As for the repetition of the Amidah, if this is not considered the repetition of the Amidah, then the blessings are in vain. So now the question is what takes the recitation out of the category of “repetition of the Amidah.”
See, for example, Rabbi Rimon’s article here:

דף הבית

The question still remains open here: if from a halakhic standpoint one must burn it, but from a moral standpoint one must not, what does one do in a clash between morality and Jewish law—which prevails? (Maybe it depends on the level of halakhic obligation as opposed to the level of moral obligation, and all this requires further analysis.) I haven’t checked now whether this was written in column 15–16.

Why is there a prohibition? Because of needless destruction?
Even if there is no obligation to burn them, one could think that burning books that contain nonsense is not needless destruction.

Yishai,
There is a moral prohibition against burning books that are sacred to other people (especially if they belong to them), just as we complain when that was done to us.

Itai,
The question of how to decide is the same as in any value conflict. It is a matter of judgment and of what is right in the situation. Here it is clear to me (and it seems agreed by everyone, even if they wouldn’t put it this way) that the right thing is not to burn them.

Rabbi, beyond that, if I’m not mistaken Rabbi Kook relates to Christianity very respectfully, and I think he even attributes divine inspiration to some of its great figures. Is it really correct to regard Christianity in all its denominations as idolatry?

Rabbi, you always mention the principle of Lex Specialis, and here apparently you are violating it.
After all, there is a clash between two values: 1) consideration for the feelings of the other. 2) burning the books of heretics.
For our purposes, both are written in the Torah. Apparently it is obvious that one should burn the book and treat book-burning as an exception to the general rule of consideration for others. According to your solution, the value of burning the books of heretics is completely nullified.

Noam,
I too am prepared to relate respectfully. Is it idolatry? Opinions differ on that. Regarding Catholics, it seems to me that for most halakhic decisors it is idolatry, and regarding Protestants, a large number think it is not.

Itamar,
According to your approach, whenever there is a clash between a positive commandment and a prohibition, or any other conflict, we should always decide it according to LS. Does that make sense?
It reminds me of the story about Rabbi Jonathan Eybeschutz and the priest, who asked him why the Jews don’t follow the Christians, since the Torah says “follow the majority.” Rabbi Jonathan answered him that following the majority is a decision rule in a case of doubt, but he himself is not in doubt. These rules are relevant only after you have decided that there is doubt. If there is no doubt, there is no need to invoke the rules. Here it seems simple to me that the moral prohibition prevails, so I am not in doubt and there is no need for LS.

So why did God command it? Would you say the same also regarding court-imposed capital punishment and separating a rape victim from her husband?

First, who says God commanded it? Second, things in Jewish law are time- and era-dependent.
God also commanded that women not study Torah (?) and that there be Hebrew and Canaanite slaves.

1. Here you are already giving a different argument (by the way, a very reasonable one in my eyes): that the era has changed. That I am willing to hear. But according to your original reasoning, that morality prevails over Jewish law, it follows that even at the time the Torah was given one should have refrained from killing a Sabbath desecrator. So I ask: how do you account for the divine command? You yourself brought the case of the Sabbath desecrator as an example of Lex Specialis.
2. In one of the responsa here you said you don’t understand those who say that in the past it was right to kill Sabbath desecrators and today it is not, because of the question why God, who is not subject to time, commanded something that was not right to do, since He knew the truth.
3. Now you are arguing that burning books is not written in the Torah, but is only ordinary Jewish law that is not binding, so then one does not need the moral conflict at all in order to permit us to refrain from doing it.

“God also commanded that women not study Torah (?) and that there be Hebrew and Canaanite slaves.”

Regarding women, indeed it is not a commandment for them to study Torah, but neither is it a prohibition. The Sages were not comfortable with it.

And Hebrew and Canaanite slaves—again, it is not a commandment and not a prohibition.

But burning missionary material is a full-fledged commandment: to destroy all idolatry. And in a Torah-level doubt we are stringent. If the Rabbi is concerned about desecration of God’s name in the matter, then at least let him burn it at home privately.

Itamar, I’m not clear on what I failed to explain in my words.
This is not a different argument. It is exactly the same argument. The era has changed, and today it is not relevant to do this, so there is nothing to which LS should be applied. That’s all.
Morality does not prevail over Jewish law in general. I wrote that regarding this case.
I did not write that this is not binding Jewish law, but that it is not written in the Torah. The Sages interpreted it that way. Therefore there is room to change with changed circumstances, or at least to freeze it.

Orthodox,
God did not command women not to study Torah. That is an interpretation of the Sages, exactly like burning the New Testament.
A thief who has nothing with which to pay is sold as a slave. That is a commandment. And even regarding something optional, if it can change with changing times, that means changing times allow changes. Either that contradicts the eternity of the Torah or it does not.
As I said, my problem is not desecration of God’s name, but that it is simply out of the question to do something that ugly (and afterward wail that they burn our books).

So only when the interpretation is from the Sages can one say that morality prevails? What if it were explicitly written in the Torah to burn the New Testament?

If it were written explicitly, it would be harder. Still, there would be room for freezing it, even if not for changing it. See the case of the beautiful captive woman, and in column 15.

I read the column. But the case of the beautiful captive woman is very mild: all in all, God revealed to us that there is no religious flaw in taking a beautiful captive woman (like eating carcasses in war), so the moral value that says not to do it enters a vacuum and certainly obligates. Would you say this also in cases like Amalek or killing a Sabbath desecrator?

