn’t help, it doesn’t help—that’s what it looks like. You need both lashes and repentance. We’ll see later that it’s not so simple. No, you need repentance. And nowadays? No, you need repentance. Nowadays what happens when there is no religious court? No, it’s not always in your hands. You can’t always—lashes, the definition of lashes may be that a religious court rules lashes for you. That’s another point we’ll get to later, that a person can even today, simply speaking, yes. What? Simply speaking it’s only when a religious court decrees lashes on you, but even if he were literally lashed in that same way—we’ll discuss that later. I know people are asking; we’ll get to it. It’s a dispute among the halakhic decisors; we’ll see.

Let’s look for a moment at Midrash Tanchuma. There’s a puzzling midrash there: “Teach us, our rabbi: one who transgresses the karet offenses in the Torah—how are they healed and released from their karet?” Someone who transgresses offenses that carry karet—how is he exempted from that karet, how is he healed of that karet? “Thus our rabbis taught: all those liable to karet who were lashed were exempted from their karet, as it is said: ‘Then the judge shall make him lie down and strike him before him, according to his wickedness, by number. Forty he may strike him; he shall not add’ etc., and ‘your brother shall be degraded before your eyes.’ Once he was lashed, the Torah had compassion on him and said ‘your brother shall be degraded before your eyes’—behold, he is your brother.” Meaning, after he was lashed, he is considered once again your brother. “And why forty?” Then there’s a homily there on why specifically forty lashes.

And similarly you find—I’m moving to the next section—“And similarly you find that for every matter that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded Moses, He wrote warnings and punishments. Regarding the Sabbath it is written: ‘Remember the Sabbath day’—a warning; and its punishment: ‘Those who desecrate it shall surely be put to death.’ They came to the wilderness and found the wood-gatherer, and Moses did not know by which death he was to be killed, but ‘they placed him in custody.’” Yes, that’s in this week’s Torah portion; that’s the answer. “They placed him in custody.” “The Holy One, blessed be He, said: ‘The man shall surely be put to death; stone him with stones.’ Immediately Moses stood in prayer and said: Master of the universe, if a person sins, shall he be stoned? Then they are ‘mistaklin’…” frustrated, I would say maybe in our language. Yes, interesting—I didn’t check in the commentaries exactly what that word means, but it sounds like something like “frustrated” in our language today. “Make for them a remedy.” The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: “Let them receive forty lashes and be released from their karet.” And then when Aaron’s sons died, they saw the same thing with Kehat, same idea, not important now.

What is he actually saying here? The Holy One, blessed be He, told him to kill the wood-gatherer, right? So Moses says to Him: but Master of the universe, if we do this, the people of Israel will be frustrated. So what? So the Holy One, blessed be He, says to him: all right, make for them a remedy—that they receive forty lashes, and that will exempt them from karet. Now with the wood-gatherer we’re dealing with desecrating the Sabbath—not exactly karet; the wood-gatherer is in fact stoned. What? Yes, he was in fact stoned in the end. But beyond that, what is the point here? What does it mean—to stone him? To give lashes for desecrating the Sabbath? Desecrating the Sabbath carries a death penalty.

Now there might have been room—Or HaChaim brings this midrash here in the portion—to understand nonetheless that the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses our teacher: look, where one has to kill, then kill. But know that karet is not automatically something hopeless. Meaning, in most places karet is accompanied by lashes, not death. So if they were lashed, they would be exempt from their karet. In any case—so what comes out? It’s not connected to desecrating the Sabbath. He is saying to him generally: here there’s no choice; kill him—and that’s in fact what they did in the end. But know that generally speaking, one can be exempted from karet through lashes. Meaning: don’t despair completely. Maybe the initial assumption of the midrash was that when Moses asked the Holy One, blessed be He, he thought maybe this was in the hands of Heaven altogether. He knew the man had to die, but maybe he thought it was by Heaven. Right? Here the dialogue ends—the Holy One, blessed be He, had to update him that it was death by human hands. But in the initial assumption maybe he thought that… But why does the midrash stop here? It describes only the initial assumption. No, the midrash doesn’t stop here. The midrash says that in cases of death at the hands of Heaven, one really can be lashed. No, fine—but here with the wood-gatherer, what? So yes, all right, the straightforward meaning of the midrash really does seem to be speaking also about desecrating the Sabbath, not just as a general point. What is it saying to him? It’s saying: know that if you lash him, he will be exempt from his karet—even in Sabbath desecration, despite the fact that there is no punishment of lashes for Sabbath desecration. And here this touches exactly on what you asked before. Meaning, if we really read the midrash this way—as, for example, Kli Chemdah read it, and I think one certainly can read it that way—then it comes out that although on the Sabbath there is no punishment of lashes, if you are lashed you are exempt from karet. Meaning that the lashes that exempt from karet are not only lashes that a religious court imposes according to the law, but generally speaking, if you lash him you exempt the person from karet. A practical difference, for example, what you mentioned earlier—say today. Maybe a person wants to receive lashes even now? A person comes, gets forty lashes, and is exempt from his karet, even though there is no religious court and in fact he is not legally liable to lashes—or even if he is liable, they cannot impose it on him. But if he is lashed, then he is exempt. That at least is how it seems from the plain meaning of the midrash.

So in fact I brought again Maimonides and the Mishnah and Maimonides: “All those liable to karet who were lashed were exempted from their karet.” And Maimonides also writes: “Whoever sinned and was lashed returns to his fitness, as it is said, ‘your brother shall be degraded before your eyes’; once he was lashed, behold, he is your brother. So too all those liable to karet who were lashed were exempted from their karet.” And what about repentance? Yes, here he doesn’t even mention repentance. Elsewhere he does mention it; maybe even here later—I don’t remember at the moment. But he does mention repentance, meaning repentance is also needed. In any case, it’s not clear here from Maimonides’ wording, and also in the Mishnah, this is presented as a general statement: anyone liable to karet—if he was lashed, he is exempt from his karet. What about someone who desecrated the Sabbath? He is liable to karet; there is no punishment of lashes for that kind of karet of the Sabbath—it’s a death penalty. Even a Sabbath desecrator, if he was lashed, is he exempt from his karet? There is also karet on the Sabbath. Yes, karet too. So if even a Sabbath desecrator was lashed, is he exempt from his karet? From this general wording of the Mishnah and of Maimonides, there was room to understand that yes. The question is whether one can receive lashes at all. I don’t know. But that’s exactly what we are wondering about: if one can receive them, and if that exempts him—because if it doesn’t exempt him, then why receive them? Clearly, whether he can receive them is really the question whether it exempts from karet. And from this general wording it appears that yes: all those liable to karet who were lashed were exempted from their karet. And this fits very well with the Midrash Tanchuma we saw, that even for desecrating the Sabbath, where there is no punishment of lashes in a religious court, if they are lashed they are exempt from karet. The most straightforward simple reading is of course not like that. The simple reading is that only lashes that one is liable for according to the Torah—meaning, according to the law one is liable to lashes for that transgression—then if you were lashed, you are exempt from karet. Not that whenever there is karet, the option is to lash him and exempt him from karet.

Could it be that a person is liable to death and for some reason is exempt—something in the criteria needed in order actually to execute him with death wasn’t fulfilled—but lashes are enough? Is there such a situation at all? No, that’s what we’re discussing. Not for the sake of karet, but legally he gets lashes? There is no such situation. Because if warning is required, and all the requirements for a death penalty are the same requirements. Right—it can’t be; one doesn’t lash. But in light of what we’re saying now, there arises the possibility that a person who committed an offense for which he is really liable to death—Sabbath desecration… only something is missing. There was no exact warning, or the warning wasn’t precise, or there was no acceptance of warning, whatever—something is missing to carry out the death penalty. He still has karet upon him. And the question is how he can be exempt from that karet. It might be that if we lash him, he will be exempt from karet. Such a possibility apparently arises, and we’ll see in a moment. In any case, generally it sounds from the Mishnah that this could be included, meaning that with every liability of karet, if we lash him, we can exempt him from karet.

