Question

Hello Rabbi,
 
By way of introduction—
Although I’ve been exposed to the Rabbi’s ideas for many years already (back from the days in Yeshivat Yeruham, through the trilogy [the first one?], and now by following the posts on the site—by the way, congratulations on birthday number 300), reading the trilogy (the new one?) is adding a lot for me (even though I had already encountered it in its earlier “notebooks” version).
Now that I’ve finished the first book, I wanted to send two comments that came up for me בעקבות the reading:

1. In the fourth conversation, the Rabbi discusses the rationality of science and asks why one should choose the simpler solution (Occam’s razor), and from this at the first stage concludes the existence of a guiding hand (the physico-theological argument), and at the second stage the proof from epistemology (a theological argument).

Perhaps one could suggest, at least regarding scientific theories, that the reason we choose the simpler theory is in fact a priori—as is well known, every function can be expanded into a series around an equilibrium point (Taylor), where one can make do with the first term in order to describe the main behavior, and only if that is not enough does one add terms. That is equivalent to choosing a theory with fewer terms. This is a mathematical argument, that is, an a priori one, in favor of the principle of simplicity.[1]

1. In the fifth conversation, the Rabbi discusses prophecies that appear in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). The claim in their favor is that these are rare events that were foreseen in advance and came true[2]. But what about the prophecies that did not come true? Regarding those, the Rabbi says that we have not found one that certainly did not come true, and therefore the way is open to apologetic explanations… whose motivation is the credibility of the prophecies by virtue of their being very specific, which expresses a high level of confidence.

On the face of it, this seems like an attempt to grasp the bull by both horns—the force comes from the specificity, and the apologetics neutralize exactly that specificity. Like in the example the Rabbi brought elsewhere: the specificity that links a specific commandment to a specific reward is what gives the force, and the apologetics say precisely that it isn’t all that specific; there are other considerations…[3]
[1] Of course, this still does not explain trust in the senses themselves.
[2] By the way, I’m not sure there is a difference between a sequence of 100 sixes and a sequence of 100 numbers predicted in advance. The reason 100 sixes is special is because we notice it in advance.
[3] Perhaps one more remark in comparison to Popper’s scientific principle—just as in a scientific theory, fulfillment constitutes at most confirmation, whereas a refutation, even a single one!, overturns the theory.