Here is the relevant passage from the book (volume 2 of the trilogy):

Every answer to prayer is a miracle (a change in nature)
One must understand the context of the discussion היטב. Every answer to prayer is a miracle. When the Holy One answers a prayer, that means that without the prayer the sick person would have died (that is, according to the laws of nature this should have been the result of his condition), and only because of the prayer he will live. If so, this is a change in the ordinary course of the world and an intervention in the order and laws of nature. In the previous section we saw that there is no divine intervention in the world that occurs within the framework of the laws of nature, and now we see that by the same token there is no answer to prayer that occurs within nature. At most there can be a hidden answer, meaning a deviation from the laws that is not observable to the human eye. But we must know that every answer to prayer is a miracle, and therefore every prayer for divine intervention is really a prayer for a miracle to occur. The question of prayers being answered is exactly the question of miracles.

Prayer for a miracle
As I understand it, this very point was not clear to the Sages or to the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and it is also not clear to some scholars of our time. Just as it was not clear to them that every divine intervention is a miracle, and that there is no such thing as His intervention within the framework of the laws of nature (that is, intervention that does not contradict the laws of nature). The Sages themselves forbade praying for a miracle, even though every prayer is a prayer for a miracle. This apparently stemmed from the worldview described in the previous section, according to which part of nature itself is open-ended (in the sense that results are not unequivocally dictated by current circumstances). They did not conceive of the world in the deterministic way we see it today within our scientific worldview. So it is no wonder that they could relate to divine interventions or answers to prayer as something not necessarily miraculous. But today we understand that the world proceeds deterministically, meaning that current circumstances always unequivocally dictate the future. Therefore every answer to prayer, like every other intervention in creation, is a miracle and a change in the order of the world. Therefore, from our perspective, it is unreasonable to expect such an answer at all.
To be sure, one might have interpreted the prohibition against praying for a miracle as referring only to prayer for an open miracle as opposed to a hidden miracle, but from the source of the Jewish law itself it is clear that this is not so. The source of the Jewish law is the Mishnah in Berakhot (9:3; for practical Jewish law, see Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 230:1):
One who cries out over the past—this is a futile prayer; if his wife was pregnant and he says, “May it be Your will that my wife give birth to a male,” this is a futile prayer; if he was coming along the road and heard cries in the city and says, “May it be Your will that these not be in my household,” this is a futile prayer.
That is, one may pray to merit a son, but one may not pray regarding a fetus that already exists that it should be male. What is the difference between these two cases? After all, even if there is already a fetus in the mother’s womb, it is still a hidden miracle, because no one yet knows the sex of the fetus. We see from here that one may not pray for a miracle, even if it is hidden. So why is it permitted to pray for a male child before the fetus is formed (or, as the halakhic decisors wrote, even up to forty days, before its form is recognizable)? The simple explanation is that prayer for a male child before the fetus is formed was seen as a change made by way of nature (that is, one that does not contradict the laws), whereas prayer regarding an existing fetus is a prayer for a miracle. One may not pray for a miracle because the Holy One does not perform miracles. Therefore this is a futile prayer.
But in light of our current understanding, even before the fetus is formed, whether it will be male or female is determined by natural processes (that is, governed by the laws of nature). According to this, there is no point in praying for that either. If the Holy One does not perform miracles even when they are hidden, then apparently He also does not perform other hidden miracles. In the scientific view it is clear that a fetus becoming male is an entirely natural process, and if the Holy One changes that, He changes something in reality. If it is forbidden to pray that the Holy One change reality, then why is it permitted here? We see from this that the Sages apparently understood that before the child is formed there is a non-deterministic margin within nature itself—meaning that the sex of the child is determined by the Holy One and not fixed by nature. In their view this was not a change in reality but only the choice of one path from among several natural possible paths. But after the fetus is formed, this is a change in nature, and that is already not something one should ask Him to do. This conception does not fit how we see things today.
Let me sharpen the point again: the Sages did not mean that the Holy One could not do this, but that His policy is not to do so (or even more minimally: that even if He does, we may not pray for it). If so, the same applies to every intervention in nature, for every such intervention is a miracle. In other words: it is forbidden to pray a prayer that will be answered, because if it is answered that will be a change in nature, that is, a miracle, and one does not pray for a miracle. The permitted prayers are only those that are not answered (rather, the laws of nature proceed as usual). But then what is the point of praying at all?

