Q&A: Education for Morality
Education for Morality
Question
Hello,
My question arose following reading your columns and responses on the site.
I saw that your position is that every person should open up all questions for himself, and decide in accordance with the view that seems correct to him. As a philosophical position this is very understandable, but in my humble opinion, as an educational position it involves some far from simple problems. True, in our generation knowledge is accessible, and there is no possibility of blocking knowledge—even if we mistakenly wanted to do so. Still, it seems to me more correct to build education on creating identification with the path that seems right in the educator’s eyes—without forbidding the clarification of questions, and discussing doubts when they arise. Without that, the alienation created toward the tradition—even if one later chooses it anew, as you did—is an unbearably heavy price.
I will advance one more step, and ask about the attitude toward morality. On the principled level, it would be desirable to apply the same process regarding moral obligation itself. It is very difficult to prove it philosophically, not to mention the boundaries that distinguish one culture from another (blood revenge; murder over family honor). And yet, it seems to me that a serious person would not recommend that every youth examine whether he finds a philosophical basis for moral obligation, and if he does not find one—then he should murder and rape whoever crosses his path.
I assume your answer will be that you assume every reasonable person has a strong intuition of obligation to morality; and still—there is no moral anchor for that. On the contrary—that is exactly the counterclaim: the role of education is to create a deep emotional bond to the Torah that will include a parallel intuition regarding observance of Torah and commandments. Clearly this stems from the educator’s position that he is right, but every person thinks he is right and fights for his position. Is it right for every person to do a restart and reexamine all values and commitments anew? After all, an overwhelming majority of people will fall along the way and not complete the process—certainly from a value and moral standpoint, but also from a purely philosophical standpoint!
Another possible answer is that indeed every person should act according to his philosophical conclusion, but we as a society should prevent those with deviant moral conclusions from implementing their position and harming others. But let us assume that we do not prevent every person from implementing his position (and also that there is a non-negligible percentage who do not have a strong moral intuition), and the day after the intellectual clarification he goes on a campaign of murder and rape; like a rational person trying to maximize his pleasures, and these are the pleasures of this dubious person. Would you still recommend that every person carry out the philosophical process for himself—or would you hold to your position that you are right, and try to instill identification with it?
Thank you very much!
Answer
Hello.
A very good question. The discussion should be divided into two planes: the educational-tactical and the essential. On the educational plane, it is not clear that we have the option of avoidance. That option leads to many young people (and adults too) arriving at questions unprepared and abandoning or losing identification no less than those who were opened up to questions because of educational encouragement like mine and remained in their faith. On the essential plane, I definitely think there is greater value in someone who forms his worldview by himself, with awareness of the difficulties and the questions.
After all is said and done, I must say that when I say everyone should confront the questions, that does not mean the educator has to be from the UN, nor that this should begin from age 0. On the contrary, I have written more than once that in my opinion exposure should be gradual, and it is very important to develop educational identification, with religion no less than with morality. But at the same time, after such an identification exists and at a sufficiently mature age, one should encourage opening questions and conducting a discussion that each person undertakes for himself, both in faith and in morality.
I have often been asked what value there is in all our worldviews if it is clear that they are formed simply from the environment into which we happened to be thrown. In the vast majority of cases, the secular person remains secular and the religious person remains religious. Conclusion 1: this is a sign that everything is programming and not really a genuine worldview. My claim is that this conclusion is not necessary and in my opinion is also incorrect. The fact that each person (that is, the majority) remains similar to his environment can be interpreted in two other ways (two conclusions): 2. that religious education enables us to grasp the truth, and without it it is very hard for us to understand and identify with it, and therefore the religious person becomes religious because he sees the truth, while the secular person remains secular because he is mistaken. 3. The opposite: secularity is the truth, and religious education prevents one from seeing this.
An analogy would be the study of geometry or art. There too, one who studied knows geometry, and one who did not does not know it. Does that mean there is no truth in geometry and everyone has his own geometry? Of course not. One who did not study will not be able to know and understand geometry, because it requires education and study. The same is true of the religious worldview (according to suggestion 2, or the secular one according to suggestion 3).
So which of the two is more reasonable? In my view, 2. The religious person knows the secular perspective, and no information is lacking to him. By contrast, the secular person neither knows nor recognizes a religious worldview. He dismisses it outright as irrational nonsense, and thereby becomes blind to it. Therefore there is an advantage to view 2. Others will say there is an advantage to conclusion 3, because religious education brainwashes. In my opinion, even if there is something to that, secular education brainwashes no less, and perhaps even more. But I assume that here others will disagree with my conclusion.
Discussion on Answer
I assume this is a matter of personal taste, but the focal point of a child’s, teenager’s, and adult’s identification with the religious world he encounters is an encounter through figures in whose path and personality he sees something great and meaningful that he wants to cling to, even if he cannot define God or his beliefs in precise verbal terms. Of course, the issue is not the figures themselves, but the connection to God and to the overall path; but the encounter is through an existing reality and not through rational and philosophical arguments.
