What kind of proof could be given for such a claim? A halakhic one. From here it sounds as though your intention is that Jewish law is always the supreme deciding factor, except that without proof there is a presumption that Jewish law itself yields its place in difficult cases. Or do you mean proofs from the Hebrew Bible (the word of God and prophecy) about the overall will of God—that if there were proof from the Hebrew Bible that God prefers Jewish law over morality (let’s say in a sweeping way), we would accept it?

First, if no proof can be brought for it, that itself proves that you are not right, because the burden of proof is on you.
Second, proofs from the words of the halakhic decisors are in the form of “according to your own approach.” If Jewish law overrides morality, and the decisors of Jewish law themselves say that morality sometimes overrides it, then whichever way you look at it, it does override it (sometimes).

By the way, Rabbi Elyashiv’s view was that in a place where opening a classroom in an apartment building causes a drop in apartment values, the apartment owners may prevent it, even though it involves Torah study.

That has nothing to do with it. Here we are talking about causing monetary loss to my property, especially since there is no importance to the Talmud Torah being specifically here and not somewhere else.

The first point is nice. The second point seemingly does not fit the context. All that remains for me to know is: if there were an explicit prophecy that Jewish law prevails, would that be proof? Or is the maximum authority of revelation Jewish law, and then even about prophecy itself we would ask whether perhaps the will of God in practice is that we not obey it.

Both are fine and good. If there were a prophecy, then simply yes—although one could discuss it from the angle of “It is not in heaven.”
There is no will of God that we should not obey His words—not in Jewish law and not in prophecy.

Since I looked into it again, I noticed two innovations that I had not known before. The first is that Jewish law has the authority to say that it is set aside because of morality. That is not at all self-evident. Granted, Jewish law can, within its own domain (the halakhic one), arrive at the same result of being set aside for morality by establishing suitable laws, but that is only a de facto implementation of setting aside, not setting aside itself. The novelty, then, is that this is possible. And the second novelty is that a case in which Jewish law itself “takes morality into account” is an example of Jewish law being set aside because of morality.

I understand, thank you very much, Rabbi.

By the way, Rabbi, I have a small insight to add. A consequence of what you said is that in Jewish law that we learn from Sinai, the moral consideration (of interpretation) would not enter in. Am I understanding correctly? (And according to those who hold that more things were given at Sinai and not just that everything is interpretation by the Sages—the Sinaitic law would prevail.)

When there are two interpretive possibilities for a given Jewish law, there is no reason not to choose the one that better fits morality. Just as pressing circumstances are a reason to follow a lenient opinion (or the lenient side), morality too is a reason to be lenient.

There is an insight here that to me is amazing 🙂
Maybe the reason that where there are two possibilities for halakhic interpretation—one more moral, and the other less moral—we choose the first (the more moral one), is itself the proof for your approach 🙂
Namely, that morality has objective value before the Holy One, blessed be He. If so, choosing the moral alternative is not a “leniency for mizrachnikim,” but rather the more stringent halakhic possibility, because morality has its source in the Holy One, blessed be He. So here there is a doubt between consideration x1 and consideration: (morality)x2+y… and it turns out that x2+y is more correct for a person who serves his Creator. (Because both x [Jewish law] and y [morality] belong to the divine sphere.)
I hope my intention is clear. It seems to me a lovely innovation/explanation for this phenomenon of halakhic ruling. (And it also pretty much validates your approach from the perspective of actual rulings, not only intuitively.)

Pressing circumstances are, simply speaking, a practical consideration, not a consideration that helps reach the conclusion that the truth is like a certain side—especially if the primary law follows the lenient side. Where there are two possibilities that are equal from the interpretive-halakhic standpoint, considerations like “its ways are ways of pleasantness” can decide the matter (as proof of halakhic truth), apparently according to everyone. If the novelty here is that a moral “pressing circumstance” is also only a practical consideration (and not a truth-revealing one), then it seems there is no principled revelation here about Jewish law, but only a permission.

Tet, you really are a killjoy—but completely right. Indeed, according to my view, which fully separates morality from Jewish law, the decision in favor of the moral option is not because that is the correct interpretation, but because one is permitted, and it is appropriate, to act that way in practice, like in pressing circumstances.
But still, this should be qualified. In Birkat Shmuel at the beginning of Bava Kamma (if I remember correctly, regarding iron horns), he wrote in the name of Rabbi Chaim that when there is doubt in interpreting the Torah, we adopt the side that is certainly stringent. The explanation is that the Torah itself, when it wrote an ambiguous text, understood that we would go stringently because of the doubt; and if that had not been its intention, it would not have done so but would have clarified its intention. Therefore it is clear that this was probably its original intention. This is said only when the doubt is in the interpretation of a verse (and not when there is doubt about what to do in practice).
If so, according to this, perhaps the same applies in our case as well. When there is doubt in interpreting the Torah, and one of the sides is more moral, one can say that the Torah knew that we would decide that way, and if it left it doubtful, it probably intended from the outset that we should do so. If so, then the moral side is also the more correct interpretation.