The truth is there are several difficulties in all these discussions about karet. First, if it’s really true that through lashes one is exempt from karet, then why does the Torah define such a punishment at all? Basically what you want is for us to lash him, right? What is this business that if I don’t lash him then… whichever way you look at it—if after all karet is a more severe punishment, right? Meaning only more severe transgressions are the ones for which you get karet. Basically what you’re telling me is that for these more severe transgressions too, really the punishment is lashes. If I lash him, then that’s it—he is also out of karet. So what’s the point? That only if I didn’t lash him does he remain liable to karet? Why? Whichever way you look at it. What? Karet is a reality. Fine—but why was the reality set up here in a way that it doesn’t exempt? The punishment of karet and all that… If there are other punishments, then automatically he is not cut off. Yes, but again, what I’m asking is: what is the justification? It doesn’t help to say this is the reality. The question is why the reality was established this way.

Maybe the justification is like Rabbi Shmuelevitz on interpersonal matters, that this is the reality. He explains why when there are other punishments it exempts, because then you are already reconnected, since karet means to be cut off—it’s the language of cutting. So once there are these other punishments, the lashes and all that, that reconnects him. Why does it reconnect him? Because karet is only where there is no remedy; it is, as it were, the direct result of the transgression—karet. And that is a result that exists for now, meanwhile I’m not… No, immediately in principle the person receives… We don’t see it. Maybe already now too he is in fact cut off. There is an explanation where Maimonides explains it about the World to Come—that he is cut off; there isn’t now… maybe right now he is not a member of the World to Come, you’re saying. Some kind of status that already takes effect now. Still one has to understand why this was established this way. The Holy One, blessed be He, still set up something here—what is the idea?

So maybe one could explain that karet was given to all those cases where a person transgresses intentionally but nobody knows about it, and there can’t be a situation of lashes. So in those cases they told you: know that the moment you commit the transgression intentionally… The question is whether lashes and karet are equivalent or not. They are not equivalent, so why do lashes exempt from karet? Because it’s some new mechanism by which it can be exempted. But no—if… why establish karet at all? There are in most situations plenty of times a person transgresses intentionally and no one knows. I didn’t ask what the practical difference of karet is. The practical difference of karet exists, as we said before—for example, something was missing in the warning, so he isn’t lashed and there will be karet. In a moment we’ll see that maybe not, because in light of what I said above maybe one can lash him anyway and that will exempt him from karet in any case, but let’s leave that for now. We don’t know. So he comes to the religious court and says: look, I incurred karet; lash me and exempt me from karet. That too is a big question; we’ll discuss it in a moment.

So he said that karet is not really a punishment; it’s that the person damaged something in reality, and that’s it. The lashes are some kind of… Karet is a punishment. You disconnect him from the World to Come—what does it mean it’s not a punishment? The Holy One, blessed be He, determined that for such transgressions one is disconnected from the World to Come. So this eternal punishment—if you get thirty-nine lashes you’re exempt from it, and if you don’t get lashed then you’re lost forever and ever? The lashes are some kind of repentance; they bring the person back in repentance. And if I repent without the lashes? Whichever way you look at it. If repentance alone is enough, then fine—don’t say lashes. Fine, repentance is always needed; say repentance helps. After all in the categories of atonement we know this is so, right? For punishments of karet, repentance and Yom Kippur are not enough; one also needs suffering. Right—that also appears in Maimonides in Jewish law. And for an ordinary prohibition, Yom Kippur and repentance are enough. Meaning there is a difference. Lashes are lighter than repentance. Of course—what do you mean lighter? Because it’s something technical: a person receives lashes and that… it makes some kind of change. So you see that transgressions that carry karet are more severe, right? Because it’s not just lashes; it’s also karet. And in fact their atonement is harder too: one also needs suffering. So why, when you are lashed, are you exempt from karet? Because it’s some special repair, a kindness of the Holy One, blessed be He.

And in fact here from the midrash too I think you can see that this really is some special kindness. Because Moses our teacher says to Him: what will they do? They’ll be frustrated if you kill them all; the people of Israel will be frustrated. So what will they do? The Holy One, blessed be He, says to him: you know what? Fine—beyond the letter of the law, whoever is lashed will be exempt from his karet. So fine, I understand. Maybe it really can be some sort of thing: karet is more severe, but the Holy One, blessed be He, wants us not to remain frustrated—or not to despair because we’ve lost our entire World to Come. So then what’s the point of continuing at all? What’s the point of the whole enterprise? At that point a person can just end his whole life—what is there to continue for? And one has to understand: this is a punishment that’s hard to grasp. So the Holy One, blessed be He, says: all right, beyond the letter of the law, be lashed and that will atone for your karet. Still, the whole thing is a little strange. Meaning, if this is beyond the letter of the law, fine—then say he is punished with lashes and that’s it. Leave it as a transgression that carries lashes, like all the other transgressions that are part of the mechanism of repentance. Fine. But why specifically here? Everywhere it’s like that. Even with an ordinary transgression, if you are lashed and you want atonement, you need repentance. That’s true regardless of karet. It’s always true. But here these are more severe transgressions; it’s not that they simply deserve lashes and that’s it. They deserve a punishment more severe than lashes, and the Holy One, blessed be He, did not think one could just give lashes and close the matter. So therefore He gave karet, which is certainly a more severe punishment, with the possibility of being exempted through lashes. That’s a different level of ranking.

I don’t really have a very good answer to this issue. I can only say that one of two possibilities I can see here. One possibility really goes in the direction you just raised. We know several things like this, such as “an eye for an eye” meaning monetary compensation, for example. What does it mean that “an eye for an eye” is money? I think we spoke about this once already. “An eye for an eye” means that what really should have been done was to take out your eye. That’s what the Torah says. The Torah only has compassion on you, and takes money from you instead of taking out your eye. But they don’t want to tell you directly that you owe money; they want to emphasize the severity of the transgression. Right? One practical difference, for example, is that there is an opinion that evaluates according to the eye of the damager, not the eye of the victim. Why? Because what you are paying is not compensation for the eye you took out; it is instead of your eye that they did not take out. It is not ruled that way in Jewish law, but there is such an opinion, and it also has practical legal implications. But you can sometimes see in the Torah expressions that are there only to describe the severity of what you did. True, in the end the Torah has compassion on you and really wants to tell you what you deserved, but in practice gives you something else.

So maybe that’s the idea of karet. But then a strange thing follows. Because then it comes out that someone who was not lashed for technical reasons—there is no religious court today, no religious court at all—what happens? He will be liable to karet. So what, just because of technique? If really this is just a way of saying: listen, this is a severe transgression and you really deserved karet, then they should really have taught us in some midrash: yes, you deserved karet, but the sages interpreted that it really means ordinary lashes, like all other transgressions of lashes, and therefore now ordinary lashes—and if I was not lashed, I’ll repent and everything will be fine. So with karet too it should have been the same. But with karet it doesn’t remain like that. Meaning, there remains a legal consequence: if I was not lashed, I am liable to karet. The issue is that no—if he didn’t pay instead of the eye, they still don’t gouge out his eye. No, of course not. That’s what I’m saying: the midrash took it out completely. It’s not “an eye for an eye” in a religious court. What? “An eye for an eye,” whether it is an actual eye or money, in either case it is in religious court. In both cases it is a religious court. Whereas karet will apply to me because the Holy One, blessed be He… ordination disappeared from the world, but reward and punishment did not. So what? So karet applies to me, and now this kindness—the possibility… Ah, you’re saying that with the eye, nowadays once there is no one to obligate me to pay there is also no one to take my eye, because there is no religious court. But with karet the Holy One, blessed be He, will always cut me off in the end. Fine. In any case, that’s one possibility.

