3. Thank you, but I did not understand exactly what the difference is between an “ethical realist” and “ethical objectivism.” I understood that you belong to both.

P.S.
By the way, I thought of another question that you referred to briefly in the previous responsum, and as I understand it, you did not reject it outright, even though you did not write so explicitly.
You argued that normative facts such as morality or commandments from God and others that appear in the Torah cannot be reduced to some prior reason for why we ought to observe them; and on the other hand this is not an arbitrary assumption but an axiomatic assumption—that we understand that this is a commandment we ought to carry out.
And it follows from this that you accept that the idea that we take the Torah upon ourselves cannot be inferred from contemplating the world. Or that if God commands you something, that is a sign that you ought to do it more than if some bunch of lunatics in the marketplace command you something and you should obey them.
That is, we have a clear capacity to distinguish in the force of validation between a command from God and a command from stupid people. Even though this seemingly is not derived from anything in the world as we know it.
But on the other hand, there are many people—even, for example, atheists online—who, if “proofs were brought to them” that the giving of the Torah happened, would be convinced that they need to observe the Torah.
That is, according to what you say, one could say that the very fact that they are prepared to accept the Torah if they had a real reason for it is a sign that already now they are covert believers in God, because if there were no God, it would not seem plausible that they would have the capacity to distinguish between a command from God and a command from a bunch of lunatics in the marketplace. (As a kind of anthropological proof).

3. For our purposes here, it is the same thing.
I did not understand your claim. What does it mean that it is “not derived from anything in the world as we know it”? There is some difference in the world of ethical facts that causes us to understand that a divine command is binding and a command from lunatics is not. That is exactly the claim of the ethical objectivist.
As for your last remark, I completely agree. Someone who says that if physical-metaphysical facts were revealed to him (not ethical ones), such as the existence of the Sinai revelation, he would begin to observe the commandments, is in a certain sense a believer. He at least understands that the revelation at Sinai is not just a physical or metaphysical event, but an event with normative significance. The main difference between believers and those who are not believers, in my opinion, is דווקא on this plane and not in belief itself. At least at the conscious level (it may be that in the subconscious, when they become convinced that there is a God and that He commanded, they will also understand that one must observe. But right now they are not aware of this assumption that is hidden within them).

Yes, I meant in the material world around us.
In the ethical world, I understand that you claim that God’s command exists firmly somewhere up above. And by our seeing the command, we understand that it must be fulfilled. (And here it is no longer possible to ask why we should fulfill it; rather, this is not an arbitrary decision of ours, but a basic understanding—one that cannot be reduced further—that it must be fulfilled when we encounter it.)
So it follows from what you say that because we have recognition of religious commandments, if they are separate from the command of morality (which of course you like to argue), then embedded in that itself is belief in the existence of those commandments, and from that belief one can easily derive the existence of God Himself by way of an anthropological proof, as the one who legislated them. And this is *not* a subjective feeling produced by religious education that developed it.
So if that is so, why do you not begin the notebooks on faith from this point and that is it? Just as the Kuzari began with the dream.
And for someone who does not have that feeling, even the proofs themselves will not help. After all, they will still ask why they should observe the Torah.

That is a didactic question. In my estimation, many people will say that they have no intuition that there is an obligation to observe, and an anthropological argument by itself is not very strong. Therefore I end with that point (the end of the fifth notebook) and do not begin with it.

In practice, if so, then morality itself is also weak on its own, because it too is essentially built on intuition.
Or are you claiming that religious values are even weaker than moral values? Because moral values have become deeply fixed throughout humanity, including the secular world. By contrast, religious values are found mainly among religious people, and especially among religious Jews with their abundance of commandments, decrees, enactments, and customs—and, it seems to me, much more so than in other religions.
In any case, it is simply obvious to me that to an average atheist it is clear that if they proved to him the reliability of the Sinai revelation and the fine-tuning argument, he would begin observing commandments.
By the way, how do you understand the structure of this issue (I would appreciate a reference, because it seems long to me): that we are not aware of the many normative values that exist in the world, but only become acquainted with them after prolonged thought about them?
One indication of this is that there were many non-moral cultures in the world, yet over the years it seems they disappeared more and more as they discovered morality—so how did they not know about it until then?
Or nowadays, for example, if you ask an average person about vegetarianism—whether it is good to eat meat—he will feel uncomfortable, but on the other hand, when he is not thinking about it, he does not feel uncomfortable at all or that he is doing something wrong.
How is it possible for us to sharpen this non-sensory kind of reflection?
Because at first glance it simply seems that insofar as we are exposed to those unseen ideas, we ought either to know everything at once or else no such idea exists. On the other hand, empirically it indeed does not seem to be so.
(And also, how can we improve our reflection?)
Do you discuss this subject somewhere on the site?

Indeed, moral values are more accessible and more widely accepted than religious ones.
I have not written about this directly. But I have written more than once that in my view it is like scientific progress. Over time, more and more ethical facts are discovered, though here it happens through broad social processes (and not within a narrow scientific community). I have written in the past that society has an active role in these discoveries.

It follows from what you say that the philosopher does not understand moral matters any better than the simple person, and that there is no expertise in morality.
Rather, the expertise belongs to the collective tendency—is this also connected to your view that there is such an entity as a collective?
And that the Jewish people are closer to their higher root?
Does it not feel to you that with respect to the initial assumption that we can observe the idea of the good, the conclusion called for by the very sharp changes over the course of human history—for example regarding homosexuals—is moral relativism?

You jumped too far. The philosopher is usually more skilled. Even within a social framework, there are some who formulate the insights and understand much better what they mean. That is not necessarily philosophers, by the way. But on average, their understanding is better than that of the public at large.