Q&A: The Physico-Theological Proof in Light of the Creation of Time
The Physico-Theological Proof in Light of the Creation of Time
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I was speaking with someone about the physico-theological proof that the Rabbi presents in the third notebook.
He argues that the whole assumption and understanding that a complex thing requires a composer/component (like all our other understandings) applies only in a world in which time exists.
But we are not capable at all of understanding a reality in which time does not exist. And since time was created in the Big Bang, it would be foolish to make assumptions about what was before the Big Bang.
The Rabbi did not address this point in the book, and I would be glad if he could respond.
P.S. after searching online I saw that in a video by the Davidson Institute of Science as well—in response to the question what preceded the Big Bang—they give the same answer.
See here: https://davidson.weizmann.ac.il/online/maagarmada/astrophysics/%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%A4%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%A5-%D7%94%D7%92%D7%93%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%92%D7%A8%D7%9D-%D7%9C%D7%95
It is strange that the Rabbi, as a physicist, ignored such a weighty philosophical objection!
Have a peaceful Sabbath!
Answer
First, why is it strange for a physicist to ignore a philosophical point?
Second, I did not ignore it. The principle of causality and the second law of thermodynamics are a result of common sense and a priori logic, not of observation. Even in our world, observation does not yield the principle of causality (as David Hume already showed). Therefore there is no reason to assume that this is not valid with respect to the creation of the world itself. Perhaps it is not, but the burden of proof is on the one who claims that it is not. By the same token, a person could argue that the laws of physics were measured on earth and do not apply on the moon or in deep space. That could be true, but our assumption is that they do apply there, and the burden of proof is on the one who claims otherwise. The same is true regarding the validity of the laws of physics in the future. We have seen them only in the past, so who says it is correct to assume that they will remain valid in the future as well? All these assumptions are assumptions of common sense, and whoever disputes them bears the burden of proof. Someone who accepts all of them and only with regard to creation rejects them is simply tendentious.
And regarding the Davidson Institute, to tell the truth their name comes up here from time to time in connection with foolish arguments of this sort, and one should not be impressed by the scientific cloak they adorn themselves with. They understand this about as much as you do.
In addition, one should distinguish between the principle of causality and the second law. Regarding the principle of causality, there may perhaps be room to say that it is a result of observation (not as Hume claimed), and then to argue that in the creation of the world it does not apply (even then this is speculation, since why assume that observation does not yield a logic that prevailed then too?). But the second law (that a complex thing requires a composer/component) is really probabilistic logic, and as such it is very strange to say that at creation it does not apply. Why should something complex come into being just like that by chance?
Bottom line, this is really not a weighty argument. Just meaningless tendentiousness. Someone who wants to remain an atheist and understands that his position is quite difficult fights for it with all his might, and in the course of the battle he gives up all the principles of common sense. Thus, in the name of science (!), he raises foolish hypotheses that flatly contradict scientific thinking. And in the end they still accuse the believers of unscientific thinking. I am astonished!
Discussion on Answer
For this purpose, the second law contains the principle of causality. After all, if there is something complex, it has a composer/component. That is the argument.
Beyond that, what follows from your remarks is that the world could not have been created at all, because its coming into being is a change, and in a world without time there is no change. That is absurd, of course, since it was in fact created. And indeed, it is not true that in a world without time there are no changes. At most, they are not described in terms of time.
The proof says that it is more reasonable to attribute to complexity a composer/component than the hypothesis that the complexity arose by chance and has no composer/component, but that does not mean this is a logical “law.”
About this it is said, “they come as one,” or at least that it is possible that in a timeless world there exists non-deterministic change that does not depend on a prior cause to make it happen.
The first sentence seems meaningless to me. And the second belongs to the realm of Purim pilpul. I hope you will allow me to bow out at this stage.
Sorry for barging into this fascinating discussion.
Does the Rabbi deny the concept of “they come as one”? (As with free choice and foreknowledge, the authority of customs and enactments even when the reason for them has lapsed, the authority of rabbis and neighborhood rabbis, the book Torat Moshe, the Oral Torah from Sinai in its broader sense, and so on and so on.)
It is a concept obvious to every yeshiva-type fellow…
Thank you very much for the expanded answer!
As you explained very well here, in the physico-theological proof there are two components:
Component 1 – the second law
Component 2 – the principle of causality
I do indeed agree with you that there is no reason at all that the second law would not be valid in every reality, with or without time.
But regarding component 2, the principle of causality,
whether we assume it is based on a priori logic or on observation, it certainly exists only in a world in which time occurs. But in a world without time: a. how could there be change in it? b. why assume that the principle of causality exists in it? After all, time is what makes causality possible. c. insofar as it is possible that cause-and-acceleration relations exist in it, is it really worth adding another intelligent entity to the explanation for the sake of such a low probability that this is possible?
Noam