Answer

I didn’t understand what it means to stipulate regarding the laws of an unintentional killer. A stipulation requires some act by the person. When he performs some act that depends on him (betrothal, acquisition, and the like), he can stipulate that the act is conditional on this or that happening. But with an unintentional killer, nothing is being done, so I don’t understand what relevance a stipulation has there.
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Questioner:
By “stipulation” I mean enacting rules different from those specified in the Torah. For example, if someone kills unintentionally, he must sit such-and-such number of years in prison (instead of being exiled to a city of refuge). Regarding most Choshen Mishpat laws, I understood that different rules can be enacted from those written in the Torah. The question is whether here too one could enact something different, or whether because it says "as a statute of judgment" this is some kind of exception regarding the ability to change it.
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Rabbi:
It seems to me that with regard to exile, it cannot be changed even without reference to "a statute of judgment," because the Torah in our portion writes that one may not take ransom for the life of a killer, whether unintentional (a ransom in place of exile; see Rashi) or intentional. That is, the Torah warns not to impose something else on him instead of exile. 
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Questioner:
For the sake of the discussion, let’s take this law: "But after the death of the High Priest, the killer shall return to the land of his possession." Now let’s assume that as a society we want to lengthen the punishment so that the killer will remain there forever and not return even after the death of the High Priest. Is that possible? Or because it says "as a statute of judgment," may it not be changed?
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Rabbi:
It could be that lengthening it is possible, since the greater includes the lesser. But that could be true even where there is a verse saying "an eternal statute."
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Questioner:
But there is a rule that everywhere in the Torah where it says "statute," one must carry out the passage exactly as written and precisely, without changing even a small detail. And the verse says that "the killer shall return." If so, how can one nullify the requirement that "the killer shall return"? One could also ask a similar question about the law of the blood-avenger: as a society, are we allowed to abolish the blood-avenger’s right to kill the killer? Or is it forbidden to change that because of "as a statute of judgment"?
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Rabbi:
First, there is no obligation that the killer return. What it says is that afterward he may return (not that he must). The obligation is that the killer go into exile.
Second, I don’t recall any rule that when it says "statute," every detail is mandatory and unchangeable. What I do recall is that when it says "statute," it is indispensable—regarding sacrificial matters, where the rule in itself is not necessarily indispensable. As a general matter, if there is a law in the Torah, it is binding and indispensable even without the word "statute."
Third, a religious court can punish not strictly according to the law (see Choshen Mishpat, sec. 2). Therefore extending the punishment is possible, but shortening it is like nullifying a punishment, and about that I’m not sure a religious court has authority (for example, not to flog someone who is liable). Admittedly, if the Sanhedrin were to decide to uproot something from the Torah, they can do so by passive omission. But that is not within the authority of every religious court that imposes extra-legal punishment.
The same discussion applies to the right of the blood-avenger. A right is not an obligation (although the Tannaim disputed whether this is actually a commandment regarding the blood-avenger), and therefore it is easier to uproot it. 
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Questioner:
Seemingly, according to what you’re saying, the verse "And these shall be for you as a statute of judgment throughout your generations in all your dwelling places" is superfluous. If so, what do the words "as a statute of judgment" come to teach us in this passage according to your approach?

In addition, why is it that regarding the laws of inheritance one cannot enact inheritance rules different from the Torah’s laws? There too, after all, we are dealing with the heirs’ rights (like the right of the blood-avenger), which one might uproot.
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Rabbi:
I don’t know what those words come to say, but it’s hard for me to draw conclusions from seemingly extra words. First, it may be that they come to say that the laws of exile are an eternal statute (and not the killer’s return to his place). Second, perhaps they come to say that these laws always apply and not only at the time of conquest and settlement or something like that. 
 