There is perhaps another possibility: maybe karet is really something temporary. It is not eternal in the sense that appears, at least in the plain meaning of Maimonides’ language. I think we mentioned last time the dispute between Maimonides and the Ra’avad about circumcision, right? At the end I mentioned that if so, according to the Ra’avad every day he violates karet, while Maimonides says it’s only until that day. Meaning, there are situations where you have temporary karet, but if you do something, in the end it is removed. So maybe the meaning is that you are liable to karet and you really are punished with disconnection from the World to Come, but for some certain time, or some certain level, some duration—after you have completed it, you do return. It’s not some eternal karet where you remain lost forever. Maybe. I don’t know. In Nachmanides there is such a possibility; he raises such a possibility in Sha’ar HaGemul. In Maimonides it does not seem so. In Maimonides it looks like a kind of: you have no World to Come, period.

Another point that comes up in connection with karet is: why are we discussing it at all? What business is it of ours? What—doesn’t the Holy One, blessed be He, know when to give karet and when not? We are making discussions for Him about when there is karet and when there isn’t, who is exempt from karet and who isn’t? Unintentional sin, certainly—there’s no issue there. I think this is, so to speak in quotation marks—I don’t know if this is right or not—the issue is that the Holy One, blessed be He… “the righteous decrees and the Holy One, blessed be He…” No, that’s not what I said. A person’s halakhic status—his standing not only with respect to the records of the religious court but also with respect to Heaven—is determined by what is decreed upon him in religious court. Fine, but still the question is why this is the subject of discussion. Religious court never decrees karet on anyone. The public declares “sanctified, sanctified,” and then even with respect to Heaven she is sanctified, and from now on strangulation applies to one who has relations with her. Why didn’t the public declare “sanctified, sanctified”? That’s not… okay, formally there are witnesses and so on, and there are all kinds of procedures done by people, and likewise your liability in Heaven. But religious court does not obligate him in karet. There is no ruling of religious court that he is liable to karet. This is a conceptual discussion in the passages: when there is karet, when there isn’t. What practical difference does it make? Leave it to the Holy One, blessed be He; He will decide when to cut off and when not to cut off. What practical difference is there for religious court to know this? So that people can tell the person: listen, if you do this without warning or with warning, know what you’re going to get afterward in Heaven. Just so you know what you’ll get in Heaven. First of all, it has a definitional practical difference, so that he can be exempted through lashes. In any case they have to lash him—what difference does it make? What if he doesn’t want to? Then they don’t lash? No—where there are transgressions with no lashes. Fine, that’s one of the points we’ll get to, but apparently there is no room at all to discuss this matter.

Look, for example, I brought here the Kesef Mishneh in the laws of leaven and matzah. There are one or two other places I found, and as is Maimonides’ way in a number of places, since he found Maimonides’ opinion aligned with that of the Halakhot, the Maggid Mishneh—sorry—aligned with that of the Halakhot, not to delve into explaining the sugya of the Talmud. And although he does not agree with the Rif except regarding lashes but not regarding karet, since nothing practical emerges for us, he did not concern himself with it. What difference does it make now? He disagrees with the Rif about karet, he agrees with him only about lashes—so what? The practical difference for us is only lashes; why discuss karet? It seems somehow that a person should know in advance what he is getting into. Yes, fine, that is important. The Maggid Mishneh did not care; Maimonides did care. Maybe the Maggid Mishneh says that the Maggid Mishneh does not deal with disputes between Maimonides and the Rif about karet if there is no dispute about lashes. Meaning, if they agree about lashes, then it no longer interests him what happens with karet, because it has no practical difference. And is that not Maimonides’ way too? If there is no practical difference, Maimonides does not discuss it? Maimonides simply rules as he rules. So everywhere he writes whether there is or isn’t karet. Maimonides doesn’t omit it. Meaning there is no room to discuss Maimonides on this issue. There is also in Lechem Mishneh on the laws of sacrificial procedure and in several other places where you see: if it is karet, there is nothing to discuss. Fine, I’m arguing with you about karet—but what difference does it make? The Holy One, blessed be He, will decide. So in advance you should know what? Fine, but I’m saying again, this is still an observation.

Now in the fourteenth root, Maimonides deals with the question whether punishments should be counted as commandments in their own right. He has a dispute about this with the Behag, as with many other things. “And our colleague became confused in this root with a confusion that does not need answering, nor is it easy to answer because of the depth of the confusion of the issues. There remains no doubt except that they think that establishing the boundaries are prohibitions in the first place. And how would he count among them the punishment and the thing for which that punishment was incurred?” Meaning, how does the Behag count both the transgression itself and also the obligation to punish whoever violated the transgression? That is altogether just one detail within the commandment itself. Say there is a prohibition to desecrate the Sabbath; one of the details of this prohibition is that one who desecrates the Sabbath is liable to karet or stoning. Why do I need now to count yet another commandment about the punishments of the Sabbath?

And now Maimonides goes on and says this: “And harder than this is that he counted those liable to karet and those liable to death at the hands of Heaven as prohibitions.” That is already really astonishing. Meaning, the Behag counted the punishments of karet and death at the hands of Heaven as commandments. Besides the prohibitions? Yes. “And they think that the liability of karet and the matter for which karet was incurred and the punishment therein—that will be the counted commandment. So much so that in the Book of Commandments he spoke of this and said in the first gate”—while Yoma will include that gate—and this is his language: “He said: and among them are two and three matters through which He informed us, blessed and exalted be He, that He will deal with them and not us.” He is guarantor over all of them, the Holy One, blessed be He. We do not have to deal with them. And he counts thirty-two such things. Fine, and so on. “And there is no doubt that he does not think that all 613 commandments are incumbent upon us, but rather some of them it is our duty to fulfill and some of them it is the duty of God, exalted be He, to fulfill.” Maimonides is being a little sarcastic. Meaning, the Behag is counting commandments in order to inform the Holy One, blessed be He, what He has to fulfill and what not to fulfill. What are you dealing with this for at all? asks Maimonides. He asked the Behag. “And these are statements of manifest error,” as Maimonides says. What on earth is going on there?

But it seems to me that in the Behag’s view there are two things here. This is just a side note. When the Behag counts punishments as commandments in their own right, the difference between him and Maimonides is that Maimonides understands punishments as a law upon the person. And this will have practical implications for later. Maimonides holds that the punishment is one of the details of the laws of the Sabbath. Meaning, one who desecrated the Sabbath intentionally is liable to stoning, unintentionally to a sin offering—meaning, intentionally stoning and karet, and unintentionally a sin offering. That is one of the details of the prohibition of desecrating the Sabbath. The Behag does not understand it that way. The Behag understands it as a law on the religious court. Meaning, the religious court has an obligation to punish one who desecrates the Sabbath, and then this has no connection to the commandment, to the prohibition of desecrating the Sabbath. There is a prohibition of Sabbath desecration, which is a commandment incumbent on me. There is an obligation on the religious court to punish one who desecrates the Sabbath intentionally, and that is a commandment upon the religious court. And because that is so, the Behag counts it as a separate commandment. Maimonides understands that it is one detail of the prohibition of desecrating the Sabbath. Know that you are also liable to stoning. Who carries it out? The religious court. Fine—that’s like sacrifices are offered by the priests. The one who carries out the punishment is an agent of the religious court, but the commandment and the obligation are incumbent on me.

For example—I’ll take it far even though it’s not quite right—what happens nowadays, for instance? Apparently one might perhaps say that according to Maimonides at least, I would still be liable to death nowadays too if I desecrated the Sabbath intentionally; there is just no religious court to carry it out, but the death liability is incumbent on me. According to the Behag there is no death liability at all. There is an obligation on the religious court to impose a death sentence, and when there is no religious court there is nothing. No obligation is incumbent on me according to the Behag.

Now in truth, what is commonly assumed is that really there is no death liability at all. Rabbi Akiva Eiger is famous in tractate Makkot—yes—that he argues, and this has earlier roots among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), that all punishments, what we call criminal law—lashes, death, all these punishments—so long as the religious court has not ruled, you are not liable at all. That is unlike money law. If you owe someone money, obviously you owe it whether or not the religious court ruled. The religious court is only there when you have a dispute and argue; the court has to decide what to do. But the court does not create the judgment; it only uncovers it. By contrast, in lashes and death, the religious court creates the judgment; it does not uncover it. Now that is not so simple. Rabbi Akiva Eiger assumes it as obvious. He even challenges Tosafot in Makkot 5 on the basis of this, and Tosafot does not seem that way to him. And there are other medieval authorities (Rishonim) from whom you can see that this thing is not so simple. But that is Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s assumption.

