Q&A: Attitude Toward Women in Jewish Law
Attitude Toward Women in Jewish Law
Question
Hello Rabbi, and happy holiday.
I would like to ask the Rabbi a question that has been bothering me for a long time—regarding the attitude toward women in Jewish law. Today, the law is that women are disqualified from testimony, and women are exempt from time-bound positive commandments—and I don’t see a good reason why this should be so nowadays. So I have 3 questions.
First question – As someone who read your article about changes in Jewish law when reality changes, I want to ask what your approach is: did the Sages receive by tradition that women are exempt from time-bound positive commandments and that they are disqualified from testimony, like Maimonides holds? Or was this their interpretation of the Torah מתוך the lens of their period? How can I know that this is an interpretation and not a tradition?
Second question – I understand that if this is a reception and tradition from Sinai, then there is nothing to discuss. However, if this is an interpretation by the Sages influenced by the culture, then there is something to discuss. If it is an interpretation, my question is: how can I know that this is an interpretation by the Sages following the culture of that time?
Third question – If it was indeed due to the culture of that time, who can make the reform so that women will be equal in testimony and commandments? Can we do it, or is it the exclusive role of the Sanhedrin to renew Jewish law?
Answer
Hello N.,
I didn’t understand the difference between the first two questions. Usually it is impossible to know with certainty, but my assumption is that the values and norms of the period do have an influence. Beyond that, even if there is no way to prove it one way or the other, the question arises on whom the burden of proof rests. In my view, once you have a reasonable explanation for a law derived by the Sages (especially when the source is very questionable from several angles), the burden of proof is on the one who claims that this is not the reason women were disqualified.
Although with a Torah-level matter you do not need a later court to be greater in wisdom and number (see Maimonides at the beginning of the Laws of Rebels), you do need the Great Court (a matter enacted by vote requires another vote to permit it). But there are many exceptions to this, especially when the times demand it. In my opinion, a reasonable consensus among the sages of our time would suffice (though that too is unlikely to happen—but in practice it does happen. Women’s testimony is accepted under various rationales).
Discussion on Answer
Adding one more question:
3. You said that in order to make a change, you need to know that Jewish law was speaking about such-and-such cases, and here, where the sources are unclear—a reasonable argument is stronger than conservatism. Why?
1. The concept of a decree of Scripture is not relevant here. You assume this is a law without reason, and I disagree. But on the main point, yes, it seems plausible to me that there is influence here from the surroundings and the period.
2. Regarding time-bound commandments, I do not have a reasonable explanation, and therefore I do not see any possibility of changing it. Abu-Darham’s explanation seems far-fetched to me.
3. Because if there is no proof from the sources, then reasoning takes the place of proof. Why assume the reasoning is incorrect without justification? If there is a reasoning, the obligation to prove that it is not the correct reasoning falls on the dissenter. This is not a question of reasoning versus conservatism, but of accepting or not accepting a line of reasoning.
Thank you very much for the quick response!
1. Agreed. I’ll just note that Maimonides, for example, holds that there is a concept of decree of Scripture regarding women’s obligation status and the reception of the laws, and that the derivation is merely an asmachta. My question comes from the fact that I remember you said in one of the lectures that the form of halakhic ruling explained by Maimonides is difficult. And I don’t remember why or where.
2. Why is there no reasonable explanation? By way of negation I’ll ask: what logical reason is there that a woman should not put on tefillin? Or not wear tzitzit? Not sit in the sukkah? Are you claiming here tradition and decree of Scripture? And another question: if it is tradition, is it possible to say that hypothetically a Sanhedrin could arise and change it?
3. Understood. Thank you very much.
1. I didn’t understand.
2. If you have a reasonable explanation, please present it. I am not aware of one. A Sanhedrin can change anything it wants at the Torah level. And at the rabbinic level, if it is greater in wisdom and number than its predecessor.
1. Maimonides explicitly argues in his Commentary on the Mishnah that derivation from the 13 hermeneutical principles is merely an asmachta, and the law is a tradition from Moses.
And there is an audio lecture where you attack this claim. I just don’t remember where or which lecture it was.
2. To argue by negation—that it is illogical that she would not be obligated in tzitzit or tefillin—is that not reasonable?
3. According to your view, why are women exempt from time-bound commandments?
A tradition from Moses, as Maimonides holds?
1. There is no such Maimonides. On the contrary, in the well-known responsum to Rabbi Pinchas the judge of Alexandria, he writes that there are only “about three or four” supported derashot. See also the second root. See my article on the second root and much more.
2. Did you read what I wrote? If you claim you have a reasoning, please present it here. You’re grinding water. Even if there is some reasoning (and I assume there is), in order to examine the possibility of change we need to know what it is (to see whether it still applies today).
3. I have no idea. Where is there such a Maimonides?
1. I read it and learned a lot—thank you very much. I discovered that the subject of the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is interpreted is a fascinating one.
Where can they be found in your writings? Your books?
2. Understood. Thank you very much.
3. Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah {page 2 in Rabbi Kapach’s edition}: “And here is an example for you: God said to him, ‘You shall dwell in booths for seven days,’ and God, may He be exalted, also informed him that this sukkah is an obligation for males and not for females, and it is not an obligation for travelers…"
I want to ask a question in the context of changing Talmudic Jewish law. When I asked about changing Jewish law, you said that if it is rabbinic, then the sages of the generation who agree to it must be greater in wisdom and in number—and you referred me to the Laws of Rebels. The question is whether, in your opinion, we have the ability to be greater than the Talmud in wisdom and number and change enactments, decrees, and customs?
