Q&A: The Ontological Proof
The Ontological Proof
Question
Dear Rabbi Michael Abraham, hello,
in the first booklet you wrote that there is a difference between three kinds of understanding and existence: 1. I understand the meaning of something, 2. I understand that this thing exists, 3. This thing exists.
According to the proof, if that being than which no greater can be conceived existed only in my mind (1), then it would be possible to conceive of it as existing in reality (2), and that is greater. That cannot be, and so by reductio we have proven that the being than which no greater can be conceived exists (3).
There are two possibilities: either anything can be conceived as existing in reality, or not. The Rabbi starts from the assumption that anything that exists in my mind can be conceived as existing in reality. That is necessary for the argument, because only that way can one show there is a contradiction—since we said that in the case where it does not exist (but only in my mind—1), it would be possible to conceive of it as existing (2). That is a contradiction because by definition nothing greater than it can be conceived (or nothing more existent than it).
There is a problem here: if anything can be conceived as existing, then that being than which no greater can be conceived must already be of type 2, and here the argument gets stuck. What comes next? So I conceive of it as existing in reality? That is exactly what I just did. It is already in such a state (2).
Maybe one could say that the whole concept, “a being than which no greater can be conceived exists,” can be conceived as existing. But if one goes that route, there is no end to it. We would get infinitely many levels of existence
(the existing existing existing unicorn, the existing existing existing existing existing unicorn, and so on), and as you explain in the second booklet, infinity usually leads to a philosophical failure.
Answer
I didn’t understand a thing.
And in particular I don’t understand what “X that exists exists,” etc., is supposed to mean. In my opinion that is an expression devoid of content.
Discussion on Answer
Correct. So?
As far as I understood, the Rabbi distinguishes between three kinds of existence and conceiving, and for convenience let us mark them with letters:
1. understanding – U
2. translation neurons – T
3. existence – E
In the chapter “The Heart of the Argument” you wrote:
If it existed only in the mind (U), it could be conceived as existing in reality (U+T), and that is greater. Therefore, if
that being than which no greater can be conceived exists only in the mind (U), then that being than which no greater can be conceived is a being than which a greater can be conceived. But that surely cannot be. Therefore, beyond any doubt,
there exists something than which no greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the mind (U) and in reality (E).
If the concept of God existed only in the mind and not in reality (U), then one could conceive of something (a concept) greater than it: God who exists (U+T). It is important to note that the comparison here is between two pictures in consciousness … but this of course contradicts the definition of the concept of God as the greatest being that can be conceived … This is a reductio proof that the fool’s conception that God does not exist is incorrect, and necessarily he and we must adopt the opposite hypothesis, that God exists (E).
Why must we adopt the opposite hypothesis? It is enough to adopt the possibility that He is U+T. There is an unclear jump from U to E. If the picture of God existing (U+T) is greater than God not existing (U), then one should say that this is the real God and nothing greater than Him can be conceived. One should note that at this point the argument gets stuck. What comes next? You cannot apply the proof to the new God (U+T), because I have already conceived of Him as existing in reality.
Maybe one can also conceive of this picture, God existing (who does not really exist but only in my imagination + translation neurons), as existing in reality, and then we get a new picture in consciousness — “the existing God” existing. But this causes an infinite number of levels of existence, and that is a problem. If that is the situation, then this is an open interval, and in such an interval there is no point representing the greatest number among the numbers in it (as you wrote).
Hope this time it’s clear…
I think now I understand. I’ll try to explain briefly.
His argument proved to you that you cannot think of God as a non-existent being. It admittedly did not prove that He exists (as you correctly argued), but it did prove to you that you necessarily conceive of Him as existing.
But such a proof is enough, since the purpose of a proof is always to change what you think, not to touch reality itself directly. Therefore, if the conclusion of the proof is that you will think He exists, it has achieved its purpose.
Now at most you can raise a skeptical question and say that even if I think He exists, who says He really exists? But that is a claim one can raise against any argument. I am convinced that the law of gravity is true, but who says it really is true?
It seems to me that the third part of the booklet deals precisely with this itself. Though I have not studied it closely enough.
Thank you very much, you opened my eyes.
In the third part, it seems that the Rabbi writes that when Anselm proves that He exists in reality, he is actually proving that He exists not only at the epistemic level (T) but also at the ontic level (E).
To prove that God exists in reality means to create in my mind the recognition that He exists (the translation neurons). That is ontology as distinct from epistemology. Both are in the mind, since both are part of a discussion we are having. The entire distinction is in the mind.
And they already remarked this about Kant—that his distinction between noumena and phenomena is itself made entirely in our minds.
On this matter, see also the lovely little book by C. S. Lewis (the one from Narnia), The Abolition of Man (Shalem Press), where he explains why the claim that some view is sublime is not a claim about me (that I have a feeling of sublimity) but about the view (that it is worthy of arousing a feeling of sublimity). At the end of the recording of the last lecture in Petah Tikva (1.12) I discuss this a bit.
So does epistemology not even create translation neurons?
Or other translation neurons. If I speak about epistemology and ontology, that means my consciousness distinguishes between those two, but still both are within my consciousness.
You explained the difference between the levels of understanding in the body of the argument: existence in the mind and in reality.
When I think of X existing (2), I have in my mind an understanding of the definition of the entity and an understanding that the entity actually exists.