Q&A: The Nature of the Commandments
The Nature of the Commandments
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Recently all kinds of questions have come up for me (or really one long question), and I would be happy if the Rabbi could address them.
When the Torah commands a particular commandment, is it trying to guide me toward some underlying essence, or is the command about a specific act that does not necessarily point to a broader principle?
Let me give an example. Take the commandment of the Sabbath: can it be understood as a collection of technical details that a person must do or not do, or as some kind of instruction for a way of life—"disconnecting, stopping in order to recharge," and so on—so that one's whole approach to the Sabbath is therefore different?
My inclination is to say that the Torah is aiming at the essence, and there are many examples that seem to prove it: honoring parents, do not murder, do not steal…
But still, there are cases in Judaism that seem to contradict this idea: the prozbul (which in a certain place nullifies the essential idea of the Sabbatical remission of debts), the binding of the halakhic-legal system to a situation in which a Sabbath desecrator will never actually be stoned, giving women the possibility to testify if the litigants allow it (this option would not be possible if there were an essential problem with a woman's testimony).
From this introduction I have three questions:
1. How can one know whether some essential inference is really the Torah's intention? If it makes sense to me? If great rabbis hold that way?
2. Can one issue a halakhic ruling based on an essential inference that arises from the Torah even though it is not explicit Jewish law?
3. Does it depend on the commandment? Are some essential and some specific?
The question arises mainly from the attitude toward LGBT people. I think that in practice some inference is being made from the Torah that the commandments relevant to this express something deeper and more essential about relationships between man and woman, family, and marriage.
The question is whether there isn't room to say that maybe in this case we are dealing with a specific prohibition (which indeed is a prohibition), but that one should not project from it further and forbid every such romantic relationship (which need not include the prohibition itself).
Can one not say that we have a choice in how to interpret the prohibition—whether as essential or as specific?
Does the Rabbi think that the choice of interpretation may depend on external factors—for example, that Judaism is trying to create a counterweight to Western culture and therefore chooses to go in the opposite direction? The question arises mainly because we do have precedents for things that were interpreted in the past as essential, but today people try to argue that they are not (mainly in areas relating to attitudes toward women).
Since the question is long, I will understand if it is not possible to address it in an orderly way; if not, I would be happy for references to various sources on the subject.
Thank you very much in any case, and have a good day.
Answer
Hello.
Let me begin with two introductory points:
1. It is not clear from your words whether you mean a general essence or essence at all (that is, simply the reason for the commandment). It is clear to me that there is a reason, but I am not sure what a general essence means.
As a rule, Jewish law establishes that we do not expound the "reason of the verse," meaning we do not act on the basis of conjectures about the reason for a commandment. One may interpret the commandment however one likes, but that should not play a role in decision-making and interpretation. This is a general statement and it has qualifications, but as a general guideline it is worth knowing this.
2. I do not see why there needs to be one answer in all cases. Perhaps there are laws whose basis is a broad underlying essence, and others that are a specific instruction.
The examples you gave do not contradict the assumption that there is a general essence, although I do not know how to say whether there is or is not. Prozbul may indeed harm the essence of the Sabbatical year, but there is another value on the other side that nevertheless justifies it. That does not mean there is an essence. Beyond that, even if you are right, this is not about a general essence but about the reason for the commandment (why is it general? The question is whether there is or is not a reason). The same applies to women's testimony. It is entirely possible that there is a principle that women are disqualified, but if a person accepts it upon himself, that is his right—to make a contract and obligate himself to another person even without being obligated. Suppose a woman testifies that I owe you money. If I accept her testimony upon myself, then it is like giving you a gift. Why should I be forbidden to do that?
From here you can understand that these questions have no practical implication. There is an obligation to keep the commandments we have received, and that's that. What difference does it make whether they have some general essence and the like?
As for the questions:
1. I do not know how to answer the question of whether to rely on great rabbis (who are they anyway). You have to decide whether you trust them or not.
2. I answered that in principle one cannot issue a ruling this way, but there are qualifications in which one may expound the reason of the verse. You can read about them in the third book of my trilogy, or in Rabbi Shmuel Ariel's book "He Planted Within Us."
3. There is definitely room for interpretation regarding LGBT people, and I have also written about this here. Everyone has freedom to interpret, but as stated, we do not expound the reason of the verse (except in certain places). Someone who says that the purpose of Judaism is to go against Western culture—that is his own conjecture, and I see no reason to accept it. People and rabbis tend to toss around such slogans with excessive confidence, and they should not be taken too seriously.
Thank you very much