Q&A: The Problem of the Arbitrariness of the Will
The Problem of the Arbitrariness of the Will
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I read the fourth notebook, and at the same time I also became acquainted with Leibowitz’s approach.
As I understand it, you argue that God established the idea of the good and of morality, and when a person considers whether to do one act or another, the observation is directed at the ideas and not at the factual features of reality, and therefore the naturalistic fallacy does not apply to that observation.
A. Did I understand correctly? If so, why should there be a difference between looking at reality and its facts and looking at ideas? Why should the fact that a person knows that something is good or moral necessarily cause him to choose that way? In other words, where exactly is the escape from the naturalistic fallacy?
B. From that perspective, I did not understand why Leibowitz’s approach is incorrect. That is, why is the claim “I am moral because I chose that” not the only answer to the question “why am I moral,” while all the others do not really answer the question, because regarding them too one can ask the very same question: why?
C. Your claim seems to contain the hidden assumption that the will really does look at the idea of morality. Why assume that this is so? I accept the proof from morality, but why is it not more reasonable to assume that the comparison between it and the act takes place after the decision of the will?
I hope I was clear enough. Thank you very much.
Answer
A. The way out of the fallacy is that ethical facts (features of the idea of the good) are value-laden facts, not neutral facts like physical facts. The fact that the chair next to me is yellow says nothing beyond describing a fact. In analytic ethics, they say that this is a descriptive statement. By contrast, the claim “it is forbidden to murder” does not describe a neutral fact, but an ethical fact. An ethical fact carries a charge that motivates action (a positive action) or restrains action (a prohibition). Therefore the claim “it is forbidden to murder” is prescriptive and not descriptive. Therefore, someone who wonders, “I know that it is forbidden to murder, but it is still not clear to me why I should not murder,” simply does not really understand the sentence “it is forbidden to murder.” Someone who understands it does not ask such a question, because he understands that it is a prescriptive statement whose practical conclusion is part of the statement itself.
B. Leibowitz, as a positivist, was unwilling to accept claims that have no empirical grounding as binding claims. Any such claim was perceived by him as arbitrary. Therefore, when he came to justify a moral or religious principle, the only justification was “that’s just how it is.” But in my opinion, his positivist limitation prevented him from understanding that the “that’s just how it is” in question is not a “that’s how it is” in the sense of arbitrariness, but rather in the sense of self-evident and not requiring justification (prescriptive). See here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%95-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%91%D7%95%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A5-%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%96/
C. I did not understand.
Discussion on Answer
A. How do we know non-value-laden facts? We simply see them. So too we know value-laden facts: we simply “see” them (but with the mind’s eye and not with the eyes of flesh. Sometimes this is called intuition or conscience). Anyone who understands that his ethical and aesthetic observations are not mere hallucinations sees that there are prescriptive facts.
B. Indeed, it goes back to A.
C. I did not understand what “decides” means. A lottery? That is not a decision. Correct or incorrect cannot exist unless there is some external standard. Otherwise this is an arbitrary lottery.
A. What is the basis for that assumption? How do we know that there is even such a thing as value-laden facts? (Beyond the semantic claim.)
B. I looked at the article already before this, and that is what led me to write the question. I agree with the claim that a value has a truth-value after I have decided in accordance with it, but why should that cause me to act according to it? In other words, the question comes back again: why should I act according to what is correct or true? (This goes somewhat back to point A; it feels to me as though there is something here that I am missing.)
C. What I mean is that the will does not go through a process of observing ideas. It just decides, exactly like the decision whether to accept one axiom or another. The observation of the idea can come afterward (when I decided to help an old woman cross the street, I was in effect saying that the value “helping an old woman cross the street” is true. Afterward, another part of consciousness examines whether the decision of the will was correct, that is, whether it matched the idea, but that is not what “caused” the will to decide, since the will is a separate part.)
And maybe that is actually the main claim.
Sorry for the length; the subject is close to my heart, and it is important to me to understand it properly.