Thank you very much,
I had a few possible lines of inquiry here for understanding what that cognitive-thinking component is in this discussion:
First possibility—it is a foundational assumption of thought that moves toward the result that appears to it the simplest or most correct. I mean an approach that *resembles* at its core the methodological assumption of actualists, but in fact claims the truth of things as part of an informativeness-based approach. The question, of course, is why to trust this “feeling,” because without a coordinating factor it seems like an arbitrary assumption.
I) So one could explain that the coordinating factor has an evolutionary source, but then the immediate question is whether evolution has the power to implant such an understanding in us, especially since evolution itself is derived from analogy. Although we do find in the evolutionary process even supernatural laws, such as the insertion of dualistic souls into bodies.
II) Another possibility is to argue that this is God, who implanted such an understanding in us. As some sacred books claim, this is the source of the truth of our first intelligibles.

Second possibility—it really is a “sense,” like sight. The main drawback here follows from a materialist assumption that denies supernatural senses. But the advantage here is obvious, and it can even receive ideal evidence from moral laws and so on. And the second-order question—why trust this sense—is no different from the question why trust our eyes, and here one can indeed think that this is a basic assumption that needs no further explanation. Or at the very least, one can use God as an excuse.

You’ve surely thought about these things—do you have an idea how to decide between them?

I mean the second possibility, where God is the one who planted this within us, and thanks to Him we have justification for trusting this cognitive kind of thinking. As you wrote, evolution itself is a product of this kind of thinking, and if we have no reason to trust it, then evolution is not correct either.

Thank you very much,
This claim reminds me of your remarks in the fourth notebook about Mr. Taylor on the train to Scotland.
But the question is whether it really has force. After all, we assume that our thinking is correct; the question is only why. And if we assume that insofar as evolution is correct, that implies our thinking is correct, then there is no problem concluding that our thinking is correct because evolution exists.
True, it is a bit circular, but belief in God in the argument *there* also has something circular about it. (Here the claim is a bit less so, because it is not about the entire system of thought and epistemology as it is there.)

Hello,
Actually I wrote something earlier, but now I’m doubtful whether it’s correct, and I’d be glad to hear what you think.
For the sake of analogy, suppose we received information from a source external to the world that evolution does indeed exist and that it created us.
Now we have the option of interpreting the tendency we display in making scientific inferences as a result of evolutionary assimilation.
But that still does not mean that the inferences we make are correct. Because one can always argue that the laws of nature were like this only until this very moment. But from the next moment on, the laws of nature will change—which is itself the problem of induction. (If that is even worthy of being called laws of nature…)
And so that same external informant would have to provide us with an explanation: just as evolution was correct until now, he would have to add a prophecy that it will continue to be correct in the future.
Therefore, as long as we do not have that prophecy, it seems reasonable to argue as you do—that this is a contemplation of the general law through its realization here in the world.
What do you think? I’m unsure whether this isn’t too skeptical a claim…

You can ask the same question about your trust in the prophecy you received. Where does that trust come from? And if it has a basis in past experience, maybe that applies only to the past and is not valid for the future? It’s hard for me to answer such hypothetical questions (if I were to receive a prophecy…).

Of course one can also raise doubt about ideal vision—maybe it is a mistake—but I don’t think you’re troubled by that. If you are, I’d be glad to hear how you ground it…..

In any case, my question was slightly different, if you didn’t understand, because I think you are mistaken in your claim that evolution itself is a product of synthetic thinking, and that if there is no reason to trust it then evolution is not correct either.
Because insofar as synthetic thinking is apparently correct (and that is the assumption of the discussion), we are required to infer that there is a coordinating factor behind it. And evolution can indeed serve in that role (even though there is something circular about it).

But now I asked whether this coordinating factor is itself adequate. Because insofar as evolution can implant that same tendency to make synthetic inferences (and in the analogy we have external information that such a process occurred), that still does not mean that the evolutionary process that existed until now will continue in the future. (And in the analogy, one would need prophecy.)
So even if it has the power to explain our *tendency* toward synthetic explanation, it does not explain why the synthetic explanation will be correct. It explains well why you are an actualist, but not why you claim the truth of things.

I don’t understand. Evolution cannot serve as an explanation for anything. It too functions within a framework of rules, and the question is who created them. At the base there must be a coordinating factor (even if the coordination was carried out by way of evolution). This is aside from the claim that evolution does not necessarily lead to reliable cognition, but to useful cognition.