Some claim that one of the laws of nature—one not yet discovered by scientists—is prayer. And someone who really knows how to pray (apparently depending on intentions, faith, repentance/purity, and things like that, which are additional conditions that enable prayer to have its effect in the world) is always answered.

But the Sages themselves gave practical advice for naturally having a male child (“if the woman emits seed first,” etc.), which implies that they did not think the sex of the fetus was determined non-deterministically.

Is all this really necessary? In my view, the distinction is indeed between an open miracle and a hidden one, but the test is whether it is something that could appear to our eyes, and a fetus that is still in the womb also meets that criterion (if, Heaven forbid, there were a premature birth, it would be possible to see its sex).

In addition, free choice is not deterministic. Is it really harder theologically to assume that the Holy One sometimes intervenes in a person’s free choice, in a way that does not affect his observance of the commandments, than to assume that He almost never answers prayers? For example: someone prays to be accepted for a job, and the Holy One causes the résumé that the boss didn’t like to seem a bit more appealing.

Israel, those who claim that—how do they know? Did they test this law empirically?

Yitzhak, I don’t know what they thought. But who says those pieces of advice were natural in their eyes?

Avi, if there were a premature birth we would see its sex, but we would not know whether it changed because of the prayer or not. I didn’t understand your last question.

Actually, what Avi suggested really does sound like an opening for the Holy One to intervene in the world without changing the laws of nature. The idea is that He could flood certain people with ideas and thoughts in order to steer reality in a certain direction. For example, the Holy One could flood certain Americans with certain thoughts about why it would be good to vote for Trump. The choice whether to vote for him or not would still remain in their hands; it’s just that the picture of considerations they are weighing was updated in accordance with what the Holy One updated for them with (a kind of hidden prophetic revelation in a person’s mind without the person being aware that it is a revelation, but rather thinking the thoughts and ideas came from himself).
This explains why prayer for something not under human control—like reversing the sex of a fetus or reviving the dead—is not a legitimate prayer, because it certainly requires changing the laws of nature, whereas prayer for something human beings can influence (even indirectly, like discovering a cure for a certain disease or giving advice for healing) is indeed legitimate.

That is possible. It seems to me that you yourself (= Oren) proposed something like this in the past (somewhere here).
Still, changing the considerations is also intervention in nature/physics, since those considerations are expressed in a brain state.

In the book The Science of Freedom you write that the spiritual world influences the material world, and that free will can move electrons. According to your view, that does not even contradict the laws of physics, even though it certainly is not deterministic (since we are talking about free choice). Moreover, this process happens all the time, so it can be seen as part of the laws of nature by which the world is governed. If so, why couldn’t the Holy One’s free will move electrons in that very same way, in order to reach the result He wants? And why not see that too as part of the ordinary course of the world?

Yosef, you didn’t understand me. Of course nothing prevents the Holy One from intervening and producing a miracle. Rather, my impression is that in practice He does not do so. By contrast, as for our will, it is clear to me that it is free. That’s all.

You are basically making two claims: (a) every answer to prayer is a miracle; (b) there is no evidence that the Holy One answers prayers nowadays.
I’m arguing against point (a): after all, you do not call the operation of free choice a “miracle,” even though it involves external intervention that does not follow from the laws of physics. So why do you call a similar action brought about by the Holy One a “miracle”?