Could it be…? The Talmud says, God forbid, the commandments of court-imposed death on these commandments—what does it say, that a person who… Yes, but the Talmud only means to say that in Heaven they will nevertheless kill him, not that he is liable to death in the halakhic sense. Say that someone who kills him would be exempt, or that the… meaning, here we want perhaps to say something stronger—that he is actually liable to death, only there is no one to kill him. Fine, but the death liability rests on him; exactly, there is a practical death liability on him. So fine, I’m not sure one can hang this on a dispute between Maimonides and the Behag, but maybe. What is commonly accepted now is that according to everyone there is no death liability so long as the religious court has not ruled. And Maimonides only counts the four court-imposed deaths as separate commandments, but what feeds them is that this is still a detail of each commandment, while the obligation here is upon the religious court, because there he defines the laws of the religious court—but each and every detail is a detail of the commandments themselves.

So there too you see, once again from another angle: what are you dealing with this for at all? Maimonides asks the Behag: what, are you counting commandments for the Holy One, blessed be He? Are you telling Him what to do, when to cut them off and when not to cut them off? What would the Behag say to that? So I said, first, he has a principled dispute with Maimonides because he probably thinks that the obligation to punish is placed on the religious court and that is a commandment on the religious court; it is not one of the details of the prohibition of Sabbath desecration. Another point probably is that Maimonides himself senses this, I think, in the Behag when he describes it: that the Behag apparently holds that there is a prohibition against us punishing for these transgressions. You are obligated to leave it to the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore it does have practical significance to count it, and these are commandments upon us. There is a prohibition upon us to punish someone who is liable to death at the hands of Heaven or to karet. Why? Because for that the Holy One, blessed be He, is guarantor. Meaning, one must leave it to Him, and we are forbidden to punish in those cases. Even in Maimonides’ wording it seems he understood the Behag that way. He writes here—and this is how he writes—that some commandments are upon Him, exalted be He, to fulfill, as he said and explained that “He will deal with them and not us,” and instead of “not us” he writes that “He is guarantor over them.” Here—“and the meaning of his saying that He is guarantor over them all is to say that He, blessed be He, is guarantor that He will cut this one off and put that one to death.”

Fine, but precisely according to… I understood that one may lash for all cases of karet. Exactly. So now we… now we said that for karet indeed one may lash. Right. So if I explain the Behag this way, that becomes difficult. Because on the contrary, the sages here are telling you: leave it to the Holy One, blessed be He; you may not lash. Leave it to Him—He will cut off. So maybe there is room to say that what is forbidden is to impose another punishment, because punishment… But who says that the lashes that exempt from karet are really a punishment? Maybe they are not a punishment. This relates somewhat to what we discussed before—how do lashes exempt from karet? It can’t be that there is a punishment of lashes for that transgression, because this is a severe transgression and its punishment is basically karet. Rather, beyond the letter of the law, the Holy One, blessed be He, allows us to lash him and then he will be exempt from karet. So it may be that those lashes are not a punishment at all. They are only an alternative form that the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself defined. We brought this from the midrash—He “set up a remedy” for them. Yes, exactly. We said this from the midrash. So since that is so, it is a way that the Holy One, blessed be He, tells us: this is how one can exempt a person from karet, beyond the letter of the law. So that is exactly what He is telling us: to punish him—you may not, because the punishment is karet, period. There is no other punishment; there is no alternative punishment. But there is an option to be exempted from karet. And then it turns out that the lashes we administer there are not a punishment at all. They are simply there to exempt from karet. This perhaps strengthens even more what I said before, and what also comes out of the midrash: after all the midrash says this is beyond the letter of the law. That is seemingly this sort of conception. And from the midrash it also emerges that one can do this even for desecrating the Sabbath. Why can one do this for desecrating the Sabbath? After all, the punishment for Sabbath desecration is death. How do lashes help? You see here that the lashes are not a punishment. The lashes are a way to exempt from karet, that’s all. And such a way exists even in cases of karet that also carry a death penalty in terms of punishments.

All this, I’m saying, maybe is one way to explain the Behag. Whether in terms of punishment—I don’t… or maybe he understands it as a commandment; not necessarily a demand of us, I don’t know. His definition of commandment is something else; one would have to see the whole… Behag is a problem: there are many versions and many texts, and it is not clear exactly what is in the Behag and what is not, and which version one follows. And there the changes go from one extreme to the other—huge changes. It’s not just a few letters here and there.

Fine. There are places, as I said before, where there is liability to karet and no liability to lashes—say where warning was missing or something of that sort. By the way, there are also opposite cases, where there is liability to lashes and no karet when the transgression is done in a lighter way—for example, partial entry to the Temple Mount. In partial entry there are opinions—and I think Maimonides rules this way too—that there are lashes for it but no karet. It is not really an “entry” with respect to karet, but with respect to lashes yes—you violated the prohibition, but there will be no karet here. Now these are situations in which the lashes for entering the Temple Mount are a punishment, because they are not coming to exempt from karet; there is no karet there at all. On the other hand, when you enter fully, the lashes are also given and they exempt from karet. Meaning, the same prohibition itself—the lashes can play two different roles. Sometimes it is a punishment, and sometimes it only exempts from karet. So this I don’t… it is hard to understand it that way, I’m saying. But if we understand that when it exempts from karet it is not given as a punishment, as I said before in the Behag, then we have to say there are two different laws of lashes in the same transgression itself, and that is a bit difficult. Unless one extends what I said before and in fact what is written here is really that there is no… when there is liability to karet, the lashes are really not a punishment at all, because it is a general principle. Whenever you are liable to karet, one can lash you and you will be exempt from karet. That’s all. It is not because there is a punishment of lashes for that transgression. Only where there is no karet—precisely there there is a punishment of lashes, because then the punishment really is lashes. It is a lighter transgression: partial entry. There there is a punishment of lashes and no karet. But when there is karet, then the lashes there are not really the same lashes. The lashes there only exempt from karet, and that’s it; they are not punitive lashes. One practical consequence, for example, may be that perhaps even nowadays one could give them. All right? We’ll see that later. Meaning, you’ll receive it as punishment, but it won’t be the same thing.

Now what—must they lash him? Ah, so that is exactly one of the implications. Simply speaking, yes. Where the Torah writes that he is liable to lashes, they have to lash him. If you understand that the lashes only exempt from karet, one implication certainly could be that maybe the religious court is not obligated to lash at all. You don’t have to lash; it’s just an option. If he wants to be exempt from karet, you can lash him and exempt him from karet. I did not find a source that says that. I did find a different source—meaning, other sources—that where there is no liability to lashes, you can come to the religious court and ask them to lash you and thereby be exempt from karet. That there is; we’ll see that in a moment.

Of course nowadays the situation sounds bleak, because if we have a technical problem—there are no religious courts, no ordained judges—then they do not lash. And since that is so, we are basically stuck with karet penalties. So this is a difficult situation, and it seems—how can that be? How can it be that because of a technical reason we are stuck at the level Maimonides describes for karet at the beginning?

And this really leads us to the second part of the issue: the controversy over ordination. In the 16th century, very briefly: the sages of Safed decided to renew ordination in light of Maimonides’ innovation that ordination can be renewed with the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel. The sages of Safed decided that they agreed to renew ordination and to ordain Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, who was the greatest among them, so that he would be ordained and would ordain others and from then on renew ordination. It is a fascinating historical episode, because one of those ordained was Rabbi Yosef Karo himself. He himself was ordained by Rabbi Yaakov Beirav. He ordained five of his students—very interesting, like Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava—and he ordained five of his students, and they also ordained onward. And this ordination continued for three or four generations. Meaning, a hundred, a hundred and fifty years later there are still ordained figures. Nobody recognizes it, though; nobody mentions it. The Beit Yosef himself is ordained, and he writes, “and nowadays when there are no ordained judges, we judge thus and so,” in the Beit Yosef. He mentions this. In the Shulchan Arukh nothing is mentioned. Maybe. In the Shulchan Arukh I think not, but I think I once saw it somewhere else of his. Meaning, I once checked the Arukh and this was afterward. Because by then they already did not want to recognize it. Yes, there was a dispute. But it is interesting because he did—meaning, he did accept it. He was ordained; he ordained others too. The Beit Yosef ordained others too. And generations later you still find—the Chida brings some writings he found about ordained men, who ordained whom and so on. I once collected some very interesting contradictions there.

