If so, why does the Rabbi think that other people have consciousness, and that we're not dealing with robots?

Perhaps the Kantian analogy overrides Husserl?

I didn't understand. Why do I assume that people see colors? That's the analogy you accepted. The question whether we see the same colors is a different discussion. Regarding that, I said there is no way to know. The question whether other people have consciousness—my view is certainly yes. That's the analogy to myself. Do they feel as I do? That is the philosophers' chestnut.

I claim something stronger than that: even the very existence of consciousness as a personal entity is like the philosophers' chestnut. Because our awareness that the other experiences can never be observed by us, since it belongs to his own "private domain."
I agree that one could argue that we can see that he has the capacity for consciousness to dwell within him; it is even logically possible to observe his "soul." But we could never know for certain that his soul is actually alive, and that this is not a soul without vitality. And that is what I don't understand—how, according to the Rabbi's view, this differs from the philosophers' chestnut.

To claim that, you have to assume that all the people around you are lying to you. After all, they report that they have sensations and consciousness just like yours. That consideration, plus the analogy to yourself, leads to the conclusion that they have consciousness—unless you are extremely skeptical and suspicious. The question whether they feel the same sensations is the philosophers' chestnut, because here their report is not relevant. They have no way to know, nor to convey to you, whether they see the same color or have the same sensation.

I didn't understand what the "analogy to yourself" is—does the Rabbi mean ideal vision? After all, as we agreed, one cannot experience the subjectivity of what is outside oneself. If so, how can one experience that he is "alive"??
And if the Rabbi means analogy in Kant's method and so on, then the Rabbi does not think those methods really hold water.
The first claim you wrote sounds a bit strange, because when I claim that the other has no consciousness, I don't mean that he doesn't exist, but that he is like an input-output machine. In any case, if we accept the assumption that there can be physical reality without the mental dimension, then it is easy to accept the conclusion that the one I'm speaking with is nothing but a machine. He is simply built that way.
A parable for this claim is animals. Very often we see facial expressions of joy and sadness in animals. But we know that they evolved to react that way. Not every living creature with facial expressions do we think really "feels" something behind them.

An analogy between me and every other person. I don't understand what is unclear here. The similarity between us teaches that in the property of consciousness too we are similar, just as in any other analogy.
The rest of the questions are mere skepticism, and if you are a skeptic there is no point in talking. I'm also not sure that you are asking me, or that the questioner is worth talking to at all—after all, maybe he is an input-output machine.
I see no point in this discussion. It has run its course.

I really didn't understand the similarity in the analogy in this case.
After all, as the Rabbi accepts, one cannot make an analogy as to whether the person in front of me feels as I do—the philosophers' chestnut—and the reason one cannot do so is that his perception of reality is his, and can never be mine.
So too with the similarity that he is "alive" = experiences and feels: that too can never come through my perception, because this is a "subjective" reality, not an objective one. The very clear distinction that I am not him means that we can never know that he really experiences.
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As for the rest, and whether this is a skeptical question, that is another discussion and seems less connected right now. Maybe at the end?.

You do not perceive other people as possessing consciousness; that cannot be done. You do not perceive yourself as possessing consciousness either; consciousness is what experiences the experience of perception, perception does not perceive consciousness.
As proof, when a person does things for himself he does not do them because he has consciousness. For example, when a person feels hungry he does not say to himself, since I have consciousness I deserve to take care of myself and go eat. Rather, he goes and eats while ignoring the fact that he has consciousness.

Kobi,
Well, we've reached the end.

Decisor,
You are mixing two planes: when I do something, clearly I have no reflection about it. When I eat, I do so because I am hungry, not because I have self-awareness and say to myself, "I am hungry," and then eat. But beyond ongoing activity, I also have reflections in which I do experience myself. When I think about myself and my consciousness—for example, when we are conducting this discussion—that is reflection.

If we've reached the end, then…
The Rabbi writes that this question is a skeptical question. But I am not at all sure that this is really the case. After all, the accepted claim is that one should not multiply entities when there is no explanatory need for them.
Therefore, if the only way to solve the question is by analogy, and the analogy here is weak to the point of failure—for example, it is not clear that one can establish a correlation on the basis of a single event—doesn't that mean we have no basis for assuming it? Unless we make use of some higher factor, like proof from epistemology.
Or perhaps this is a basic belief that does not require any external proof at all.

My remarks were made on the plane of human dignity or human worth; I showed that the question of consciousness is not connected to the matter.
As for the question whether consciousness is the cause of anything in reality, I think not. And all the uses we make of the word consciousness are not connected to consciousness itself, but to other mental processes that are strongly correlated with consciousness. For example, memory consolidation—we remember things we are aware of—or speech—we are aware of what we are saying.
That is, consciousness is the final result, and does not serve as the cause of anything. Including the word consciousness and speech about consciousness: consciousness is not their cause either.