As for the first part, that belongs to the realm of the teleological proof. Right now I’m speaking from an “atheistic” approach: evolution is an excellent explanation for the creation of man. The question that it too itself requires explanation—I’m setting aside for the moment.

As for the second part, okay, that is indeed some kind of argument. But over time there is still reason to assume there will be some connection. A smart human can produce electricity and atom bombs more than a “stupid” chimpanzee can… so just as according to your view there has to be a God in the first part, for the same reason one can answer in the atheistic approach that enough time has to pass in the process in the first part. Otherwise, in both methods, without some additional method, we would have to be skeptics.

I lost you.

What I meant was that I’d be glad to know whether, in your view, a *naturalistic* explanation can explain the concept of perceptual thinking.
After all, the main point in your view is that there has to be a coordinating factor between the external world and internal thought, and it does not matter whether that factor is God—who revealed Himself to us in the mirror of intuition—or whether we observed with the “eyes” of the intellect in the Platonic world of ideas, or whether we *only* have an intuitive feeling that helps us choose the correct interpretation of the data even though it does not really see or hear intellectually—as long as whoever implanted that feeling linked it to the world.
If we go with the third option, it sounds like evolution can provide a very good explanation for that (I’m putting aside the additional question about what stands above the laws, and for the sake of the discussion choosing a purely naturalistic approach).
It was only in relation to this that you raised two questions, and I added one more.

1. Evolution itself is a product of this thinking, and if there is no reason to trust it then evolution is not correct either: this does not sound to me like a correct argument, because this is a “theological” argument that derives the nature of the coordinating factor from our trust in these inferential tools, and if so then there is really no difference from the religious claim in this matter, which derives God’s existence from the existence of thought. For the evolutionary process too can serve as a coordinating factor suitable for this purpose.

2. Evolution does not necessarily lead to reliable cognition, but to useful cognition—this too does not sound right to me in either sense, because there is no doubt at all that over the long run an intelligent creature is far preferable to a stupid creature. The only question is whether enough time has passed in the process to do this. But I do not think this objection is correct, because since this is a theological argument, here too one can say that the atheist’s position is no different from the believer’s. Just as the believer asks the atheist, “Who says enough time has passed for the products of the evolutionary process to be sufficiently correct?” so too the atheist can ask the believer, “Who says there really is a God?”
And to this I added my own question:
3. Even if we accept that there was an evolutionary process, it cannot rescue the situation. Because the main foundation of analogy is the claim that what was will be. So even if the evolutionary process really took place and it really did develop in us the feeling for analogical inferences, and it happened justifiably, there is still no reason to claim that the analogies we make today are correct. Because the whole concept of analogy is that what was will be—but that itself cannot be learned from the process, because it is possible that in another moment the laws will change or operate differently, etc. etc.
I’m unsure whether this is too skeptical a claim or not. Because insofar as the laws have held for 15 billion years, it seems reasonable to assume they must continue—but against that, this itself is exactly the question: how do you know that…?
Theoretically, here too the atheist can, as in the previous questions, argue that the basic assumption is that such a world exists with such laws of nature that will not change in the future, etc. But here that sounds unreasonable to me, although I do not know how to put my finger on where the mistake is in what I wrote earlier.

First, one cannot ignore the fact that evolution is not an explanation. It operates within laws, and the question is who created the laws. Therefore a coordinating factor is needed. I do not understand why you ignore this argument, which pulls the ground out from under the entire discussion.
1. I didn’t understand.
2. Incorrect. In a place where truth is harmful, we should not have been expected to see correctly. When a tiger is chasing you, it is better not to see that (because in any case I won’t be able to defend myself, so why be afraid?). Beyond that, I wrote that in cases of cognitive error (like a mirage) we always look for an explanation. Yet seemingly we could have concluded that it is just an evolutionary bug (evolution didn’t finish the job). Our assumption of the completeness of the sense of sight has no justification.
3. This is not a skeptical claim at all. Excessive skepticism is a claim directed against things that are reasonable to accept or for which there is no reason to doubt. Here, the claim that believes that what was will be has no basis. Skepticism toward it is called for.
But this is really a pointless discussion, as I said.

