It has long been the custom of the moral supervisors in the yeshivot to repeatedly mention in their talks a "good eye." I never understood what that "good eye" is. Does the Rabbi know what they mean?

I think they mean an appreciative, generous way of looking at things—the opposite of the evil eye, which is a look of jealousy and stinginess. That is what the Sages call a good eye, as distinct from an evil eye.
https://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/16323

Too bad the Rabbi didn’t delete it.

In the words of the Sages, "a good eye" does not appear as an appreciative outlook, etc.
"A good eye" and "an evil eye" are two opposites, as we find in the Mishnah (Terumot 4:3): "The measure of terumah: with a generous eye, one in forty. Beit Shammai say: one in thirty. The average measure is one in fifty; and with a grudging eye, one in sixty."
One should note that "an evil eye" is also an independent concept, as brought in the Talmud (Berakhot 55b): "If someone enters a city and fears the evil eye, let him take the thumb of his right hand in his left hand, and the thumb of his left hand in his right hand, and say as follows: I, so-and-so son of so-and-so, am of the seed of Joseph, over whom the evil eye has no power, as it is said: 'Joseph is a fruitful son, a fruitful son above the eye.' Do not read 'above the eye' but 'rising above the eye.' Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Hanina said: From here: 'And let them multiply abundantly like fish in the midst of the earth'—just as fish in the sea are covered by water and the evil eye has no power over them, so too the seed of Joseph is not ruled by the evil eye."

Does the Rabbi agree that taking the concept of "a good eye" out of its original context has de facto led to a corruption of the doctrine of man—that is, to moral decline? For example: a Jew sees his fellow acting contrary to morality, and refrains from rebuking him so that he improve his actions, because he has "a good eye" and does not see flaws in his fellow…
Thus society continues in lawlessness while removing every restraint and barrier…
The above would seemingly be an exceptional example of how distorting the intent of the Sages causes the opposite result from what the distorter intended (the "moralist").
Does the Rabbi agree with what I’m saying, or am I mistaken without realizing it?

I completely disagree. In my view, your own words are an example—sadly not an unusual one—of the distortions of tendentious interpretation. The meaning of a good eye and an evil eye in the words of the Sages is exactly as I described, except that among the Sages, as among others of their time, there prevailed a view that looking with an evil eye also causes harm to the person being looked at (at least if he is worried about it). The moralists refined the essential moral core and gave up the superstitions. You, apparently, are recommending that we keep only the superstitions and give up the morality, all in the name of repairing the world. The wonders of tendentiousness.
And even if that were not the correct interpretation, I still fail to see what harm it causes. On the contrary, it brings very great moral benefit (even if I’m not looking at it with a particularly good eye). Only someone looking at this interpretation with an evil eye could see something bad in it. I recommend that you adopt the recommendation of the moralists on this matter.
By the way, a good eye does not mean ignoring flaws and/or not criticizing them. That is an interpretive mistake regarding the Mishnah in Avot. See the commentators on the Mishnah in Avot on "and judge every person favorably."

Rabbi Michi, after searching and not finding:
1) Where does this interpretation appear in the words of the Sages, as the Rabbi described?
2) In my question I brought the Talmudic passage (Berakhot 55b) as proof that there is no connection between "a good eye" and the concept of "the evil eye" (understood as causing harm…), and this is a common mistake that many good people make. The opposite of "a good eye" appears in the Mishnah in Terumot quoted above.
3) What is the essential moral core that the "moralist teachers" refined out of superstitions? On the contrary, what proof is there that the words of the "moralists" are not themselves just superstitions? Does the Rabbi know even one person who became more moral from studying their words and method?
4) The Rabbi took my words out of context. Where did I recommend keeping the superstitions? On the contrary, I’d be glad if all those beliefs vanished from the world (spit spit, hamsa hamsa).
5) What moral benefit does the "good eye" bring? All in all, a person learns to lie to himself under a moral disguise, inventing for himself a forced "utopian" world with no grip on reality?

Thank you in advance, and with a "good eye," with great respect and appreciation.

1-2. I’ll repeat. In the Mishnah in Avot, a good eye is contrasted with an evil eye (the disciples of Balaam and of Abraham). An evil eye that causes harm does so because of the look of the evil eye. Therefore, the interpretation of an evil eye as harmful (the Berakhot passage you cited, and there are others) does not contradict the interpretation of an evil eye as stinginess and a jealous gaze. The jealousy is what causes the harm of the evil eye. Correspondingly, a good eye is an appreciative gaze. Now remove the harm from the picture—which is probably superstition—and you are left with that meaning.
Bartenura on Avot 5:19:
"A good eye"—he is content with what he has and does not covet other people’s money. For so we find with Abraham, who said to the king of Sodom (Genesis 14): "From a thread to a sandal strap, I will not take anything that is yours."
And likewise there, 2:9:
"A good eye"—he is content with what he has and does not seek excess things, and he is not jealous when he sees that his friends have more than he does.
Exactly the opposite of an evil eye.
And regarding the setting aside of terumah, it is the same meaning there too: a good eye means generous and not stingy, not protective of his money and not jealous of others who have more; and an evil eye is the opposite.
I did not take your words out of context. You complained that the moralists changed the Talmudic meaning of an evil eye. The Talmudic meaning is the superstition, and that is what you wanted to keep.
I explained everything else.
All right, I’ve exhausted the topic.

