Thank you, Rabbi, for the answer. I did not understand why the Rabbi takes it to mean specifically that she caused him to sin. It says there that what is relevant is that the Jew had relations with her intentionally. It does not deal at all with what she did or did not do.
Another question: what is the rationale for distinguishing between a Jewish woman and a gentile woman in this context?
In addition, how is someone who lives in a Western environment supposed to reconcile the clash within himself between a ruling of this kind and everything that shaped him as a person, influenced by the values of the Western world, in which he finds positive and correct principles?
What am I supposed to think about Maimonides, who issued a halakhic ruling of this kind? These things trouble me very deeply. Maimonides is considered one of the greatest figures ever, and on the other hand his view of the gentile woman is horrifying (at least to me). It is hard for me to contain the contradiction between this problematic ruling and the regard I am supposed to have, in my mind, for his character. How can one cope with the gap between the greatness of the sages of Israel and things they said or wrote that seem very hard to a person living in Western culture? And in general, is this revulsion at executing a girl who was raped a Western thing?
I admit that issues of this kind make it very hard for me to be part of the religious community.
Thank you in advance, Rabbi.

Hello.
What leads me to interpret it that way is precisely your question. Why interpret it in the most difficult way specifically? “He had relations with her intentionally” means that she caused him to sin and he cooperated. This excludes a case of causing him to sin where he acted unintentionally.
As for resolving difficulties of this kind (here there is no difficulty, as above), I will tell you two things: 1. Norms change over time, and there is no reason to rule specifically like Maimonides. 2. Even if there were agreement among all the halakhic decisors, there is room and authority (and even an obligation) for the decisors of the time to change it. One should remember that gentiles in the past behaved very differently from gentiles nowadays, and therefore this criticism is anachronistic. See my article here:

האם יש עבודה זרה 'נאורה'? על היחס לגויים ועל שינויים בהלכה

גוי שההלכה לא הכירה

It is also worth looking at column 15, where I discussed common mistakes in the understanding of the relationship between morality and Jewish law, and real difficulties (unlike this one here):
https://mikyab.net/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%A1-%D7%91%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%91-%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%A8-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8-15/

Thank you very much.
But then another question comes up for me: if indeed we change Jewish law, or at least adapt it to the norms of our time, then what is Judaism, really? One can imagine that the norms currently prevalent in the Western world might have looked different because of one historical development or another that would have put the West on a different path, and then our norms too would have been different. From all this it would seem that a priest's daughter is no better than an innkeeper, and Judaism is passing through the filter of the West. Then it is also not clear why Judaism is needed at all. After all, we judge it through lenses shaped by the norms of our time. Seemingly, one could give it up altogether. Our conscience does not need a book to understand that that ruling of Maimonides makes no sense nowadays.

I will just add that regarding the beautiful captive woman, they add another layer on top of the Torah’s permission to act in that way, and forbid it because of universal morality; but regarding this halakhic ruling of Maimonides, the move is different, and the Rabbi argues that one should abolish a certain behavior that is required by Jewish law (according to Maimonides at least) because of considerations of contemporary Western norms. (I am ignoring for the moment the fact that some disagree with Maimonides. I am talking about the principle. After all, there are other examples of laws like these that require behavior deemed immoral from the Western point of view.)

You are making a strange assumption, that we have some kind of admiration for the norms of our time and therefore find it necessary to adapt to them. Not so. I simply think these are indeed the correct norms, just as the Sages drew from the culture of their time. So I adapt the Torah to what I think is right (and that is what has always been done). The world progresses toward the correct norms; it did not just happen to land on random norms by chance.

There is something I do not understand. If the Torah is adapted to the norms of that time, it follows that we know how to act without guidance from any book. If so, the question returns: what do we need the Torah for as well?

The Torah is not adapted to those norms; rather, it is interpreted also in their light. There is a very big difference between those two claims.

The difference between the claims is indeed great; the question is how, in practice, that difference is expressed. When will there be a situation in which the norms and conscience say A, and the Torah says B, and we will decide on B? What is the rule for distinguishing between cases in which we decide A and those in which we decide B?

Aside from all this, there are many Jewish laws that are not connected to current norms at all.
The practical side is a topic in itself, and I cannot write a whole essay here. If there is an example, we can discuss it.