As for the laws of inheritance, the problem there is different. Seemingly, there we are dealing with a person stipulating against the laws of inheritance, since he is the one transferring the property. But that is not possible, because while the assets are still in his possession, this is not inheritance but a lifetime gift (and that truly can be done). And after his death they are no longer in his possession but in that of his heirs as determined by Jewish law, so he can no longer transfer them to someone else.
However, from the wording of the Talmud (which linked this to stipulating contrary to what is written in the Torah) and the halakhic decisors, it appears that there is a fundamental problem in stipulating against the laws of inheritance, and not merely a technical problem as I wrote. They are not considered monetary laws, meaning rights of the heir, but rather prohibitions (duties of the one leaving the inheritance).
Therefore, it seems to me that the basic distinction is that in inheritance the right is a duty imposed on the one leaving the inheritance, not a right of the heirs, and therefore it cannot be stipulated away. Whereas with the blood-avenger it seems obvious that this is not a duty on the killer toward the blood-avenger but a right of the blood-avenger. If the heirs do not want the inheritance, the father is still obligated to leave it to them (afterward they can of course waive it and give it to someone else like any gift). But if the blood-avenger does not want to kill the killer, there is no obligation on the killer to be killed.
The basis of the matter is in the words of Nachmanides (Numbers 27:11), that the order of estates determines the order of inheritance, and all this is because the Torah’s will is continuity through the father’s descendants. That is, the laws of inheritance do not express the will of the one leaving the inheritance, as is accepted in other legal systems, but the will of the Torah, which does not depend on the deceased’s opinion, and therefore one cannot stipulate against them (in legal language: inheritance law is mandatory, not default).
And this is what Sefer HaChinukh writes in commandment 20:
And when the power of the one leaving the inheritance departs from the property through his death, the right of the heir immediately falls upon it, in the manner of the chain of creations that the blessed Creator wished to follow one after another without interruption.
Afterward I saw that somewhat like my point, the Raavad raised this difficulty in Laws of Marriage 12:9, and see Even HaEzel on Laws of Inheritance 6:1, who noted this and wrote that one might have thought it was possible to stipulate regarding inheritance because there is a verse that seemingly allows a father to transfer the inheritance to whomever he wishes:
But he discussed it further: what need is there for the verse "as a statute of judgment," and why would we have said that the one leaving the inheritance can remove the heir through a stipulation he makes with him, even if the heir agreed? For in that point even the Maggid Mishneh agrees with the Raavad that the heir cannot transfer ownership, because it is something not yet in existence. If so, in what way is the power of the one leaving the inheritance superior, that he can remove the heir from his inheritance? And even if we say that the withdrawal here is not from the assets he will inherit later, but from the status of heir that he already has, what does this have to do with the law of stipulating contrary to what is written in the Torah? They performed no act between them that brings about the effectuation of the heir’s inheritance. Rather, Maimonides’ words require explanation, for it is stated explicitly in the Mishnah in Bava Batra 130 that he cannot say, "So-and-so shall inherit me במקום there is a daughter," or "My daughter shall inherit me במקום there is a son," because he stipulated contrary to what is written in the Torah. And one cannot say that this does not literally mean the general law of stipulating contrary to what is written in the Torah, but only that he lacks the power to alter the law written in the Torah, for on 126 the Talmud explicitly links this to the law of stipulating contrary to what is written in the Torah and raises an objection from Rabbi Yehuda, who says that in monetary matters his stipulation stands; and it answers there, and it is evident that it is one and the same reasoning. And he wrote about this that since the Mishnah follows Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, and so the law is, that if one spoke concerning someone fit to inherit him, his words stand, and the Talmud learned this from the verse "on the day he causes his sons to inherit"—the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath to whomever he wishes—therefore, were it not for the verse "as a statute of judgment," we would have said that he can bequeath even in a way that changes the inheritance rules written in the Torah. 
I also saw there that he wrote that "a statute of judgment" written in the passage of inheritances teaches in the Talmud that inheritance cases are not judged at night, and only Maimonides learned from this the prohibition against changing inheritance law (Maimonides, in his way, brings the fitting verses even against the Talmud, as explained in the principles of Maimonides). In any case, we learn from here that the word "statute" can teach completely different things even in the matter of the blood-avenger (for example, that his case not be judged for exile at night), and one cannot force any conclusion from it regarding changing the law for future generations.
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Questioner:
Regarding the exclusion of inheritance law from ordinary monetary law, I saw that Rashbam in tractate Bava Batra 113b compares the laws of inheritance to monetary law, and this is his wording: Perhaps you mean the law of inheritances—that they are judged only by day like other monetary cases, as it is written regarding them (Jeremiah 21), "O house of David, execute judgment in the morning"; for all other inheritances too are called "judgment," as it was taught, for it is written at the end of the passage of inheritances, "and it shall be for the children of Israel as a statute of judgment." Since it calls them judgment, infer that all other inheritance matters too are by day. And if because it is written "and they judged the people at all times," Rava already explained this in Sanhedrin, in the chapter "One Who Judges Monetary Cases" (34b), as referring to the completion of judgment, but the beginning of judgment is by day; that is why it is written, "on the day he causes his sons to inherit," and that is what we learned: monetary cases are judged by day and may be completed even at night.
As it was taught, etc.—meaning that similarly we also find in another baraita that it equates all inheritances with judgment; for one might have thought that division of inheritances is like an ordinary division of partners and is not considered judgment, so it teaches us otherwise. Still, both verses are needed: "on the day he causes his sons to inherit" is needed for the beginning of judgment, that it be by day, and "a statute of judgment" is needed to include all other inheritances, that they too be considered judgment, for that verse "on the day he causes his sons to inherit" speaks only of a son inheriting his father.
Occurred to her—an expression of occurrence, like "and chance chanced upon her" (Ruth 2), meaning it became fixed as a matter of judgment and requires three judges and by day. And we also derive from them for all monetary laws that their beginning must be judged by day, like inheritances, regarding which it is written "on the day he causes his sons to inherit." 
Likewise, I remember that in one of your lectures you said that the laws appearing in Choshen Mishpat in the Shulchan Arukh are generally duties that arise from rights (as opposed to the prohibition of interest, for example, which is a duty not arising from a right, and therefore does not appear in Choshen Mishpat). The laws of inheritance do appear in Choshen Mishpat, so seemingly it would appear that we are dealing here with a duty that arises from the power of the heir’s right (unless you would say this is an exception).
Even if you say we are dealing here with a duty that does not arise from a right, one could still argue that the heirs are the ones conferring, not the one leaving the inheritance. The inheritance stipulation I mentioned above was not referring to a person making a stipulation about his own private inheritance, but to changing the law of the state so that inheritance is divided differently by default. Therefore it can be said that the heirs (who are citizens of the state) are the ones conferring, not the one leaving the inheritance (since the heirs accept upon themselves the laws of the state which say that the inheritance is divided in a certain way). So the duty of the one leaving the inheritance is still fulfilled; it is just that the heirs transfer, as part of their agreement to the state’s laws, their inheritance to those entitled to it under state law. This is similar to the property-relations law between spouses in the State of Israel, which says that the woman is entitled to part of the husband’s assets after divorce (contrary to Jewish law)—so too in our case it can be said that the sister is entitled to part of her brother’s inherited assets (contrary to Jewish law). 
Likewise, one could argue that the heirs waive the inheritance because the law requires them to waive it, and therefore a stipulation in inheritance as well (that accords with state law) is effective (according to the Talmud in Bava Batra 126a: "You can even say it is Rabbi Yehuda; there she knew and waived it, here she does not waive it").
Even if you say the brothers’ waiver is ineffective, one could compare this to the prohibition of interest, since there are state laws that sometimes obligate a citizen to pay interest (say, for late payments to the electric company). In other words, state law can override a halakhic duty that conflicts with it (in monetary matters), and we do not say that the law is void because it "stipulated contrary to what is written in the Torah" (correct me if I’m mistaken here).
 