And following up on Yosef R.’s question: you are only acquainted with your own free choice, whereas it may be that all other human beings have no choice. “They are robots” (the problem of solipsism). If you rely on common sense and human intuition that people have choice and act accordingly—despite what deterministic science claims—what prevents us from likewise following the intuition of millions of people throughout history that there is divine intervention in a subtle way within nature? “Coincidence is God’s way of remaining anonymous” (Albert Einstein). Is there good proof that there are no empty “spaces” within matter through which God can deflect the outcome of events? After all, according to libertarians there really are such spaces, and they are the “souls” of human beings acting on atomic particles, etc. Why shouldn’t the “soul of the world” act this way too?? You wrote: “because my impression is that in practice He does not do so”—but, as noted, millions of believers are impressed otherwise and tell stories of providence, which can be dismissed only in the same way one can dismiss human free choice. And indeed, researchers who deny God’s intervention and existence also deny libertarianism. Moreover, aren’t there studies proving the effectiveness of prayers and religious life—as you showed in the book God Plays Dice; what changed since then?! Has it even gone beyond balanced doubt?! What is the reason to ignore popular belief when it is not directly contradicted by the laws of nature? Or—and here I ask innocently—does science possess all the information about all the states of subatomic matter? I don’t think so. Therefore the hypothesis that if we had all the information we would predict the future remains only a hypothesis. And from that, there is still room for God to intervene in matter, whether in “the flap of a butterfly’s wings at one end of the world to bring about a typhoon storm at the other” (a familiar metaphor)—that is, intervention in places not deterministically closed—or within human choices, as in the scriptural expressions: “the heart (= intellect) of kings and ministers is in the Lord’s hand,” “the Lord hardened Pharaoh’s heart,” “to a person belong the arrangements of the heart (= intellectual systems), but the answer of the tongue is from the Lord (= control over his speech),” “and they (the sons of Eli) did not heed their father’s voice because the Lord desired to kill them,” and dozens of such axioms in biblical thought. And perhaps also in places that contradict the laws of nature, so long as they are not apparent to the human eye—for the Lord’s hidden reasons (to allow choice, etc. etc., without now addressing the issue of futile prayer). What would you expect in order to believe in providence?? After all, a coincidence—for example, that your family is stuck in the middle of nowhere at night and exactly by chance a ride arrives immediately, having happened by mistake to come there, with a huge empty car—enough room for everyone, no one missing—traveling to the exact God-forsaken place to which you are headed—all this, as you described, would prove nothing in your eyes. Even though the coincidences here pile up and push the probability farther and farther away, isn’t that the very thing you would thank the Lord for, even without the slightest doubt that He is trying, in His hidden way, to communicate with you, to develop a language with you—a subtle mystical language through which millions of people speak with God: the language of personal providence and coincidences? At least this belief sounds coherent with the picture reflected in the sacred writings of all religions and with human perception—especially since through it one can easily explain the whole period of biblical miracles, as Maimonides, Gersonides, and other rationalists down to our own day all did, maintaining that God intervenes through nature and its laws, and therefore the splitting of the sea was really tides, etc., and the miracle was the timing, and so on. Whereas your view, by contrast—that once God did not intervene in nature for billions of years, and then at the time of Mount Sinai and afterward for about a thousand years decided both to accept prayers and answer them and to perform miracles that shatter nature, and then suddenly withdrew again into His indifferent hiddenness so that we would mature and manage on our own (as you wrote in one of your articles)—this view sounds like mythology at its finest, about some changing divine entity, and it does not present a consistent picture of a unified reality integrating spirit and matter as the mystical logic proposes (as in the space opened by the panentheistic approach of Rabbi Kook and many others, up to Arthur Green, Jonathan Sacks, Eliezer Berkovits, Heschel, and many others). This is not a refutation of the logic you presented, only an expression of bewilderment and discomfort in the face of the conclusions you draw. This discomfort is voiced here by many, and I ask whether, aside from your personal reasoning, you assume it would be an error for people who believe in all of prayer and providence to draw other conclusions.

P.S. Thank you very much for your devotion in writing and answering.

Yosef, I understood and answered. This is pointless semantics. Choice is part of our world (even if not part of the laws of physics), since it happens all the time. Intervention by the Holy One is not like that simply because it does not happen. As far as I’m concerned, call both of them miracles. What difference does it make what we call them?

