Q&A: Does True Randomness Not Require an Explanation?
Does True Randomness Not Require an Explanation?
Question
Hello Rabbi.
I did not understand the assumption underlying Chapter 8 in the physicotheological argument.
The Rabbi wrote there: "As we shall see, we must ask ourselves whether the neo-Darwinian picture contains a random component, because if it does contain such a component, it can definitely serve as an alternative to the physicotheological argument and make its conclusion unnecessary."
I am speaking in principle, setting aside your explanation that there is no true randomness in evolution.
Why, if there were true randomness in evolution, would it be impossible to infer a conclusion from a rare result that occurred?
After all, if for example rolling a die were truly random (ontic randomness), and we got the number 6 a hundred times, would we not have to conclude from this that there was some directing factor that controlled this "randomness"? (And then it would become clear retroactively that this was not really randomness after all.)
And if the Rabbi means that one should not infer this conclusion, because there were hundreds of thousands of rolls, then we have already arrived in the territory of the anthropic argument, so what does this have specifically to do with true randomness? After all, that objection is valid even with randomness that is not true randomness, because one cannot infer any conclusion from a rare result that occurred within a huge number of trials, and so the fact that evolution is not truly random contributes nothing at all to overcoming the anthropic objection.
Answer
Indeed, a large number of rolls allows for a rare random result. The anthropic argument is truly problematic, and this is another difficulty. The problem I am discussing here assumes that there is no randomness. I do not know what randomness that is not true randomness is. Here no objection is possible. What came out is the result of design and of the laws that govern the process.
Discussion on Answer
With a coin toss, the large number of trials explains nothing. Probability is only our language here (because there is nothing random there). What really explains the result in a coin toss is the laws of nature, because everything there is deterministic. The same applies to evolution.
So basically the Rabbi is claiming that one should be astonished (and draw conclusions) from a result of 100 rolls of 6 even if that happened within billions of trials?
In my opinion, if the die/coin were tossing itself, then I would be amazed even if all its tosses were different.
With a deterministic die, there is nothing to be astonished about.
Rabbi, I did not understand the deterministic comparison between evolution and a die.
After all, we have not found anything evolving nowadays!
There is no comparison. The question was why the random dimension that exists in evolution is important, and for that purpose the comparison to a die was brought in. What does that have to do with the question whether there is evolution nowadays (and by the way, there is)?
A) Is the die familiar to us deterministic? Because the Rabbi always brings it as an example of being amazed at a special result.
B) So when the Rabbi proved that evolution is deterministic, we are not supposed to be amazed by it, right? (Like the die.)
Please convince me about evolution nowadays, and who said there is a random dimension nowadays—please present another example.
I was not convinced, because the die does not evolve but matter does evolve, but why through randomness?
The die is deterministic. I use it as a borrowed example for a random process (because in our world there is no true randomness, except perhaps in quantum phenomena at the micro level).
Moshe, read the literature (for example on The Beak of the Finch). I am not dealing with evolution itself, only with its theological implications.
I would be glad for yes/no answers to the following statements:
A) Does the anthropic objection exist only if there is randomness in the universe?
In other words: after the Rabbi showed that there is no randomness in nature, is that objection canceled?
B) Are we not supposed to infer a conclusion from a die that lands a hundred times on 6 (namely, that it has a structure designed to land on 6), even though the results are deterministic?
C) "With a coin toss, the large number of trials explains nothing"—so should we conclude that the die is biased even if the special result occurred within a huge number of trials?
And please explain the statement: "If evolution contains such a component, it can definitely serve as an alternative to the physicotheological argument." Why? Because of the anthropic argument, or even without it?
Book: The Beak of the Finch — (about evolution nowadays) by Jonathan Weiner
Before I read it, I would like to know whether it contains an answer and proofs regarding the cases discussed in the words of Rabbi Daniel Bels
http://www.haemet.net/articles/creation/evolution_of_man/truth_man_apes_skeletons.htm
Y,
A. Indeed.
B. Yes. Not despite that, but because of it. Exactly as if it lands 8 times on 6 and afterwards 3 times on 2 (that is, a result not necessarily special), it is designed to land that way.
C. I did not understand.
Moshe, I have not read Bels. If you want evidence for evolution over a short time and in our own day, read that book.
B) I wrote "not" at the beginning of the sentence, so I am not sure what the Rabbi meant. Let me ask it this way: if I roll a regular die (which is deterministic) and got 100 sixes, and these are the only rolls I made, should I conclude that the die is not fair and is designed to land on 6 more often?
Most likely yes.
And what if the special result of the deterministic die occurred within billions upon billions of trials?
I do not see any point in this endless discussion. I already wrote that with a deterministic die every result is dictated by the laws of the die. What is unclear here?
It is clear that it is determined by the laws. My question is how one can infer the conclusion that the laws are special from the fact that they led to a special result, when that came after masses of trials.
In the case of the deterministic die, I assume the Rabbi would say that if the special result (100 sixes in a row) occurred after masses of trials, one should not infer the conclusion that the die is engineered in a special way so as to reach this special result, even though it is not random.
So too with evolution: if there were many trials for the creation of life and its development (assuming that is true), and one of them succeeded, what does it help to say that evolution is not random? In any case, one should not infer anything about the specialness and complexity of the laws that, within masses of trials, arrived at some special result—just like with the die.
I do not understand how denying randomness eliminates the anthropic principle. Should we also, in the case of the die, infer that it is special despite there having been many throws?
The number of trials is irrelevant for a deterministic die (in a deterministic process, the number of trials has no meaning). If the result of the laws of nature is the formation of life, then it is reasonable that the laws were created by someone so that life would emerge from them. If there had been a random process of the formation of laws, and the system of laws that happened to arise was not special, but because of masses of trials there happened by chance to be a special result, then that would have been an alternative proposal. That's all.
Wait, so also in the case of a die that was thrown many times and within that there came out a special result, one should conclude that its designer probably intended for the special result to come out?
I assume the Rabbi saw the question and felt there was no point in explaining, so I would be glad to speak with the Rabbi by phone, if possible; it is very important to me.
Sure.
True randomness—as opposed to rolling a die, where the process is deterministic and we simply lack information.
What I am asking is why, if evolution had a random component, it would be an alternative to the physicotheological argument. If it is because of the large number of trials, that would also be true even without true randomness (like tossing a coin, where many trials explain a rare result).
What is it about randomness that makes the argument unnecessary?