1. I have quite a few books on the hermeneutical principles and their use. They can be obtained from me. There are also articles here on the site.
3. It does not say here that this is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai. For Maimonides, anything not explicitly written in the Torah is called “from oral tradition” or “a communication from the Holy One, blessed be He,” and the like.
Why not? In this context I will bring an absurd argument of the Raavad against Maimonides there. When Maimonides writes that you need a court greater than the previous one, the Raavad objects from the enactment of adorning the streets of Jerusalem with produce, which was changed by Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai. This raises a great difficulty: what objection is there here? Maimonides would explain that Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai was greater than his predecessors. The Raavad assumes that there is a deterministic decline of the generations, meaning that whoever comes later is necessarily lesser. But according to that, the law requiring a court greater than the previous one is empty of content (not to say an oxymoron): if it comes later, it is necessarily lesser. There can be no later court that is greater. This requires further consideration.
I read a bit and it’s fascinating and enlightening. I wonder why nowadays people enter a study hall / yeshiva and do not study the principles of the 13 hermeneutical rules?! It’s really important, and according to Maimonides in the Laws of Torah Study chapter 1, it is a complete obligation! And in general, the Sanhedrin and anyone who wants to issue halakhic rulings independently must have mastery of the subject.
Did you mean, by your books, A Good Measure: The Hermeneutical Rules on the Weekly Torah Portion?
If Maimonides writes that God told Moses “the males and not the females,” is that “from oral tradition” and not a halakha given to Moses at Sinai? I couldn’t understand what the difference is between “a communication from the Holy One, blessed be He” and a halakha given to Moses at Sinai.
– Interesting point—thank you very much!
They don’t teach it because there is no one to teach it. We have lost that knowledge.
Indeed. And even more so in the first two books of the Talmudic Logic series.
As for halakha given to Moses at Sinai: in Maimonides’ method, this is a law transmitted orally without a source in a midrash or verse, and its status is like rabbinic law (the words of the Scribes). “From oral tradition” can also be an interpretation of a verse (I recall an article by Rabbi N. A. Rabinovitch in one of his books on the phrase “from oral tradition” in Maimonides’ method).
In any case, for our purposes, it does not really matter. Whether it is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai or from oral tradition, I still do not see what the reasoning is behind this exemption, even though such a reasoning does exist also at the foundation of halakhot given to Moses at Sinai and oral traditions. And without a reasoning, I do not see how one can propose a change.
Is what you do in your books on the 13 hermeneutical principles not considered learning and knowledge that has been lost? Is it impossible to learn it from the Talmud and reconstruct that knowledge?
Which book would you recommend studying first?
Understood, thank you very much!
Indeed, it is study, but it is research that tries to reconstruct lost knowledge. There is no such knowledge available, and therefore many do not deal with it. I am definitely in favor of returning to it and trying to reconstruct it.
I would suggest the first two books in the Talmudic Logic series, because they are more systematic and comprehensive.
Once there is a reconstruction of the knowledge, it becomes something real. True, not something known to us continuously for thousands of years, but certainly something preserved in a hidden way for thousands of years.
It is important to me to ask what the status of the reconstructed knowledge is in your opinion—do you give it enough weight that with the help of that knowledge, a hypothetical Sanhedrin that would arise could discuss the hermeneutical principles and rule differently from the Talmud, as Maimonides wrote in the Laws of Rebels?
Is Talmudic Logic in English?
First of all, why do I need to determine for a Sanhedrin that may arise what it will or will not do? It will decide for itself. As far as I am concerned, certainly yes. Moreover, you do not need a Sanhedrin or even ordained sages to make use of the hermeneutical principles. What you need is only the necessary knowledge. However, in order to disagree with the Talmud or with a previous Sanhedrin, there is a need for number (= a court).
The books are in Hebrew.
Thank you very much!!
Hello Rabbi, how exactly can one buy the books?
יש ללחוץ כדי לגשת אל 28280287.pdf
Is this still current?
If not through that link, which is the most worthwhile {I don’t know if it’s still current}..
Then it’s on Amazon.
https://www.zipy.co.il/p/amazon/non-deductive-inferences-in-the-talmud-hebrew-edition/1848900007/#wrapper
https://www.zipy.co.il/p/amazon/the-textual-inference-rules-klal-uprat-how-the-talmud-defines-sets-hebrew-edition/1848900015/#wrapper
Only on Amazon
Thank you very much for the response!
1. In your article on changes in Jewish law regarding disqualification from testimony, you write:
"It is very difficult to arrive, by examining the sources of Jewish law, at a clear conclusion regarding the reason for women’s disqualification from testimony: is it because of lack of education, or because they are not involved in society, and the like, or perhaps it is simply a ‘decree of Scripture,’ a matter without reason."
And here you say:
"In my view, once you have a reasonable explanation for a law derived by the Sages (especially when the source is very questionable from several angles)" – "Usually it is impossible to know with certainty, but my assumption is that the values and norms of the period had an influence."
So I understand that you are not assuming this is simply a decree of Scripture, but rather assuming that there is an influence from the values and norms of the period.
Did I understand correctly?
2. If I understood correctly, this is regarding disqualification from testimony. As for obligating women in time-bound commandments like men {as an ideal discussion and not a practical one, unfortunately}—can the same claim be made here as well?
Thank you very much!!!