Hello Gilad.
The question of other minds is a well-known pilpul that nobody really believes in. So why deal with it? It could also be that we are surrounded on all sides by green winged fairies—only nobody sees them. In every area of life we make generalizations, in science and in life, and therefore the assumption that all human beings have free choice is also, in my opinion, a reasonable generalization. If in your view it isn’t—then health to you.
For a fuller explanation than what I gave here, I have no room here. You’ll have to wait for my book (the trilogy), where I explain this in greater detail. In my humble opinion there are excellent arguments for it.
Here I will only say that millions of believers are not impressed in the opposite direction; rather, they assume the opposite. There is no evidence for it, and with every such impression I can explain to the person impressed where he is mistaken. There are also many people who do not understand relativity—so does that mean it isn’t true? They just don’t understand. The same applies here. People do not understand what a miracle is and what divine intervention is, and usually they also err in the probabilistic meaning of events, and therefore they form such impressions. If they understood, it would pass.
There are also quite a few mistakes in your own remarks. For example, you identify intervention with randomness and with chaos, and those are not at all the same thing (see my book The Science of Freedom, in the two chapters dealing with these areas), and much more.
Generally speaking, this picture is not merely my own conjecture, but a claim such that, in my opinion, anyone who says otherwise simply does not understand what he is talking about. This is not a matter of dispute or different opinions.
In principle, rare and hidden intervention is possible, but there is no indication (and there can almost never be any) that it actually occurs. Therefore even if it is theoretically possible, nobody can tell us that it indeed happens.

You treat the most well-established principles and findings of science as hypotheses, but that is incorrect. These are clear scientific conclusions (and like every scientific conclusion they are not logically necessary or absolutely certain, of course. But it is wrong to call them a hypothesis). Note that the religious claims too—and certainly the “impressions” you mentioned—are no more established or certain. So why should I accept them more than the findings of science, which have constantly stood and continue to stand empirical tests?

By the way, in my book I did not prove the effectiveness of prayers. Read again. I wrote explicitly that I take no position. I only showed the flaws in biased studies (I provided, in a footnote, a link to severe critiques of the studies claiming that prayer is effective).

Regarding what you wrote above: “Still, changing the considerations is also intervention in nature/physics, since those considerations are expressed in a brain state.”

As I recall, even according to your own view you agree that there is one place in the world where some electron moves without a prior physical cause, and that is in the human brain (a movement stemming from a conscious decision). For our purposes, let us treat this process as an influence passing from the spiritual plane to the physical plane through the “psychophysical bridge.” Let us assume, for the sake of the discussion, that human consciousness is divided into two parts: one part exists on the spiritual plane and one part exists on the physical plane (electrical signals in the brain, etc.). These two parts affect each other through that same “psychophysical bridge.” Divine influence on human beings on the spiritual plane does not require breaking the laws of nature, since the spiritual plane is not subject to nature. That influence then trickles down into the physical plane through the “psychophysical bridge,” thereby affecting the course of events in our world without bending the laws of nature.

There is an amusing anecdote in this connection from the English Wikipedia entry on Cantor (who may have been Jewish):
“he considered his work on transfinite numbers to have been directly communicated to him by God, who had chosen Cantor to reveal them to the world”
Not only that: he used the notation of the letter aleph in his theory as symbolizing infinity at different levels. And as is well known, the letter aleph symbolizes God in Jewish thought.

Thank you very much. I’ll go back and look at your book again.

In any case, the position of minor intervention within the random “pockets” (or gaps) that are not deterministically closed was developed, according to the philosopher Amos Funkenstein, by Maimonides—and in his opinion this is valid even in modern physics—in order to explain how providence intervenes within nature, in what is called “miracles of the possible kind,” namely:

“The form in which the Holy One directs events, because nature is not fixed in every respect, and because there is always some built-in contingency in it. The Holy One, as it were, uses these contingencies to direct events this way or that without violating the laws of nature”…. (p. 123 in the article linked below)

…“Maimonides’ assumption, according to which there are essentially ‘pockets’ of contingency in nature, is somewhat similar to the conclusions of modern physics, which sees a principle of indeterminacy in nature, and not merely because of our lack of knowledge or the inaccuracy of our instruments, but because of a lack of fixedness embedded in the very structure of nature” (ibid., 122).

And he gives an example of a philosophy of history that follows from this insight:

“Maimonides says that indeed the Holy One could also have performed a miracle in the psychological constellation of the Israelites, and from the outset, when they left Egypt, given them enough courage to cross the land of the Philistines directly; and He could also from the outset have miraculously changed their mentality so there would be no need for stratagems to distance polytheism. But this is not how the Holy One acts in history. He does not act contrary to the laws of nature, in which ‘human nature does not change suddenly from one extreme to the other,’ but with their help and with the help of that remnant of contingency that always exists in history and in the universe as a whole. And thus the religion of Israel gradually took shape, and the people of Israel took shape as a group, as a religion, as a wholly monotheistic nation. The driving force in this development was, as stated, the Lord’s cunning and strategy, that is, the way in which, seemingly naturally, gradually and seemingly by itself, monotheistic faith once again took the place of polytheistic habits. Thus the people of Israel came into being; thus, if one may say so, Israelite faith came into being; thus Israelite faith took root in the people of Israel—gradually, in accordance with the laws of nature but under divine direction.” (ibid., 138)

