Q&A: Questions About Certainty
Questions About Certainty
Question
1. You told me that nothing in the world is certain—but what about existence itself? After all, we feel that we exist, and from my point of view that is certain (I should note that I have never managed to understand how someone can be a nihilist—it seems illogical to me)?
2. If you separate the concept of truth from certainty—what meaning do these two concepts have at all? Is certainty worthless because there is no such thing?
3. The last time I spoke with you about these topics, what I understood was that there is no certainty in a proof, because a proof must be based on foundational assumptions, and foundational assumptions are something that cannot be proven, so anything built on them is not proven. But I remember we spoke in a way that suggested I can still know that the foundational assumptions are correct on the basis of intuition; that intuition is indeed a tool for recognizing truth. I can recognize that something is true without it being proven. I also believe that cognition is a tool for reaching certainty—it's certain to me that God created the world, because that is what my intuition tells me—it is clear to me. Why don't you want to think that way?
Answer
1. I am definitely not a nihilist. I gave up certainty, but not truth. What you are claiming here is Descartes' "cogito" argument (I think, therefore I exist), and much ink has been spilled over it, but this is not the place. For the purpose of this discussion, I am willing to accept the certainty of that, even if philosophically and logically there is room for objections. That is the uniqueness of this claim, at least according to Descartes' approach: it is truly necessary from within itself (and does not require observations).
2. Certainty with respect to facts is an intellectual abstraction. I speak about different levels of probability, and on that basis I can define a probability of 100%, and that is what is called certainty. In practice, this cannot be attained regarding facts (perhaps except for existence itself, as above). Certainty does exist regarding logical tautologies (two things equal to a third thing are equal to each other. If every X is Y and a is X, then a is Y. And so on). But logical tautologies do not say anything about the world (they do not assert anything, but deal only with relations between propositions).
3. I definitely do want to think that way. More than that, what you wrote in this section is exactly what I argue: although proofs are based on assumptions and therefore logical certainty does not exist with respect to facts, we have intuition, by means of which we adopt our assumptions, and that is our instrument for truth. But the products of intuition are not certain, only true. That is precisely what I keep saying all the time. Intuition does indeed give us truth, but not with certainty. Therefore our cognition is indeed a tool for reaching truth, but not certainty. Notice that once again you are conflating truth with certainty.
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Questioner (another one):
In your book God Plays Dice, you argue that it is possible to prove the existence of God in the world, and seemingly even when you prove it with rational arguments it still remains doubtful. The Kuzari also writes in the Fifth Essay that all the proofs of philosophy are doubtful and not certain, and therefore it would seem that the certain proof is the subjective proof—that we have encountered the Divine.
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Rabbi:
I did not understand the question. You quoted the Kuzari. Indeed, no argument is certain, since it is based on foundational assumptions. The encounter does not give you certainty either. Faith is not certain.
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Questioner:
In your book you say that faith is not certain, and that is hard to understand, because if I experience something subjectively, nobody can tell me that I am not experiencing it. It's like my saying that the sun warms me. And if that is not certain, how can the Rabbi observe the commandments out of doubt and even rejoice in them?
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Rabbi:
Even someone who sees a mirage—nobody can tell him that he is not seeing. But one can tell him that what he sees does not exist in reality. The same is true regarding faith. I am not arguing about the subjective feeling. The question is whether it reflects something in reality. Faith is a claim about reality. A fascinating discussion of this distinction appears in the book by C. S. Lewis (yes, the author of the Narnia series), The Abolition of Man (Shalem Press), and also in my book Truth and Unstable.
I can observe commandments in a state of doubt because I know that, as a human being, everything is ultimately subject to doubt. There is no certainty about anything. From my perspective, what is probable is enough to act upon in all areas, and therefore also in faith and in Jewish law.