I forgot to add that the Talmud in Bava Batra 126a treats stipulation regarding inheritances as a monetary stipulation, and the whole question is whether this follows Rabbi Meir’s view that a monetary stipulation against the Torah is invalid, or Rabbi Yehuda’s view that a monetary stipulation against the Torah is valid (and then they establish that it works only where there is waiver). So according to everyone it is agreed that this is a monetary stipulation.
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Rabbi:
It is clear that this is considered a legal matter, and therefore it is not judged at night. That is exactly what I wrote. That is apparently also the reason it appears in Choshen Mishpat, which deals with laws between people. And still, Maimonides and the other halakhic decisors ruled that this is not a legal matter in the sense of ordinary monetary laws that one can stipulate about, and not like the Talmud you mentioned. I haven’t looked into it now to see where the passage disagrees, or whether perhaps that is not the conclusion of the discussion there. Either way, it is certainly Maimonides’ ruling.
It should be remembered that even in the dispute of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding monetary matters, there are parallel passages that explain it in different ways (for example, that everyone agrees that a stipulation "on condition that the Sabbatical year not cancel my debt" is ineffective, but the dispute is about the law of a stipulation "that you not cancel me during the Sabbatical year").
Waiver will not help here, because the brothers cannot waive something not yet in existence. They have not yet received the inheritance. They can waive it after they receive it, but then it is already a gift and not a waiver. That is of course if they do not have the right in advance, for if this is a preexisting right then it can be waived from the stage at which you have it.
It seems to me that in the laws of inheritance the heir has a right because of the Torah’s determination, and not by virtue of some obligation or damage. Therefore here it is not in his hands to waive it, only to give it away after he receives it. It is like "on condition that you cancel my debt" and not "during the Sabbatical year." And this is not even a stipulation (since they are not doing anything upon which a stipulation can be made), but a waiver.
The state too can confiscate the property from the father or confiscate it from the heirs. But it probably cannot change the laws of inheritance themselves (and it is strained to say that they confiscate the property from the father retroactively a moment before his death). In general, regarding something one cannot stipulate about, the law of the kingdom is not the law.
By the way, it seems to me that there are halakhic decisors who wanted to argue that the state really can change inheritance law, and only private individuals cannot stipulate. I haven’t looked into it right now.
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Questioner:
If you agree that the state can confiscate the property from the heirs after they inherit, why would the law then not be effective for distributing the inheritance differently from the Torah? Just interpret the law as confiscating the property from the heirs, not from the one leaving the inheritance.
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Rabbi:
That’s right. That is what I wrote. The law can confiscate property from the heirs. But that’s not an interpretation; that really is what the law would need to do. Otherwise it would not take effect. The same regarding the blood-avenger: the law can punish the blood-avenger with death for no reason, and thereby de facto forbid him from killing the killer. Even so, it still requires discussion, because if the purpose of the law is to violate Torah law then perhaps there are those who would deny the validity of the law of the kingdom in this regard (because there is no law of the kingdom when one goes against Torah law, and it requires further analysis whether doing so indirectly is possible or whether the purpose is what determines it).
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Questioner:
 