I don’t think this argument is entirely correct, because it depends on many assumptions and factors, especially on which premise of the cosmological argument you are using. And because I don’t want to get into the theological realm of proofs for God here, I prefer to focus on the issue of perceptual thinking from a “naturalistic” point of view. In any event, if in order to maintain scientific thinking we must use faith in God, then all the better 🙂
———
On 1. There is one point that really comes up again in 3 and also somewhat in 2, and it sounds like the most fundamental point here in the discussion, and it connects to the fourth notebook, where you wrote it there as well.
You argued earlier that whoever wants to accept synthetic tools and uses evolution itself to justify them runs into a problem. Because evolution is a product of this thinking, and if there is no reason to trust this thinking, then evolution is not correct either.
But on the other hand, how is this different from the believer who argues that there is a God behind it who coordinated between him and the world? Just as he derives God from the correctness of synthetic thinking (or for all of epistemology, as written in the fourth notebook), so too the naturalist can derive from the correctness of his thinking a coordinating factor in the form of evolutionary development.
True, apparently, whereas implicit faith is possible for the religious person (especially for the average Christian…), when it comes to scientific theory it is hard for us to accept implicit faith. But even that is not entirely correct, because in the end our main belief is that our thinking is correct. We only derive a coordinating factor. We do not need to “experience”/“feel” it, only to be aware of our need for its existence (otherwise our assumption is arbitrary). And in that respect evolution can indeed serve as a coordinating source—if it can indeed do that, which is already question no. 2.

2. Everyone agrees that there are all sorts of cases where it is better not to think than to think. The question is: over the long run, what process will produce more viable creatures—a process that produces a herd of fools or a process that produces a herd of scientists (and sometimes cowards). Likewise, I’m not sure evolution can distinguish, for example, between fearing a tiger from 20 meters away and beyond, but not fearing a tiger at a distance of 5 meters and closer because it’s already too late. And even if over the long run this could happen, in the end most of those who had a tiger around them at a distance of 5 meters are already dead and left no offspring…. So usually the examples you would give of this kind are examples that would no longer be under the process’s control.

2.5, and this again connects to 1. You argue that our assumption about the completeness of the sense of sight has no justification because we do not know where we are on the evolutionary axis. But my question is exactly like in 1 or 3, that is: how much can we derive from our belief in the correctness of thought and the senses and feelings etc. etc. about the coordinating factor? Why not derive that there was a process that had enough time, and that its products are already without defects, etc. etc.? How is that different from God?…
3. Thanks.

Okay, I really lost you. I don’t know what a naturalistic explanation is. You mean an insufficient explanation. There are many of those. Evolution is not a sufficient explanation, and I explained why. If you disagree—then you disagree. I see no point in continuing the discussion.

Okay, I’ll ask it very briefly, and I’d be glad if you’d address this point. Even though it goes beyond the physico-theological proof, for the sake of continuing the discussion I’ll ask it as part of Mr. Taylor’s proof 🙂 (and then there will be enough of a theological component in it that you’ll probably answer).
There is a proof that the Rabbi, in the fourth notebook, defines as theological: it shows a person that when he thinks about some thing Y, that in fact “entails” for him an implicit belief in factor X that caused Y.
For example: free choice entails –> belief in a soul/consciousness. Morality entails –> belief in God. And so on.
My question is whether these kinds of proofs have the power to *characterize* the thing they entail, or not?
For example, belief in free choice can lead us to believe that not everything is material, but it cannot characterize exactly what that thing is.
And if we come to our topic, regarding the proof from epistemology, everyone agrees that it entails belief in a coordinating factor. But who is this coordinating factor? Here, apparently, the proof can no longer help at all. But you claim that it can, and therefore I’d be glad to know why.

For example, I will claim that the coordinating factor is evolution. And you will object that evolution cannot lead to such a strong confidence in cognition. So I will revise that coordinating factor to an evolutionary process that had laws which would ensure from the outset the creation of creatures with correct thinking, and that underwent a sufficiently long process to create human beings with correct thinking, etc. etc. And so always—for every question you ask, I can slightly revise the process so that it fits the creation of creatures suited to our issue.
My question is: is there a way, in proofs of this type, to characterize the initial factor when there are several *possibilities* that could cause the creation of event Y?

I explained this in the notebook. Indeed, proofs of this kind (but also “philosophical” ones) cannot characterize the factor. The claim is that there is such a factor, and it does not matter whether you call it evolution or a discharge universe. But it must be an intelligent entity, not a system of laws. See there.