Question

Hello Rabbi,
If I understand your position correctly, you hold that Jewish law and morality are two different fields. It follows that there can be a contradiction between a moral value and a halakhic value. On your view, there is no essential difference in the *dilemma* between two such values in a situation where they clash, whether real or imagined. Also, as I understand you, a person’s moral world comes from within him, from conscience or from reason, and it is subject to critique, at least self-critique if not more. Jewish law, or more precisely an explicit command from the Torah, is not open to that sort of play, because of its direct divine nature.
In a real case where such values clash, I assume there will be cases in which the moral value prevails. But to what extent? For example, a worn-out example: the death penalty for desecrating the Sabbath (and apologetics about a murderous Sanhedrin and so on, with your permission, are not convincing—and as I understand you, not to you either).
In a case where one reaches the conclusion that a person violated an explicit Sabbath prohibition, say kindling a fire, and in doing so met all the technical-halakhic requirements needed to justify putting him to death by such means, I assume that there your position would be that such a person should indeed be executed, together with the moral stomachache (or more precisely, headache).
If all my assumptions so far are correct, then clearly there are cases in which the practical ruling will be immoral—that is, Jewish law instructs one to perform an immoral act. My question is: if the Torah says one thing, which is not open to interpretation as above, and morality says something else, which is open to interpretation because a person arrives at a moral conclusion independently, why should a person choose a law that seems arbitrary to him and opposed to his common sense? Let me be more precise. You often speak about your philosophical conclusions regarding the existence of God as being “reasonable,” and that it is “reasonable” that such a God also wants things, and that it is “reasonable” that the existence of a tradition strengthens the claim of revelation at Sinai, etc. A product of probabilities only gets smaller and smaller…
Or would you say that the words “he shall surely be put to death” can also receive an interpretive shift like “an eye for an eye”? And if so, then to what extent? Or perhaps there is no limit to the matter.
Or would you say that morality too is probabilistic (?) or in any case philosophically weaker than I am presenting it here, and if so, why?
Or would you say, in your characteristic style ;), that to the question “Why should a person choose a halakhic value over a moral one?”—he shouldn’t. Meaning, he should choose the moral value, full stop, if he is convinced that that is indeed the case. And if so, it follows that only a person who is convinced that in such a case the halakhah still prevails (where there is no halakhic maneuvering to avoid an immoral ruling) should make such a choice. If that is the way, then I would be glad for some persuasion or sharpening of your arguments about the superiority of Jewish law over morality on the normative plane, in a case where a person must choose a halakhic yet immoral option. (That is, in a case where there is no escape—for example, a case where you would choose a halakhic but immoral option, and why in your view that is the correct choice).
 
Many thanks, and I hope I didn’t make too much of a tossed salad out of this, though it’s clear to me that there is indeed a salad here fit to eat 🙂
Thank you!