From what I read in the place you referred me to, the laws of logic are not created things but eternal. Does that mean that besides God Himself there is another primordial reality (since one cannot say that logic is part of God)? Or to put it differently: is it impossible to relate to God as a simple infinite reality in which there is no place for divisions or logical definitions or any others?

Another question: it is impossible to grasp a (real) thing without boundaries of space and time, so how can one grasp God, who is above space and time? He is not a logical or mathematical entity. And if we say He is another type of entity, not in the category of human perception, how can we say about Him that He is subject to logical laws? Perhaps in His true reality there is no place for logical laws, even though we do not grasp that (just as we do not grasp Him Himself).

One more question: if God “decided” to create the world, what does that mean? That He has newly arising thoughts, or thought processes that can be chosen? And what is the mechanism of His choice—is it “free” (and could He, Heaven forbid, make a mistake), or dictated in advance?
And if there are thought processes in Him, does that mean He is “a reality in time,” and that past, present, and future apply to Him?

The laws of logic are not an entity, so they were not created and are not eternal. They simply are. It’s like asking whether the shape of a square was created or is eternal. It is a form, not an object (except for Platonists who speak of ideas). Or whether 1+3=4 was created or eternal.

Maybe it is impossible to grasp Him experientially, but the idea is easy enough to grasp. What’s the problem? He is not subject to logical laws because this is not subjection. I explained that. And certainly you cannot say such things, because you are subject to them. All this is just empty talk; it’s a waste of time.

Not necessarily. It could be that from the outset the plan was for the world to be created at such-and-such a moment or stage. Nothing changed in Him. Besides, it is commonly accepted today that time too was created with the world (in the Big Bang), and before that there was no time.

The main question (the third one) was whether God has hesitations or choices between two paths or two ideas. If so, is that choice free for Him? And if it is free with no prior cause or motive whatsoever, can He choose something not good?

And while we’re on the subject of choice: how does the idea work that it is possible to create ex nihilo a mechanism with the option to choose independently without dependence on its inventor, if the whole potential of that mechanism depends on the one who invented it?

I don’t know whether it makes sense to speak of hesitations in His regard. But why is that important? A choice can be completely free even if one chooses the good. But if someone is good in his very essence, I’m not sure it makes sense to speak of choice in the sense in which we speak about it regarding ourselves.
As for the second question, I didn’t understand it at all. We exist by virtue of our Creator, and still every one of our choices is free. What’s the problem with that? True, if He had not given us the power to do this, we could not choose, but now that the power has been given, we choose through it freely between alternatives.

I’ll explain the second question. When one invents a mechanism ex nihilo, it must be that there is nothing in the mechanism beyond what the inventor put into it (as opposed to inventing something from something else, where the inventor uses potential already latent in the original thing from which he shapes the second thing). So how can a human being choose in a truly divine way (for the choosing person is, so to speak, divine in his choice—he invents it ex nihilo at the moment he chooses with absolute freedom and with no prior decisive cause)?

Another question related to the above: after the Creator brought creation and all its mechanisms into being from absolute nothingness, does He still sustain it at every moment in some sense, or after creation does what was created already stand on its own and have a reality that is not dependent every moment on the Creator?

And another related point: how can one understand creation ex nihilo in the absolute sense? I know there is a Platonic idea about the world as an emanation of something from something—of a subtler and finer being that existed forever. Doesn’t Judaism, which believes in creation ex nihilo, end up trying to say something illogical—that suddenly something was created without anything prior to it?

First, sorry that above I wrote in the masculine. I thought this was a male questioner and not a female one.

I understood the question and answered it. I do not see any problem with free choice ex nihilo, whether the Holy One, blessed be He, sustains us at every moment or not (that is, whether He created us and then left us). Just as a person programs a computer and now the computer can perform actions that the person cannot do, or can do them faster. There is no problem here at all. In my opinion this difficulty simply comes from a word game. Think about it and you’ll see.

Regarding the second question, I have no idea; it could be either way. But it really makes no difference for our purposes.

As for the third question, Nachmanides raises this difficulty both in his commentary to Genesis and in his commentary to chapter 3 of Song of Songs (in Chavel’s edition of the Writings of Nachmanides). There is a contradiction in his words between the two places. In Song of Songs he adopts the Platonic view (contrary to the “Judaism” you described), and in Genesis he does not. In an article I once wrote I resolved the contradiction, but this is not the place. In any case, for my own part I do not see a problem. Creation ex nihilo is not a logical contradiction but an inability. Therefore there is no obstacle for one who is omnipotent to do it.

With a computer, it is different because it is something from something else; the abilities already existed potentially beforehand. A person did not create them, only organized them. But with choice, this human possibility of choosing in a divine way (that is, of bringing the chosen side into being ex nihilo through the human being) was itself created ex nihilo. So how can it be that a person chooses without the potential for choice already being given in him from the outset? (Especially if every reality requires that God sustain it at every moment.)

And is it possible that reality stands on its own without divine sustaining? If so, that is like creating a new god, since He created an additional reality alongside His own reality and so, כביכול, He is no longer alone. And if not, does that mean that creation is an expression of divinity itself—meaning there is nothing truly new here, only a form of expression of what already existed?

Okay. We’re stuck. I’ll try one more time:
1. The potential for choice is indeed in him (that is the ability to choose), and therefore he can use it and make a particular choice.
2. Indeed, in a certain sense this is like creating a new god. So what? About this it was said, “and you shall be like God, knowing good and evil,” and “in the image of God He made man.”

1. The question was to distinguish between a computer and choice.

2. The question was unrelated to choice, but about whether God sustains reality at every moment or not (if yes, it is as though it were an expression of divinity itself, and if not, it is as though He created a new god—a new reality alongside His own reality).