Q&A: Objective Morality
Objective Morality
Question
I understood from your remarks in several places that you claim morality is objective, that there is such a thing as right and wrong and that it is not culture-dependent.
Do you think the same is true regarding disputes of taste? Disputes about beauty? And what is the difference?
That is, why is it that when two people argue about whether chocolate tastes good, we dismiss it by saying that everyone has their own taste, whereas in morality it is different? What is the root of the distinction here? Is it only because chocolate is not something important, though even there there is one truth? Or is it really the case that in matters of taste there is a plurality of truths? And if so, why is that different from morality? What is the basis for the distinction?
Answer
Why don’t you ask about scientific truth? There too there are disputes. I assume the basis of your question is that these are non-factual realms (in the usual sense). But I disagree with that, and in my view these too are facts (though not physical ones). In the realm of morality there is right and wrong because that is our clear intuition. Just as we have a clear intuition that there is a wall or a table in front of us, and we would not accept skeptical challenges to that (and those exist there too).
As for taste in the literal sense—the chocolate—and smell, I agree that there is no point arguing.
As for aesthetic and artistic taste, I am somewhat undecided. My inclination is that there too there is truth and falsehood, but it is more flexible and allows for more legitimate positions within the framework.
The question of what the basis for the distinction is is not clear to me. It is simply different because that is how we see it. What is the basis for the distinction between a cloud and a table? You simply see that these are two different things.
Discussion on Answer
First of all, you need to distinguish between saying there are no intuitions and saying that different people have different intuitions. Those are really not the same thing. Second, I didn’t say that every moral question has one correct answer. There may certainly be questions that have several correct answers. And still there is right and wrong in morality (because for all questions there are also incorrect answers, and there are questions for which there will be only one correct answer).
Thank you very much!
Let me ask the second question a bit differently: where does the indication come from that this domain is objective (and therefore there is room to argue—morality) while another domain is not objective in that way (the taste of chocolate)? Is it only because in one case we argue and in the other we brush the argument off casually? (I’m not belittling that argument, which shows that this really is how we think, but is that the whole story?)
Everything begins and ends with intuition. Even the perception that when I see a wall there really is a wall there is an intuition.
One must distinguish between two planes: 1. I see a wall. 2. I have an intuition that in this seeing I am encountering something outside of me.
Number 2 exists in morality as well, and less so in aesthetics. But in the taste of chocolate it does not exist at all. From here comes the hierarchy I described.
When people make claims about the physical world, they are making claims about things that, in our view, exist outside human beings as well and are not context-dependent. When people make moral claims, do those claims have meaning outside of us, that is, outside human beings? Can someone claim that the fact that murder is immoral exists in the world in the same way that the law of gravity exists?
More than that—can something be moral or immoral without mental qualities necessarily being involved? Murder becomes immoral solely because of the intention to murder. If a stone fell and killed someone, it does not thereby become immoral. In other words, mental qualities must be involved (empathy, love, hatred, etc.—which by their nature are not objective) in order for it to be possible to speak about morality. In my opinion this is a decisive difference, and it strengthens the view that morality is not objective.
As for the matter of arguments—people argue and bring rationality into issues that are not rational at their root. If I am wondering whether to ask out a woman I love, and perhaps even consult with someone about it, that does not make my love for her or my fear of rejection rational or objective. I agree that in most cases, if people are honest, they will agree about what is moral and what is not, because we share similar basic traits. Similar, but not identical!
Well, we have a deep disagreement. See the fourth notebook, part 3.
I didn’t understand, Rabbi. There are moral questions regarding which there is no consensus and no clear collective intuition, so how can one speak about right and wrong? Unlike a wall, where everyone agrees that it is a wall.