Q&A: The Zealotry of Pinchas
The Zealotry of Pinchas
Question
Hello, honored Rabbi,
I came across a saying today while studying tractate Horayot (10a), according to which "a transgression for its own proper sake is greater than a commandment performed not for its own sake." The saying was stated in the context of Pinchas killing Zimri, though it was qualified to "a transgression for its own proper sake is as great as a commandment performed not for its own sake." Even so, a "transgression for its own sake" still retains its greatness.
At that moment I couldn't help but recall the despicable case of Yishai Schlissel, who stabbed six people taking part in the Jerusalem Pride Parade about two years ago.
So my question is: is there an essential difference between Pinchas's act of zealotry and Schlissel's act, a difference so fundamental that it should have caused Schlissel—who studied this Talmudic passage (or saw the story of Pinchas itself) and understood it as imposing on him an obligation to prevent what he saw as an injustice, even with motives that were clearly not pure—to reconsider and stay with his books?
Put differently: given that Pinchas received divine approval for his deed, what should have instructed Schlissel not to do the same? Is it only "the law of the land," or is there something deeper here that he missed? (It seems to me that "you shall not murder" does not apply here, since Pinchas himself killed.)
Thanks in advance.
Answer
Hello.
A commandment is a commandment, and it should be done regardless of its consequences (except in very exceptional cases). But here we are dealing with a transgression, and therefore it must be judged and one must decide whether to do it or not based on its consequences.
Therefore, Pinchas's act is worthy of praise, whereas Schlissel's act deserves sharp condemnation (it helped no one; it only caused harm). Beyond that, Pinchas harmed an intentional sinner (as I assume), someone who did what he did when the people were bound by the commandments. By contrast, Schlissel harmed an unintentional sinner—or really someone acting under compulsion (in fact he harmed someone who is not a sinner at all)—since homosexuals nowadays do not understand that this is a prohibition (they are secular). Beyond that, the people today are in a different condition, since most are not bound by Jewish law.
On this occasion I will mention what several later authorities write: that a transgression for its own sake depends on the intention of the person doing it (the Netziv, Rabbi Kook, and others). I do not accept that. Take Yael's act (brought as an example in the parallel passage in Nazir). The act was justified because of its consequences (Sisera was the enemy's general), and therefore it does not seem reasonable to me that if Yael had felt that she was doing the act out of lust, it would have been forbidden. The need to kill Sisera would still exist, and the Jewish people would not be required to give that up just because Yael was not righteous. This follows from the view I mentioned above, that a transgression for its own sake is evaluated according to its consequences.
Discussion on Answer
Elchanan, and if he had done it during the act itself? Besides, there's room for the reasoning that a public march intended to permit an act that justifies zealots striking someone also justifies such an attack.
And if anything, you should have distinguished on the grounds that in Jewish law we do not find a rule of "zealots may strike him" regarding one who has intercourse with a male.
Why would it justify it?! What is the transgression in the march itself?? The concept of "zealots may strike him" (which presumably does not exist today anyway… because this kind of zealotry is not entrusted to an ordinary person…) is extremely limited within a framework of rules, one of which is that it must be during the act of transgression itself!!
Who invented this very detailed and precise framework of rules? Where does it appear?
Rabbi Yohanan said: If he comes to ask, we do not instruct him to do so. Moreover, if Zimri had separated and Pinchas killed him, Pinchas would be executed for it. If Zimri had turned around and killed Pinchas, he would not be executed for it, for Pinchas is a pursuer. (Sanhedrin 82a)
And see further in the medieval authorities.
Our master Rabbi A. may he live long,
Did you really think I was looking for a link to the Talmudic passage about Zimri and Pinchas? I know it very well. But you decided, out of your broad wisdom, that there is a whole Torah and detailed rules on this matter, and that is what I asked about: where does this invention come from?
Sorry for the delay..
