Hello,
I read the article about these interpretive restrictions. It really can explain a great many cases. But I don't think every case.
For example, the case I brought from "the other site." There he cited the Mishnah in Berakhot: "If he was reading in the Torah and the time for reciting the Shema arrived, if he directed his heart, he fulfilled his obligation; and if not, he did not fulfill it."
And as is well known, in the dispute in Rosh Hashanah, there is the position of Rava that commandments do not require intent. And of course the questioner there challenged him from an explicit Mishnah in Berakhot. And they answered that it is speaking there about someone proofreading.
But here the main law of the Mishnah really seems to be missing from the text. It's not just that there is some difficulty in applying the general Platonic rule to a situation without other forces present. Rather, here the plain sense of the Mishnah is speaking about actual intent. Not about the intent that when he is proofreading he should pronounce the words properly. That is what the next line in the Mishnah already addresses explicitly, where it says: "If he read but did not articulate its letters precisely"—did he fulfill his obligation or not?
I would be glad to see whether the Rabbi can explain this interpretation in a reasonable way.

See also the famous article by Bnaya Kaspi, who also analyzed the mechanism of interpretive restriction —

יש ללחוץ כדי לגשת אל pituchey_hotam00404.pdf

I'm sorry, but I really don't see any problem here. This is a much easier case than those I dealt with in the article. In fact, this isn't even an interpretive restriction at all, but simply reading the Mishnah according to its plain meaning.

The Talmud says that "he read but did not direct his heart" can be interpreted in two different ways according to the two opinions:
According to the one who says commandments require intent — the meaning is without intent of the heart to fulfill the obligation.
According to the one who says commandments do not require intent — the meaning is without intent to read, but rather to proofread.
First, notice that both interpretations are entirely possible in the Mishnah. After all, if commandments do not require intent, there is no reason at all to assume that the term "intent" here means intent to fulfill one's obligation. According to Rava, such intent is not required by Jewish law at all (or at least it is not indispensable). So according to his view, it is obvious that whatever intent he sees in the Mishnah is intent for the act itself (to exclude an unintentional act), not intent to fulfill the obligation. An unintentional actor is someone who performs the act without awareness, and that is exactly the case of someone reading in order to proofread, who does not intend to read.

I'll say again: both interpretations are perfectly fine in the Mishnah. We, however, are used to interpreting the Mishnah in line with the halakhic conclusion, which according to most medieval authorities is that commandments do require intent, and so we have grown accustomed to reading "he directed his heart" as meaning that he intended to fulfill his obligation. But Rava did not hold that way, and there is no problem at all with reading the Mishnah differently. The mistake is that people apply the reading familiar to us and assume that this must necessarily be the plain meaning of the Mishnah. It is not the plain meaning of the Mishnah, or at least not the only plain meaning.

After that you noted the continuation of the Mishnah in Berakhot, where it speaks about one who read but did not articulate its letters precisely. I take it that you meant to say that the continuation of the Mishnah already covers the issue of unintentional action, and then according to Rava there is an illogical redundancy in the Mishnah. But that is simply a mistake.
To understand why, we have to clarify what "reading in order to proofread" actually means in practice. What exactly is he doing? The medieval authorities (for example, Bartenura) wrote that the meaning is that he reads the letters but not according to their vocalization, and that is indeed the simple meaning in the Talmud (for when proofreading a written scroll in order to identify scribal errors, one need not pay attention to the vowels, only to the letters). If so, the opening clause according to Rava is not the same case as the ending clause.
In the opening clause, we are dealing with someone who reads the entire word with all its letters, but the vocalization is not accurate. He garbles the reading, since his purpose is only to proofread and not to read. But the meaning of the case in the ending clause of the Mishnah is that he omitted and altered letters, meaning there was no act of reading at all.
The opening clause deals with someone who reads without paying attention to the vocalization, an unintentional actor: there you read the words in full, but you are occupied in something else and have no intention of reading. But the ending clause speaks of someone who did not articulate its letters precisely, and there there is no act of reading at all. He is reading different words — not only in pronunciation and vocalization, but in the actual written form. He is omitting letters from the writing itself.

Notice that here we are not dealing with an interpretive restriction at all. This is simply a reading of the Mishnah according to its plain sense, and there is no difficulty in it whatsoever. So here no special explanations are needed at all. If this is the hardest objection he found against Talmudic give-and-take, then our situation is excellent.

Wow, thank you so much for the expansion!! Now it really does seem very simple to me. At first that reading sounded really strange to someone stuck in the accepted understanding of our time.
The thing is, I still don't manage to understand how one can push the language of the Talmud when there is a contradiction between the wording of the Mishnah and the Talmud. I think that all the examples you brought in the article are all of a somewhat different kind. There it wasn't a contradiction to the plain wording of the Mishnah, but only setting it in a very specific case (as though the wording of the Mishnah required some further addition). There you argue that they try to place them in the full realization of the general Platonic law. As you yourself explicitly wrote, the main novelty always remains in its source in the Mishnah. The Talmud only tries to realize the Platonic Jewish law.
But there are cases where the language really contradicts the position the Talmud establishes, not just complements it.
For example, in the next chapter from the Mishnah in Beitzah that you cited, the Mishnah there says that if they ate the eruv tavshilin, then as long as any amount remains one may rely on it. The Talmud establishes it as an olive-sized amount, and not just any amount.
("If it was eaten or lost, one may not cook in reliance on it at the outset; if he left over any amount from it, he may rely on it for the Sabbath.")
Here too would you argue that the "any amount" in the Mishnah refers to the Platonic law — that the quantity of the eruv was small from the outset? Clearly there is something a bit problematic here. The words "any amount" mean "any amount," not an olive-sized amount.
I assume one can find examples that are much more contradictory to their plain meaning, but I don't recall any at the moment.

In the case of eruvin it seems they understand that the Mishnah is not giving a general rule or defining a quantity ("any amount"), but saying that you don't need 50 logs, or even 10 egg-bulks, for example, but rather "any amount" (even just a tiny bit of food!). But not less than an olive-bulk. That's already too far, and that's not what they were talking about.

That is, "any amount" is not absolute, but meant to rule out the second possibility — a very large amount.

With God's help, 14 Cheshvan 5779

It seems that "any amount" means a minimal quantity fit for eating. Therefore the minimum is an olive-bulk, since less than an olive-bulk is not considered "eating."

With blessing,
S.Z. Levinger

Others already preceded me and answered you nicely in two ways. I agree with them as well.

Hello,
How does the Rabbi understand the interpretive restrictions throughout most of the mishnayot in Ketubot chapter 7,
about "one who vows his wife off," where there is an opinion that she made the vow?
That is, the first Mishnah means "he vows his wife off" literally, but four times it is taken non-literally…
(even if because of certain reasons involving a contradiction with the previous Mishnah, though it can be explained differently)

It's hard to answer in a general essay-like way about the entire chapter. If you want to raise one example here, it will be possible to discuss it.