In any case, this whole episode generated a major controversy. At the head of the opponents was the Maharlbach in Jerusalem. He was the leading sage of Jerusalem in that period, the Maharlbach, Habib. And the sages of Jerusalem opposed it. Now there are several very interesting catches there, and I spoke about this once on one Monday, because their opposition worked on two levels. On one level, they did not agree that ordination should be renewed, for various reasons. On the second level, if they do not agree, then even if it should in principle be renewed, it still won’t help because you don’t have all the sages of Israel. Meaning, they can veto the ordination not only because they disagree and therefore are right and one should acknowledge them—even if one does not acknowledge them, as long as you don’t have all the sages of Israel, then no. So now they begin to discuss whether a majority of the sages of Israel is enough, because the majority were in Safed, at least the majority in quality were in Safed. So they start to discuss whether a majority is enough or not enough. And all this is discussed in Kuntras HaSemikhah, and it is very interesting, this point. And sages from outside the Land of Israel also get involved: the Radbaz from Egypt—at first from Egypt, later he moved to Jerusalem, still during the ordination controversy, and in the end to Safed—but he opposed it all along. The question is whether sages outside the Land of Israel have any say in the matter at all. Some argued yes, despite the fact that Maimonides says this is only the sages of the Land of Israel, because after all one cannot ignore sages of first-rank stature. Fine, he lives in Egypt, so what? But he tells you not to ordain—can you ignore that? Then that somewhat empties Maimonides’ words of content. There are several very interesting points there that touch on the interface between Jewish law, practical conduct, and reality.

In any case, in the end this controversy is conducted between the sages of Jerusalem and the sages of Safed, and the matter fades away. After a hundred or a hundred and fifty years there is no trace left. Already at that time someone informed on Rabbi Yaakov Beirav and he fled to Damascus, and that also more or less extinguished the process. What people know less, though, is that one of the basic motivations for this process was our issue. So look here: I am now bringing a long quotation. This quotation is abridged. Everywhere there are three dots there is an omission, because the pamphlet is enormous. Kuntras HaSemikhah, which appears in the Maharlbach—basically the Maharlbach’s last section is Kuntras HaSemikhah, and that is the main source we have for the whole issue, including the opposing views, meaning he brings both sides. Very little of this remained in writing other than Kuntras HaSemikhah and the other side. Yes.

So the Maharlbach writes this. He brings the language of those—because they sent him a letter in order to ordain him too. They approached him, first, to agree, and at the same time they also sent him a writ of ordination, meaning that he too would be ordained on their authority. So they sent him this document, and he quotes from it as follows: “And now, because they have transgressed teachings and violated law—yes, we have sinned, we have transgressed the teachings, violated the law—therefore the Lord’s anger burned against His people and He breached among them breach after breach. There is no king and no prince, no mighty man and no man of war and no war of Torah. The wise artisan and discerning whisperer have perished and are gone. We have wasted away in our sins because they have multiplied, and so the people of the Lord became a scattered and dispersed people, all of us. Like sheep we have gone astray, each one to his own way, and our sins have increased above our head. Day by day the crown of our head has fallen,” and so on. “There is no longer a prophet, a teacher of righteousness, and among us there is no one judging fines, rebuking the wicked for his blemish. And if a man comes close to return to the Lord, he says in his heart: why toil in vain? What gain is there if I fast, if I go about darkened, and receive forty lashes and no more—if it will not avail, and will not exempt me from my karet, and my sin is always before me and my shame will not be erased?” What’s the point of repenting? After all, in order to be exempt from karet, repentance won’t help me; I also need lashes. So the person no longer repents and nothing interests him anymore. In practice he can just continue sinning. He’s lost; that’s it. He has already lost his World to Come.

Meaning, one has to understand—it’s interesting that this surfaced only there. This is a question that should have bothered people throughout history ever since ordination ceased. It is a very hard question. This is always the question of repentance, really: how can you say that a person no longer has a path of repentance? The moment you say that… Right, but if… how can he go on? Exactly. No, but here it’s not only that there is no path of repentance. Here Maimonides says to him: karet has been decreed upon him—you have no World to Come. If you have this transgression or that transgression, I understand that the path of repentance is closed. But here it means: I have no path of repentance, meaning I’m lost. And there is nothing to do about it. That is much more far-reaching. How can such a thing be? So what happened to all the people of Israel since ordination ceased? What, they are all liable to karet there? That’s it—they were cut off from the Jewish people? No, not all of them are like that. Whoever committed that transgression—and I think unfortunately there were not a few who did incur karet penalties. So what, all of those—finished? They no longer belong to the Jewish people? Lost? This is something very, very troubling.

Now here it is presented as something that troubles the individual person: what is the point of repenting if in any case it won’t help me at all? “And this in our days became a stumbling block and a rock of offense, preventing return to the Lord and causing people to cling to folly and a wayward path and to lock the gates of repentance.” Meaning, they describe there a reality where people indeed did not want to repent as a result of this; they saw no point in it. These are apparently Torah scholars, meaning people who know that repentance will not help them. So they don’t—there’s no point, so they don’t do it. So what do the sages of Safed say? The sages of Safed basically say that this is why we now want to renew ordination, and then we will be able to lash them, and when we lash them they will be exempt from their karet, and that will give them motivation to repent. So this is actually one of their main arguments for why they wanted ordination.

There are places where it seems they did not really want to return to being ordained in every sense and for every matter. It was basically an ordination with quite limited significance: to allow people to be exempt from karet. It was not really for judging and changing how life is managed in this world. It seems not. There are places where yes, because they also talk about the calendar, they mention the calendar too. But there are places where it somehow seems that this really just came to solve technical problems. It may be—I did not track the chronology exactly—perhaps in the course of the dispute, when they saw that it wasn’t going all the way, they tried to do something narrower. They tried to say, okay, then at least give us agreement so that these people can repent.

Now the Maharlbach, who does not agree, of course has to address this question: first, why he disagrees; and second, what to do with these people? So what are they supposed to do now? Maybe even this was only for very pious people, who even about themselves thought maybe we have a possible karet. Fine, maybe, doesn’t matter. But practically this really is the situation… “And who is there, and what one, who would be called by the name of Israel and rely on the God of Israel, saying: ‘I am the Lord’s,’ who could restrain himself regarding this matter and whose eyes would not run with tears because the gates of the people of the Lord have been destroyed?” Therefore all the words of this letter, “we arose and confessed, we the younger ones”—that continues the words of the sages of Safed. Yes. “And therefore we want to be zealous for the honor of Heaven, for how can it be that there is one who suffers and one who returns to the Lord with all his heart, and there is no true judgment? And let us say one to another: be strong and let us strengthen ourselves for our people and for the cities of our God, and let us raise the banner of Torah which has been cast to the ground for some time and trampled in the streets,” and so on, “and let us allow everyone to repent. Therefore we selected the greatest among us in wisdom and number, the complete sage, the great rabbi, Mahar”i Beirav, that he should be ordained and called head of academy and rabbi, and he should seat the wiser among us with him and they shall be called rabbis and be ordained forever. Doing truth and uprightness, bearing truly and uprightly the judgments of the Torah, to judge and to discipline. And if the guilty man deserves to be beaten, and he comes before them, they shall lash him according to the Torah as much as can be borne, and he shall be exempt from his karet and draw near to the hidden God”—perhaps a wordplay between olam and ne’elam, unless it’s just a scribal error—“and all this people too shall come to its place in peace.” Meaning, the renewal of ordination is meant, among other things, to allow people to be exempted from their karet.