I didn't think so…
But it's a very simple and clear rule.. (at least one rule): "during the act"!!! If that isn't explicit, then what is?!
Where is this rule stated? From where is it learned? And how do you know one cannot derive from it, by an a fortiori argument, regarding a parade that aids, supports, and advances the phenomenon which, during the act itself, would allow attacking them?
And similarly: if there is a parade that promotes a favorable attitude toward murder and will lead to murder, would you not view the marchers as pursuers?
Honored great Rabbi, with all due respect… a little reading comprehension?? "If Zimri had separated and Pinchas killed him… Pinchas would be executed for it"!
And yes… I think that halakhically a pursuer is only when he has the knife in hand on the way to the victim… not verbal incitement…
And if he was on his way toward Cozbi and Pinchas killed him, would Pinchas also be executed for it? In my poverty, and with my own "little reading comprehension," I did not find a solution to that in the Talmud, and I hope the master will help me with his broad understanding.
Maybe I'm naive… but the plainest plain meaning of the matter is this: Pinchas has no right to kill him unless it is at the very moment of the transgression!! Not on the way there. Not a parade. And not incitement.
It seems to follow that today too, if that exact same case happened during the act itself, it would be proper to kill as Pinchas did in his time. The question is whether you agree with that or whether there is some additional difference connected to the period?
Of course I'll wait for the Rabbi's answer. But the discussion (the way I discussed it) was whether to compare Yishai Schlissel to Pinchas—a comparison the ear cannot bear… obviously murder is murder, and it's a grave matter, especially since a "spirit of zealotry" certainly was not in Schlissel…
In any case, if Schlissel had done everything according to the conditions above, we really would have had to struggle to distinguish between the cases… (including proving that Schlissel is not a true "zealot"…)
I'm actually not focusing on Schlissel as such but on the idea: does the rule of "zealots may strike him" apply today, or is there reason to say that it does not apply today?
The rule certainly exists. The question is whether in one situation or another it cannot be carried out. (Maybe because there are no zealots today… and the like.)
And I'll bring proof: from the law of levirate marriage nowadays, where we do not perform levirate marriage but only halitzah, because of the view of Abba Shaul, who worries that the levirate marriage will be done not for its own proper sake, which would, God forbid, cause the children to be illegitimate. Therefore today we do not do levirate marriage, only halitzah. (And in effect, by doing so we prevent establishing a name for the deceased brother. This shows you the power of stringency.) And perhaps one can see from here that it is possible to determine regarding the entire people that they are incapable of performing levirate marriage for its proper sake (and even if you were to find a righteous person who would have all the proper intentions, etc., he would still be forbidden to do levirate marriage). If so, perhaps one can say and determine that today there are no "zealots," and therefore the entire rule of "zealots may strike him" is void.
Of course, again, I will wait for the Rabbi's response and to see his view on the matter.
The problem is that the law of "zealots" is not really a regular law like levirate marriage; the perfect zealot is supposed to do it without asking a rabbi. The whole idea is that it comes from within him… anyway, we'll wait for the Rabbi.
Thanks
True. And determining that nowadays there are no people who would intend levirate marriage for its proper sake is also not a law. I only wanted to suggest an analogy between the two things—that we can determine for the entire people a certain spiritual level. Just as you determined regarding levirate marriage that nowadays people do not intend it for its proper sake, so too determine regarding zealotry that it is not genuine and that today there is no "zealots may strike him."
I do not know where you got the idea that Schlissel is not a zealot. He certainly seems to me to be a zealot. His act was negative because it was of no use, he did not strike someone who was guilty, certainly not intentionally, and it was not done according to the law (except under a very expansive interpretation; see above).
In principle this rule applies today as well (it's forced to hang it on capital law, which has lapsed), but even a zealot has to weigh his steps. Especially since, as the Talmud says, it is permitted to kill the zealot under the law of a pursuer, and therefore society too may prohibit this and even punish him.
