Still… please…

Despite the gibberish involved, I would recommend that the Rabbi write a post about it. Once and for all, the various guises of skepticism need to be put in their ridiculous place.

There is a limit. If I write a post about every vague New Age nonsense, I won’t get very far.

Please, honorable Rabbi, maybe after all… I tried to convince my brother that we are not living in a simulation… but I couldn’t find a proper answer… and recently it has started to bother me too…

Thanks in advance

So ask yourself where this simulation exists (in the real world?), and maybe that “real” world itself exists inside an even bigger computer simulation? There is no end to it, and you won’t be able to convince your brother. In such a worldview, the very concept of “convincing” has no meaning at all.

That is, suppose I convince you somehow. But how could I convince you that I myself am not part of the simulation designed to convince you that it doesn’t exist?

Dear Immanuel, even if it is possible that I, “the one doing the convincing,” am part of an imaginary simulation;
on the assumption that you become convinced by me that you are not in a simulation—then I am not part of it, because according to your view it does not exist (assuming you were convinced).
And the whole concern that I am part of the imaginary simulation exists only under the assumption that I failed to convince you logically. So really the difficulty simply remains where it was.
Bottom line: everything depends on persuasion.

The question is: what is the problem with a collective simulation of all humanity?
Between that and the real world there is no difference at all (the distinction is philosophical only—whether I am an idealist or an empiricist/dualist—but there is no practical difference between the approaches, at least on this issue).

The only problematic claim that one would need to try to refute is a private simulation of the subjective individual. Such a claim would mean that all the figures in my life do not really exist.
It seems to me that the very intuitive belief I have about my friend—that he feels he has subjective consciousness, just like me—should itself convince me that I am not in a “private” simulation.
And again, this still does not get us out of our skeptical duty, but there is no need for that either (that is not a deficiency, of course; someone who is a skeptic is not supposed to be convinced of anything).
Sabbath שלום

For the sake of the questioner, I summarized the content of the video for the Rabbi in the hope that the Rabbi would respond to it.
As I understand it, until the middle of the video the speaker raises merely skeptical questions—what the Rabbi calls negative skepticism.
B. For example, since one can imagine a simulation that could produce a world like ours, what are the chances that we are in fact not living in a simulation?
A. He cites important people such as Elon Musk who support the idea that we live in a simulation, or people who do not know how to prove that we do not.
C. He claims that the skeptical approach has already been accepted since the time of Plato and even earlier.

From the middle (around minute 3:00), he begins to establish the theory positively—apparently what the Rabbi calls positive skepticism.
And these are his proofs:
A. Minute 3:37 — (it would be worthwhile for the Rabbi as a mathematician to look at it directly, because I didn’t understand it exactly)
To the surprise of those developing the mathematical theory behind string theory, “supersymmetry,” after developing and developing it they discovered that their formulas for string theory are simply the code used as a computer protocol for error detection widely used in internet communication (the code itself literally, not just something similar to it).
And that really suggests a simulation…

B. Minute 4:39 —
The world is essentially discrete (quantized); that really resembles a pixel on a computer screen. (Simulation.)

C. Just as there are rules in a computer or in computer games, so too there are rules in the world. (Simulation.)

D. According to the “Fermi paradox,” which claims that statistically the entire universe ought to have been teeming with life, yet we do not see any life around us,
therefore this proves that there must be a simulation operating only on Earth, while in space the simulation produces something else.

Toward the end he argues that there is no major practical difference in the inquiry. (But it is quite clear that it changes our entire understanding of reality and more.)