For the sake of discussion, if a religious court were to assess the father’s presumed intent and conclude that presumably he would want his daughter to inherit equally with the sons, but he simply didn’t manage to divide the property before his death (say, if the death was unexpected) — could such a consideration be used to determine that the daughter inherits equally with the sons?

Unspoken intentions are not legally binding. Even a deathly ill person has to say it explicitly (and then his words are treated as if written and delivered). If the matter is in his heart and in the heart of everyone, then maybe there is room to discuss it. I do not think that is the case here (unless we are dealing with a particular deceased person about whom something specific is known. And even then one would have to discuss why he did not write a deed of gift during his lifetime).

For the sake of discussion, suppose they conducted a survey with a representative sample of the population and asked whether people wanted to leave their inheritance equally to all their sons and daughters, or whether they wanted the inheritance divided according to Torah law; and suppose the survey results showed that the majority want the inheritance to be divided equally to daughters as well. Would that make it possible to determine that the daughter also inherits even where her father did not explicitly say that he wanted to leave her an equal share?

Seemingly the son is in possession, and the burden of proof is on the one seeking to extract money from another, so such a majority does not count as proof and cannot be used to take money away from someone in possession. (The heir stands in his place.) The fact that in practice the money is not registered in his name does not mean he is not in possession — certainly when the bandits are the ones trying to take the money from the one in possession on the basis that it is in the hands of bandits…

Delaying the signature.
Can they say that they are not signing, and after all they are just refraining from action, and by doing so they effectively prevent the son from receiving the inheritance; and if he wants them to sign, they will collect payment for their portion according to an equal division — is that permitted?

Oren,
in my opinion, no, because a majority does not create an absolute presumption. And in general, in monetary matters we do not follow the majority. And if this is not about monetary law but about prohibitions, then all the more so people’s opinions do not determine anything, because they are stipulating against what is written in the Torah.

As for Tam’s possession argument, in my opinion that is incorrect. If the father really intended to leave something to the daughter, then the son never received that money in the first place and therefore is not in possession. At most, perhaps one could say here that a doubt (about the father’s intent) cannot override a certainty (the Torah law).

Father, I didn’t understand. Sign what?

A court order authorizing the son to take the inheritance.

Why does it matter what the father intended? The son stands in his place, no? So the son is in possession.

Regarding what you wrote, that a majority does not create an absolute presumption — why not? For example, in the rule that most acts of intercourse are presumed to be with the husband, doesn’t the majority create a presumption? Or the rule “anything that separated is presumed to have separated from the majority” — that also means there is a presumption that something coming out of a group belongs to the majority, which basically means that a majority creates a presumption, no?

As for the rule that in monetary matters we do not follow the majority, that applies only when one of the litigants claims that he himself does not belong to the majority, as in the Talmudic passage of “one who sold an ox and it turned out to be a goring ox,” where one of the parties claims that he sold an ox for slaughter and not for plowing, unlike most people. But in our case, the father is no longer alive, so he cannot claim that he does not act like most people. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that his view was like the majority view — namely, to leave inheritance to his daughters as well.

As for whether this is a monetary matter or a prohibition, I don’t think it matters for our purposes, because the question is whether the father formed a definite intention to transfer to his daughter her share of the inheritance as a gift just before his death. Here it is clear that we are dealing with a right the father had, since he is allowed to give a gift to whomever he wishes as long as he is alive.

The Torah’s inheritance laws are tied to the laws of the Sabbatical year and ancestral holdings, and they have no meaning when the state is not run according to the Torah. If the state decided that things are divided equally, then that is how it is.

Decisor, do you maybe have sources?

Property law is determined by the state. And inheritance is basically just a transfer of ownership.

“And to the children of Israel you shall speak, saying: If a man dies and has no son, then you shall transfer his inheritance to his daughter.”

Who is “you shall transfer”? Who does the transferring? The government. Ownership is not decided by a judge or a rabbi. The state decides.

Tam, I already explained this. If the father intended to give a gift during his lifetime, and these things are in his heart and in the heart of everyone, then it is as though he gave a gift during his lifetime (even though ordinarily unspoken intentions are not legally binding), and therefore the son is not in possession at all. What is so hard to understand here?

Oren,
regarding the rule that in monetary matters we do not follow the majority, you are assuming Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s explanation, but he himself says that this is a dispute in Tosafot (Sanhedrin 3 and Bava Kamma 26), and most halakhic decisors did not rule like him.

Beyond that, the rule is that unspoken intentions are not legally binding. For them to be valid, they have to be in his heart and in the heart of everyone. For that, a mere majority is not enough. It has to be a compelling assessment, not an ordinary majority. It has to be obvious on its face that this is what he personally intended. The laws of majority are not relevant here, even if we were to follow the majority in monetary cases.

Giving a gift requires an act of acquisition, no?..
What difference does it make if the father wanted to give to the daughter? Even if he announced that this was his intention, wouldn’t an act of acquisition still be required?

And what about delaying the signature on the court order transferring the inheritance to the son — is it permitted to delay, or is that theft (assuming we know that the father also wanted to give only to the son)?

For a deathly ill person, no formal act is required.
I didn’t understand this issue of delaying the signature. Signing what? Does the court need the family members’ consent for its decision?

Is every deceased person who left an inheritance considered like a deathly ill person with regard to what he intended in his heart to leave as inheritance?

As for the signing issue:
The court sees all the heirs as equal to one another; there is no difference between son and daughter. Therefore, if the son demands to take everything, he needs the daughter’s signature agreeing to transfer her right to him, and she uses this to delay his receiving his share, and is willing to sign on condition that he give her her portion.

Without a signature, no one can take anything. Everyone’s signature is needed for dividing the inheritance, either equally or however the parties work it out among themselves.

Yes. Right before his death he is a deathly ill person.
If the court sees all the heirs as equal, then what does the daughter’s signature accomplish? If she wants, let her give a gift to her brother and that’s that. What does this have to do with the court?

1. If the deceased stated his intention to proceed according to Torah law, but did want to give some share to the daughter and did not specify how much, is there room to say that since he did not write a will, his status is like that of a deathly ill person?

2. Regarding the signature: if we start from the assumption that according to Torah law it belongs to him, then because of state law is it considered hers, so that if she wants to give it to him it is like a gift? She also agrees that according to Torah law it is his, but since he needs her signature, she demands for this a sum equal to her share under the state’s division of the inheritance. Isn’t that theft?

1. I didn’t understand.
2. I do not understand this business of the signature and don’t see what the question is. If the court thinks the inheritance is divided equally among everyone, then it belongs to all of them regardless of signatures. Can a person sign that the law is something other than what it is? And if the daughter wants to give a gift (legally speaking) to her brother, good for her. And even if a signature is required for some reason (which I do not understand), this is still the same question as the first one. If the money does not belong to her, then she is obligated to sign in order to prevent theft (and again, even if she does not sign, she would have to receive the money and return it to her brother).
In short, we are just going in circles.

I assume the questioners mean that the daughters would give their signature consenting to arbitration in a rabbinical court, in exchange for the sons transferring part of the inheritance to the daughters as a gift. And if the sons will not agree to give a gift, then the daughters will not agree to sign (there is no halakhic obligation to sign for arbitration).

The question is not whether there is a halakhic obligation to sign for arbitration. The question is whether taking this money is theft or not. As far as I’m concerned, the discussion has been exhausted to the point of bleeding dry.