I understand. Though even regarding a solid rule like stringency, there are discussions whether it is by way of certainty or by way of doubt.

Haha yes, Tet completely killed my joy… no matter, the seal of the Holy One, blessed be He, is truth.

And by the way, I probably didn’t pay enough attention to the Rabbi’s previous answer. I asked whether in a case that we learn from Sinai, since it is objective it would override the sphere of reasoning (the moral one) just as it overrides the sphere of halakhic reasoning.
What you see here, so you sanctify there. Nothing more.
The Rabbi answered, “Where there is a possibility of two different interpretations, there is no reason not to choose the one that fits morality.” I liked the response very much; it brought out my comment above (which turned out in retrospect not to be successful). But as I think more deeply about your response, I understand that I did not understand the poet’s true intention… (regarding the matter I asked about, of course).
Can one give interpretations to a Jewish law we received from Sinai?
Exemption from payment in the case of pebbles kicked up by an animal is the classic example.
Would it be that because someone thinks this is not moral (say, the injured party had an object worth a tremendous fortune broken), we would be able to give a moral interpretation that would obligate the owner of the cow that kicked up the pebbles??
In reasoning-based interpretation I seemingly understand the Rabbi’s words, but with a tradition from Sinai I do not understand.

I’m not talking about games. If there is a reasonable interpretation and it is more moral, then yes.

“What we learn from Sinai” is passed down from generation to generation; I don’t know whether it is possible to interpret it better than the tradition in such a case.

And my intention, of course, is that the exemption/payment for pebbles kicked up is “half damages,” as is known from the passage in Bava Kamma there.

By the way, regarding interpretive doubt, or legal doubt, it seems reasonable that one should discuss whether it is epistemic or ontic, but it seems more likely that it is an ontic doubt (though I don’t remember this being mentioned in the posts), and its law is the law of doubt. Right? (I prefer joining celebrations to other activities.)

Nothing comes down from Sinai without interpretations. We are not talking about interpreting better or worse than the tradition. A tradition reached us, and we have to interpret it.
Ontic or epistemic in this context means whether both interpretations are correct (in some weak sense?) or only one is correct and we do not know which. But I do not see a difference here.

In my humble opinion, it depends on the conceptual inquiry whether the interpretive ruling is the *cause* (the reason), or whether it indicates the reality that has existed in the verses all along (a sign). If the interpretive ruling is a cause, then it seems to me that this really is an ontic doubt. But if it is a sign, then it is an epistemic doubt.
That is how it seems to me. And from what I remember, the Rabbi’s view is that there is interpretive freedom (accordingly), and therefore it is a cause… so it seems to me that for him this would be an “ontic doubt.” But then the Rabbi may come and slap me down 😉

Ah, pardon me, the Rabbi replied before I noticed..

I thought both interpretations are correct, as you explained in “these and those,” and what is not determined is which weight prevails. And that is a determination that, since “it is not in heaven,” even heaven does not know. Is that called weak? Fine, let it be weak. As for the question whether legal doubt too is a “certain doubt,” I can’t think of a practical difference at the moment, but if it is true it is worth stating. (I’ll check tonight whether Shev Shema’tata discusses it there.)

A practical difference would be in an interpretive doubt that is also a prohibition from another verse…
An inevitable result, though unintended—what is the law in such a case? Would Rabbi Shimon permit such a doubt to be actualized, or perhaps not? (Or perhaps there is also a prohibition of benefit here? [for the Sages already said, “Stolen waters are sweet”] since they enjoy the act itself [mainly the commandment {and if you object that commandments were not given for enjoyment, I’ll tell you: yes indeed, it gives me psychological pleasure to feel that I am fulfilling a commandment, especially when it comes at the expense of sweet waters!}] which is a Torah prohibition… Heaven forbid.)
Or perhaps we will need to wait for a third text to decide between them?
(I’m joking, of course… I don’t want to be a burden, but it was an idea that amused me; no need to respond of course.)

By the way, Rabbi, it seems to me there is a Mishnah in Avot that supports your approach on Jewish law and morality: “He used to say: Anyone with whom people are pleased, the Omnipresent is pleased with him. And anyone with whom people are not pleased, the Omnipresent is not pleased with him.”
(In other words, basic human pleasantness is a category that has real standing before Heaven.)

Mishnah 10 in the third chapter.

If you prefer, I can say it from a verse: “And you shall do what is right and good.”