Is Naḥalat David found in the pebbles passage?
Is the Rabbi planning to publish a work on the Talmud? Or at least on Bava Kamma?

I also think the Rabbi should engage more in rabbinic literature in general, and yeshiva-style literature in particular. Aside from the fact that this itself is a fundamental value (as the Rabbi has written several times), it would also help your acceptance among a broader public.

Begging your pardon, I don’t understand these suggestions. This is what I do most of my days. I teach Talmud daily in analytical depth, halakhic topics, and conceptual Talmudic analysis only. I’ve published countless articles and books on this. Anyone who wants to partake may come and partake. If people know only my philosophy and my columns, that is apparently where their interest lies.
Publishing works on the Talmud is a waste of money. Nobody buys it and nobody reads it. I have several already in manuscript form for many years.
And beyond that, I don’t deal in public relations. Whoever isn’t interested and doesn’t know, need not know. And if this stems from overvaluing conceptual Talmudic study—that’s an excellent situation. I am the last person who would want to change that and change his areas of interest.

Chai, I don’t know what you mean by “the pebbles passage.” There is a section on page 3b (the end of the first sugya in Bava Kamma), and there is one in chapter 2 (a change regarding pebbles to quarter-damages, etc.). Naḥalat David is at the beginning of Bava Kamma on the first sugya. It’s very easy to find.

Thanks. Where can one find the Rabbi’s books and articles on the Talmud?
P.S. Does the Rabbi give daily in-depth Talmud lectures at Bar-Ilan only for students? Just so I don’t end up freezing on the roof like Hillel the Elder.

My articles are here on the site. Many of them deal with Jewish law and conceptual analysis. Books also appear here, and some of them deal with conceptual learning. For example, all of my Middah Tovah books (7 books).
My classes are for students. But anyone who wants to study in the kollel at Bar-Ilan is welcome. You won’t have to freeze on the roof. Though you should check with the office, because according to university regulations you may have to pay as an auditor. I don’t know.

I have several already in manuscript form for many years.
We’d be happy if they were published here on the site without wasting money, and may you merit all good things.

I didn’t understand.

Hello,
What I meant was that the Mishnah itself contains the answer to the question whether a derivative is like its primary category or not, because the Mishnah states the common denominator, which comes to include derivatives.
Regarding the interpretation itself, that the Talmud discusses the form of the derivative—whether it is like Sabbath or like impurity—
I find this interpretation difficult,
because in tort law there is no point of resemblance at all to impurity.
Also, this is written in the Mishnah in “the common denominator,” which implies that the common denominator determines what counts as a derivative, and the common denominator is resemblance, not the result of contact.
And from simple reasoning too there is no reason to relate to contact, because that simply doesn’t seem relevant, since what interests me in tort law is the result and not the act. And if there is nevertheless a definition of the act, then we should narrow it down as much as possible and try to obligate, on logical grounds, as much as possible.
I also didn’t understand Rabbi Yitzchak Zev’s interpretation,
because according to his approach it comes out that there is a possibility that derivatives are more severe than primary categories.
Thanks,
Moses

I think Moses, in his last comment, is fulfilling “Make for yourself a rabbi” with great embellishment. Happy are you, Israel.

Moses,
The fact that the Mishnah says that derivatives are like their primary categories—that itself is precisely what the Talmud discusses and tries to understand. Rav Pappa said that some are like them and some are not like them, and throughout the entire sugya we see that all the derivatives of the primary categories listed in the Mishnah are like them. That is exactly why they concluded that only pebbles are not like their primary category.
And with that you also have the answer to your question: what was the initial thought that in tort law there are causal derivatives and not only learning-based derivatives? Rav Pappa said there are such cases, and they searched and did not find any until they saw that indeed pebbles is such a derivative. All the others written in the Mishnah really are not of that sort.
And it’s also not true that in tort law what matters is the result. That is the opposite of the whole sugya. If the main thing were the result, then what room would there be to talk about different primary categories? Anything of yours whose guarding is your responsibility—you would be liable for its damages (that is, for the result), and that would be that. The whole discussion in the sugya that distinguishes among the different primary categories is a distinction between different modes of causing damage, that is, the manner of the damage and not the result.

