Q&A: Morality and Jewish Law
Morality and Jewish Law
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I just finished your YouTube course on morality and Jewish law, and I have a few questions and a few objections, if I may:
1. My intuition strongly resists what you propose, namely that there is a profound gap between morality and Jewish law, and that these are two different categories. Personally, I tend to think that Jewish law is not always the supreme morality, as Rabbi Kook claims; I certainly cannot accept the Chazon Ish on this. But it also should not contradict morality—it is at most either non-moral or moral. Of course, you will challenge me: how can it be that the Torah discriminates regarding the convert, the status of women, the laws concerning gentiles, Amalek, etc.? It seems much more reasonable to me to interpret this as meaning that in the past this really was defined as morally acceptable, and today it no longer is. The Torah was given at a particular time, with particular conceptions, and therefore once there is a more correct understanding of things (such as morality), then even Torah-level laws—once there are halakhic tools—should also be changed in accordance with proper morality. After all, it is clear that in the past gentiles lacked civilized behavior (as the Meiri says), it is clear that women had a lesser status in the community, the Jewish people in the process of formation had to take care of the family unit and be careful about absorbing converts, and Amalek too—when a people tries to destroy your people while it is still forming—the command regarding them is extremely severe because an example had to be made of them. But today the situation is not what it once was! And indeed, if we had the authority, maybe we really should interpret the Torah differently, in line with supposedly more correct conceptions. In fact, this seems to be the prevalent approach in Jewish law—Rabbi Bazak, in his book Until This Day, argues that it seems “an eye for an eye” was meant literally, and the Sages changed it because in the past it was truly considered moral to cut off the hand/eye of someone who caused injury, and today it is no longer moral. Why not say this regarding all the commandments? You also say this about the attitude toward the convert; this also seems to be the Sages’ determination regarding the stubborn and rebellious son, the beautiful captive woman, which was written only in response to the evil inclination; the Meiri says this in relation to a gentile too—why not continue along that line? It seems more correct to me. (As for indirect causation and murder—I really wonder, since that is a rabbinic derivation—it really sounds to me like perhaps it is simply a mistaken derivation. Is it possible to say that?)
2. You argued that Jewish law and morality are separate categories because, you said, we see that the Torah’s commandments contradict morality—and that is how you solved the problem. But you opened a new black hole—you made a statement that in my opinion is not at all intuitive or understandable—you said there is religious value to a religious commandment in order “to repair the eternity within splendor.” Basically, you said you have no understanding at all of why this is a value, but apparently it is a value. I do not understand why this answer is preferable to what I am suggesting—you explained one thing but created complete incomprehension regarding the value of the religious commandment. I explain that there is always moral consideration, and as morality becomes clearer, the Torah must be adapted to it. What is the flaw here?
3. Even if you disagree with me, I would appreciate a somewhat deeper explanation of what religious commandments add if this is not moral correction. “Eternity within splendor” means nothing to me. Do you really believe there are such corrections? And another question on the matter, since we are already on the subject—is the value simply in fulfilling the commandment, such that it really would not matter if the Torah had instead required eating pork and abstaining from kosher animals? Is the main thing just the command itself?
4. Another argument I saw—you claim that killing an Amalekite baby back then was immoral. But why? Morality is doing good for others—and presumably establishing a kingdom of priests and a holy nation that will repair the world under the kingship of the Almighty is a greater good than an Amalekite baby. It is like when you yell at your child because he did something dangerous and make him cry—you hurt him in the short term, but in the long term you are helping him. Why can’t we look at the obliteration of Amalek this way? And in fact, according to my approach, today, now that we are already established, it may be that the commandment should be abolished even if an Amalekite were literally placed before me.
5. According to your approach, you argue that one may interpret Jewish law, where there are two equally plausible interpretations, according to the moral interpretation—but when are there ever two equally plausible interpretations?! I feel that this does not really exist. There is always one interpretation that seems more likely on its face than the other. Also, did I understand correctly that the only source for your approach of adding a moral consideration is your interpretation of “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a time of pressing need”?
6. You argued that there is no discrimination between killing a Jew who was coerced by a gentile, and a Jew who murdered a gentile, because we as Jews merely raise the bar and do not carry out the ordinary law found in all states—this is anachronistic, because in the past executing a murderer was the norm, and it really does seem that one could claim there is a moral flaw here, and I do not feel able to accept your approach that this is not flawed.
7. Euthyphro and the question of whether the good precedes God or whether it is good because God determined that it is good—Rabbi, I did not understand your approach. I think the good and the Holy One, blessed be He, are one. There is no earlier or later here—the good truly exists just as God truly exists. The same with logic—it comes from God (as Maimonides says, that God is the active intellect, etc.). Why do you not accept this?
8. You said that if the Jewish people accept something upon themselves, it becomes binding. So the Jewish people accepted the Shulchan Arukh upon themselves—why is that not binding?
9. By what value-currency do you rank my breaking a promise to the Holy One, blessed be He? If I know I am obligated to listen to Him and I violate His command, is there some immoral dimension to that? Or is there no problem here because no one is harmed?
Have a good holiday!
