Q&A: Two Points on ‘Halakhah and Morality 9’
Two Points on ‘Halakhah and Morality 9’
Question
Hello and blessings to the Rabbi, good evening 🙂 An interesting insight after I watched the ninth lesson in “Halakhah and Morality” (countless thanks, it was an amazing series): 2 points.
(1) The Rabbi draws an analogy from Nachmanides’ “a scoundrel within the bounds of Torah permission”: between the image of humanity (“abstinence” [where there is a metaphysical expectation, without a “command”]), and the image of morality. And the Rabbi is proposing a novel claim that Nachmanides’ interpretation applies also to “morality,” and not only to “abstinence” (humanity).
And I would like to suggest a point for thought that may help—perhaps we can say this by an a fortiori argument?
For apparently humanity (which is private, subjective) is lighter and less severe than morality (which is universal, for every person [and one could investigate whether that means the whole world as well {but this is not the place}]).
And I’m unsure whether one can say even more than that… that this is a case of “the greater amount includes the lesser,” that “morality is included within humanity”—meaning that when a person behaves immorally, he is also damaging his image of humanity (one portion), and also his image of morality… (an additional portion [that is, “double”]), and therefore, according to Nachmanides, Heaven would also expect us to behave in a moral way.
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(2) And one more point, much less critical… (and even more armchair-ish) to sharpen Rabbi Lichtenstein’s view—just for the sake of intellectual amusement; I’d be happy to hear a refutation, because this seemingly poses a difficulty for the impressive house of cards the Rabbi built—regarding the idea that the category of morality is a Torah-level commandment (that is, this also operates on the halakhic plane). This would follow the mode of derivation of the “common denominator”: there are many commands in the Torah that are [apparently] moral, and the common denominator among all of them is: always “do what is right and good” with all people:
“Honor your father… do not go about as a talebearer… do not take vengeance nor bear a grudge…” etc. etc…. That is, moral behavior [and the verse “and you shall do what is right and good” is merely a scriptural support]. In my view, this is a mode of derivation from the thirteen hermeneutical principles… “building a general rule from a parent source and several verses.” The Rabbi has a good question—why the medieval enumerators of the commandments did not include this in the count of the commandments—but there is a strong argument on the other side, namely derivation through one of the Torah’s interpretive principles.
What does the Rabbi say?
Answer
1. There is one point here toward leniency and one toward stringency: extra-Torah values obligate even without a command—that is the stringency—but they are not included in Jewish law, and that is the leniency. The a fortiori argument can teach the stringency, but not the leniency.
2. That is not the common denominator of all those commandments, because as I argued, the parameters of each such commandment do not overlap with the parameters of a moral command (indirect murder, confinement causing death, etc.). But if one were to derive all of these by means of a common denominator, then there would be no question why they are not counted, because at least according to Maimonides, commandments derived through hermeneutical principles are not counted (only what is written explicitly in the Torah, or emerges from it explicitly in the plain sense).
Discussion on Answer
I said that what is included in Jewish law does not have parameters that fit morality. As for damage caused indirectly, apparently this is a dispute between Meiri and Hashlama (who say that he is actually considered a robber if he does not pay, and is disqualified from testimony) and the other medieval authorities, who say that he is liable to punishment but not to payment.
Beyond that, if you go by the rules of hermeneutical derivation, you have here ten verses that do not teach a general rule (unless you construct a necessary interdependence among all of them).
Thank you very much, Rabbi.
2) Nice—I hadn’t thought of that. But one has to remember that many of the laws are exemptions in this world. For example, indirect causation is exempt under human law, but liable under the law of Heaven.
And one could examine whether the Talmud there, at the beginning of the chapter Ha-Kones in tractate Bava Kamma, regarding the list of things a person does for which he is exempt under human law but liable under the law of Heaven—whether our Sages there meant to obligate him on moral grounds, or on halakhic grounds. (Because if it is on halakhic grounds—then maybe one could make a common-denominator derivation, if I’m not mistaken. [And as the Rabbi said, if so, then there is no difficulty, because this is a hermeneutical derivation. {By the way—I honestly admit I’m not sure this is what Rabbi Lichtenstein meant, but I once thought about this myself, when I was thinking about the concept of a “common denominator”… and both my conclusion and Rabbi Lichtenstein’s come out the same.}])