Q&A: Whether Jewish Law Deals with Reality or with Perception
Whether Jewish Law Deals with Reality or with Perception
Question
In his latest article, the Rabbi ended with the paragraph: “This raises an interesting question about Jewish law in general. Does it deal with reality as it is, or as it is perceived by us (in our cognition)? But this is not the place to go into it.”
This issue has been occupying me a lot lately [I am studying the laws of prohibitions and permissions, and I think that if Jewish law deals with reality, then: a. these laws are not relevant at all in our time, since the determinations of the Sages applied because that is how they understood reality, but apparently that is not actually how things are. For example: 1. a second vessel does not cook; 2. the discussion whether the lower one prevails or the upper one prevails; 3. absorption in utensils; and other topics too numerous to mention.]
b. Many discussions among the Sages come across as not serious and devoid of content, and it is unclear what the dispute is if it revolves around clarifying reality. [For example, the discussion whether the lower one prevails or the upper one prevails is seemingly not a serious discussion if it revolves around clarifying reality, both because that discussion depends on many variables, and because it is something that can be investigated. Another example: the Talmud and the medieval authorities went on at length discussing what the limit is for the spread of one substance into another substance [for example, two pieces that were roasted or salted together, one permitted and one forbidden—what is the boundary by which the permitted piece becomes forbidden? Again, if the discussion is about reality, the multiplicity of approaches here [see section 105] is a discussion devoid of content.]
I would be very glad to hear your opinion on this, as well as introductory sources.
Thank you for the in-depth discussions you conduct and for responding to every question.
Answer
For some reason it seems to me that I already answered this question. I’ll answer again briefly.
In most cases, it seems that the halakhic decisors meant to make claims about reality itself. But, as is their way, they did so on the basis of reasoning, not on the basis of scientific knowledge, which they did not have. And indeed, based on the knowledge we have today, it appears that quite a few of their determinations are mistaken. Therefore, the easiest thing is to say that they did not mean to make claims about reality, but rather to construct a model. That may be true in the case I dealt with here, but generally, my impression is that it is not true.
First, one has to distinguish between a case in which the words of the decisor himself make it clear that he did not intend to assess reality. If so, then the mismatch with reality should not bother us. Beyond that, not everything written by this or that decisor is binding. If you reach the conclusion that reality is different, you may act differently. The last thing that is binding is the Talmud (see Rosh, Sanhedrin ch. 4, no. 6, and Kesef Mishneh at the beginning of ch. 2 of Rebels).
Recently, experiments have been done on absorption in utensils (search Google for Dror Fixler and Yair Frank, and see the sources they cite), and it turned out that at least in today’s utensils the absorption is minimal. This changes quite a few laws regarding mixtures, meat and milk, and the like. And indeed, Rabbi Lior wrote that there is room to be lenient if other decisors join him (I do not know whether that happened). In general, what is permitted is permitted even if there are no decisors who say it is permitted. Their daring or lack of daring is irrelevant. They are not the masters of Jewish law, and if something is forbidden then it is forbidden even if they permit it, and vice versa. The question is when I reach the conclusion that change is indeed required and that it is proper to change. Once I reach that point—there is no obstacle to changing, and there is no need to ask anyone. And note well: I mean there is no obligation to ask, and the answer does not depend on the words of this or that decisor. He has no essential authority. It is very worthwhile to ask, so that he can help me see things clearly and make sure I am not mistaken.
Discussion on Answer
First, it depends on the types of materials.
Second, the separation of utensils is also based on custom. After all, utensils used only with cold food—even according to the accepted Jewish law—have no absorption, and there is no problem using them for both dairy and meat. The important question is when a utensil becomes forbidden in the accepted terms—can it be permitted based on the research findings? In my opinion, yes.
Did the Rabbi actually change his own practice in the laws of meat and milk after reading the research of Fixler and Frank? Seemingly, according to the Rabbi’s position that what is permitted is permitted even without the agreement of the decisors, if there is no reason to assume they were mistaken in their research, why is there any need for separate meat and dairy utensils?