The Maharlbach in his responsum deals at length with this issue, apart from the argument over ordination and all that. The Maharlbach says as follows: “However, it appears to my humble opinion, both in the explanation, that one cannot attain that important purpose which the rabbis of Safed thought to attain through that agreement, and in the essence of the law, as I shall say. For it is true and correct that the awakening of the rabbis of Safed to attain that important purpose for whose sake that agreement was made”—it seems that this was the central reason—“is exceedingly great. It is very beautiful and good in the splendor of the God of Israel, showing the intense desire of those stirred by this to cleave to His love and fear and to exalt His Torah upon His holy land, and they certainly have good reward; they shall be like a watered garden. But as it appears to us, their agreement will not help to attain their goal and the holy fruit of their thought. For the essence of the law is defective, and the listener will say: what is this ordination, and why did they do such a thing?”

Meaning, the Maharlbach says: they have a wonderful goal. But what can you do? It is impossible to attain that goal. At least on the face of it right now, it seems that the Maharlbach understands the mess, agrees there is a mess, but says: what can you do? We’re stuck; there is no way to solve it.

So what does he now say? He says this: “For that which we learned in the Mishnah, ‘all those liable to karet who were lashed were exempted from their karet,’ and we derive this from the verse that says ‘your brother shall be degraded’—once he was lashed, behold he is as your brother—this refers to when they warned them at the time of the transgression for lashes, and afterward they were lashed in religious court. And if there is no warning, there are no lashes by religious court. And if the lashes are not by religious court, there is no exemption from karet through those lashes. For what the verse says, ‘your brother shall be degraded,’ refers to lashes by religious court.” What is written, “your brother shall be degraded,” applies only when a religious court lashes him, and through those lashes he once again becomes your brother. But if it is not lashes of the religious court, then no. Meaning, this won’t help all those who committed the transgression before ordination. In a moment—not only before ordination; I’ll explain more. Not only that.

“And thus it is written explicitly in the halakhot of the Rif”—which he says is Sefer Nimukei Yosef—“and this is its language: all those liable to karet, if they were warned for lashes because of the prohibition written in them, and were lashed, are exempt from karet.” Clear enough? Only if they were warned and became liable to lashes and they lashed them—only then are they exempt from karet. So the Maharlbach says this is severe: one gets a possibility of better atonement? Yes, but still the point the Maharlbach wants to make here is something else. He wants to say that only lashes that one is legally obligated to receive in religious court exempt from karet. Not just any… Remember the Midrash Tanchuma we started with? He disagrees with it. Or he reads it differently, not important. But he says no: only where there are lashes that one is obligated to receive in religious court, only then does it exempt from karet.

And that is exactly what they want to do—to lash them. Wait, wait—we’ll get to them. I’m first speaking about the Tanchuma; one second. “Rashi did not need to elaborate and explain this because…” fine. He says that even Rashi, who did not explain this at length by saying that this applies only to lashes one is liable for, only omitted it because he found no need to elaborate, but obviously he agrees to that as well. “For it is obvious that there are no lashes without witnesses and warning.” In tractate Megillah, first chapter, it is written explicitly. Rashi himself writes explicitly in Megillah and this is clarified, and this is his language: “All those liable to karet who were lashed”—those whom witnesses warned about a prohibition that carries karet and who were lashed in religious court—“are exempt from their karet. The heavenly court no longer exacts punishment.” Until here. “Thus that very purpose for whose sake that agreement was established cannot be attained through it.”

What does he mean to say? He says this: only lashes one is liable for under religious court law exempt from karet. So your problem won’t be solved even if you really are ordained. Why? First, it’s talking about those who sinned earlier. But more than that—who are you really talking about in practice? Who are you talking about? You’re not talking about offenders with two witnesses who were warned and said yes, on that condition I am doing it, and everything. Those are not the people you’re talking about. You’re talking about the exact opposite kind of offender. You’re talking about a righteous Jew who stumbled, incurred karet, and wants atonement, and comes asking the religious court: lash me. Now the sages of Safed say they are in distress—we are not ordained, we cannot lash, so let’s establish ordination. The Maharlbach says to them: ordination won’t help you. In such a case there are no lashes. Where there are no lashes, it won’t exempt. So true, if there were someone who had witnesses and warning, then yes, you would succeed in exempting him from karet. But that’s not the public you are talking about. You’re talking about people who want, as we know in the Ten Days of Repentance, to be exempt from karet. Exactly. He says: yes, “on that condition I am doing it”—how many penitents like that are there? Maybe one or two. But they are not the subject there. The sages of Safed wanted to solve the problem of those liable to karet who were not liable to lashes and are not doing things publicly in the street. So in such a case you are not exempting anyone from anything. That’s what the Maharlbach says.

Of course, what do the sages of Safed say? They apparently understand as we said before, right? What are they really saying? Yes—that one can lash even when there is no legal liability to lashes, in order to be exempt from karet. And that is exactly the Midrash Tanchuma with which I began. And I think this is clear as day; otherwise what is the whole discussion about?

Afterward he continues. Fine, now we are in distress, so what should be done? Really then what—is it hopeless? So there are no penitents? There is no point in repentance? Nothing will help at all? So he says this: “Nevertheless, even according to the simple apparent meaning, the matter is clear regarding the case before us, that that aforementioned agreement does not help to attain that important purpose that the rabbis of Safed, may they be blessed, thought to attain. And with all this, the penitent should not be distressed by this, nor despair of the forgiveness of his sin, because even without lashes by religious court his sin will be atoned for and he may rise to stand above the level of the completely righteous through repentance, if he strives to fulfill all the essential elements of repentance. For the prophet of peace promised us, ‘Return, O Israel, to the Lord your God,’ and tradition says this applies even if he denied the principle. And not only through suffering, but even without suffering, if he fulfills what Solomon said, ‘Through kindness and truth iniquity is atoned for,’ in the way explained by our saintly master Rabbeinu Yonah in Sha’arei Teshuvah at the end of the first gate.” Meaning, if you increase kindness and so on, there are alternatives to suffering too. In other words, you can be atoned even without suffering and without karet and without anything—meaning just through repentance, repentance, good deeds, and so on.

So there is a very big innovation here. Rabbeinu Yonah does not speak about karet; he speaks about suffering, if I remember correctly. The Maharlbach extends it to karet too. And he says basically: when we are told—and Maimonides explicitly writes—that one needs lashes and repentance, without that one is not exempt from karet, that’s what Maimonides says. And he says no: repentance is enough. Yes, he says that… Now from the plain reading he is not disputing Maimonides. What would one have to say otherwise? What do you mean? Just like that you cite Rabbeinu Yonah about suffering and then dispute Maimonides? Say something. Even if you disagree, say I have proofs against him, I hold like the other opinion, something. Nothing. It seems fairly clear that he means to say that this is talking about a situation where there is no religious court. Where there is no religious court—and I’m telling you we cannot ordain and it won’t help anyway—but still, since there is a problem, so what should we do now? So what—there’s no point in repentance? No. In such a situation, if there is no possibility, no religious court to lash him, there repentance alone is enough, because the Holy One, blessed be He, does not come with unfair demands upon His creatures. What more could I have done? I repented. I cannot get lashed. In such a case, he says, repentance alone is enough, and you can rise higher and so on and so on. Where there is a religious court, that’s what Maimonides says—that one needs both lashes and repentance. There it does not help without that.

But even when Maimonides speaks about a time when there is a religious court, remember: what happens where the conditions for lashes were not fulfilled? There was no warning, or something like that—what then? According to the Maharlbach, lashes still won’t help, but still this too was said even in times when there were ordained judges, not only in our day. Anyone who doesn’t have the avenue of lashes can be exempt from karet through repentance alone. This softens a little what we asked at the beginning: how can it be that some technical detail, namely the absence of lashes, means I am cut off forever? So he says no—if you repent properly, good deeds, kindness, whatever, then yes, you are exempt even from karet. In other words, this karet—the punishment of karet—is karet with limited guarantee. Meaning basically in the end they are telling you: karet, karet—but practically, if you do what you need to do, the Holy One, blessed be He, will take care of you. That’s basically what he says.