As for Rabbi Yitzchak Zev, clearly that is what comes out. And indeed regarding derivatives learned from two primary categories through a common denominator on page 6a there, according to the Rosh’s view (as opposed to the great authorities cited in him), they can be more severe than the primary categories. Rabbi Yitzchak Zev there notes that Rashi and the Rif disagreed about this.

Hello,
I ask forgiveness.
It’s very hard to write and express oneself in writing; I’m simply not used to it.
As for the matter itself,
I still think it cannot be that this is a doubt in the Talmud,
because it is clear that the common denominator in the Mishnah is learned before the Talmud’s discussion. And it is clear that it comes to teach us something,
even though we do not know what.
And it is clear that it comes to teach us about the liability of derivatives and not of primary categories, because the primary categories are written in the Torah.
And if it is clear that derivatives are like them, then what is the Talmud’s question?
In my opinion, to say that there are causal derivatives is an unnecessary invention, because the world can be arranged with a simpler definition of resemblance.
Even pebbles can easily be defined as resembling foot, because it is a common type of action.
And in my opinion it is impossible to define it as cause, since the physical foot is not itself a defined category in tort law—it is just a name.
It’s not that there is such a thing as “foot.”
“Foot” is a symbol for common damage.
It’s hard for me to explain, but the idea of cause and effect just does not register in my mind here.
Maybe because I am assuming a very basic hidden premise: that tort law is about resemblance and not about causation.
But as I said earlier, why assume otherwise?
Another point about pebbles: after all this is a law given to Moses at Sinai.
But without that law, it seems it would just be ordinary foot,
and liable for full damages.
So then how does this whole thing work?
As for the result, in my opinion it is obvious that this is the only thing that interests us.
After all, tort law is interpersonal law,
and what interests people is results, not acts.
I agree that in tort law the act matters,
but without a damaging result there is no discussion of liability.
What I meant was that in light of the issue of the result, we should define the act, and then define tort law in terms of resemblance and not causality,
because then the possibility of liability is greater.
As for Rabbi Yitzchak Zev,
in the Rosh it sounds as though everything learned from two primary categories works in such a way that there is one main primary category that defines the derivative, and the secondary primary category only reveals to us that the difference from the main primary category is not really a difference.
Apparently that is how the Rosh learns.
So then there is no proof.
But in any case, I claimed that it is not logical for a derivative to be more severe than a primary category.
So it does not matter whether this is a misunderstanding in Rabbi Yitzchak Zev or in the Rosh.
And furthermore, according to what you say, it comes out that there is proof for this reasoning from those who disagree with the Rosh, and it does not seem that this is the root of the dispute. In my opinion everyone agrees that it cannot be, they only disagree about the form of the derivation.
Thanks,
Moses
If possible, one more question:
My daughter asked me,
why did Joseph develop Egypt, when in the end they used that against the Jews, and how did wise Joseph not fear this?
I have no answer.
Thanks,
Moses

What you see in the Mishnah is that there are learning-based derivatives that are like their primary categories. The question is whether all derivatives are like that. And the conclusion is no. Pebbles is not a learning-based derivative of foot, and there are quite a few proofs for this besides mere reasoning.
In short, this clearly appears to be the straightforward meaning of the Talmud. At most you could say that the sugya is built as a didactic progression: that in the Mishnah they already know that the derivatives are learning-based, and the discussion comes to sharpen the meaning of the matter and to present pebbles as a derivative of a different type. So pedagogically they begin with the question whether derivatives are like their primary categories or not, and in that way present the whole structure.
The Rosh is proof because that is how he understands “the common denominator” in the Mishnah. That is, learning from two primary categories produces a derivative that is more severe than one of them. Clearly, a learning-based derivative cannot be more severe than the primary category if it is learned only from it. That is a simple tautology.

