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Q&A: Definition of "General" and "Specific"

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Definition of "General" and "Specific"

Question

Hello Rabbi Michi
 
I wanted to ask about the topic of "general and specific" among the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is interpreted.
We learned in Kiddushin 24b:
"If he strikes"—a general term; "tooth and eye"—a specific term. A general term followed by a specific term means that the general includes only what is in the specific: tooth and eye, yes; anything else, no. "He shall send him free" then returns and gives a general term.
We were unable to understand how the Talmud learns that "if he strikes" or "he shall send him" is a general term—after all, this is part of a sentence in which that is the predicate: "if a man strikes the eye of his slave." Seemingly there is only a specific term here. Otherwise one could classify any verb as a "general term"—
"Remember the Sabbath day"—day is general, Sabbath is specific.
Thank you

Answer

In Rashi and in Shittah Lo Nod'a LeMi there, they explained that it says "he shall send him free" instead of "he is free." The extra verb comes to include many acts of sending free. The later authorities (see, for example, Atzmot Yosef) objected that seemingly these words of Rashi refer to what follows, where multiple forms of emancipation are included, and not here. But in my opinion they are mistaken, and Rashi really does mean it here. And what troubled him was precisely your question. Therefore he writes that the inclusion implied by "sending free" comes to teach that there is a general term at the end here. (True, this is not really an inclusion of multiple sendings, but the phrase of sending is what broadens. And that is the difference between the two derashot: whether one includes multiple forms of sending free, or whether one broadens the last specific term and turns it into a general term.)
There is here something like an "if it is not needed for its own matter" move, since this inclusion is not understandable (according to the derashah here; the derashah later indeed finds another solution for it, and then in fact they do not expound it as general and specific and general). Therefore they redirect it into serving as a general term for the preceding structure.
A tentative scholarly note: it seems to me that the earlier cases of general and specific were careful to use general and specific according to the content itself (as in "herd and flock, wine and strong drink, and whatever your soul desires," regarding redeeming the second tithe), but in later generations these derashot were expanded and general terms of more indirect kinds were introduced. And perhaps in these indirect derashot the intention is only as a scriptural support, but this requires further investigation.

Discussion on Answer

Alon (2017-05-10)

Hello Rabbi,
Can you give examples from the Talmud of the indirect general terms you mentioned in the last paragraph?

Thanks.

Michi (2017-05-11)

An example of exactly that was given right here.

Haggai (2017-05-12)

Maybe the Rabbi remembers other examples of indirect general terms?

Michi (2017-05-12)

It seems to me that most examples are like this. Just look up derashot of general and specific and you'll see immediately. For example, Sukkah 50b, Sotah 46a, Nazir 35a, and others.

Judah (2020-10-08)

Is there a book that gathers together all the cases of specific-and-general, general-and-specific, and general-and-specific-and-general in the Torah, including of course analysis of them with citations and commentaries?

Michi (2020-10-08)

I don't know of one. The second book in our Talmudic Logic series deals with the derashot of general and specific, their development, and their logic. We go through quite a number of sugyot, but not all of them.

Rafi (2021-05-25)

A question about general and specific:
General and specific—"the general includes only what is in the specific." If so, why did the Torah write the general term? It could have written only the specific.

Michi (2021-05-25)

The medieval authorities (Rishonim) on the baraita of the hermeneutical principles explain this. If only the specific had been written, we would have constructed a binyan av and expanded it to other cases. General and specific comes to say that it should be narrowed more. For a more precise description of the difference (how far one expands with a binyan av and with the principles of general and specific—since even in general and specific there is some degree of expansion), see my book on general and specific (the second book in the Talmudic Logic series).

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