With God’s help, 27th of Sivan 5780

According to Rabbenu Yonah in his commentary to Avot, a "good eye" is "generosity of heart," whereas a "good heart" is the trait of willingness and conciliation; this is the patient person, who is not short-tempered, distances himself from anger, and responds gently. "Even if people do something bad to him, he bears it, and there is no bitterness in his mouth, for his palate is sweetness and he is altogether delightful."

This fits well with the plain meaning of the verses in Proverbs: "He who has a good eye will be blessed, for he gives of his bread to the poor"—that is a generous-hearted person; and "good-hearted" is one who rejoices in his portion, as it is written: "All the days of the poor are bad, but the good-hearted has a continual feast" (15:15). Rabbenu Yonah explained there that a "good-hearted" person—even if he is poor—his days are good because he rejoices in his portion. And this trait is the foundation of patience, which stems from a person’s ability to take his problems and difficulties in proportion, and therefore to be less angry at others.

Best regards,
S.Tz.

According to the words of Rabbi A. I. Kook (brought in the book Sihat Avot by Rabbi Yitzhak Dadon), a "good heart" is the desire to benefit another. Whereas a "good eye" is an appreciative outlook on the world even in its present state, despite the fact that it is far from perfection.

And this is what the Rabbi writes (Ein Ayah, chapter 2, section 95):
"The foundation of all moral ideas depends on the quality of one’s outlook on life, whether with a good eye or a bad one. If present life finds favor in the eyes of the observer, in its materiality and spirituality, then all moral and general ideas will proceed in harmony and reconciliation with the current condition of life and society, and his ways will proceed calmly and peacefully, without an overpowering urge to uproot the present; and accordingly, all speculative ideas too will fit this path."

Someone who looks at the present situation with a tiny, dismissive criticism, as a negative state that must be uprooted from the root, will find it very hard to work toward repair and improvement gradually and patiently.

By contrast, someone who knows how to discern the points of light and goodness that already exist in the present will find it easier to cultivate and strengthen them, until they become the dominant factor in the person and in the society one wishes to improve. And this parallels the words of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov (in Torah 282, "Azamra"): when one places the emphasis on the "little bit more" that remains healthy, it can be nurtured and strengthened until "a little light drives away much darkness."

According to this explanation of the "good eye" in the words of Rabbi Eliezer, the connection is well understood with the three things that Rabbi Eliezer would emphasize: "Let your fellow’s honor be as dear to you as your own, and do not be easily angered"—be patient toward others. But by contrast, do not be patient toward your own shortcomings; rather, hasten to correct them: "Repent one day before your death," and do not postpone until tomorrow, for who knows whether tomorrow will come. And be patient toward others, your friends and your students, but do not rely on the patience of your teachers; rather, "be careful not to be burned by their coal."

Rabbi Eliezer teaches us to be careful with the honor of our fellows, and all the more so with the honor of our teachers; to be patient toward our fellows; and on the other hand, not to be patient toward our own shortcomings, but rather to hurry to correct them—better one moment sooner.

Best regards,
S.Tz.

In the comment "The Explanation of Rabbenu Yonah…", paragraph 2, line 4:
… it is the foundation of the trait of patience. …

In the comment "And According to Rabbi A. I. Kook," paragraph 3, line 1:
… someone who knows how to discern …

S.Tz.,
You quoted from Ein Ayah:
"The foundation of all moral ideas depends on the quality of one’s outlook on life, whether with a good eye or a bad one. If present life finds favor in the eyes of the observer, in its materiality and spirituality, then all moral and general ideas will proceed in harmony and reconciliation with the current condition of life and society, and his ways will proceed calmly and peacefully, without an overpowering urge to uproot the present; and accordingly, all speculative ideas too will fit this path."
What exactly is the claim here? That moral opinions are not a direct decision but a result (deterministic) of one’s "outlook on life"? It is certainly possible that someone whose life is good won’t be a sweaty revolutionary, but what does that have to do with opinions? I, for example, according to my opinions, think several serious revolutions ought to be made in the world, but the truth is that at the moment the system in general works in my favor (and it seems likely to me that the revolutions would damage that good). I may not devote my whole life to providing proper compensation to miserable workers in the Third World, but there is no doubt that in my opinion that is the right and justified thing. How would you explain such an opinion?

To "No Point"—hello,

See Edmund Burke’s book on the French Revolution, where he describes how in England, where they proceeded moderately and did not destroy the "old order" in a rage, they were far more successful in improving the condition of the people.

Someone who thinks the present is only evil and evil accomplishes nothing, but ends up either in total despair or in a bloodbath. By contrast, someone who acts moderately—warning against the evil but also encouraging the good points—is the one who succeeds, steadily and patiently, in repairing and improving.

And as Archimedes taught us, you can’t move the world without one stable "point" 🙂

Best regards,
S.Tz.

Are you saying that in this passage Rabbi Kook basically just repeated the basic conservative position? That’s a pragmatic consideration (which I accept), not a view about what lies at the root of every person’s moral opinions. Even a revolutionary understands perfectly well that the current state is preferable to anarchy, but thinks that the expected gain from revolution is preferable in certain cases.
My conception of morality and economics, for example, changed enormously over a number of years without my personal situation changing to any significant degree (relative to expectations).