And from this follows the conclusion of a natural messianism in Maimonides’ thought, in which monotheism rules the world while the world proceeds according to its ordinary course:

“The miracles… from the category … that he called ‘miracles of the possible kind’—they are the spur of history, the active force in history. They are what seem to him to be ‘the Lord’s cunning and wisdom,’ the way in which providence exploits the contingency of reality in order to direct the course of history not against nature but through changing existing situations that appear to be natural states. Such too will be the days of the Messiah” (ibid., p. 155).

This is a long and illuminating article that directly touches on the issue under discussion here, like many others.

If I understand correctly—these “pockets” do not exist?!

file:///C:/Users/USER/Desktop/%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%98/%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A1%20%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%A9%D7%98%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9F%20%D7%A8%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%9D.PDF

Hello Oren.
Indeed, correct. Now I remember that you actually proposed this long ago. Still, even influence in this form could appear and be measured, and it does not seem to me that this happens. For example, if we pray for sick people (with a sample group versus a control group), the Holy One will move the doctors’ desires toward the correct treatment path, and then we ought to find that indeed the group prayed for has a higher recovery rate. It does not seem to me that this happens. In that sense there is an influence on nature here that ought to be measurable.
One must remember that the Holy One can also freeze the laws of nature themselves. He has the ability and the power, but my claim is that He does not do so. So we have not gained very much with the model proposed here. True, it does not break the laws of nature, but that is not the problem in standard theology. Breaking the laws of nature is possible without any problem; the problem is that it simply does not happen. In that sense, influence on doctors’ minds also does not really happen, and therefore in my opinion we have not gained very much from this creative idea.
Beyond that, of course, influence on natural events in most cases cannot be carried out this way.

Hello Gil.
Funkenstein probably understood physics about as well as Maimonides and the rest of the miracle theorists and scholars of Jewish thought. There is no such thing as miracles within nature, and there is no random element, holes, or pockets in the laws of nature.
As for intervention through human consciousnesses, see my reply to Oren above.
If you read The Science of Freedom, there are more chapters there relevant to this discussion (in fact, almost all of them, because there I deal with human intervention in nature, so the logic is quite similar to divine intervention).

As for the model of intervention through human consciousness, it solves the difficulty in the Sages’ distinction between prayer for miracles (such as “May it be Your will that my wife give birth to a male” or “that these not be members of my household” = changes for which influence on consciousness would not help) and prayer for things like “a complete recovery for so-and-so” (an influence that can happen without changing the laws of nature, namely through influence on consciousness). It can also provide a basis for permitting prayers nowadays, since there is a way they can be fulfilled without requiring a miracle (miracle = changing the laws of nature). It basically serves as a substitute for the non-deterministic margin in the Sages’ conception.

There is another question, though: whether prayers are answered nowadays (even those that do not require miraculous intervention). About that, you argue that even without miraculous intervention, there is no answering even in that way (and that this is the Holy One’s policy nowadays). Empirically that indeed seems right (see this link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Studies_on_intercessory_prayer). The question is whether the very impression (a reasonable one) that prayers are not answered today turns all prayers into “futile prayers,” or whether only prayers that require changing the laws of nature deserve the title “futile prayer.”

I understand. The question is whether this happens, and if not—whether that does not fall under the category of a futile prayer (as you noted afterward). It is quite clear that the Sages did not see things this way, and did not think there was a difference between intervention through consciousness and intervention in physics.

I commented in the WhatsApp group that the proof from the Talmud in Berakhot—that it is not God’s way to perform hidden miracles—can be rejected, because only in the case of a fetus is it not His way to intervene, since there is a female here and to turn her into a male is a bit like erasing a person. And they also brought there that the Jerusalem Talmud disagrees and holds that one may pray up until birth.