The sages of Safed apparently do not understand this way. There is a leniency and a stringency in their words. On the one hand they understand that no, one is not exempt from karet without lashes by ordained judges—that’s the stringency. On the other hand they say: fine, but one can lash even someone who is not legally liable, and in that way exempt him from karet. Each side has one leniency and one stringency, but each of course tries to offer a solution. One offers it this way; one offers it that way. So each chooses one leniency and one stringency.

But really, according to the sages of Safed, what comes out regarding all those people until the renewal of ordination? What do they think happened to them? What—were they all cut off? It is really astonishing. The Maharlbach truly says: what are you talking about? Whoever repented… yes, maybe they would say that really repenting as one ought to is difficult. Fine, so practically everyone was cut off? So practically what they are saying is that almost everyone was cut off, unless they really repented properly. But if they say there is a problem, then apparently most people don’t do that. So most of those liable to karet were cut off. What an astonishing thing that is, this innovation. “No one banished from Him will remain banished”—I don’t know.

In any case, the Maharlbach is more lenient on this point. That’s what I’m saying: he has a leniency and a stringency, but altogether it’s a leniency because he gave us a solution. He says: “In sum, Torah lashes are what exempt from karet together with repentance. It is possible that the person being lashed might die from them, and according to everyone they have no power to put to death any person who committed a transgression carrying a death penalty if he was not warned, even if the transgressor comes before them and begs them to do so, for the atonement of his sin.” And he equates these lashes with death. Why? Because he is consistent with his own view. What is his view? Not like Midrash Tanchuma. That these lashes are a punishment. They are a punishment. And someone who receives punitive lashes has a rule that he is exempt from karet.

What do the sages of Safed and Midrash Tanchuma say? You’re right—putting him to death is certainly forbidden if he is not liable to death. But these lashes are not a punishment. Punishment is not imposed where it is not deserved. But here these are lashes meant to exempt from karet; they are not punitive lashes. And this is Midrash Tanchuma consistent with itself. And it is clear that they follow this approach in any case. And if it’s not a punishment, why do you need a religious court? What? Ah—in a moment I’ll get to that. I’ll get to that in just a second.

After that he says: “Furthermore I say that even if the law would support that a religious court may lash a transgressor without witnesses and warning with Torah lashes when the transgressor comes and begs them to lash him for the atonement of his sin”—meaning he says as well that it is simply forbidden to lash him, not only that it doesn’t exempt from karet. It is forbidden to lash him; that is inflicting injury. There is a prohibition of injuring. No—he says whenever one lashes, there is a chance the person could die. And if you do that without having been commanded to do so, then it turns out you caused a person’s death. Right: injury and perhaps danger of murder, yes. So therefore he says first of all it is forbidden to do this. And besides, even if you say it is permitted, it still will not exempt from karet. “Even so, he is not exempt from karet through those lashes, even if he repented. And even in a transgression that has no karet, he is not exempt from the heavenly punishment on that transgression through those lashes. For specifically when the verse says ‘your brother shall be degraded’—once he is degraded, behold he is as your brother—it speaks of those lashes mentioned there and not other lashes.”

And even regarding lashes that one is legally liable for from the outset, the Maharlbach himself brings in the name of Orchot Chaim—the next paragraph, look—“And I saw in the book Orchot Chaim that he wrote concerning lashes things which according to their plain sense contradict what I wrote. Even so, even according to his words, that agreement agreed upon by the rabbis of Safed is of no use at all; and the purpose attained through it can also be attained without it.” Meaning, he means to say: Orchot Chaim is certainly like you, that is obvious. But even according to him, you don’t need this ordination at all; the goal can be attained even without your ordination. So in any case, your ordination is still unnecessary. Why? “And this is his language”—now he quotes him: “And lashes certainly atone together with repentance and confession, for lashes among those liable to lashes stand in place of death among those liable to death. And death never atones except with confession. Thus our rabbis said: all those put to death confess, for everyone who confesses has a share in the World to Come. And if you ask why they did not mention repentance together with confession, that is because he is standing at the place of stoning and going to die, and has no time to sin, so there is no need to say, ‘I have acted perversely and will not do so again.’ But in those liable to lashes one needs repentance. And although the lashes do not atone except together with confession and repentance, it is impossible that they should not lighten the punishment of that sin for him because of the pain he suffers, for that pain is part of the punishment he incurred at the hands of Heaven. And there is no difference in this matter between whether he was lashed in religious court or outside religious court, except that if he became liable in religious court to lashes, they lash him against his will. But if he committed a transgression not in religious court and without warning, and he himself wants to be lashed in order to lighten the punishment of the sin, blessing shall come upon him. And if he does not wish it, we do not force him.” Thus wrote the Ramaz in a responsum; he also brings the responsum of the Ramaz on this.

So what does he say? He is basically saying this: first of all, the lashes themselves reduce part of the punishment, even without repentance. The very fact that you suffered—for suffering also atones to some extent. And by the way it appears from him that it actually reduces the punishment in Heaven, though I’m not entirely sure, but that’s what it sounds like. Then he says more than that. He is basically saying: what is the difference between a case where there was warning and all the conditions were fulfilled, and a case where there was no warning? If there was warning, the religious court must lash. If there was no warning, the religious court has discretion to lash if the person asks; then they can lash him. And both this one and that one are exempt from karet. Either way they are exempt from karet. So it is explicit in his words that a person who is not legally liable to lashes in religious court can come to the religious court and ask them to lash him, and this will exempt him from karet.

Now of course the question arises: why does it have to come to a religious court? No, but maybe that’s correct. It contradicts what the Maharlbach said only on the point that he said if there is no legal liability to lashes then it doesn’t help. Here he says it does help. But still maybe it has to be that the religious court does it and not… yes, of course, that’s what I’m saying now. Why do you need a religious court? That’s what one still needs, right? And this contradicts the Maharlbach even more. Even more. Because this sounds exactly like the sages of Safed, and there is precisely some problem inside the sages of Safed too. The sages of Safed also wanted to be… no, the sages of Safed also say that ideally you still need a religious court. What are the sages of Safed actually saying? Notice: they’re dancing on two branches. What are they actually saying? On the one hand they say that you do not have to be legally liable to a court punishment in order to be exempt from karet. On the other hand, it has to be ordained judges. Otherwise why do you need ordination? That’s what he argues against them. He says: Master of the universe, if only the lashes, the suffering in the lashes, atone for karet, and you don’t really need punitive lashes from religious court, then according to Orchot Chaim too you don’t need your ordination. So even without ordination, beat him and exempt him from karet. After all that too is what he says: “it is impossible that it should not lighten the punishment of the sin because of the pain he suffered,” the suffering itself, regardless whether these are lashes from religious court or not.

Therefore I think that within Orchot Chaim, if one reads him a little more carefully—he does write that he comes to the religious court. He doesn’t say he goes to his friend and says hit me a little. So Orchot Chaim too says one needs to come to a religious court. It is really not clear what the logic behind the matter is, but that is what he says. And within the sages of Safed too there is the same thing: that you need a religious court, yes, even though they agree that lashes one is not legally obligated to receive in religious court still exempt from karet. But you still need a religious court—why? It is not fully clear. But this too seems to be present among them.

So apparently the simple understanding—the one that says that the suffering itself atones—is not accepted even by the sages of Safed. True, one does not need punitive lashes from religious court, but it is not that just any suffering of lashes exempts. You still need ordained judges to be involved here. And maybe suffering does atone, yes—but “lashes,” lashes that are always considered something that atones—the lashes that exempt from karet are not by virtue of the suffering in the lashes. Of course that counts as suffering like all suffering, but that will not be the law of lashes that exempt from karet.

