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Q&A: On Idolatry for Its Own Sake

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

On Idolatry for Its Own Sake

Question

Hello Rabbi,
In one of your lectures you mentioned Maimonides’ view regarding idolatry, that only someone who accepts it as a deity is liable; one who worships it out of love or fear is exempt. You mentioned that accepting it as a deity is somewhat similar to serving God for its own sake, meaning that the person who accepts an idol as a deity worships it not for some other reason, but because he sees it as a god. But on the other hand, you wrote regarding coercion in matters of belief that if someone truly believes something, he cannot be blamed for it, since he is coerced by his beliefs. So seemingly this creates a situation in which one cannot be held liable for idolatry. Is that not so?

Answer

Hello Oren.
A good question that has troubled me quite a bit (and Nadav Shnerb as well). See Nadav Shnerb’s article in Akdamot on this topic (if I remember correctly, it is called: Reflections on Idolatry).
In my view, there is acceptance of a deity driven by inclination, but the acceptance is still serious, meaning that he is genuinely committed. Yesterday I wrote about this in an answer to one of the questions (I do not remember now exactly to whom). Perhaps this happens when he believes in the existence of the idol, but would not have worshipped it were it not for the inclination. That is, as to the meaning of the worship, he truly believes in it (he thinks it is serious), but the decision actually to worship it, to be committed to it, is because of the inclination.
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Questioner:
Maybe this can be paralleled to the idea of: “From not for its own sake, one comes to for its own sake.” Meaning: at first he does not worship idols and is also aware of the prohibition against worshipping them — stage 1. After that, he begins to worship idols “not for their own sake,” that is, out of some side interest, without accepting them as a deity, while understanding that it is nonsense, in which case he is exempt — stage 2. Then he begins to understand that there is something to it, but is still worshipping out of self-interest, not for its own sake — stage 3. And finally he begins to worship for its own sake and accepts it as a deity, in which case seemingly he is coerced by his beliefs, but he brought himself into that state of coercion, as you wrote in another answer, and therefore he should be held liable — stage 4. According to this definition, for a person to be liable for idolatry he must pass through all four stages above in that order. If he was born into stage 2, 3, or 4, and remains in that zone, stage 2 or 3 or 4, he is exempt. Even if he moves directly from stage 1 to 3 or 4, he is exempt, since he is coerced in his beliefs. For the transition from stage 1 to 2 one becomes liable regarding beliefs but not regarding seriousness, and for the transition from 2 or 3 to 4 one becomes liable regarding seriousness but not regarding beliefs. In addition there is an initial condition for liability, namely that one be aware of the prohibition against worshipping idols, as I wrote in stage 1. Meaning, someone who begins as a secular person or an atheist in stage 1 also cannot become liable. Only someone who begins as a religious person in stage 1 can become liable. What do you think of this model?
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Rabbi:
I think that is possible, but not necessary. What I proposed is one possible model, and it does not require all the stages you described. A person worships idols even though he knows there is the Jewish God, but he thinks there is indeed substance to the foreign deity as well, associationism. He does this out of inclination, but he accepts it as a deity out of that inclination.
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Questioner:
I think your suggestion needs the addition that this person recognizes two entities. One is the Holy One, blessed be He, and the second is, let us say, Baal. That person understands that the Holy One, blessed be He, is superior to Baal, and that one should obey the Holy One, blessed be He, in the event of a conflict with Baal’s command, and nevertheless chooses to obey Baal even in conflict with the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, out of inclination. Otherwise, if that person recognizes Baal as a power equal to the Holy One, blessed be He, then seemingly he is coerced by his beliefs.
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Rabbi:
Your point is included in what I said.
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Israel:
Is there no way to say that the punishment is not because of blame, but out of a desire to eradicate idol worshippers? It sounds bad, but many of the Torah’s laws of punishment do not always sound as though they are one hundred percent matched to blame.
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Rabbi:
Hello Israel.
In principle that is possible, but then we would have had to punish every idol worshipper as such, even without accepting it as a deity. That too is not what Maimonides writes. And in my humble opinion, it is forced to say that in cases where there is no acceptance of it as a deity, this simply is not idolatry, and therefore the law of “you shall eradicate the evil from your midst” does not apply.
More generally, I think that according to the Sages, punishments are usually a sanction for blame, unless it is explicitly stated otherwise, as with the wayward and rebellious son, or in the Talmudic passage about mishap and disgrace regarding animals.
And as for the Torah’s criminal law as a whole, I think the situation is actually the opposite of what you wrote. Usually very clear proof of guilt is required, and without it there is exemption. That is why warning is needed — and warning is given only to distinguish between inadvertence and intentional violation, that is, to ascertain blame — and acceptance of the warning is also required, and there is discussion whether a scholar requires warning. All this indicates that blame is a necessary condition for punishment. One acting unawares, one acting inadvertently, one acting without intent, and so on, are exempt.

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