Q&A: "Truth" in Leibowitz's Thought
"Truth" in Leibowitz's Thought
Question
Rabbi Michi, hello,
I read on your site the article "The Arbitrariness of the Will in Leibowitz's Thought." I agree with the criticism you made of Sagi, who held that the concept of arbitrariness does not require pluralism. However, later in the article you try to argue that Leibowitz believed his philosophical and religious doctrine was correct even though its foundational assumptions are "arbitrary." I agree with you that such an approach is possible, but from a careful reading of Leibowitz's writings it seems that this was not his approach. For example, he writes in a letter published in his book I Wanted to Ask You —
"A person's conduct follows necessarily from his value-decisions, and these do not stem from what he knows but from what he wants. 'Truth' and 'value' are two separate worlds."
In this quote it seems that Leibowitz is not only speaking about the arbitrariness of the will and the impossibility of rationalizing the realm of values, but is also adding that this is a realm that does not belong at all to the category of truth and falsehood. That is, it is simply pure desire (like the desire to eat ice cream).
Another proof of this approach is found in his book Conversations on Faith and Philosophy with Avi Ravitzky —
"Leibowitz: I present you with a situation in which a person has to decide between two things that are very dear to him, and then one is pushed aside for the sake of the other, and that proves that for this person the second is the value. That ends the discussion! Ravitzky: And does that prove that the first is not dear to him at all?
Leibowitz: Again… many things are dear to me. A sweet whipped-cream cake is very dear to me, but the moment that thing would require me to murder someone in order to get that cake, then it becomes clear that whipped-cream cake is not a value in a situation where it requires murdering someone.
Ravitzky: That's a clash between the interest in sweet whipped cream and a value.
Leibowitz: I don't know — this distinction between interest and value — I have an interest in the rule of justice in the world. Well, what would you say about that? An interest is a value. I have an interest in the national-political independence of the Jewish people. [laughs]"
It seems here that he sees a value as just an arbitrary desire, not connected at all to "truth," exactly like wanting whipped-cream cake…
I have a few more proofs, but these seem sufficient. In my opinion, Leibowitz really was a postmodernist and held that his values were not the correct values, but only his subjective decisions.
I would be glad to hear your response.
Thank you very much
Answer
Hello N.,
The first proof is no proof at all. When he speaks about will, what he means is that it is not a fact, not that it is arbitrary. I want some value, but the value is not a fact. Your second proof, from the identification of interest with value, is indeed difficult (and it comes up in his writing more than once, like Eleanor Roosevelt with Playboy), but that is simply his misunderstanding (of himself and in general).
It seems to me that I explained there that it is quite clear to me that Leibowitz did not understand himself. He was a positivist, and as such his thinking was limited. He was not willing to accept truths for which we have no proof. Therefore, from his perspective every axiom is arbitrary (because he has no justification or argument to ground it), "because that's what I want" (like ice cream). But in my estimation, what he meant to say was that it is true in his eyes even though there is no justification for it.
The clearest proof of this is that it is very hard to accept the moral pathos with which he criticized the whole world and his wife (the occupation, the disco-wall, and so on), if these were merely things he happened to feel like and not things to which he saw himself as committed, and which he also saw as binding on others.
By the way, many postmodernists are like this too — they do not understand themselves. What they mean to say is that things are not necessary and depend on foundational assumptions, but instead they say that nothing is true, everything is narratives and other nonsense. In most cases these are simply misunderstandings of the world and of themselves.
Discussion on Answer
I would like to note that in the interview with Avi Sagi, Leibowitz repeatedly says: no one is obligated to do anything! When he criticized the whole world, he did not mean to say that they were violating an obligation; rather, it was a kind of declaration that those people had chosen evil. And he fought the evil he hated with all his soul.
Indeed, it seems that he did believe in objective truth and knew how to decide the question of what a good act is, but claimed that the decision to act according to the good is arbitrary. Why should I choose the good? Just because! Because I love good. The same way I love ice cream.
By the way, regarding commandments too, he argued (in the conversation with Sagi) that no one is obligated. The fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded something does not obligate a person to obey. (The naturalistic fallacy / Hume's is-ought problem.)
He chooses to obey because he feels like it. Because he wants to.
As I explained in the article, he did not understand himself. The failure of positivism.
Interesting.
As for the reason he was so forceful and preached so much on various issues, he gives an explanation for that later in the book (http://www.leibowitz.co.il/word/PDF/Leibowitz&Ravitzky_V.1.0.pdf – end of pp. 46 to 48). He explains that he fights because he really, really hates it, unlike ice cream, which he's willing to see other people having….
In any case, thank you very much, and I'm inclined to agree with you.