You can also derive it from the fact that one may tell a bride that she is beautiful and gracious in order to spare her dignity. If it is permissible to lie in order to spare someone else’s dignity, then all the more so it is permissible to do so in order to spare your own dignity (your life comes first).

Not exactly. In the case of the bride, I’m lying for her sake, whereas here we’re talking about my lying for my own sake.

In my opinion it is still morally invalid. “To deviate for the sake of peace” does not mean to lie. Rather, as some commentators understood it: “I have grown old” instead of “After I had grown old, I had smooth skin again” is only a paraphrase that expresses the same content, which is true in itself. The change is in form, not in content.

But an actual lie — that is, saying words whose content stands in opposition to the speaker’s own awareness — is certainly not morally permissible. One can simply remain silent, or say that it’s none of your business (there is no commandment to be polite at the expense of the truth), or say something ambiguous, one of whose meanings is true, even if it will not be understood according to that meaning.

As for “a beautiful and gracious bride,” even according to the more lenient view of the House of Hillel, this is not a lie but the truth. Because identification with the friend who bought something in the market is so great that even in his own eyes the merchandise is perceived as worthwhile, since “his mind is mixed pleasantly with people.”

Copenhagen, the question is whether you are making this as a claim about Jewish law and Talmudic aggadah, or whether you disagree with them. Lying about “the bed” is exactly what you are ruling out. And regarding your argument itself: if I’m impolite, not only the other person pays a price, but I do too (I’ll be seen as impolite). There is absolutely no reason in the world that I should pay a price for somebody else’s nosiness. So in my opinion there is no problem brushing him off with a lie. And the games of saying something ambiguous never appealed to me. It seems to me that Rabbeinu Yonah (in Shaarei Teshuvah he goes on at length about lying) already noted that a lie is determined by the hearer’s understanding.

First, if the concept of “deviating for the sake of peace,” according to the House of Hillel regarding “a beautiful and gracious bride,” means what I presented, then it follows that with deviation regarding “the bed” too, the meaning is not an actual lie but something like ambiguous words that also have a true content.

In any case, perhaps the Talmud’s intent regarding “the bed” is only that it is halakhically *permitted* to deviate, not that there is a *commandment* to deviate. Then moral judgment comes into play. Especially since there are also contradictory Talmudic passages about people who were extremely stringent about telling the truth.

Quite often we are required to pay a price for irresponsible acts of others, a price we could have avoided if not for the moral consideration. Israel could have destroyed all of Gaza and thereby solved the problem of Hamas terrorism, but it chooses to pay a price because of some consideration (whether justified or not).

Is it really preferable to be seen as impolite by nosy people, who perhaps would rather we lie to them than be impolite? If we tell nosy people that it’s none of their business, then in the end either they will recognize their mistake or they will distance themselves, and either way we’ll get a healthier environment than one in which nosy people keep prying and the pried-upon keep lying.

An ambiguous statement, especially in response to a nosy question, is not a lie. Because it seems that uttering a lie is technically defined as an act of representation (in writing or speech or otherwise) whose content is contrary to the content in the speaker’s mind (which he regards as true). By contrast, the game of uttering a lie is more problematic: pretending to speak truth while in fact speaking falsehood. But someone who makes an ambiguous statement is not pretending, and in many cases both sides know that the ambiguity comes in response to excessive nosiness. Granted, when this is not a response to an irresponsible act like nosiness, it is not proper to be ambiguous — so as not to deceive and the like (and it seems that deception is not identical with lying) — and besides, there is value in being understood precisely.

I’m not familiar with that Rabbeinu Yonah, but on the face of it he seems problematic to me (though not like Rabbi Dessler’s absurd statements on the matter). Very often the other person does not understand, and the speaker does not thereby become a liar, and a person cannot be responsible for everything that happens in another person’s mind.

Even according to the House of Hillel, that’s when there is an option to say something ambiguous. But when there isn’t, it stands to reason that even according to their view it is permissible to lie. So nothing can be inferred from there regarding “the bed.” There the commentators explicitly wrote that actual lying is permitted.
I think the second part of your remarks also mixes different planes. I’m talking about a case where there is no way to avoid the prices I pay by some other route (for example, when I’ll be seen as impolite and I’ll pay a price, not merely that he’ll draw conclusions). The question is whether in that case one may lie. Obviously, if it’s possible to avoid it, then it is preferable to avoid it; that is not what the discussion is about.
A person is responsible for what happens in another person’s mind when it is his fault and intentional.

The claim is: a. In general, a society in which people avoid telling lies even at the price of impoliteness or hurting feelings is healthier than a society in which people do not avoid lying. b. The price of being seen as “impolite” is too low to sacrifice for it the value of not uttering falsehood. Indeed, it seems to be the opposite: if it’s none of his business, then this is actually a matter of dignity — that a person can set boundaries for the busybody, and also before Heaven, in that he does not sacrifice the value of truth for the sake of maintaining the supposedly proper functioning of ingratiating human relations.

I defined a lie as communication that in standard situations is meant to provide a symbolic representation of reality, where although the proposition perceived in the speaker’s mind as true is P, he intentionally represents it as not-P. The question to what extent a person is responsible for what happens in another person’s mind is not relevant in this respect. There is no contradiction in saying that one must not utter falsehood, yet in certain cases it is permissible to intentionally cause another person to be misled. For example, if it is a game, or in our case, a person who has no right to demand that you know some truth.

One can additionally bring support for the idea that ambiguous speech, one of whose meanings in the language is true, is not considered uttering a lie, from the fact that Abraham said of Sarah that she was his sister: “And moreover, she is indeed my sister, the daughter of my father though not the daughter of my mother; and she became my wife” (Genesis 20:12). Abraham explains his speech by relying on the fact that it has a true meaning, not because it is permissible to lie when the price of truth is too high. (As for “Only there is no fear of God in this place, and they will kill me,” the intent is to justify the act of deception itself, which is forbidden in ordinary cases, not the seemingly false statement, which is explained in the following verse.)

I don’t understand. Are you claiming (like Kant) that Abraham would not actually have lied even to save his life?

Lying is a relatively minor moral offense, not something in the category of “be killed rather than transgress.” Kant, of course, went too far. But doing it merely to prevent “hurt” feelings (especially since there is no real act of harm, because the hurt person is the one who chooses whether to be hurt by the words, as the cognitive psychologists have shown), or just in order to be polite — that goes too far in the other direction. I would also distinguish between a real lie and polite expressions that are not lies. Like the answer to the question “How are you?” where the expected answer is “Fine,” even if things are actually terrible.