I have no problem with exposure to questions, and also with recognizing various problems in faith, some of them unsolvable. It is also important to learn to live with certain problems. But my feeling from the site is one of complete disconnection from the entire Jewish tradition throughout the generations. The intellectual clarification, as it emerges from the site, does not integrate with that identification, but uproots it.
Even if everything is open today, an approach that identifies more with the Jewish tradition can help those who are clarifying things, while leaving the religious feeling in place.
I do not know many people who would want to enslave themselves to a religion that seems intellectually reasonable, and perhaps more plausible than other alternatives, if it contains no sense of meaning and some closeness to God. I wonder whether you are not uprooting everything in order to arrive at intellectual proofs.
The claim regarding morality revolves around this point: morality requires the same level of intellectual proof, and it is no more grounded, and nevertheless you do not call on people to clarify all the philosophical questions before we refrain from stealing, murdering, and raping. Why not? Probably because there is less attraction to the alternatives in this area (how many want to join ISIS, after all?). But that is not a real argument.
In short: 1. In the educational aspect, in my opinion there is harm in the sharp sense of disconnection from the whole Jewish tradition that comes through from the site. I cannot blame you, because that is what you believe, but if so one should acknowledge the educational harm and say that to you it is preferable. 2. On the principled level, I do not understand why not fight with the same force for the simple commitment to morality.
Since you do not fight the natural commitment to morality, it seems to me that the leading consideration is practical—where the point of struggle is, and/or that with morality you identify more easily, whereas religion is a philosophical conclusion whose status is far inferior.
*call on
First, I forgot to add a link to my column on sacred lies, which deals with this topic: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8-21/
As for your final remarks, there is a difference between morality and faith/religious commitment on two planes:
1. In the moral context, the results are of great importance even without action that stems from conscious decision, and there the decision and reflection are only a bonus. By contrast, in religious commitment, the decision is a condition for the religious value of the acts (see Maimonides, end of chapter 8 of Laws of Kings).
2. Beyond that, in the area of morality, identification is roughly equivalent in value to decision, whereas in religious commitment identification may express only habit and not decision. As I wrote to you, a decision does not have to be philosophical. As far as I’m concerned, simple faith is also a decision, although it is preferable to be aware of the difficulties and then decide in favor of simplicity (because then it is a fuller decision).
Regarding disconnection from the tradition, it seems to me that here we are already departing entirely from the previous discussion. Here it really is not about a luxury (being a deciding philosopher rather than a simple believer). Regarding faith and religious commitment, the question is whether to investigate or to make do with simple faith, and so there one can still discuss it. But with respect to the contents of the tradition, the question is whether the details of the tradition are true or not (not whether they are proven). My claim is not that it is preferable to arrive at the contents by a philosophical route, but that I very much doubt regarding many of them whether they are true at all, and therefore it is very important to examine them with reason. That is, here the discussion is not whether to uphold the tradition out of trust or to examine and reach a philosophical conclusion that it is correct, but rather there is a major question whether it is correct at all. And here one must not give up the clarification and the decision even if they are liable to lead to lack of identification and to religious “coldness.” The coldness of fools is not worth, in my eyes, a garlic peel. An ignoramus cannot be pious, nor can an unlearned person be God-fearing. And the wisdom of the poor man is despised (metaphorically).
It is important to understand that the fact that people identify with the tradition simply because it is tradition does not necessarily indicate a hidden decision, but usually mere habit. And indeed, sometimes this covers over complete nonsense with no basis and no logic. This is unlike identification with faith itself, and perhaps even with the revelation at Mount Sinai, where “simple” identification can express an intuitive decision (for here the conclusion is correct even after logical criticism, at least in my opinion).
In general, in a case where the matter is not true, I am not prepared to give up the demand that each person decide even at the expense of simplicity. See again the column on sacred lies linked above.
I read the column on sacred lies. And indeed, I accepted that according to your approach—that you are trying to sift out of Judaism beliefs that are insufficiently grounded—this is justified.
I have one claim: don’t present this as an educational rescue. I don’t know who would choose to remain in such a cold religion. Separate the issues and say that the very clarification of the questions is an educational benefit, even if someone who benefits from clarifying them would have believed in Judaism in a fuller way.
What you are coming to do is something else—to clean up Judaism. Presumably there will be some people who go in this direction. It is neither plausible nor correct that this path also prevents broad-scale dropping out. I do not know whether its educational benefit outweighs its harms. That is your right—but there is a difference between saving Judaism from itself and preventing secularization.
Another point in this context is that from what I have read so far, I have not seen a direct argument against many of the beliefs included in the Jewish tradition (aside from knowledge and free choice, the obligation of effort, and a few others). I have only seen the conjecture that almost all the intellectual content of Judaism is not included in the Torah from Sinai, and accumulated over the generations. As a private individual, you do not identify with them, and therefore prefer to sift Judaism free of them.