Aside from the strange reasoning you raised, in the plain sense of the Mishnah, and likewise in the Talmud and commentators there, they do not see this as a unique case. It is a prayer over the past brought just like “May it be Your will that these not be members of my household.”

A. Why is that a strange reasoning?
B. It counts as “over the past” because now it will not change, and so his prayer is really about yesterday; therefore it is similar to every prayer over the past.

And the Jerusalem Talmud, which says one may pray up until birth, proves my point, and the commentators there brought another midrash about this.

I meant the invention about erasing a person. I explained that from the Mishnah and the medieval authorities it appears clearly that they saw this as a standard example of prayer over the past. And I didn’t understand your attempt to reject that.
The Jerusalem Talmud proves nothing about the Babylonian Talmud, and in any case the Babylonian Talmud is what was ruled as Jewish law.

As I understand it, the medieval authorities saw this as a regular case of prayer over the past because it was clear to them that the Holy One would not intervene here to change the fetus, and so the prayer is really about yesterday. Even in your understanding, it is implicit in the passage that one does not pray for a miracle, and so the prayer is about yesterday.
The proof from the Jerusalem Talmud is that, it seems to me, the dispute between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds is not so extreme—whether God performs hidden miracles—but rather a specific dispute over whether He changes a female into a male.
I still don’t understand why in your eyes this is strange reasoning. To turn a female into a male without asking her—according to Merav Michaeli that’s outright murder.

By that logic, even prayer about the future is prayer about the past if it is clear that the Holy One will not intervene. It seems to me we’ve exhausted this.

One who goes to measure his grain says, “May it be Your will, Lord our God, that You send blessing on this heap.” If he measured and afterward blessed, this is a futile prayer.

What do you think of the direction of saying that the Sages said it is forbidden to pray for a miracle because of their scientific conception, and once that conception is mistaken, the Jewish law is nullified too?
After all, everyone would presumably agree that the patriarchs did not sin when they prayed, even though that was a futile prayer, since according to the laws of nature something else should have happened. So it is permitted to pray for a miracle, and the Sages simply said otherwise by mistake.

The prohibition against praying for a miracle is a norm, and I do not see why to tie it to one conception or another. The patriarchs did not sin because they did not know the reality (or because the reality in their time was different).
What I argued for is a change in reality. That is, one should change the Sages’ conception of reality, not the norms of the Sages.

Regarding the patriarchs, you said either that they did not sin because they did not know reality, or that reality was different.
According to the first answer—do you want to say that really God would not have wanted them to pray, because it was prayer for a miracle? (And if He did want it, doesn’t that mean the norm is mistaken?)
According to the second answer—what does it mean that reality was different? The laws of nature, or God’s will regarding prayers? (If the laws of nature, that seems unlikely. If God’s will, how do we know God no longer wants us to pray for a miracle?)

Correct.
The change is that the Holy One used to be more involved and today is less involved. This is the change in His policy that I described here in the past:

חיפוש אחר אלוהים בעולם

Therefore it is possible that once He really was involved in nature, and only today He no longer is.

I want to say it doesn’t depend on that change, even if I grant it.
Even if God intervened more in the past, that intervention was still in the category of miracle, and those prayers too were for a miracle.
My argument is from the prayers of the patriarchs.
We both agree that they were for a miracle. And I add the assumption that they were pleasing before God, since the whole Jewish people was built from them (even though it could have been otherwise).
Even if the patriarchs did not think they were praying for a miracle, God certainly knew that they were, and nevertheless those prayers were pleasing before Him (according to my assumption).
From this I want to say that prayers for a miracle are pleasing before God, and that the norm not to pray for a miracle is mistaken (and likely arose from a mistaken conception of the laws of nature, as you say).

It does depend on the change. If there were no laws of nature in the sense there are today, but rather part of the regular conduct was through divine involvement, then it is possible there is no prohibition against praying for it.
As for your assumption about the prayers of the patriarchs, I do not know what it is based on. But if you assume that, then of course you have assumed the conclusion, and it indeed follows from it.

Okay, and if there is no involvement—is there a prohibition? Why is it reasonable to assume so?
(Even the Sages, who said it is forbidden, did not say so because they thought there was no involvement…)

Because it is not proper to ask the Holy One to act contrary to His decision and His policy. Why is it not proper to pray for a miracle in the first place? Presumably for that reason.