Answer
This is long and made up of many questions. I will try to address it briefly. If you want to continue the discussion, I suggest splitting it up, meaning opening a separate thread for each question, otherwise we will never get out of this.
1. My starting point is that in Jewish law there are values beyond moral values. I understand that this much you accept (because of the non-moral laws). If so, I do not see what the problem is with there being situations in which they conflict with moral values. After all, even within morality itself there are conflicts between different values. Therefore I see no need whatsoever to force things in the directions you suggested, and there is no reason to raise arguments against them. They are unnecessary and strained, so why discuss them at all?!
Of course, there is nothing preventing us from saying this in certain cases; here I am arguing against your principled claim that all cases are of that kind. By the way, in the case of the beautiful captive woman and “an eye for an eye,” this is an interpretation offered by one person or another, but it does not seem that this was really the position of the Sages. They did not see this as a value-based change (see Column 15). But as noted, that does not matter.
2. I did not base this on the fact that there are anti-moral laws. I intentionally based it on non-moral law. Again the same mistake as in the previous section. I did this precisely because of your arguments here. Once I proved that there are other values (religious ones) beyond moral values, the question of course remains what they are meant to achieve. I call this “eternity within splendor,” but that is only a code name for religious values that I do not know how to explain. But lack of knowledge of how to explain something is not an objection but a question. I also do not know how to explain why we put on phylacteries or do not eat pork. So what? If the Holy One, blessed be He, said it, I assume there is some explanation. That is what I call “eternity within splendor.”
The flaw here is exactly what I explained in the previous section. Not in the anti-moral laws, but in the non-moral ones.
3. I said there and wrote here that for most of them I have no explanation. A priest’s wife who was raped may perhaps be understood as an injury to the holiness of the priesthood, which is a religious and not a moral value. But as I explained above, inability to explain is not a difficulty. Do you have an explanation for the non-moral laws?
4. Because murdering babies is immoral. At most, place them under supervision or give them a different education. My assumption is of course that there is no determinism and that a person has free choice. Clearly you do not harm one person in order to save another. That is against Jewish law and against morality. Therefore your explanation in this passage is not reasonable.
5. It can also be two interpretations on the plain meaning and the homiletic level. As in “an eye for an eye.” But this is a principled determination, and examples do not really matter to me. Even if there are no examples, in principle it is possible. Moreover, sometimes the equality between the interpretations can itself be based on the moral difficulty present in one of them.
6. Then do not accept it. It seems simple to me.
7. See Column 457.
8. Because it did not accept it upon itself. Even the commentaries on the Shulchan Arukh disagree with it. Halakhic decisors of the 16th–17th centuries actually prohibited ruling directly from the Shulchan Arukh (see the Talmudic Encyclopedia, entry “Jewish law”).
9. That is an interesting question: can there be a moral transgression in what one does against the Holy One, blessed be He, given that He is not harmed? It can be answered in two ways: a. He is harmed (see my columns on “divine service as a higher need,” perfection, and self-perfection). b. There are values of human perfection, even if the other party is not harmed. Like lying, or keeping promises (even when not keeping them harms no one, as in an oath to do something).
Discussion on Answer
If you need Maimonides, he certainly did not say that. He said that the details of one commandment or another do not have a reason, but the commandments certainly do. That is how almost all the commentators understood him, and that seems by far the most reasonable. There is no logic in seeing all the commandments as arbitrary, as Maimonides discussed at length.
But that is exactly what I said—that the commandments themselves have a reason: to create a kingdom of priests and a holy nation distinguished in its customs and its ways from the rest of the nations. Isn’t pork / cow part of the details of the commandment?
No. Pork and cow are commandments in themselves. What you are describing is not the commandment but the general rationale of all the commandments. Maimonides certainly was not speaking about that, and I, the humble one, do not think so either.
Thank you, Rabbi. I will open separate inquiries, but here I would like to focus only on the first point:
You propose that there is a complete separation between Jewish law and morality. You argue that this understanding comes דווקא from the starting point that there are non-moral commandments (ritual impurity and purity, kashrut, etc.), and from that it is clear that there are additional values in the Torah, and therefore if there are additional values they can also contradict morality.
I think this is a double leap:
A. The fact that there are additional values such as “religious values” does not make it necessary.
B. The fact that religious values would straightforwardly contradict morality is also not necessary.
In my humble opinion, the reason for the non-moral commandments is to set us apart from all the nations by means of commandments. He really could have commanded us to eat pork and camel and not to eat cows and birds, and there would be no difference (didn’t Maimonides say that there is really no reason in the details?). Every state has its own laws, and so too does the people of the Holy One, blessed be He. The Torah wants to establish a kingdom of priests and a holy nation in the world, and for that you need a people that will bear this responsibility. Without that, it simply will not work, and therefore morality alone is too universal, which is why there are also religious commandments, whose special feature is to constitute a nation with its own laws, living its own life in which we are subject to God.
If I accepted your claim, I would think that it is דווקא from the anti-moral commandments that one sees that the Torah does not take morality into account, but here I think one sees very clearly that as morality becomes clearer, we change our understanding of those commandments, assuming that we think it is God’s will that this happen in this period (an eye for an eye, gentile, convert, etc.).
I would be glad to hear your opinion.