By the way, there is no rule that the zealot may not ask a rabbi. On the contrary, Pinchas did ask. The rule is that he is allowed to do it without asking a rabbi, and the rabbi has a rule that we do not instruct this.
As for the question whether one can determine that today there are no zealots: one can, though I do not think that is correct. There definitely are zealots; what is involved is a change in the scale of values regarding zealotry.
A zealot certainly has to act according to Jewish law (even though this is not a law like other laws, still, in the laws of zealotry there are threshold conditions). If Schlissel did not act according to the basic condition of "during the act," then he is not a zealot. And more than that, these are matters of the heart, so how can we know the zealotry of each and every person? About Pinchas we have no doubt, since God testifies about him: "when he zealously avenged My zeal."
To begin with, I don't understand where the notion grew from that the rule "zealots may strike him" applies to everything. The Sages, and Maimonides as well, explicitly define that it applies only to one who has intercourse with an Aramean woman, and there is an explicit prohibition there concerning other things.
So from where does any discussion arise in the context of Schlissel, who attacked in a completely different case even if we assume he had attacked someone actually committing the act?!
I'd be happy for a reference to an in-depth article on the subject, if there is one…
If you cannot know that he is a zealot, then you also cannot know that he is not. A zealot is a mental and spiritual state, and the question whether he acts according to the law and properly is a different question. There can be a zealot who errs and is still a genuine zealot. If God were revealed today, maybe He would also tell us that Schlissel is a zealot.
Segev, see the beginning of the thread.
Because if the zealot is avenging God's zeal, it's hard to say that he doesn't recognize and know when his zealotry is in the right place and when not… and if inwardly he is still a zealot, that is not relevant… I'll add, by way of phrase, "an ignoramus is no zealot"… I mean that if you're mistaken about something so critical in your action… (I believe he also thought a lot before he went out into this bloodbath) then surely this is not your place…
That reminds me of Rabbi Dessler's statement that changing the truth for the sake of peace is not falsehood. Falsehood is only what one is forbidden to say, but here one is permitted and required to say it, and therefore it is truth. Nonsensical and outrageous remarks that testify to extremely simplistic thinking.
A zealot is a zealot, and there is no point identifying him with a Torah scholar who is expert in the fine details of Jewish law and careful about all of them. It is not the same concept.
First, to suspect דווקא Rabbi Dessler of simplistic thinking is ridiculous… and second, I didn't demand that he be expert in the laws of conversion or circumcision… but in the laws of zealotry, since right now that's what he's dealing with… and as I said, he surely thought a lot before he went out to act… first thing you think: is it permitted? Is it proper? Is this what God wants from me right now? Simplistic maybe, but true.
I pretty much agree that it's very simplistic to say that falsehood isn't falsehood when it's forbidden, because that moves the concept of "falsehood" from fact to evaluation, and that's something I haven't seen in any philosophical theory. The theories speak about the fact that sometimes it is permitted and desirable, but no one innovates that it isn't falsehood, and Rabbi Dessler takes that approach because he is compelled to remove the great figures of the nation from the category of falsehood, instead of solving it in a much simpler Torah way that sanctifies the end according to many sages of Israel.
And a question for Rabbi Michi: I saw the beginning of the thread. Does the permission for zealotry in every place stem from the Talmudic statement, "A transgression for its own proper sake is greater than a commandment not for its own sake"? If so, then it doesn't really speak about zealotry but about every kind of transgression. In my opinion there is no doubt that no rabbi would permit, as a general rule of Jewish law, actually committing a transgression for its own sake—only in a local, specific case. Therefore it cannot really be discussed in theoretical terms at all, because it has to be judged case by case.
This question is beside the point. For a very simple reason! This was not at the time of the transgression itself, so there is no permission of "zealots may strike him" at all!! So see there—Yishai Schlissel is a full-fledged murderer; no one disputes that. And there is not the slightest connection to the case of Pinchas!!