If I understood you correctly, you are saying that theoretically the law can bring about a situation in which the inheritance is distributed differently from Torah law (by confiscating it from the heirs), it’s just that currently the law in the State of Israel is not formulated that way, and therefore it is not effective for this purpose (which is why a lifetime gift is needed)?
 
If that is indeed the case, what would the law be for someone who buys an apartment from a woman who inherited the apartment not in accordance with Torah law (and land cannot be stolen). Would he have to return the apartment to its legal owners?
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Rabbi:
Good question. It is fairly clear that she does not have to return it, and the acquisition is effective. Perhaps because the law confiscates the apartment from the owners at every moment, and even if the inheritance itself cannot be nullified, after the inheritance the confiscation certainly takes effect.
 
In addition, it seems to me that one should distinguish between the question whether it is permitted to do this and the question whether, once it was done, it takes effect.
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Questioner:
One more question in this context, to sharpen the point:
Suppose an inheritance worth 100,000 shekels falls before a brother and sister. The sister insists on receiving half the inheritance in accordance with the laws of the State of Israel, whereas the brother demands to receive the entire inheritance according to Torah law.
A. Is there anything improper in the brother’s behavior in insisting on his right to receive the whole inheritance?
B. If in the end the inheritance was divided half-and-half against the brother’s will, and after some years he managed to steal 50,000 shekels back from the sister—would the brother be allowed to steal from the sister the part that belongs to him?
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Rabbi:
A. The brother is fine from a halakhic perspective, because he is protecting rights that belong to him. If you ask me morally, I’m not sure (unless he wants to receive the entire inheritance and then voluntarily give her half).
B. What is the difference between the wordings? This is just like the previous question. If state law applies after the fact, then even if it was forbidden to legislate this, it is forbidden to steal what is not yours.
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Questioner:
Regarding B: it seems to me there was a slight misunderstanding between us about the previous question (there I asked about the obligation of return of a third party, not of the sister). In any case, if state law applies after the fact, is the sister obligated to return her share of the inheritance to the brother? Or perhaps her only prohibition was that initially she tried to apply the laws of the State of Israel to the inheritance, and she should have followed the inheritance laws of the rabbinical court. But once the violation was committed, there is no obligation of return? And in general, what prohibition are we talking about here (theft? or something else)?
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Rabbi:
Why does it matter whether it is a third party or the sister herself? If the property is not hers, then someone who bought it from her doesn’t own it either.
However, if state law applies after the fact, then she does not need (legally) to return it, but perhaps her possession of the money is itself a prohibition (because it came into her hands through a prohibition), and it would be proper to return it in order to rid herself of the prohibition, though not by force of theft law.
But with the buyer, it seems there is no obligation to return it even from the standpoint of prohibition and not only monetarily (for it came into his hands permissibly).
And perhaps one can apply here the law of despair and change of possession. I need to think about it more.