You could have chosen a path of continuity, and seen yourself as continuing one line or another (say, Maimonides in his interpretation of parts of the Torah as allegory, or his attitude toward demons, and so on). Bottom line, there is no sacred lie here. This is an axiomatic choice—whether you place trust in the Jewish tradition as a whole or not. Many do place trust in the Jewish tradition, out of recognizing its power, and cope with various intellectual difficulties—they offer solutions and so on. The filtering and refinement too are done with a message of belonging. The message that comes through from your important words is that most of Judaism is false, aside from a small core of truth.
It seems to me that softening the message would not have been a lie even in your eyes, but it would have allowed many to receive from your teaching and refine various beliefs within Judaism.
I do not expect you to preach faith in the sages, God forbid. Only to convey a gentler and softer message.
Thank you very much, and more power to you.
I don’t distinguish, because in my opinion it does both things. Maybe you disagree with me, but that is my view. By the way, in my opinion it may not save the masses, but it does save the more intelligent segment (as I wrote in column 36, that we are losing it).
I don’t know what messages you picked up from my words, but that is not what I wrote. I have written more than once that my impression is that the majority is an addition of the later generations and was not given at Sinai (Maimonides also wrote this explicitly), but the identification you are making between that and the claim that the majority is false is a mistaken identification. On the contrary, my claim is that authenticity is not a condition for obligation. And see the language of Maimonides in the second root, where he wrote that he does not count the midrash-derived laws not because they are “not true,” see there carefully. But it is true that even if Maimonides had not written this, it would not bother me (I do not rely on him). The trust many people place in tradition as such is mistaken in my eyes, and this is not connected to axioms. It is a baseless belief, like Russell’s celestial teapot. Baseless beliefs are not axioms that I see as an even doubt (50-50).
On the other hand, it is true that even if the tradition says something, if it is not authentic (not given from Heaven), there is room to cast doubt on it. It is not automatically false, but neither is it automatically true. In general, automatic assumptions are not logical.
All this will be clarified in my trilogy.
Apparently, we will have to wait for the trilogy.
In the meantime, I will note a few points (final ones?):
1. Regarding the formerly religious questioners, it seems to me that the law of small numbers is affecting your sense of the scale of the problem. Since very many of them come to you to clarify their faith, the phenomenon loses proportion in your eyes (in my view many of the points you noted are correct, but not on the right scale). I studied in fairly elitist and no less intellectual institutions, from high school through kollel and at university, and in my eyes the phenomenon is completely negligible relative to the formerly religious as a whole (I know one and a half of the type you described). I certainly do not agree that we have lost specifically the intelligent and honest ones. Life circumstances, and the feeling that Torah did not suit them, are what usually caused people to change their way of life. What is true is that serious people in particular are not willing to accept the option of “light” religiosity, and if essential things in Torah disturb them, they switch sides. In my humble opinion, the solution to this is connected more to a deep spiritual response to coping with the modern world than to philosophical proofs. In any case, I admit that I too am influenced by the law of small numbers, but I have less reason to assume that my sample is biased…
2. I identify a fairly small gap between your proofs in the fifth notebook for Torah from Sinai and a general trust in its transmitters and in their outlooks as a whole. That does not mean one cannot discuss and even dispute various details. But your point of departure—that one should accept nothing at all from their words in matters of thought, not even in basic Torah whose status is established—seems to me mistaken, and certainly not healthy for the existence of religious life and the education of youth.
3. This stems in part from the fact that identifying the Torah as a shaping and formative force in the Jewish people is tied to the great Torah scholars who developed it and led it from generation to generation. One can debate and disagree with them—and certainly for the most part there is no authority for any specific opinion. But it seems to me entirely wrong to discuss things from zero—with no reference at all to their words, which in your words are tantamount to neglect of Torah study, can be studied on Tisha B’Av, are rather boring, and so on.
In my eyes, this is similar to one’s attitude toward science: a person stands before the scientific enterprise as a whole and identifies that there is much truth in it, and therefore will place trust in the great scientists as a starting point, at least until he studies the issues in depth and raises one objection or another.
4. For this reason, a person who identifies the power of Torah will place trust in the system as a whole, and build his outlook through engagement and dialogue with it. Hence identification with the Torah and its morality is a significant consideration in faith (rational faith!), together with the considerations in the fifth notebook. I admit that various isolated phenomena, and the public conduct of entire communities, greatly damage this trust, and this too is another meaning of “desecration of God’s name.”
Thanks again
One more addition. I am against consequentialist thinking. If someone goes on a killing spree, I should try to prevent it. But ignorance and conditioning are not the proper way to do that (even if it were effective, and I’m not sure it is). That was the claim made after Rabin’s murder—that religious thinking and education lead to extremism up to the point of murder. And I argued that even if that is true, there is no argument here that would keep me from giving my children a religious education. At most, I have to be careful that it not happen. Perhaps when there is near certainty of moral harm there is justification for conditioning (preventing thought), but that is only in extreme cases. See my next column, which I will publish soon (continuation of the discussion about incitement).