In the case of the beautiful captive woman, this too is an interpretation of the Sages and not explicit in the text of Scripture.

In the case of the beautiful captive woman, that is the reasonable and straightforward interpretation of the text; it takes a lot of effort to understand that the Torah wants this ideally from the outset.

If it belongs to them, that is a different story.
But why should they care if it is burned when it does not belong to them? I only care if someone does that to me in front of my eyes, so that I would have to rend my garment. Certainly if it is done privately, it should not bother them.

To Rabbi Michi:
A. Seemingly, the answer you gave is because of enmity, not because of morality (we do not want them to burn our books).
B. Even if it is because of morality, one could also argue the opposite: the respect I give them is precisely because they believe in what they are doing. Yes, they burn my books because, in their view, the faith is true, and therefore I too burn their books because my faith is true. Liberalism, however attractive in practice, does not really respect them, since it conveys that their faith is not true. (Likewise regarding the Palestinians: my respect for them is genuine precisely because I want to defeat them and not “contain” them, as with the fake left.)
C. Still, one can argue that the reason not to burn is not because of morality but מתוך the laws of idolatry: idolatry that has been damaged by its worshippers loses its status as idolatry. The secularization process Christianity is undergoing damages the idolatry, and in the end turns it into something ordinary. A church closed in Europe due to non-participation by the local population ceases to be idolatry and becomes a historical tourist site, just as the statues of Baal or Zeus in a museum are no longer idolatry. There is no need to burn the New Testament because there are no longer believers in the New Testament.
D. This barb can also be turned against Judaism. If one can secularize Christianity, one can secularize Judaism too. Someone who deals with it does not really believe in it, and therefore there is no holiness in it either. A Torah scroll written by a secular person is not holy because he does not believe. This is essentially Rabbi Tau’s argument against academia. Turning secularization against Judaism kills it.

A. I wrote that both considerations exist. And here I will add another reason that I did not write above: a person should make decisions about his life according to the greatest number of arguments and data. Therefore it is impossible to burn relevant sources, just as it is impossible to block a person from examining his path by force of “do not stray after your heart and your eyes.”
B. Well, that is just pilpul. To burn does not mean to respect, and the fact that you do not burn does not mean granting legitimacy, but rather minimal respect for the person and his path, exactly as we expect toward ourselves. Not for nothing did we complain about those who burned our books, and we did not see this as respect for us—and rightly so.
C. There are hundreds of millions who believe in the New Testament. It has not been nullified.
D. Regarding secular Jewish identity—I didn’t understand what Rabbi Tau added. It is a simple idea. See here:

על זהות יהודית בזמננו ובכלל

Yishai, in principle I am talking about collecting the books and burning them in the town square. In private, in principle, it is possible, because it does not hurt anyone. But if there were such a fixed halakhic ruling, then even if it were done privately, everyone would know about it.
Beyond that, there is the reason I added in my previous response to Y.D.

Which point in the case of the beautiful captive woman is rabbinic? And besides, you still haven’t answered whether this is possible also in a Torah law. After all, you brought the beautiful captive woman as an example of a Torah law. I really didn’t understand.

A. And according to your view, how can all the prohibitions against reading heretical books that appear in Maimonides apply? (Or have they become a dead letter, in the category of “expound and receive reward”?)
B. 🙂
C. And what about an empty church in secular Europe?
D. In my view, the idea of secularization דווקא does have a halakhic implication regarding Christianity. Regarding Judaism, the difference is that Judaism, as the Christians defined it, is not in the spirit but in the flesh. A Jew is a Jew if he was born to a Jewish mother. Therefore, even if the critique of spirit succeeds (a Platonic invention), it does not succeed against the flesh, for the flesh is part of this world (both I and my mother are certainly part of this world). Since divine revelation among Jews is found in the flesh (“From my flesh I behold God”—though from Job, still relevant), secularization does not manage to damage us.

Itamar,

Who said that the beautiful captive woman is rabbinic? I wrote that this is an interpretation of the Sages of the verses (like most laws of the Torah).
In Torah law too this is possible, at least as a freeze if not as a change. There are quite a few examples. For example, “do not form factions” today does not prohibit two religious courts in one city. Custom is not the custom of a place but an ethnic custom. The Sages in the Talmud (without a Sanhedrin) uprooted a Torah law through positive action (such as killing an informer about money, and more). Levirate marriage that is not implemented, an oath in religious court, and so on. I also brought examples of permissions that are not realized (such as slaves). And there are many more (what, like a peddler with his wares…).

Y.D.,
A. They cannot apply and in fact never did apply.
C. That is a question in the laws of nullification of idolatry, and is not relevant here (I think an empty church is not considered nullified within the parameters of nullification of idolatry, but I have not checked this now). I am speaking here on the principled level.
D. I didn’t understand a thing, but I don’t understand what the discussion is about. Clearly there is no Judaism without Torah and Jewish law. Flesh, presidents, clouds, and spirit—and there isn’t even rain.

But all your examples are about changing times and social repair. There is no clash of values here. I really don’t understand.
And in general, why should there be a difference in this matter between something clearly written in the Torah and an interpretation of the Sages?

Exactly. That’s what you asked for, no? Changing times project a different relation to Torah law. A clash is created between a value-world and Jewish law as it was.
The interpretation of the Sages is a product of their perceptions, and therefore here a mistake is definitely possible, not only a change.
I think we’ve exhausted it.