Why should Joseph fear something that had not yet happened? Is everything supposed to be clear to him through prophecy? Besides, if Egypt had collapsed, he and his family would have collapsed with it.

You don’t need to be a prophet to know what will happen in the future. It is obvious that the Egyptians would exploit every tool Joseph developed for them in order to enslave the Jews.
“The deeds of the fathers are a sign for the children.”
In every generation Jews developed tools that in the end were used against them.
Therefore there is a claim against Joseph.
It would have been possible to carry out a minimum level of rescue for Egypt.
Why build a sophisticated tax system that empowers Pharaoh?
Or why exempt the priests from taxes?
And so too in history:
The Jews turned Spain, England, and Germany into powers,
and even North America, and perhaps South America too.
The Jewish people do not need all that.
Ordinary exile is enough for them.
Thanks,
Moses

As for pebbles, it doesn’t seem to me that this counts as a causal derivative. Just because it was carried out by means of the foot, does that make it something that comes out of the foot? That doesn’t make sense.
You wrote that there is a logical argument.
It would be interesting to know what it is.
Maybe you could write it.
The whole matter is extremely puzzling, because this is a sugya that everyone learns,
but the lack of understanding of the sugya is sky-high.
I still haven’t found any interpretation that really satisfies,
including Rabbi Michael’s interpretation, which according to his words relies on Naḥalat David.
I just can’t grasp intellectually a definition of a derivative in terms of cause and effect, or more accurately, parent and offspring.
It also does not fit with the law given to Moses at Sinai.
That implies that were it not for that law, it would be full-fledged foot and liable for full damages,
like the view of Sumkhus, who does not have that halakhah.
Thanks,
Moses

Hello,
It seems to me that you think there is a communication gap here, because you answer and I keep insisting.
The point is that I truly do not understand how there can be, in tort law, a derivative that comes out of the primary category.
And half-damages for pebbles does not come out of the foot; rather it is an action performed by the foot.
The external description is as if it comes out of the foot,
but every case of foot is like that—it comes out of the foot.
Even when the animal steps on a vessel, one could look at it
as something coming out of the foot.
And also in the Talmud on page 3, the Talmud asks why this is a derivative of foot.
According to what you are saying, there is no room for the question,
because obviously it comes out of the foot.
Another question:
What is a simple tautology?
I didn’t understand what the word means.
Thanks,
Moses

Indeed, that is how it seems to me. Pebbles is a damager that is born from foot and is not learned from it. If it were learned from it, it would be like it. You are not looking at it correctly. You are asking how the damage was produced, and I am asking how the damager was produced. The damager called pebbles is born from the damager called foot. The damage to the vessel is something else. In that sense, the damage of ordinary foot is not born from foot; it is itself foot. And if it is damage in its normal manner that was not done by the foot, then it is learned from foot and does not come out of it.
Something like this appears in the Talmud in Bava Kamma 6a regarding his stone, his knife, and his burden, which are learned from fire and pit. Why from fire? Because those objects reached the ground by means of the wind. Note that here the wind did not create the damage but the damager (the pit). The damage is the ordinary damage of a pit (and therefore the Rosh there sees this as a pit in every respect, as mentioned above here).
A tautology is a claim based on definition—a logical necessity that follows from the very definition of the concepts or from a simple logical rule. A tautological claim teaches us nothing new.

“I have several already in manuscript form for many years.”
We’d be happy if they were published here on the site without wasting money, and everyone would benefit.
The Rabbi didn’t understand. That was a quote from what he wrote above, that he has books in manuscript. Usually that means that the author has several books in writing that he has not yet published, and you also wrote that publishing them would be a waste. So I suggested publishing the manuscripts here without money and everyone would gain.
Good luck.

All the books (including those) have been uploaded to the site under “Books.”