Hello Rabbi. I’m trying to understand why there is a comparison between the prohibition against praying for the contradiction of laws of nature that we know exist, and the contradiction of hypothetical laws that we do not know exist. After all, the deterministic claim—and I would be happy if the Rabbi, who is an expert in the subject, would correct me if I’m mistaken—is a philosophical claim and not an empirical one. It is a claim that began in philosophy and at some point scientists adopted it for philosophical reasons, reasons presumably influenced by the development of science, but not proved by it. For it certainly cannot be empirically proved in scientific research, since even those who support this claim know that they cannot observe and predict determinism, because on their view we do not know all the laws. If so, this is not a scientific claim, since it cannot stand the test of prediction and confirmation or refutation. So all we have here is a philosophical dispute, one that already stood before the Sages, and today only receives a more credible feeling because of scientific development, but no more than that. Therefore, even if someone inclines more toward the philosophical opinion with which the Sages disagreed, this has no connection at all to the issue of the prohibition of futile prayer, which was said regarding laws empirically known to a person.

The distinction you are making between philosophy and science does not exist. Science itself is based on philosophical assumptions. Every scientific law is the result of a generalization based on several observations in particular cases. Therefore every contradiction you find to the laws of physics is a contradiction to philosophical principles. That is what science is called. And if prayer to change the laws of nature is forbidden, then we are talking about every prayer.

I didn’t quite understand the Rabbi’s words:
A. On the scientific level: is determinism a scientific claim; does it meet Karl Popper’s conditions for a scientific theory? Can it be predicted or refuted?
B. On the philosophical level: why does it obligate our conceptual framework (and that of the Sages)? After all, many oppose this conception, including the Rabbi himself regarding human free choice. Why, concerning man, is the Rabbi sure it is mistaken, while concerning providence the Rabbi is sure the Sages are mistaken? There is no way to prove it, and if so it is nothing more than an intuition. And if so, the Sages simply had a different intuition.

A. On the philosophical level, no scientific theory is refutable. One can always say that the body did not fall to the ground because at that moment an imperceptible wind was blowing. Quite a few non-empirical assumptions underlie science, and also underlie the demand for refutability. In that sense determinism is a scientific claim in every respect, since it is a direct result of physics. If physics is refutable, then determinism is too.
B. I do not oppose determinism. I only claim that our will sometimes deviates from it. I have written about this many times here on the site, and it is worth searching.
I am not sure the Sages were mistaken; rather, I am sure there is no reason to think they were right. They had no sources of information that you and I do not have, and therefore there is no reason to look for excuses that reconcile their position. If Einstein told me something about physics that seemed wrong to me, I would think twice, because I know he had great understanding and knowledge in physics. That is not the case with the Talmudic Sages, who erred even in matters that were well known in their own time, all the more so in matters not known in their time. Just like sages of our own time who err in those same things that are known in our time.

This exact point is what is missing for me. I would be glad if the Rabbi could explain it, or direct me to an explanation: how is determinism a direct result of physics? Is it really entailed by it, or only possible, or simply more convenient for physical theory on the methodological level?

Physics reduces the inanimate world to four fundamental forces. The rest—go and learn. Those forces are deterministic (apart from quanta).

What four fundamental forces? You mean neutron, proton, electron, and…?

Why can’t one say that the Sages held that what already exists in reality cannot be changed, and they weren’t talking about laws of nature at all?

https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%97%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%94%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%93

Ah, that’s quantum physics. I’m still at the beginning of physics.

A simple question: who said it is forbidden to pray a futile prayer? It only says that it is futile, and I haven’t seen any language of prohibition mentioned.

Who said it’s forbidden?

The title of the question claims there is a prohibition. And your first answer too, as I understood it, discussed a “prohibition” regarding praying for salvation.
Practically speaking, do you hold that there is no prohibition against praying a futile prayer?

On the face of it, there does not seem to be any prohibition here. It simply does no good (it is futile). One could say that the Sages established a prohibition against it because one is turning to the Holy One for no reason. I saw that in Yeshuot Yaakov 682:2 he wrote that there is a prohibition here lest his merits be deducted, as in the Talmud, Sabbath 32a: one for whom a miracle is performed has it deducted from his merits.