What is the explanation for that? So later on, look, he himself asks: “And if you say: since the blows of the lashes are equally strong in this case and that case, what difference is there between this and that?” Between lashes one is obligated to receive and lashes one is not. Yes, the Maharlbach asks against himself. He says after all, if what exempts is the pain, the suffering, then why does it matter whether he was legally obligated to receive it or not? If that suffering is a substitute for karet, then what’s the problem? “Not so; there is indeed a great difference between them. For the Torah said: ‘Then the judge shall make him lie down and strike him,’ etc. And that is not like when he himself comes to the religious court and casts himself before them and asks them to lash him. Proof of this is what the sages said in tractate Ta’anit, in the chapter ‘The Order of Fasts, How So,’ regarding that which we learned in the Mishnah: they place ashes on the ark and on the head of the nasi and the head of the court, and each one places on his own head. The Talmud asks: should the nasi and the head of the court take it themselves and put it on their own heads? Why should someone else put it on their heads? The Talmud answers: why is it that another person takes it and puts it on them? Rabbi Abba of Kisrin said: one who is embarrassed by himself is not like one embarrassed by others.”

So what does the Maharlbach say? Why do you need punitive lashes from religious court? Because when you come on your own initiative and ask the religious court to lash you, it is not the same shame as when the court forces you, takes you, and beats you by force. And since that is so, only that exempts from karet. I think there is actually a better answer here for the sages of Safed. Why do you need a religious court? Why do you need to come to a religious court—ordained judges, or a religious court? Because this has to be perceived as something imposed on you from outside.

But then why, according to the Maharlbach, would one need witnesses and warning? That too is part of the humiliation? What does it have to do with it? Fine—say that the court humiliates him through others. Fine. So that is exactly the conclusion of the sages of Safed, no? That the court should lash him. Fine, excellent—but why do you need all the conditions in order to incur lashes? Does that too add to the humiliation? What does it matter whether there was warning or not? What? After all, what they wanted to do—so perhaps these are important men, I don’t know, the greatest sages of the generation maybe, and perhaps that is a criterion for how great the humiliation really is. You come to the greatest sages of the generation and receive from them—who knows, maybe. But the definition is that you come to a religious court, and a religious court means only ordained judges. One who is not ordained is not a religious court. Is it less humiliating if they are not ordained, before the greatest sages of the generation? Why? “Happy are you, Israel, before whom are you purified?” But they apparently really wanted to do it for one who requests it.

There’s a contradiction from the wise sun, who gets up and says it really doesn’t help. Yes, although I understand that’s what he said, and I think his own explanation maybe even fits their view better than his own. Because what difference does it make if he requests it? Fine, so let him not request it, and lash him against his will, without his requesting, without witnesses and warning—just to exempt him from karet. What’s the problem? Why do you need the conditions in order to incur a punishment of lashes? That he does not explain. You need to come to a religious court, that it comes from someone else. It should not be that you request it but that they come on their own. But the whole rule that only they may beat him, and that there must be witnesses and warning—why do you need witnesses and warning? Let them beat him on their own initiative, without his request, but without all the conditions. Clearly, according to his approach, lashes are a punishment. And since that is so, you cannot beat him; it is prohibited, as he said above—injury is forbidden. If he is liable to lashes by Torah law, then the religious court may lash him; that is not a transgression, and everything is fine. But if not, then true, from the angle of exemption from karet, but the religious court is forbidden. The court is forbidden because this is injury.

So his explanation is terribly technical. The sages of Safed may well be saying exactly that. Agreed, you’re right, and that is the exemption. And Orchot Chaim too, who says a religious court is needed but not all the conditions, as with the sages of Safed—why? Because one needs a religious court so that it comes from someone else, but not that one really needs all the conditions. Why not all the conditions? Because according to them this is not a punishment. Even without its being a punishment, it exempts. One only needs for him to be lashed, and that serves as a substitute for karet; that’s all. They continue consistently with their own approach here too.

Now why, according to the Maharlbach, does this matter work exactly? It turns out then that this is basically an awfully technical matter. You are liable to punitive lashes. Without your being liable to punitive lashes, one may not lash you—according to the Maharlbach I’m speaking now. One may not lash you. Right? Then you are stuck with karet. So what, should they violate the prohibition of injury, beat me anyway—I waive my rights, bruise me, yes, injure me and beat me so that I can be exempt from karet? Is this some technical issue—that they are forbidden because of injury, and therefore I get stuck and remain with karet for life? It seems the Maharlbach has something beyond that. It’s not just a technical field. The Maharlbach really understands that the exemption is probably not just the suffering. True, the suffering is what exempts you from karet, but there is some metaphysical element here, I don’t know exactly what, but it has to be a punishment of the religious court. It has to be defined as a punishment of the religious court in order for you to be exempt from karet. I’m not entirely clear why, but “your brother shall be degraded before your eyes”—that’s what the verse says. If there is a punishment of the religious court, as we learned from this verse, then that punishment will also exempt you from karet. Why? I don’t know. Scriptural decree. I don’t know why.

The Maharlbach’s central view is that lashes exempt only when a person committed a transgression and was warned: know that if you do this, you’ll be lashed. Only then—that is really his main position. He tries to retreat from it a bit, but that is the main position of his. Yes, he tries perhaps not to dispute Orchot Chaim. Fine, so that is the first position of the discussion. In such a situation, what basically happens is that a person transgressed and in a sense knew that he had submitted himself to lashes at that moment. So as it were, the moment a person submits himself to lashes, that is the punishment that comes to him. So that’s it, and there is no karet because he submitted himself in order to receive lashes. You submitted yourself in order to receive lashes—that’s what you’ll get. So what, you’re a bigger wicked person, and therefore you don’t get karet? You’re a smaller wicked person and you get karet, while a greater wicked person does not get karet? Through lashes, as it were, you are violating what the religious court tells you, not what the Holy One, blessed be He, tells you. What does that mean? On the Sabbath—what is this called? You ate pork, you said… But they told you: know that you will get lashes, and so you went and got lashes. So it can’t be that the lesser wicked person gets karet while the greater wicked person is exempt from karet. Does that make sense? It is very strange, very strange. But that is what comes out according to the Maharlbach. That is what comes out. Meaning, a lesser wicked person who does not legally incur lashes will remain with karet. And the greater wicked person, the one who does incur lashes by law—the one who says yes, and intentionally yes, I am doing it—he specifically will be exempt from karet? This is very puzzling.

Puzzling in logic, even though—again—if you ask just an ordinary learner in any study hall, ask him: how is one exempted from karet? He’ll laugh and tell you: you do the Ten Days of Repentance, you come, yes, you do… Now this thought that there is a punishment… Nachmanides… maybe from the other side Nachmanides has some solution, because after all the verse says regarding him that there are lashes and he is exempt from karet. This midrash… Yes, but the midrash there was speaking when he repented. There there was certainly repentance. There not the body itself… But that still doesn’t mean you need warning and all that. It fits with the Maharlbach, but it doesn’t prove the Maharlbach. So that’s why I say: on that I don’t have a really good answer. I really do not know what the sages of Safed do with all the Jews up to the 16th century. What was going on here?

Now Nachmanides really wrestles with these matters. He says it cannot be that because of one transgression like this, where you failed to get lashes or something like that, you lose your entire World to Come. So he says there are things where yes and things where no; it depends on the severity of the transgression. He distinguishes between several kinds of karet. But in Maimonides himself it really lacks a reason. So one has to say that in any case they probably thought one can repent, but with lashes it is easier. Fine, I don’t know—maybe.

There is one last point here. In the Maggid Mishneh—well, the Mishneh LaMelekh on Maimonides, chapter 16 of Sanhedrin—he brings the opposite view. He says that lashes exempt from karet only in situations where there is no liability to lashes. Only where there is liability to lashes—then you are liable to lashes, why should that exempt you from karet? You are lashed because you are lashed, and besides that there is karet. Only where there is no liability to lashes… If he got lashes twice? Lashes as lashes, and lashes instead of karet? Maybe that would help, I don’t know. Maybe. Rabbi Zalman kind of pushes such things away—it doesn’t… he gets to the Mishneh LaMelekh there, but that contradicts explicit passages of the Talmud, so no. That’s what he writes there. Of course that could solve some of the problems, but no—that is not the accepted view there. Fine.