I thank the Rabbi for the openness and the ability to conduct a real and honest discussion. These things are not self-evident at all, and I doubt there are many other Torah figures capable of this.
I will give a few examples. For instance, the idea of procreation, which is based on the insight “He did not create it a waste.” Nowadays it is clear that there is no further need to bring more people into the world. The norm in the West is two children, and even fewer, per woman. Human beings have conquered the globe, and therefore apparently logic says that this commandment does not fit with accepted norms. Another example is Jewish slaughter, which is considered cruel by Western standards. Why not stun the animal first? More humane and much more fitting to the norms of our time. And what about homosexuality? Norms today say that one should not constrain people as long as they have not harmed anyone else, and therefore there is apparently something very strange about this prohibition—not to say dark. And not to mention circumcision: harm to the organ of a tender infant in the name of values that clash head-on with the norms of our time.
Thank you very much in advance, Rabbi, for the openness and tolerance.

Let us look at those examples.
1. Regarding procreation, there is indeed room for the argument that today it is not desirable to have more than a son and a daughter. The Torah-level obligation is a son and a daughter, but from the prophetic writings, “He did not create it a waste,” one should have as many as one can. That ancillary law can be voided today, and the reason is that the explicit interpretation of the verse is that the goal is to populate the world. Today, when the world is populated and additional increase may even be harmful, it is no longer binding. Again, one can argue with that reasoning, but it is a legitimate opinion (and it is indeed my personal opinion), and that is enough for me to demonstrate the mode of thought.
You asked why we need the verse if we go by our own reasoning and current norms. It is needed in order to introduce the very obligation to have children. Without the verse, we would not think there is such an obligation. Current norms enter only at stage two, to limit what emerges from the verse. By the way, these are not current norms but perfectly sensible judgment. What is current here is the situation (that the world is saturated), not the mode of thought.
2. Jewish slaughter may not be optimal (in my opinion it is not cruel, though perhaps there are methods that cause less pain; I am not sure about that), but the laws of slaughter were not intended only to lessen suffering. The consideration of animal suffering is one consideration within a whole complex, and therefore here I do not see room to change.
3. The same applies to homosexuality. This relates to column 15 that I referred you to. The Torah’s prohibition is not moral, and therefore it should not be judged in terms of morality and values. I do indeed think there is nothing morally wrong with it, but there is something religiously wrong with it. Is eating pork, or blood, or forbidden fat morally flawed? Yet the Torah prohibits it. That means the Torah has aims beyond moral aims. Therefore the prohibition of homosexuality is not a moral prohibition, and in any case there is no possibility of changing it because one thinks there is no moral flaw here. The same applies to circumcision.

I understand what moral evil is. According to a Western interpretation, it is an action that harms another person. (It seems to me that such an abstraction sums up a very broad body of thought in Western moral philosophy—maybe even all of it except Nietzsche.)
But I cannot manage to define for myself what the concept of “religious evil” means.

First of all, moral evil is not defined as Western or Eastern. What does that have to do with the West?

As for religious evil, in most cases I also do not understand and do not know how to define it, but I trust the words of the Holy One, blessed be He, and the Torah, that there are acts that are religiously wrong. For example, the wife of a priest who was raped must separate from him, even though their remaining together harms no one, and separating them is adding injury upon injury to the couple. Apparently the separation is necessary in order to preserve the holiness of the priesthood. The holiness of the priesthood is a religious value, not a moral one. The same is true of the holiness of the Temple and forbidden foods and the like.

It is connected to the West because in other places on the globe the norms are completely different. I understand that the Rabbi would argue that they are mistaken, but it is hard for me to escape the idea that, like many other things, norms are a geographical matter. (And note: I do not necessarily mean to say that there is no moral truth. I am talking about what exists in practice.) We as Jews in Israel are very influenced by the West, and Jews in other periods were influenced by other norms. I detect a Western spirit blowing through the Rabbi’s words. I would be glad if the Rabbi would give an example of something in Judaism that is worthy of change and adaptation in light of norms that are not connected to the West.
I understand what the Rabbi is saying about religious evil. But this issue again leads to clarifying the truth of the tradition and Judaism. I assume the Rabbi is convinced of the truth of the tradition and the Torah at a level that allows him to override the suffering of the rape victim. As for eating pork, the level of conviction in the tradition can be lower, since not eating bacon does not affect reality nearly as much. The point is that this scale of conviction, which allows you to act harshly from a Western point of view, is not defined. The matter is left to the person intuitively. I can say that from my standpoint Judaism is “proven” enough that I will not eat pork, because the harm in that decision is very slight to nonexistent; on the other hand, it is not proven enough for me to prevent a homosexual person from realizing his sexuality, or to prevent a raped priest’s wife from rebuilding her life within her family.

All right, the positions are understood. I will only say that there is no moral system that ignores harming others. That has no connection to the West. The West (again, a generalization of course) also forbids harming innocents when fighting terror, and that is a norm I do not agree with. There is some strange tendency to identify moral principles with Western thought, but that is not so. But as I said, we have exhausted the matter.

Thank you, Rabbi, for an eye-opening discussion.